

NICOLAE TITULESCU'S PREDICTIONS YET CURRENT AFTER EIGHT DECADES

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Abstract: *Illustrious representative of interwar Romanian diplomacy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, permanent delegate of Romania to the League of Nations in Geneva and President of the said institution (1930 and 1931) in the years when the phenomenon of the degradation of the collective security policy became visible, N. Titulescu subordinated his entire activity to serving the vital interests of his country. He was on the barricades of the struggle for the achievement of Romanian national unity in 1918, supported Romania's cause at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919-1920 (he was a signatory of the Trianon Peace Treaty with Hungary, June 4, 1920); after the war, his main concern was to ensure the security of the country's territorial status quo through a network of bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements, under the auspices of the Covenant of the League of Nations, being actively involved in the "organization of peace", the achievement of "security collectives", the annihilation of revisionist politics*

A.F. Frangulis, President of the International Diplomatic Academy, historian, diplomat, politician of great influence in interwar Europe, characterized Titulescu as follows:

La Délégation de Roumanie comprenait un membre qui mérite une mention toute particulière : M. Nicolas Titulesco. Grand, plutôt laid, car son visage avait quelque chose de tartare et de simiesque, il était d'une intelligence remarquable et un brillant orateur; c'était aussi un homme de grand Coeur; il fut mon ami très sur , jusqu'à sa mort qui survint en 1941.

Je fis sa connaissance au Conseil de la S.D.N. ou je plaidais , le 25 juin 1921, pour le rattachement de l'Epir de Nord à la Grèce¹....Il fut deux

¹ L'Académie Diplomatique Internationale, Paris. Library, Manuscript Memoirs of A.F. Frangulis, f. 53.

fois Président de l'Assemblée de la S.D.N.; il avait un prestige immense et forçait l'admiration de tous ses collègues; son charme et son esprit désarmaient non seulement ses contradicteurs mais aussi ses adversaires².

A lawyer by training and education, Titulescu had vast knowledge of national and universal history, which allowed him, throughout his entire political career, to discern with great accuracy the meaning of the evolution of the international situation from which he derived the specificity of Romania's situation, the dangers that loomed in the near or distant future. It should be remembered as a teaching that is always valid, in all times, what Titulescu strongly affirmed: "To be the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, you must know the history of your country and especially the European political history..."³, an indisputable truth but little or no consideration by those who are temporarily in this position.

It should be remembered that the great Romanian statesmen who made major contributions to Romania's foreign policy had solid knowledge of history that broadened their horizon of knowledge and understanding of the evolution of phenomena; starting with Mihail Kogălniceanu, foreign minister under two reigns—A.I. Cuza and Carol I—who defended Romania's interests at a time when great external dangers threatened the very existence of the country, Ion Brătianu - prime minister in the same times of austerity, Titu Maiorescu whose name is associated with the Bucharest Peace of 1913 (the first independent action of the Balkan states without the interference of the great powers of the time), Ion I.C. Brătianu—the craftsman of the Union—alongside King Ferdinand I; the post-war period brought to the forefront politicians of great international scope such as Tache Ionescu with his exceptional vision of the dangerous evolution of the international situation which required the creation of a united front of the newly emerging states in Central and South-Eastern Europe to defend the status quo of the territorial unit and their independence, Nicolae Titulescu—Romania's most skilled diplomat and politician in the third and fourth

² *Ibidem*. The reports about Titulescu in these Memoirs include, among other things, details about the Nazi plans to assassinate the Romanian diplomat.

³ Archive of the Library of the Romanian Academy, Fund XIV, file 8083, The memo sent by N. Titulescu to King Carol II at the beginning of 1940.

decades, followed by Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen, who remained in the history of Romanian-Czechoslovak relations as a defender of the freedom of this country in the face of aggression German-hortists; Armand Călinescu and Grigore Gafencu, to whom we owe a foreign policy that sailed between Scylla and Charybda, keeping the country's borders untouched until the summer of 1940, when all the states allied to Romania no longer existed on the map of Europe.

