


MINERVA




JOURNAL OF HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY

Volume 2, Issue 1, February 2022



ROMÂNIA DE MĂINE FOUNDATION PUBLISHING HOUSE



MINERVA

Journal of History and Philosophy

Volume 2, Issue 1, February 2022

Editor: *România de Măine* Foundation Publishing House
Bucharest, Romania

<https://minerva.editurafrm.ro/2022/volume2-number1/>

E-mail: contact@editurafrm.ro

INTERNATIONAL EDITORIAL BOARD

President of the editorial board: GHEORGHE VLĂDUȚESCU, Romanian Academy

- ALEXANDRINA CERNOV, honorary member of the Romanian Academy
- ALESSANDRO DENTI, Università di Roma Tre
- VIORICA MOISUC, Ovidius University, Constanța
- IOAN N. ROȘCA, *Spiru Haret* University, Bucharest
- CONSTANTIN STOENESCU, University of Bucharest
- MELINA ALLEGRO, Istituto TESEO, Italy
- STEFANO AMODIO, Istituto TESEO, Italy
- ALEXANDRA RADU, Istituto TESEO, Italy
- MARIAN ZIDARU, Andrei Șaguna University, Constanța
- ACSINTE DOBRE, *Spiru Haret* University, Bucharest
- NICOLAE MAREȘ, Ph.D., diplomat and writer

Editors/Translation of texts into English: Mihaela SAVU & Dragoș CIOCĂZAN

Cover: Magdalena ILIE

Cover illustration: Pixabay

© All rights reserved

DTP: Vasilichia Gabriela DINU; Magdalena ILIE; Georgiana Laura GÎRJOI

The responsibility for the content and originality of the text belongs entirely to the authors.

PEER-REVIEW POLICY:

All papers in this journal have undergone editorial screening
and anonymous double-blind peer-review.



Romania de Mâine Foundation Publishing House

Bucharest, Romania, 2022

© All rights reserved

ISSN: 2784 – 2002

ISSN-L: 2784 – 2002


CONTENTS


History

150 YEARS SINCE THE BIRTH OF POLISH MARSHAL JÓZEF PIŁSUDSKI (Part I), Andrzej DUBICKI	7
ROMANIA’S TREASURY – GUARDED BY THE RUSSIAN “ALLY”; NEW DATA AND TESTIMONIES FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, Viorica MOISUC	27
DIPLOMATIC MEMOIRS AND THE VALUE OF SOLIDARITY - EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY AND SOLIDARITY. A BOOK REVIEW, Ioan VOICU	83

Philosophy

TRADITIONS AND CURRENT MEANINGS OF ROMANIAN PHILOSOPHY, Ioan N. ROȘCA	93
PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION: THE SCHOOL AS A MEANS OF TRAINING, Melina ALLEGRO	103
PHILOSOPHICAL REASON MEDIATING IN THE CONTEXTS OF THE RECURRENCE OF SOCIO-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES, Acsinte DOBRE	111
WAS THE MODERN COSMOPOLIS TRANSFORMED INTO A POST-MODERN GLOBAL VILLAGE?, Constantin STOENESCU	119
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SURVEILLANCE IN THE MODERN ERA, Alessandro DENTI	131
HENRY MURRAY'S PERSONOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF NEEDS, Stefano AMODIO	137
NEURO-LINGUISTIC PROGRAMMING IN DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATION, Alexandra RADU	139





History



150 YEARS SINCE THE BIRTH OF POLISH MARSHAL JÓZEF PIŁSUDSKI (Part I)

Andrzej DUBICKI

Associate professor, University of Łódź, Poland

Marshal Piłsudski was one of those people who, giving everything to his people, rises above what is the special essence of a nation and thus integrates into the vastness of humanity.

Nicolae Iorga, May 1935

Abstract: *Certainly, due to the unfortunate historical situation in which the second great world conflagration ended, from 1945 to 1989, neither in Warsaw nor in Bucharest about Piłsudski and the Romanian-Polish alliance was spoken much too little or biased. This, especially for fear of disturbing the “big brother” of the East, as it is known that, from his youth, Tsarist Russia had punished the young Piłsudski with exile in Siberia. Analysing his activity today, we can easily conclude that Piłsudski was the one who fully contributed to the building of close, mutually beneficial Romanian-Polish relations. We can say with certainty that even so far the fundamental documents in the archives, libraries and newspapers have not been highlighted on the subject.*

Keywords: *Poland, Kingdom of Romania, Ukraine, historical context, WW1*

December 5, 2017 marks the 150th anniversary of the birth of the strategist and military man who revived millennial Poland after 123 years of desertion – Józef Piłsudski. In recent decades, opinion polls in his country show him to be, along with the poet, philosopher, theologian and priest Karol Wojtyła, the former Pope John Paul II, recently raised in the light of the altars, and then beatified, one of the most important personalities in the millennial Polish history. So, along with his fellow citizen, successor in the seat of St. Peter in the Eternal City, the first Polish Pope, considered a gift that heavenly pronoun gave to humanity, Piłsudski is in his immediate vicinity in the souls of Poles. In the monograph I dedicated to the Marshal,

80 years after his passing into eternity, I presented in detail his figure as well as his contributions to Polish and universal history¹.



Józef Piłsudski

In this study, I will focus on his relations with Romanians and with Romania, in times of great historical balance, because important representatives of the Romanian state and people had the chance to get to know Józef Piłsudski quite well, sometimes in unusual situations, especially Romanian diplomats accredited to Warsaw. However, Romanian historians, especially in the last 60 years, have written too little, and Polish publicists, diligent in their overall analysis, are also far from deciphering the Romanian-Piłsudskian phenomenon².

Certainly, due to the unfortunate historical situation in which the second great world conflagration ended, from 1945 to 1989, neither in Warsaw nor in Bucharest about Piłsudski and the Romanian-Polish alliance was spoken much too little or biased. This, especially for fear of disturbing the “big brother” of the East, as it is known that, from his youth, Tsarist Russia had punished the young Piłsudski with exile in Siberia. Analysing

¹ Nicolae Mareş, Józef Piłsudski – Monograph, ePublishers, Bucharest, 2015.

² Henryk Walczak, *Sojusz z Rumunią w polskiej polityce zagranicznej w latach 1918-1931*, Alliance with Romania in Polish Foreign Policy from 1918-1931, Szczecin, 2008.

his activity today, we can easily conclude that Piłsudski was the one who fully contributed to the building of close, mutually beneficial Romanian-Polish relations. We can say with certainty that even so far the fundamental documents in the archives, libraries and newspapers have not been highlighted on the subject.