Nicolae Titulescu, pursuing with priority the security of all Romania's borders through all diplomatic and political means at his disposal at the time, sought to secure the country's most fragile border - the one with the USSR, understanding that the traditional German-Russian collaboration, continued without interruption and developed after the peace of Brest-Litovsk, could announce the establishment, sooner or later, of an alliance of the two powers, fatal for the small states geographically located between them. As is known, all that Titulescu achieved at the end of extraordinary efforts was only the initialing of a treaty of mutual assistance, Montreux, July 21, 1936. On August 29, the so-called "reshuffle" of the Tătărescu government took place, materialized in the replacement of Titulescu at Foreign Affairs, with Victor Antonescu. The treaty with the USSR, for which Titulescu had fought for years, remained in the initialing stage, unknown to the government in Bucharest—which had given its foreign minister a special "power of attorney" to carry it out.

The evolution of things in the next stage is well known: Hitler's war machine started its engines, abolishing the independent state of Austria, then Czechoslovakia, then turning, after the Hitler-Stalin understanding of August 23, 1939, towards the West; it was the turn of the western states. On September 1, the war for the destruction of Poland began. By June 1940 the map of Europe was radically modified. Romania, still having the borders of 1918 still untouched, had become the next victim of the two great allies: Hitler-Stalin and their smaller collaborators: Hungary and Bulgaria.

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Remember. Nicolae Titulescu noticed the increasingly obvious dangers to security and peace in Europe already in the early years of the third decade when the German-Soviet collaboration on the economic-political level announced the cancellation, step by step, of the clauses of the Versailles Peace Treaty in the context in which the "appeasement" trend in Anglo-French policy towards this process attacked the very essence of the new political and territorial order based on the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Peace Treaties of 1919-1920.

Indeed, the third decade seen, as a rule, as a period dominated by the organization of peace and security under the aegis of the League of Nations, changes its face to a thorough research; the documents brought to light unknown aspects, which substantially modify the judgments up to now on the process of Romania's political isolation.

First of all, the global research of the relations between the great powers—France, Great Britain, Germany, Soviet Russia, Italy, the United States of America—in the immediate post-war period highlights the emergence of elements of international insecurity. The inherent grievances of the defeated states, subject to the rigors of the peace treaties—Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria—manifested themselves in a wide range of actions, all aimed at the revision, in one way or another, of the Peace Treaties—signed and ratified by these states, it is true, but not accepted as sine qua non obligations of their foreign and domestic policy.

The conception regarding the artificial division of states into two categories: states with "general interests" and states with "limited interests" that dominated the decisions of the "Big Four" even at the time of the Peace Conference of 1919-1920, became permanent in the decades that followed, becoming a characteristic feature of the political strategy of the great powers in their relationship with the smaller states; this policy proved bankrupt and returned like a boomerang on its promoters.

Hence the alteration of the concept of security unique and indivisible: it was arbitrarily divided into the security of the states west of the Rhine and the security of the states east of the Rhine. The first was done at the expense of the other; put into practice in the immediate post-war years through treaties and agreements that evaded the provisions of the Covenant, undermined the work of organizing collective security.

The decisions of the International Economic Conference in London in 1924, the Locarno Agreements, the cancellation of Germany's war debts followed by the granting of "Gleichberechtigung" to this Power in 1932 and the failure of the Disarmament Conference—political acts committed in flagrant violation of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the provisions of the Treaties of Peace—all this provided favorable conditions for armament policy, stimulated the assertion of revisionism and revenge.

In this general context, the politics of the USSR and its international relations had a special place. The removal of tsarism as a political regime did not bring any substantial change in the foreign policy of the new regime, that of the Soviet dictatorship. The preservation of the territories annexed over time by the former Empire, the recovery of the territories lost by the new power in 1917-1918, the non-acceptance of the process of national self-determination of the nations targeted by these plans and the adoption of an aggressive policy towards them affected, even before the end of the war, the prospects for peace and security in Europe, especially in the eastern and central areas.

After the capitulation of the Central Powers, the Hungarian revisionist-revanchist forces in connivance with the Russian Bolshevik forces launched the aggression against the newly established states in Central Europe to reconquer the old territories and restore the pre-war imperial status quo, events that complicated the international situation, announcing, in the perspective of time, the regrouping of political forces, also defining the direction of the evolution of international relations.

Under such circumstances, the long-standing special relations between Soviet Russia and Germany entered a new phase from Brest-Litovsk onwards, reaching their highest point in August 1939. Their development (unaffected, at no time by what was called "difference of ideologies") on an economic, political, military level, had catastrophic effects for peace and security on the European continent. based on the principles and provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

As far as Romania is concerned, its political isolation, the premises of which were created in the third decade, ended in August 1939 through the provisions of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty and its Secret Protocol: all the treaties carefully constructed in the post-war years in order to ensure border security no longer worked, the great multilateral treaties like the Pact of Paris, the Convention for the definition of the aggressor of

July 1933 from London were totally and long inoperative, and the League of Nations had already entered "history".

A word more on the Anglo-French tussle in the Balkans in the summer and autumn of 1939. The April "guarantees" for Greece and Romania, which, declaratively, committed the two great powers to support the two countries in case of unprovoked aggression to which they would have responded "with all their forces", were considered in Bucharest to have moral value. Although Romania's situation worsened with the events of August 1939, the "guarantees" kept their same character: the concern of the governments in Paris and London to release themselves from obligations mainly had in mind the establishment of a military naval and air support base in Thessaloniki, objective to which the tripartite Anglo-French-Turkish treaty of October 19, 1939 was subordinated; the text of the Treaty, the annexed Protocols and the Special Agreement were initialed in Ankara on September 28, 1939. In art. 4 para. 2 of the Treaty it was provided that the two governments (of France and of the United Kingdom) "undertake to cooperate effectively with Turkey and to offer her, at her request, all possible help and assistance from the moment that a military action initiated by a European power would reach the borders of Bulgaria or Greece". The "guarantees" no longer had the role of marking the "interest" of England and France for their old ally.

At this time, Adrien Thiéry, the French minister in Bucharest, conveyed to President Ed. Daladier personally, "Gafencu's [foreign minister] increasing concern for the Russian danger"; through the Romanian minister in Moscow, Dianu, Molotov "vehemently protested against the armed gangs that threatened the Soviet border"; Thiéry reported that "the Soviet government sought to classify Romania as an aggressor, invoking the London Declaration of 1933". They could not be absent from the accusations brought to Romania and those related to the support given then by the Armand Călinescu government to Poland invaded by German and Soviet forces.⁴ What was left for Romania to do in those conditions of total isolation?

How right Nicolae Titulescu was when he said: "humanity does not need the revision of treaties, but the revision of its own prejudices... What

⁴ *Ibidem*, Fond DA8, Dr2, sdrb, Tel. No. 1045-1046, Bucarest, le 22 sept., 1939, signed by Thiéry.

must be done to ensure peace is for the peoples, in complete sincerity and without hidden thoughts, to work together for spiritualization borders".

It was a desideratum, a new idea at the time, revolutionary, emerging from a peaceful conception of the meaning of relations between peoples and states, opening wide horizons in the development of human society.

A desideratum still untouched by human society.

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A document dated September 11, 1939, signed by Nicolae Titulescu and expressly addressed to King Carol II, acquires, even after more than eight decades, a special significance through its content and the judgments formulated by the former Foreign Minister.⁵

The document, one of a secret nature, sent encrypted to Bucharest, represents an information of the main decision-makers of the country regarding the international situation of Romania in the perspective of a future peace that would have intervened between the belligerents at that moment, as well as the tactics and strategy to be followed for safeguarding the territorial status quo of the country.

"Although England has officially communicated to Japan that, even if Poland is completely conquered, the war will continue, although we have no reason to believe that this will not be the case, and that we are faced with a long-lasting war, as in foreign policy things can change from today to tomorrow, we cannot completely exclude the hypothesis of a peace conference, closer than one would think⁶. It would therefore be possible—said Titulescu—that the famous reconstitution of Europe will come up soon." In this possible perspective, he stated: "No matter how long the war is, Romania must be ready and, in order to discuss the terms of peace, prepare in advance for it." Starting from the axiom that "Romania's goal must be not to return a square centimeter of the territory it possesses

⁵ M.A.E. Archive, Fund 71 / Romania, Year 1939 May-December. Strictly confidential express telegram for His Majesty the King. Saint-Moritz, Monday, September 11, 1939. "To be deciphered by a member of the Cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. I would like to communicate the text of this telegram to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs"+. Signed Titulescu. The deciphered document has seven typewritten pages.