We can easily be convinced, at the same time, that over time a large number of Romanians have intersected with him, met him directly, talked or discussed with him, have written cordially about his personality, about his actions, its manifestations, without having a solid synthesis of its reception in Romania for 80 years. Superior factors at a high level and especially those next to them are concerned with their own image and personality / of some of them, alas, how insipid and arrogant/, not with the image of their predecessors. It is very probable that among the first Romanians to meet Piłsudski was the politician and writer Constantin Stere, who personally met the young Polish revolutionary in Siberia. He made the Piłsudskian character the hero of a story set in his novel *Around the Revolution*.³



Queen Marie of Romania


In her turn, Queen Maria of Romania retained with special accuracy the distinct image of the personality of the Polish leader, projecting in her writings the general and his country in the context of the times. Some of his characteristic features were left to us by King Ferdinand's consort recorded as for herself in her *Daily Notes*, respectively in the "rediscovered memoirs."⁴

³ Nicolae Mareș, *Constantin Stere și mareșalul Piłsudski exilați în Siberia*, in „Viața Românească”, 8/2015, pp. 54-61.

⁴ Queen Marie of Romania, *Însemnări zilnice*, vol. 5, p. 252.

We remember from these writings both the cordiality and especially the select consideration that she had for him, as a close one, perhaps the most beautiful image that a crowned head had about the Polish Marshal, surprising him from the most different angles. Not only in Sinaia, in September 1922, but also during a reception given by Polish President S. Wojciechowski in July 1923 in Warsaw, when Piłsudski told to those present, encouraged by the Queen: "All sorts of snobbery and made us laugh all the time." Queen Mary also writes: "He is truly spiritual, full of life and funny, although with health he is really a finished man and 'untreatable' in temperament, I think. I have almost a feeling of affection for him. It is absolutely original, and has a strong character. All Poles respect him, but being extremely stubborn and bull-headed, it is difficult to handle when you are not in complete control of the situation, which is generally the case for those who are too intransigent, so half their real qualities are largely wasted."⁵

Nicolae Iorga, the greatest Romanian historian, former prime minister of Romania in the 1930s, also filled entire pages in Romanian publications about Piłsudski's personality and his activity, especially in the newspaper he ran throughout the interwar period: *Neamul Românesc*. Iorga was followed by other remarkable pens from Romanian journalism. Without fear of being wrong, I can say that nowhere in the world has Piłsudski had a better press than in Romania to the highest level. I think that Carol II, ever since he was Crown Prince, also looked at the Marshal as a role model. He never forgot that in 1922 he was decorated by the Polish military leader.



Nicolae Iorga

⁵ *Idem*, p. 52.

In 1924, when Iorga paid a longer visit to Poland, passing through Lemberg, Warsaw, Vilnius, Poznan and Krakow (here he was offered the title of member of the Polish Academy of Sciences), he violated all the protocol rigors of the guests and – despite the express instructions of the organizers not to meet with Piłsudski –, he nevertheless went to his residence in Sulejowek to visit him. He wrote a moving material about the Marshal in the *Neamul Românesc*, but also recorded in his *Memoirs*, on June 16, 1924, succinctly. “At Marshal Piłsudski. Half an hour’s drive beyond the Capital, through the Jewish neighbourhoods, then along the forests and fields. A garrison, on one of the barracks of which read: ‘Long live crone’. In the middle of a group of spruces, houses built by legionaries guarding the one from which Thugut’s political left is increasingly parting and which the socialism of the ‘Rabotnic’ is attacking. A number of guests are waiting. The Marshal greets us in a room with mundane memories and portraits and Napoleonic books. He looks fatter and better than in Sinaia and speaks cheerfully. Half an hour passes between jokes. The former military attaché in Bucharest accompanied me.”⁶

And at the death of the great missing man, the unmatched historian made an impressive analysis of the situation in Poland in the aforementioned publication *Neamul Românesc*, later resumed in the second volume of memoirs and essays entitled: *Oameni cari au fost*. It is entitled: *După Piłsudski*. Knowing so well the past of millennial Poland, Iorga scrutinizes the exact future of the country.

“Marshal Piłsudski was one of those people who, giving everything to his people, rises above what is the special essence of a nation and thus integrates into the vastness of humanity.

As long as they are at the helm, there can be no action other than their own. The constitutional forms are indifferent, because the interest is directed on the interpretation they give; political parties cannot have true consistency; individuals can live only to stand in the service of the one who dominates them by his proportions and initiative and who can crush them with a gesture.

But as we are only passing incarnations of our case, there comes a time when exceptional personalities go away, and then the people are left alone with themselves.

This is what is happening to the Polish people today.

⁶ Nicolae Iorga, *Memorii*, vol. 3, June 16, 1924, p. 169.

He can show his true will for the first time, and he has to give his whole measure for the first time.

He may as well – and we want it with all our hearts – reveal to us hidden treasures hitherto, and, as a direction, choose paths which have hitherto been unexplored or from which he has been stopped.

A great collective silence will of course occur after the last salvos resound above the tomb of the hero, and this will be the most precious homage to his memory.”⁷

We find in the lines written by Iorga a kind of premonition for the following decades, when Siberian winds fell over the Vistula, and which froze Poland’s plans for further rebirth. Even the human senses have been affected. But not forever.

The Vistulian historians remain indebted to these Romanians who mirrored Piłsudski, as head of state, as a leader, as a soldier and as a man, to present the aspects and the light in which they knew him and especially to be known today in Poland. Unfortunately, in none of the biographies dedicated to the Marshal, published in his native country and abroad, and there were many, I did not find a word in any of them about his reception in Romania, about the portraits of the Polish Marshal made by Romanians. They boast about the “analyses” and sore stories, either when they translate Boia or write something else about Ceausescu.

A totally new source is the diplomatic archive of Romania, from which I took – for the first time from oblivion – a number of current, unusual appreciations for the 20s of the last century about Piłsudski and his activity, belonging to distinguished Romanian diplomats. Ferdinand the Integrator accredited them in Poland, after the reunification of the Romanian lands on December 1, 1918. I have in mind the plenipotentiary ministers: Alexandru G. Florescu (1919-1924) and Alexandru T. Iacovaky (1924-1927).