⁶ Nazi Germany then groped for the possibilities of a "peace" in a formula like "München".

today, and this is not only right, but it has been seen from the Sudeten affair that a partial revision tends to become total.⁷ The explanation of Nicolae Titulescu's concerns for Romania's situation in the context of the war that had broken out lies in the research of a large number of secret documents made available to him by "an illustrious Frenchman who played an overwhelming role at the last peace conference", documents that showed how "the big four"—Clemenceau, Wilson, Lloyd George, Orlando—treated and "judged" Romania at that conference, according to criteria that had nothing to do with the objective realities and the imprescriptible rights of the Romanian nation, a member of the Entente.

Before any discussion, I bring to your attention a few matters that do not involve any comment:

1. Romania's entry into the war was based on two fundamental acts signed in Bucharest by the Prime Minister of Romania, Ion I.C. Brătianu and the plenipotentiaries of France, Russia, England and Italy: the Political Convention and the Military Convention by which the Allies accepted a series of conditions regarding the territorial claims of Romania (the territories inhabited by Romanians and under the domination of Austria-Hungary), the conditions of military collaboration, etc.

2. Romania did not claim the annexation of any foreign territory.

3. Before the opening of the work of the Peace Conference, the Romanian nation in all the historical Romanian provinces under foreign occupation (Bessarabia, Bucovina, Transylvania-Banat) had determined themselves and decided to unite with the Motherland.

⁷ Hitler's claim to the Sudetenland area of Czechoslovakia on the grounds that it is inhabited by a German majority, triggered the process of breaking up the Czechoslovak state through repeated territorial mutilations in favor of Hungary, Poland and, finally, the disappearance of this state from the map of Europe—without to fire a single shot, as in the case of Austria. I recall the position of France, England and the USSR—the main allies of Czechoslovakia, with firm obligations inscribed in the treaties to come to her aid in case of aggression—of abandoning their ally, getting rid of any obligations.

These are indisputable truths.

Why did Titulescu consider—in the light of the documents researched in the summer of 1939—that, in the perspective of a new Peace Conference at the end of the war that had broken out on September 1-2, 1939, "Romania's situation is desperate"?

The answer seems to be simple: in the discussions between the "big four" during the Peace Conference of 1919-1920, absolutely all of Romania's new borders were disputed, their modification was proposed to Romania's disadvantage, avoiding practically everything the content of the Conventions of August 1916 but also the acts of self-determination (in accordance with Wilson's "Ten Points") of the Romanian nation, mentioned above.

I will refer to the issues raised by the former Foreign Minister, in the order existing in the document.

Dobruja. The delegate of England, Lord Balfour "requested the restitution of southern Dobruja to Bulgaria. Tardieu (France) energetically opposed this request saying that Romania came to the Conference as an ally... not as a loser with the obligation to surrender. Balfour refused /saying/ outright «What a pity!»". In the same position, the other three interlocutors "requested that the texts [/referring to the new status of Dobrogea/] be drafted in such a way that the Bucharest treaty of 1913 is not recognized by them and appears for them as a *res inter alios*"⁸. In fact, in a much later conversation Titulescu had with Churchill, in London, the latter supported the same point of view regarding Southern Dobruja; the thorough argumentation of the Romanian diplomat had no effect on his interlocutor. It is difficult to understand this position of England, because the question of southern Dobruja had been divided between the participating states at the Bucharest Peace Conference in 1913, a conference in which none of the great powers of the time had participated.

Bessarabia. Whenever Russia disputes Bessarabia, Romania thinks it is covered by the 1920 treaty signed by France, England, Italy and Japan. From reading the documents I am talking about, it appears that the treaty of 1920 has less value than we think, given that in 1919, Clemenceau, in the

⁸ *Ibidem.*

name of the Peace Conference, wrote, in black and white, to Admiral Koltchak to continue the fight against the Soviets, because in return he promises the non-Romanian parts of Bessarabia.⁹ So—comments Titulescu—for our Allies, France and England, in the most Romanian province, which is Bessarabia, there are also non-Romanian parts that must be returned to Russia".

Given the novelty for Titulescu of this position of France—signatory of the Bessarabian treaty—he considered that "here too a thorough study of the situation in Northern Bessarabia is required, because it emerges from what they say that not only for Hitler, when he wanted to make the state Ukrainian, but also for France and England, Bessarabia would be divided."