It should be noted that the second one also functioned as the first collaborator of the first Romanian envoy in Poland, Alexandru G. Florescu, with some intermittencies, from 1920 to July 1927. To the two Romanian messengers the “president” generously shared some of his concerns, but also of the worries that were bothering him about the belligerent Russian demonstration. This was at a time when Bucharest did not have a diplomatic mission in Moscow. The judgments and opinions resulting from these talks were sent by the two messengers of the Romanian people to

⁷ Nicolae Iorga, *Oameni cari au fost*, vol. 2 p. 305

the Sturdza Palace, and which – in the form of reports or dispatches – reached the cabinet of the Romanian prime ministers and the Royal Court, giving – among others – some of the most valuable testimonies about some of the current international events and about Poland's position from the most authoritative source. These documents contained not only the pulse that the Marshal knew from the reports of his subordinates with missions in various capitals – he was especially interested in Moscow from where he had all sorts of reports on internal or external issues. From Piłsudski's descriptions we can find out what plans were hatched in the main chancelleries of the great powers, in the most stormy moments in the history of the Polish nation: the war against Bolshevism, the *coup d'état* of May 1926, Poland's foreign policy at the time of the rebirth of the modern Romanian state and so on.

We have thus related the reactions and the way in which Piłsudski described his country's relations with Germany, England, Russia and France, etc. Not even to this date, those analyses have not been valorised. Such a true source would help to better understand how Poland's bilateral relations with Romania have evolved, the goals of Polish diplomacy and how the Romanian-Polish alliance was born, as a shield against bellicose Bolshevism.

Piłsudski and 1920-1921 Poland in the Eyes of the First Romanian Diplomat in Warsaw, Alexandru G. Florescu

Precious Romanian testimonies, little valorised so far

The stories that I am planning to present below and that keep the patina of time intact, we can perceive as a kind of *sepia photos* – not only of the Marshal, but also of his collaborators, of the realities in Poland and in the world. The reports of the two Romanian diplomats capture in this present essay not only a diplomatic approach, but also to quill of the minister and writer Aleksandru G. Florescu; they reflect the naked reactions and thoughts that Piłsudski expressed aloud, not only to the interlocutor in front of him, but first of all to the Country that the envoy represented and especially to the King, mainly to the Romanian prime ministers and the military, cultural and economic authorities. We do not know to what extent historiography in other countries has provided telegrams or reports of mission heads accredited to Poland by other states, as well as some details about their decision-makers' reactions to their proposals. As well, we do not

know to what extent such testimonies are preserved in Western or Muscovite chancelleries, nor about their form and *quality*. The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs holds them in its archives. Regrettably not valorised so far.



Alexandru G. Florescu

In the Romanian-Polish bilateral situation, together with the existing coverage in the press, the reports we present have a special colour and veracity, especially in reflecting the times and the Romanian-Polish friendship relations *in statu nascendi* at that time.

Going through the pages left by Romania's first messengers in Warsaw, one could learn useful lessons even today about the situation in the conflict zones that have appeared and are taking place on Ukrainian soil.

We will analyse the most important ones in the following, in the chronological order of the documents' drafting and sending from Warsaw to Sturdza Palace in Bucharest, not before stating that Florescu and Iacovaky presented to Romanian decision-makers not only the issues on which Piłsudski was referring to, but also some of the thoughts and positions of other Polish political and military leaders: Prince Sapieha, Minister of Foreign Affairs or his successor Zaleski, General Tadeusz Rozwadowski, so close to the Romanians, and so on. Romanian diplomats had no hesitation in presenting their own judgments, accompanying them with suggestions for action at the executive level, which is becoming increasingly rare today.

Florescu – the First Head of the Romanian Diplomatic Mission in Poland or About the Epilogue of the First World War Seen from Warsaw

Thus, on April 9th, 1920, the Romanian plenipotentiary minister in Poland, Alexandru G. Florescu⁸ informs the President of the Council of Ministers and *ad interim* Minister of Foreign Affairs, St. C. Pop, through a report sent by courier, about the result of the conversation he had with General Tadeusz Rozwadowski, former Austrian military attaché (of Polish origin) in Bucharest, for seven years, during the reign of King Carol, which the successor of the sovereign also knew personally.

The military-diplomat has since befriended the young couple: Ferdinand and Maria, according to the memories of the King's consort. Rozwadowski returned to his native Poland at the outbreak of war and held important military positions, including chairman of the Polish Military Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference or Chief of the General Staff during the battle against the Bolsheviks in the fierce clashes for Warsaw from August 1920. The Romanian Minister in Poland reports to the leader of the Sturdza Palace some aspects of great importance, collected at this level, from a prominent Polish leader, close to Romania, and who had just returned from Paris, immediately after a conversation he had with the head of state, Józef Piłsudski. The impressions and opinions of these leaders could not but be useful for the Romanian factors – which, like the Poles – were negotiating peace in Paris from similar positions⁹.

⁸ Alexandru G. Florescu (1872-1925), Romanian diplomat and writer with studies in France like his predecessors. He was admitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through a competition. He served as attaché to the Legation in Paris (1890-1891), then in Vienna (1891-1892); Chancellor of the Consulate General of Romania in Thessaloniki (1892-1893), Secretary of the Legation in Berlin (1894) and St. Petersburg (1895 + 1899); director in the Ministry; extraordinary envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister to Athens (1911-1913), envoy to the same position in Warsaw (1919-1924), from April 1, 1924 accredited to Riga and Tallinn, respectively, with residence in Warsaw. He was removed from office upon request. He died at the beginning of September 1925. His merits in the development of relations between Romania and Poland, as a man, were noted in the Polish press.

⁹ On Romanian-Polish contacts in the French capital see: Nicolae Mareș, *Raporturi româno-polone de-a lungul secolelor*, pp. 278-304, TipoMoldova Publishing House, Iași, 2016, revised edition.



Tadeusz Rozwadowski

The impressions and opinions of these leaders could not but be useful for the Romanian factors – which, like the Poles – were negotiating peace in Paris from similar positions.

That is how we learn that General Rozwadowski came from France with the conviction that: “England wants to revise the treaty and even the peace treaties. The attitude of this power towards Germany and Russia shows that London wants these two countries to ‘work’ for it to help it in its economic strengthening.”¹⁰

The Polish military also considered that the President of France, Mr. Millerand, who a year ago had received in France, like Clemenceau, Queen Mary with all possible honours, would be: “too lenient with the policy of England, and his fall from power is imminent as some political circles accuse him of weakening his policy.” “Mr. Barthou’s interpellation, only announced, reflects this state of mind. Mr. Barthou would be the possible heir of Mr. Millerand.”

More interesting for the Romanian diplomat was the terms through which General Rozwadowski looked at “Poland’s relations with Russia”, but also Romania’s relations with this country, relations on which we will return.

The conclusion of Florescu’s conversation with Rozwadowski was that **France was under the influence of Russian circles in Paris (!)**

¹⁰ The above quotations as well as those presented below are in the cited monograph (1). These are inserted in the pages of the paper (from 273 to 407), respectively in the 27 reports and telegrams, copied and processed by us from the MFA Archive. They are accompanied by titles and subtitles belonging to the author, in order to keep the reader’s attention awake, ensuring, I hope, an attractive, modern form of journalism.