Bucovina. In the committee of four—says Titulescu—"the reasoning behind the ceding of Bucovina was as follows: «considering that no one is asking for Bucovina, it will be assigned to Romania». It is hard to imagine that the four knew nothing about "Austrian Bucovina", about the events taking place in that province in 1917-1918, about the conflicts between the Austrian rule, the new leaders of the Bolshevik Ukraine, about the claims of Russia, Austria, Ukraine and self-determination Romanians. "It is absolutely necessary—Titulescu conveyed to King Carol and Armand Călinescu—to arm ourselves with the necessary statistics proving that Bucovina belongs to us by virtue of the principle of nationalities, because this time someone will be found to demand Bucovina. In any case—the former minister emphasized—it is strange to find the foundations of Ukraine, wanted by Hitler before August 24, 1939, the date of the German-Russian agreement, in the discussions of our Allies from 1919"(emphasis added by the author).

The border with Hungary. It is known that the war of Bolshevik Hungary against Czechoslovakia and Romania, in 1919, ended with the defeat of Bela-Kun, the failure of the Revolution of the Councils and the temporary occupation of Budapest by the Romanian army, was an issue widely

⁹ It should be noted that many of the files of the Peace Conference of 1919-1920, inaccessible to research before 1939, gradually entered the scientific circuit after the Second World War alongside the personal archives of the political leaders and diplomats of the time. The Clemenceau-Kolceak correspondence is well known. I referred to Clemenceau's promise regarding the "non-Romanian parts of Bessarabia" in this work.

debated at the Peace Conference, simultaneously with the treaty negotiations of peace with Hungary. Multiple interests were at stake, all revolving around a single issue: the restoration of the Hungarian kingdom with its old possessions as the main power in Central Europe, or the recognition of its disintegration and the establishment of new states on the ruins of the dualist monarchy.

"Clemenceau, after a series of fruitless attempts to obtain the withdrawal of the Romanian armies from Budapest... ended by saying that order must prevail and affirming his belief that Ion Brătianu will not withdraw his troops from Budapest until he obtains the line he asks for, he proposes to give Romania this line, and he **will do justice to Hungary later** (emphasis added by the author). Considering this position, not only French, Titulescu, Osuski (Czechoslovakia) and Pasici (Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom), sent, on the very day of signing the Treaty with Hungary (June 4, 1920), a letter of thanks to A. Millerand for fixing the border with Hungary on the alignment desired by the three states. The document remained unanswered because it reached the President of the Conference shortly before 4 o'clock when the Treaty of Peace with Hungary was being signed. Titulescu's comment (signatory, along with Dr. Cantacuzino, of the Treaty of Trianon): "When the border towards Hungary was fixed like this, it is difficult to rely, only on the justice done to us in 1920, at a future /peace conference/".

Banat region. "It is a sad page of history, says Titulescu. It was on this issue that "the efforts of our delegation were concentrated." The documents he researched showed that a cession of territories to Bulgaria in southern Dobruja in exchange for the Bulgarian government's support "against Serbia" was discussed confidentially. Titulescu criticizes this attempt by the Romanian government to make Quadrilateral an "object of territorial compensation". In the last part of the telegram sent to Bucharest on September 11, 1939, the author brings the information that the French minister in Romania, Count de Saint-Aulaire¹⁰, known for his attachment to the Romanian cause, close collaborator of Ion I. C. Brătianu—in the telegram sent to the French government announcing the signing of

¹⁰ PhD Viorica Moisuc, "Count of Saint-Aulaire, A great friend of the Romanian people in times of hardship", in *The Generation of the Great Union of Romanians, 1918. Historical landmarks*, România de Măine Foundation Publishing House, Bucharest, 2018, p. 63-74.