(emphasis added – N.M.), the Romanian diplomat being presented with a phrase uttered by Marshal Foch: “do not put us in a position to choose between you (Poland) and Russia.” Notice! This is because, like Foch or Paleologue, the current Secretary General, Berthelot, and so many others are married to Russian women. “Russian propaganda is very clever and strong,” and Polish newspapers “criticize the inactivity of the Polish minister in Paris, who does not know how to fight with enough strength and dexterity against Russian propaganda.”

Honestly, the Romanian plenipotentiary minister made it clear to the general – discreetly – that the representatives of France and England accredited in Warsaw do not see the attempts to fulfil the Polish territorial claims as favourable, as well as the fact that England “sees” as Germany and Russia to “work” for it in the future, helping “its economic strengthen.”

As for the Allies, Rozwadowski’s conclusion was that they would like to be “sweetly forced” (“les Alies se laisseront faire une douce violence”) – hence “the need to combine the action of both of our governs.” “The Allies do not want to decide on the fate of Bessarabia,” the general told him. “They still believe in the illusion of reconstituting unitary Russia. I know that Bessarabia is Romanian land, that the population is Romanian. But Russians everywhere say the opposite.” In addition, Russian emigrants in the French capital claim that: “Bessarabia is Russian and that Russia will never give up on it.” The same is true of the Polish frontiers of 1772, which Russia does not accept, as well as the right of the revolutionary socialists with Axentief at the head, on behalf of the international socialists, of the Social Democrats – Plekhanov’s old party –, of the Party of Russian Unity lead by Mr. Alexinschi.

Regarding the *Ukrainian issue*, Florescu remarks how the important political circles in Warsaw believe that: “the Ukraine created in Brest-Litowsk by Germany and Austria should not be confused with the real Ukraine”; “the first, with a geographically vertical appearance, includes, in addition to large areas of Poland, the so-called country of small Russia.”

The real Ukraine

This is how it “stretches – according to the Polish interlocutors”. “On the contrary, geographically horizontal, it goes from the Dniester to the Dnieper and further, even to the Don, where it approaches the Cossacks. While in the small Russia the national idea would not be developed at all, in Ukraine itself, the one that, according to General Rozwadowski, would interest us more, not only that this idea exists and is developing, but along

with the tendencies of the Don Cossacks it is moving in a smooth direction, hostile to Russia.”

“From this conversation – concludes the Romanian Minister – it was clear that the Poles intend to annex, by plebiscite, of course, a part of the territories of small Russia where the Polish influence is quite developed and likely to develop further through propaganda made by the advance of the armies and the expulsion of the Bolsheviks.”

As for *proper Ukraine*, “General Rozwadowski seemed to share the idea of organizing this country in common agreement with Romania. Regarding the economic exploitation of Ukraine, he was thinking of a possibility to interest France and the United States in this process.”

The interlocutor also considered that “an area should be established over which the Bolsheviks cannot pass” with their propaganda, so that Romania and Poland can get rid of the “effects of Bolshevik anarchy” through a buffer zone.

For a common Polish-Romanian front

To achieve this, against the Bolsheviks, General Rozwadowski believed a *conception front* was needed – recalling that “Marshal Foch considers the same”, so “without the displacement of forces in aid of this or that country.”

“This idea could be achieved – according to Rozwadowski – by pressure at a certain point in time, in order to weaken one attack directed at another.”

In another April 1920 report, Minister Florescu reckon that “Poland – seeing the chaos and anarchy in Russia, as well as the weakness of Ukraine – will of course seek to draw from these two the most beneficial consequences for itself.” This in the sense of maintaining “territorial claims on the borders from 1772, the continuous advancement of the Polish armies through Ukrainian lands, the organization of these lands, the denial of the possibilities of Ukraine’s own existence devoid of national consciousness, devoid of cult class, of an appropriate government and administrative staff. All this clearly shows that Poland will seek to take over some of the territories claimed by Ukraine in both Volhynia and Podolia”.

“The restoration of order by the Polish armies and administrative bodies in these regions shaken by the Bolshevik plague and the scourge of war, the presence here and there of Polish landowners long scattered by an often uneducated population, the restoration of a somewhat more normal economic life, there will be so many considerations that, in addition to an active propaganda already started, will greatly influence the outcome

of possible plebiscites.” In addition, “Poles also believe that the Ukrainians will be content with what is left to them.”

“As for the southern part of Ukraine, the part that interests us, Poland will seek to agree with us to strengthen its territorial gains by consecrating what our will would give it.”

The analyses sent from Warsaw by the Romanian diplomat will not be limited to a simple *information*, but to present their own “**opinions on various issues of interest to the country**” (emphasis added by Minister Florescu – N.M.), and “this issue should be researched with the utmost care.”

So, in the early 1920’s, when “the policy of the Allies tends to reconstitute Russia in a somewhat unitary form, it is equally certain that our policy must aim to thwart this reconstitution.”

Minister Florescu went on to inform Bucharest that the Allies’ views on the Ukrainian issue could have “the worst consequences for us”. And, unfortunately, we went through such moments.

“*Ukraine needs to feel that we are its friends*, that we support it, that we want it to have a life of its own.” This was Florescu’s proposal to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, respectively that Romania should use: “the occasion of today’s exchange of views on the conditions of peace, [which] can prove these feelings of ours towards it.”

In addition: “Even if Ukraine does not succeed in gaining its independence, even if it ever rejoins Russia, this reunification could only be conceived in the form of autonomy, and in such a case the help we would have been given it today, the friendship we would have shown it would be a title we could always invoke against her.”

“If it succeeds in gaining independence, in part because of us as well, the title we would invoke would, of course, increase in significance.”

The Allies – the desire for tight control over Poland

From his various contacts, including with his French and British counterparts, the Romanian diplomat concluded that *the Allies were trying to gain heavy control over Poland*, and “on the issue of peace and, subsidiary, on the (Ukrainian) issue – Warsaw seeks to pursue its own policy, which will show that it wants to come to terms with them.”

The conclusion of Minister Al. Florescu’s report was that Poland’s policy in the Ukraine issue seems to be as follows: “It is trying to take over Ukraine in two ways, on the one hand in the form of territorial acquisitions, of course enshrined in plebiscites, and on the other in the form of a tutelage, a kind of protectorate to which Poland would like share with us.”

We find out further – from the report of the head of mission – that the attempts made by Zaleski (August Zaleski – future foreign minister, young man with studies in England – mason – who during the war had the mission to convince the British that Piłsudski's actions are not directed against the Entente, but only against Russia – N.M.), as Chairman of the Conference of the Commission in charge of investigating issues of interest to Romania and Poland, “that the Polish Government would be glad to see Odessa belonging to Romania.”