Romania's Conventions with the Allies in August 1916, made shocking assessments regarding the "respect" by the Allies of the commitments made towards Romania, in terms of territorial provisions and military collaboration. I am transcribing the most relevant parts of this telegram from the French minister, as it appears in Titulescu's letter: "Baron Fasciotti /Italy/ seemed affected by having to give his Government's agreement to a clause of guarantees more favorable than what he was able to obtain Italy. He expressed himself in these terms: «There is no inconvenience in guaranteeing Romania impossible concessions; we will not keep our engagements, without any remorse, because we have no muijloc to execute them. This guarantee clause would have been less embarrassing if the Romanian political circles had been more moderate». And Saint-Aulaire ends his telegram with these words: **"The Russian Minister approved such a judicious observation!"** (emphasis added by the author). "Therefore—comments Titulescu—Saint-Aulaire also expresses the opinion that the Allies can, without any remorse, not keep the commitments made towards Romania, as being unrealizable. What an absurd construction! Either the Allies were victorious and could cut, for the benefit of Romania, from the body of Austria-Hungary what they had promised, or the Allies were defeated by the Central Powers and no longer had any obligation towards Romania. Saint-Aulaire's telegram...shows us what may hide under the courtesy of foreign ambassadors." And Titulescu ends his letter by once again formulating the requirement that he considered imperative for the political leadership of the country at that time: "Romania must be kept within its current borders and it can be kept. This is a matter of general policy. But for this, Your Majesty and the Romanian Government must know more, in as much detail as possible how things happened at the last Peace Conference, in view of the new one, no matter how distant it may be, we not being able to present ourselves to the world, as some try to do, as being enriched without cause. That is why I allowed myself to telegraph. It's war. Death is closer to us than ever".¹¹

The document is impressive and particularly current—as I said—even after the passage of almost 90 years. It should be stated that a confirmation of what Saint-Aulaire would have thought and transmitted in the formulation quoted above to the French Government in August 1916, I did not find in the documents I studied in the Diplomatic Archives at the

¹¹ Romanian Foreign Ministry Archives, doc. cit.

Quai d'Orsay, nor in the Archives of our [Romanian] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, nor in other archives. In the comprehensive book of memoirs of the French diplomat, published in 1953, there is no allusion, much less information, regarding the opinion expressed by Fasciotti after the signing of the Conventions with Romania in August 1916, nor about the position of the Russian minister. We find only the following account to be as correct as possible:

M. Brătiano signe, dans le matiné du 17 août , avec les représentants des quatre Puissances de l'Entente un traité d'alliance dont voici la substance: contre la garantie de son intégrité et la carte blanche pour annexer la Transylvanie, la Bucovine et le Banat, la Roumanie s'engage à déclarer la guerre à l'Autriche-Hongrie avec toutes ses forces , au plutard le 28 août ; les puissances alliées s'engagent à ne pas conclure la paix séparée avant qu'elle n'eût reçu satisfaction; elles s'engagent à l'admettre sur un pied d'égalité dans toutes les négociations de paix¹².

In fact, Titulescu himself has highly valued words for the French minister in Romania during the years of the First World War. Even in the telegram of September 11, 1939, he recounts the well-known episode of Saint-Aulaire's recall to the French Foreign Ministry, being accused of too much sympathy for the Romanians.: "When Ionel Brătianu convinced Saint-Aulaire to give him in writing, in Iasi, in December 1917, the authorization to make a separate peace, in the sense that Romania fulfilled all its obligations and that the Allies no longer I can ask for nothing, Clemenceau revoked it. Since then, Saint-Aulaire linked his fate with that of Ionel Brătianu..."¹³.

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Titulescu emphasized the truth that in foreign policy things change from one day to the next; translating his words, we understand that the directions of such "changes" impose various options, each of them requiring adequate information, based on the best possible knowledge of facts, events, their directions of evolution. It is an imperative for the activity of a politician who serves the vital interests of his country:

¹² Comte de Saint-Aulaire, *Confession d'un vieux diplomate*, Flammarion, Paris, 1953, p. 336.

¹³ Romanian Foreign Ministry Archives Fond 71/România, doc. cit.

Le politician et Le Politique sont des gens différents, comme sont choses différentes la politique et l'intrigue... Le Politique peut se tromper, le politician trompe. L'un fait de la politique, l'autre se nourrit de l'intrigue. Le politician ne ressemble pas plus à Un Politique qu'un cabotin ne ressemble à un artiste.¹⁴

That is why a historian sees current and necessary knowledge, even after the passage of many decades, of some value judgments such as those contained in the above document.

¹⁴ Louis Barthou, *Le Politique*, Hachette, Paris, 1923, p. 106. Diplomat and man of letters, former French Foreign Minister in the 1930s, Barthou clearly defines in this work the difference between a politician and a politician.