August Zaleski

“A solution is being sought – the Romanian diplomat said – to give us something in return for what would be taken for no reason; *we were invited to a robbery hook-up.*”

*Our situation, more disinterested in regard to Ukraine,
is better than that of Poland*

“We would not jeopardize it unless we would listened too blindly to the Allied mercantile advice, denying Ukraine the support it expects from us to achieve its aspirations.”

“If Ukraine feels that we are hostile to its aspirations, or at least indifferent, and if Poland alone comes to its aid, I think it will be bad for us.”

Poland does not want war anymore, but it avoids peace

“I would like to remind Your Excellency of the statement made to me by the head of the Ukrainian mission in Warsaw, Mr Livitzki, Minister of

Justice and Foreign Affairs in Mazepa's cabinet, and which I communicated to you by my telegram ciphered under No. 491 of March 7th, that if Ukraine ever had to decide on a federal form, Petlura's government would like Ukraine to join a federation with its neighbours rather than Russia."

Alexandru G. Florescu goes on try to convince Bucharest that the federal system, due to overly imperialist ambitions on the back of Ukraine, would not be appropriate for Poland.

The turn that the situation on the front took, with the withdrawal of Polish troops from Kiev, determined the Romanian diplomat to communicate on June 9th, 1920 to the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Duiliu Zamfirescu that: "Poland does not want further war, but recoils from peace", because the war brings with it the depletion of finances, the aggravation of the economic and monetary crisis, the worsening of the state of health; and in time it may even bring fatigue and rebellion to the front."

Florescu proves to have a good eye and a forecast close to reality, if we consider that in 2-3 months the Bolshevik roller has reached the Vistula. Focusing on the *shielding* of the Polish state, the diplomat considered that "peace, of course, would ease the financial situation, but would only partially solve the economic crisis, because it would throw through cities and villages so many elements that would thicken the phalanx of the unemployed and burdening their already burdensome budgets."

The shielding of the Polish state is not yet strong enough

According to Florescu, in order to be able to easily resist the possible turmoil that could be caused by a skilful exploitation of the passions of all these elements: "Peace would then bring a great increase in the cost of living, the Russians absorbing the Polish goods and products." He reiterated – through the above statements – again some aspects highlighted in earlier reports: "Many do not want peace, but the vast majority want it, if it were the peace [they] would want."

Minister Florescu's analysis even captured some psychosocial subtleties, which originated from the nature or mentality of the Pole. Thus, Bucharest was informed that: "The Pole is imperialist by birth, by being told that his country is the greatest victim of injustice, and that he has lived with the thought that, from the enmity of the three empires that divided it, a new Poland will be revived today."

"Today's demands are for him a re-entry into law, an erasure of division errors. This is the very basis on which the Foreign Minister has skilfully based his argument regarding the terms of the peace."

Poland has suffered a blatant injustice. The repair must be carried out by cancelling the annexation.

“Today’s war has been waged in the name of justice, in the name of restoring nationalities oppressed in their rights, in the name of free judgment on the fate of peoples. If it has suffered injustice, Poland has the right to its own reparation. This reparation will also be confirmed by popular consultations. Following the example of the Great Powers, who decided to hold six plebiscites on the disputed territories in some of Poland’s border regions in the north and the west, the Poles want to do the same with the eastern countries.”

He mentions that he does not say it directly, but this is also the political thinking of the Head of State, Piłsudski.

“So the territories that Poland claims would be returned to it by virtue not of a conquest, but of a detachment.”

“And as for the other conditions, who could claim that Poland would not have the right to demand restitution of property taken from it during the war of 1917, or that it would not have a duty to defend itself against anarchist propaganda, or that it would have no obligation to demand that the ratification of the treaty be made by a real representation of the Russian people? But for the Poles, the demands of the peace terms are natural and necessary. They appear in this way in the minds of all the competent factors and the Head of State, the Diet, the Government, and even the socialists – who here – put the idea of homeland a little higher than the third international.” And, the Romanian diplomat continues:

“It is said that the head of state, Mr Piłsudski, would be more for the continuation of the war. It is true that he relies especially on the military party by which he is much loved; however, he also has the support of the left, i.e. the peasant party. He even supports the Socialists as one who has stepped out of their ranks. Of course, the trends of these elements are not concordant. But Mr Piłsudski’s ability was, in drawing up the peace terms, to take these trends into account.”

What Florescu did not know was that the Soviets, by no means, were thinking of reaching peace with Poland. Their goal was to cross Polish territory with the Red Army in order to establish Soviet power in Berlin. Warsaw was a stage in the way of the Bolshevik roller.

Moreover, the population was partially hoodwinked by the Soviet propaganda, in the sense that the Soviets would receive the peace suggested by the Poles, because the economic and military condition would no longer allow them to continue the war.

But Poland was most concerned about England's attitude and Mr. Lloyd George's latest statements, which "weakened their situation in relation to the Soviets".

The line followed by Poland – plebiscite proposals

Especially where the national consciousness seems unprepared. And Florescu considered Lithuania's situation "more tender."

"Neighbouring Germany, it (Lithuania) is at enmity with Poland. But I believe, as I have shown in a previous report, that Poland, not being able to attract Lithuania to it at will, will be able to do so out of necessity. For Lithuania, cut off by Russia through the proximity and continuity of the Polish-Latvian territories, will have no choice but to choose between Germany and Poland."

The Black Sea is another safety valve for Poles – wrote Minister Florescu from Warsaw – and "the suggestion made to us by the Polish Government that he would not view with disdain our dominion of Odessa has a natural explanation: our disinterest in this matter, which they suspect, would give them a free hand over Ukraine."

"It seems to me that the Polish Government's ties with Petlura are becoming tighter every day. We are working here to organize two Ukrainian divisions, at the end of which Petlura would return to his country."

"It seems to me that in their minds the Poles, as I said above, after cutting a large piece of Wolhania, if not all, as well as a smaller piece of Podolia – we know what a plebiscite can mean after a military occupation and a longer administration in a country in anarchy and disorganized – will try to help create a smaller Ukraine, which would extend as a space to Taganrog, leaving this port – Rostow – in the hands of Russia to have access to the sea."

Better neighbouring Ukraine than Russia

This is what the Romanian diplomat in Warsaw considered – giving the example of Poland, which sought to give Ukraine the necessary elements to develop, administer and govern itself.

The Romanian diplomat considers that it would be good if "Romania would leave Poland alone to execute a kind of tutelage, of protectorate over Ukraine, if it were indifferent first to the aspirations of the Ukrainians but also to the anarchic outbreak at our gates." Florescu also writes:

"The head of state, whom I had the honour to see yesterday on the occasion of the presentation of Lieutenant Colonel Antonescu, said to me, 'Even if, for some reason, there is no intervention in Ukraine now, one day it will be necessary to intervene; it will not be today, it will be tomorrow; it

will not be tomorrow, it will be the day after tomorrow. But the intervention will certainly be necessary... Your interest, as well as that of Poland, is to point the threatening peak of Ukraine to the East.”

To all this, the Romanian diplomat does not forget to add as well those he learned – from another source – from the Minister of Latvia to Warsaw: “If Ukrainians do not feel that the Poles or you are helping them, then the nationalist elements, that will eventually grow and strengthen there, will not turn their anger towards Russia, but towards their Western neighbours.”

Florescu considered that “we must not leave the Poles the right to appear as the only saviours and protectors of Ukraine,” especially since “Ukraine, Hungary and even Poland have an open issue against us: Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transylvania.”

Florescu points out that the Poles do not want to hear about Rakowski, but go with Petlura’s government, which can be considered a Polish admirer, in any case an enemy of Russia, and by recognizing the person chaired by Russia, “we would make a divergent note; we would be the only ones at the Conference with this opinion.”

England is increasingly active in the Baltic States

From Warsaw, in early April 1920, Alexandru G. Florescu found that England’s politics and influence were indeed becoming more and more active in the Baltic States.

“England has helped to settle the territorial dispute between Lithuania and Latvia, just as, of course, if there is a political alliance, England will have been mediated for it. Also, the misunderstanding that threatens to take quite serious proportions between Estonia and Latvia has also been settled by England. The day before, a more serious conflict was about to break out between the Poles and the Lithuanians, and, again, England intervened to solve it. A Lithuanian detachment had chased a small Polish garrison from a railway station linking Wilno to Dwinsk (Dunaburg). Returning in greater numbers, the Polish soldiers managed to chase away the Lithuanians, took a few dozen prisoners, and took a few machine guns.

But in order to show a spirit of reconciliation, which seems to be the usual attitude that the Poles seek to adopt towards the Lithuanians, the prisoners were released and their weapons returned immediately. After a while, the Lithuanians set out again against the Poles, whom they chased away from the station again. This time, the head of state ordered the Lithuanians to be chased away 10 kilometres to better protect the railway. The operation is successful. But the English intervened; an English

delegate arrived in Warsaw, and after some discussion it was decided that the station should remain in Polish hands, the Polish front should resume its old demarcation line, and the delegate assured that this railway would not be attacked again.”

“So England’s influence is seeking to become predominant in the Baltic States, and I already have the impression – a very personal impression – that one can see either a division of spheres or a struggle of influence between England and France from the Baltic to the Black Sea.”

Nothing separates Italy from Germany

This was stated by Minister Florescu from Warsaw. What the Romanian diplomat would have liked to know was, “Which way does Romania incline more today, towards England or France, as I do not know, he said, if in a more distant tomorrow, it will not approach Germany.”

“For the time being, it would seem that we lean more on England, if I were to draw this conclusion from the fact that we are treating peace with the Soviets, without having made closer contact with Poland.”

“England’s policy, at the moment, seems to be to weaken all bodies which might be a force to be reckoned with as much as possible, to keep them at its economic discretion, and Poland, whose dreams of enlargement and of Russia’s economic exploitation could have disrupted England’s plans, had to be stopped in its momentum of expansion. It started with Danzig, it was attempted with Eastern Galicia, it continues with the Baltic States. In my opinion – Florescu thought –, I don’t know to what extent it will be good, no matter how much we try to discourage its imperialist tendencies, to have a weak Poland with us.”

Let us keep in touch with Poland

This was what he imperiously demanded the head of the Romanian diplomatic mission in the reborn Poland. He also stressed that *we are surrounded by enemies, and the allies are far away; let us not lose touch with the Warsaw Government* – this was the wish of a realistic, patriotic minister, waiting for the directives *that the foreign minister wants to give him* in this direction.

“But I think I can once again hammer at Your Excellency,” Florescu said to the foreign minister, “so as not to lose touch with the Warsaw Government. No matter how much we follow the policy of the Allies, especially of England, we must not forget that the Allies are far away and that (we) are surrounded by enemies.”

(To be continued)

Andrzej Dubicki, Associate Professor at Łódź University, Poland. In 1997-2002, he studied at the Institute of History of the University of Łódź, where, since 2002, he continued his doctoral studies. He received his doctorate in 2006 from the Pedagogical University of Krakow. He received his habilitation degree in 2015 from the Faculty of Political Science and International Relations in Toruń. Since 2016, he has been a professor at the University of Łódź in the Department of Political Theory and Political Thinking. It deals with issues of Romanian history in a broad sense, which are of interest to both political science and history. Since 2015, he has been author, co-author and editor of several dozen publications and articles, including: *Nicolae Titulescu, the portrait of a politician and a diplomat*; *The party system of the Kingdom of Romania 1866-1947*; *Conditions and operation – political and social biography of Lucjan Skupiewski*; *The Daco-Roman Wars 101-106 AD*.

ROMANIA'S TREASURY – GUARDED BY THE RUSSIAN “ALLY”; NEW DATA AND TESTIMONIES FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION¹¹

Ph.D. Professor Viorica MOISUC

Decades of concern regarding the vast and complex issue of the history of the Romanian Treasury sent for temporary storage in Moscow, during the military occupation of Romania by the Central Powers from 1916-1918, have materialized in a volume of annotated and commented documents, summaries, articles, and studies published by Romanian historians, including myself.

Romanian archives, keepers of the original documents (National Bank of Romania, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, State Archives, Manuscripts Section of the Library of the Romanian Academy, private archives, countless volumes of event participants and eyewitnesses' testimonies), a series of documents from foreign archives (for example, the French Military Archives at Vincennes, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, the Archives of the League of Nations and others) were the Romanian literature's documentary basis on this subject. **What was missing were testimonies from Russian archives, the existence of which was denied by Russian and Soviet historians and politicians.**

Historian **Ilie Schipor** has managed to break into these archives and reveal hundreds of documents (unknown – *declaratively* – by the Russian side) that fill in the gaps in the information so far, so that a whole series of aspects of the Treasury's history appear in a different light and requires re-evaluations and new conclusions. We are talking about the work ***Destiny of the Romanian Treasury – Arguments from the Russian archives***, Oscar-Print, 2021, 446 pages: collection of Russian documents (including facsimiles of the originals), translated, annotated, commented, notes and introductory study.

I will refer to this new evidence in the following pages.

¹¹ This is a chapter from the work *Calvary of the Romanians in the struggle for liberation and national integration*, vol. II – in progress.

*

In terms of the international relations and the Romania-Russia bilateral relations, the Russian Soviet regime created, a century and a quarter ago, the “*Treasury Problem*” intertwined with another, created at the same time, that of “Bessarabia” which, in June 1940, amplified, including “Bukovina” as well.

Throughout the research carried out over many decades in archives and libraries in Romania and other countries, I have managed to decipher to a large extent the nature of these problems, the connections with the foreign policy of Romania, of Russia, of the other European powers in the context of the evolution of the international situation over a long period.

As I have already stated in my works, the full knowledge of the historical truth is almost impossible even when the sources of documentation do not stop you in any way. The more you deepen the research of a certain phenomenon, process, set of events, etc., the more new and new questions appear, the more other avenues open for the study of new aspects, suspected or not. Things get complicated when access to documents is deliberately obstructed for political or other reasons.

The issue of the Treasury is one of them. It is debated on all levels – historical, political, economic, and financial, diplomatic, etc., **from January 1918 until today**. Opinions, theses, hypotheses were issued, proposals were advanced, formulas for solving this complicated problem, all have remained theoretically, some being kept only in the desiderata stage. Is there, after one hundred and twenty-five years, a prospect of “*solving*” this problem fairly? No one could give a sharp answer. In fact, the question is *what do the two parties involved mean by “problem solving”*? From a legal point of view, from the point of view of morality, things seem to be as simple as possible: **Romania** started from the objective truth that a good entrusted to someone for safekeeping based on official documents, with precise provisions and commitments for restitution, ***is to be returned to the owner without the need for new negotiations, discussions, etc.*** **Russia** has refused until this day, for a century and a quarter, violating its own signatures and commitments, to return to the rightful owner the property entrusted to it for safekeeping. Why? Because the Soviet power simply looted everything in its care but did not recognize and does not recognize, so the positions of the two competitors have remained diametrically opposed.

What Russia returned to Romania in **1935** and **1956** is a small part of the Treasury, restitutions that have not included *the gold reserve – coins and bullions – of the National Bank sent to allied Russia in 1916-1917*.

Starting from a **false premise – allied** Russia in the First World War, with firm commitments signed in official documents (Bilateral Convention of

1914 and Political and Military Conventions of August 1916) –, the Romanian Government entrusted – forced by circumstances or not – to its “ally”, also based on official documents signed by the Romanian and Russian plenipotentiaries, all the wealth of the Romanian state. Deposited in the Palace of the Kremlin and other Russian banking institutions, also with proper documents and firm commitments of the Russian Government **to preserve, guard and return Romania, this fortune has been simply confiscated by Lenin in the name of the new Soviet Power, without any rights**, under ridiculous pretexts, at the same time declaring broken the diplomatic relations with Romania – the “ally” that Russia had betrayed on all fronts since the beginning of the war. It happened on **January 13th, 1918**. This arbitrary act has a strange provision: it states – acknowledging – that it dealt with 1) the “**Romanian gold**” and 2) that “**it will be returned to the hands of the Romanian people**” – statements empty of content, refuted by all Russian politics from that moment and to this day.

For a century and a quarter, the plaintiff honestly demanded his rights, bringing to the table a pile of official documents and testimonies, which were opposed only by words, forgeries, accusations, and totally unjustified claims. In fact, the confrontation – over a century and a quarter – has taken place and is taking place between **the force of law and the law of force**.

*

After January 1918, on the agenda of Romanian foreign policy, obtaining the return of the confiscated treasure by Soviet Russia was a permanent goal. The issue was discussed at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919-1920, at the Reparations Commission, etc. An important moment was the *International Economic Conference* in Genoa **in 1922** where the Romanian delegation led by Prime Minister Ion I.C. Brătianu obtained the decision for **Russia to return its treasury** to Romania, a decision that remained only on paper. However, two significant issues should be noted: in Genoa, **Romania** unilaterally **committed itself to non-aggression against Russia**; this commitment is also enshrined in the **1926 Romanian-French bilateral treaty**, this time strengthened by **the French guarantee**, at the same time, in **1922**, concomitantly with the work of the Genoa Conference, the Soviet and German foreign ministers, **Cicerin and Stresemann signed the secret treaty of cooperation on all levels at Rapallo, violating the Treaty of Versailles**, among other things, by the availability of the USSR to give Germany free rein to rebuild its arms industry and army on Russian territory.

In the 1920s, several rounds of Romanian-Soviet talks took place – in the context of the absence of normal diplomatic relations – with the main subject being *the restitution of the Treasury*. All without reaching a common point of view. It should be noted that the Soviet side constantly tried to combine the issue of the Treasury with that of Bessarabia, whose union with Romania was never recognized by Moscow. The last round of talks took place in Vienna, in **1924**; The Soviet delegation's attempt at *bargaining* has been recorded then: Romania's renunciation of its Treasury in exchange for Russia's recognition of the Romanian possession of Bessarabia, an offer that was rightly rejected by the Romanian side. At the same time, Moscow organized a vast **subversive armed action of political destabilization** in Romania with the support and collaboration of the Romanian section of the Comintern – **the Communist Party** (the so-called Tatar-Bunar uprising).

Since then, **punctual official negotiations** on the issue of the Treasury have not taken place.

In the years 1928-1933, there was a certain reorientation of the USSR's attitude towards the collective security policy, towards the League of Nations; however, this situation did not mark a fundamental change in its foreign policy. But, its accession in 1928 to the Briand-Kellogg Pact to outlaw the war as a tool for resolving disputes between states was part of this new attitude, stating that Moscow's territorial claims to Romania did not suffer an amendment: the "**Litvinov Protocol**" signed in Moscow in **1929** between the USSR and its Western states with the stated intention of implementing the Briand-Kellogg Pact was supplemented by the *Official Declaration* of the Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov, in which it was stated that the act signed in Moscow should not be understood as a *waiver* of Russia's territorial claims against Romania.¹²

Nicolae Titulescu's diplomatic action in 1933–1936 sought to use every opportunity arising in European political developments to achieve not only the normalization of diplomatic relations with the USSR but also the securing of the Dniester border through precise commitments of this power. The re-establishment of the Romanian-Soviet diplomatic relations in June 1934 created the illusion of a real positive political-diplomatic evolution. In such a context, far from being able to obtain the restitution of the Treasury in its entirety, in **1935** archival, numismatics values, acts and documents as well as a large number of worthless objects were restored. **The gold of the National Bank deposited in the Kremlin has not been returned.**

¹² See, Viorica Moisuc, *Premisele izolării politice a României 1919-1940*, Humanitas, Bucharest, 1991, Part II, Chapter I, "The Genoa Conference and the Rapallo Agreements (1922)", pp. 154-179.

The degradation of the international situation in the years 1937-1940 removed from the diplomatic agenda of Romania the issue of the Treasury's restitution. The dangers that were announced for the territorial integrity of Romania, for its independence and sovereignty, were continuously aggravated. In **1940**, as a result of ***the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the aggression of the USSR against Romania made the first breach in the national territory: Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina***. The others followed. The German-Soviet cooperation opened in Brest-Litovsk and strengthened in the following years, overcoming the "*ideologies*" – considered by many to be irreconcilable –, inevitably led to the unappealable condemnation of Poland and the outbreak of the Second World War.

*

For Romania, the Second World War brought back to the forefront the issue of ensuring the security of the NBR Treasury, in the circumstance when the evolution of events, on a military, political, diplomatic level, outlined the danger of the Soviet invasion.

*„In the Archive of the National Bank of Romania there is a file with no. 20 of the Administrative Directorate – we read in the paper **The Treasury of the National Bank of Romania in Moscow**¹³ – which reveals another dramatic episode in the history of the Old Lady. In a way, it is about re-editing similar facts and events during the First World War, but with a different development, other actors, and a different purpose. It is a demonstration of the fact that a story like that of the Romanian treasury in Moscow could have had another ending.”*

Of course, we can always talk about "*another ending*" of the events that took place along the centuries, but we must always consider the context in which those events took place. Thus, for example, in the context of the failure of the Romanian military offensive in the first phase of the *National Unification War*, of the way Romanian-Russian political and especially military relations evolved, the acceptance of the solution to evacuate the Treasury to Russia, abandoning Switzerland, Denmark and England's suggestions, must be analyzed according to the main decision-makers: Romania was in a political and military alliance with Russia, France and England, but the effective cooperation on the front was aimed only at Russia, which from the outset derogated from the obligations it had officially assumed

¹³ *Tezaurul Băncii Naționale a României la Moscova – Documente*, Foreword Ph.D. prof. Mugur Isărescu, Historical comment and edition by Cristioan Păunescu, Marian Ștefan, Editura Fundației Culturale Magazin Istoric, Bucharest, 1999, p. 87.

through the Military and Political Conventions of 1914 and 1916; the military disaster that came quickly after the war required quick decisions, the German-Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bucharest was imminent. The "Russia" option as a temporary shelter for the Treasury had, perhaps, as an alternative – except for the extremely short time available to the Romanian Government – only a solution such as "*Tismana*" from the 40's, but which, then, had not been prepared at all in any way. Evacuation solutions in other countries, using sea or land transport, could not be considered given the German-Austro-Hungarian domination of these routs.

During the Second World War, the evolution of the military and political balance of forces in the direction of the Axis losing the war was predictable after Stalingrad. With the fragmented national territory, at the discretion of the German "ally", without any other ally, with two neighbours whose revisionist appetite was far from being satisfied, the Romanian Government had little room for manoeuvre. We find out from the documents kept in the NBR archive that the attempts made by the Bank to evacuate its treasury in Switzerland or Turkey, "*could not give any satisfactory result*"¹⁴. Consequently, the Bank's management, "*concerned with the safe preservation of gold, considered it necessary, in the face of circumstances, to move the gold shelter from the treasury in Bucharest to another region of the country.*" The Romanian Government approved this operation and the Bank "*received the agreement to build a security treasury at the Tismana monastery in Gorj County*"¹⁵. In absolute secrecy, all the necessary works were carried out to house the gold with the direct involvement of the General Staff of the Romanian Army, so that by the second decade of September 1944, NBR's gold and 51 boxes of Polish gold were stored and insured at Tismana. The Soviet occupier, present in Romania since August 23rd, 1944, did not find out anything about the operation that was taking place.¹⁶

*

The all-encompassing Soviet occupation installed in Romania along with the "*liberation*" – not because the country was defeated in the war but because the great powers, USSR-US-Great Britain decided, taking into account their own interests and not the principles set out in international

¹⁴ *Tezaurul Băncii Naționale a României la Moscova*, p. 88 (Note of 4th of July 1944 addressed by the Governor of the NBR to Mihai Antonescu, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers).

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 91-97.

documents about “*rightfulness and justice*”, “*the rights of the peoples*”, “*the liberation of the occupied territories*”, etc., signed during the war years – had the most serious consequences, on all levels, on the Romanian society.

Why, in the Churchill-Stalin transaction inscribed on the famous napkin, Romania, of all the states abandoned to the USSR, passes with the highest percentage in the Russian “interest” sphere?

During this long period, as I said before, the *National History* has been mutilated with priority. The treasury, like all other chapters of Russian-related history, has been **closed** to knowledge and **forbidden** to research. Unappealable.

I note two turning points in the history of this Soviet-occupied country:

- ***The withdrawal of the Soviet army from the country in 1958;***
- ***The Declaration of April 1964*** – when the Sovroms, the ubiquitous Soviet advisers and many other instruments of the occupation were liquidated.

For reasons that I have never understood and accepted, there is not much talk about these two historical moments, much less about their positive consequences for the Romanian society. Or they are minimized, misinterpreting their meaning. Like the moment of August 1968.

Gradually, the openings have expanded into all areas, including the field of historical research. National history has begun to re-enter the natural rights of knowledge – but within the limits dictated by the nature of the existing political regime and the state of relations with the USSR.

In this context, the history of the Treasury has returned to the attention of historians; at the same time, the recovery of the Treasury entered the agenda of Romania’s relations – a “**socialist**” country – with the USSR – also a “**socialist**” country – but in the position of “**patron**”.

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej had the initiative to try to open the discussion with the Soviet “comrades” on the issue of returning the Treasury. In circumstances still little studied and known, in **1956**, a small part of the Treasury was returned. The press release of the “Tass” news agency of 12th of June 1956 broadcasted the following title: the USSR “*decided to transfer to the government of People’s Republic of Romania historical values of Romanian applied, decorative and plastic art*”; in the years of the World War II, “*all Soviet archives and state values, including Romanian ones, were evacuated to regions of the country out of danger*”; “*at present, the*

Romanian historical and artistic values that are preserved in the U.R.S.S.¹⁷ have also been put in order, detected and systematized in **their entirety**" (emphasis added – V.M). The "Tass" communiqué stated, "*The Soviet people have carefully preserved all these works of art that are of great historical and artistic value. The U.R.S.S. Government and the Soviet people have always regarded these values as an inalienable good of the Romanian people itself.*"¹⁸ Unlike the "Tass" agency, General Vedenin, the Kremlin commander, narrated George Oprescu, the head of the Romanian Commission invited to Moscow "to receive everything", how the Romanian objects were "discovered": the general had seen "accidentally", in the church of the Holy Apostles, "some icons" that seemed to him not to be Russian and, "researching the situation", he found out that they "are part of the treasury deposited by Romanians in 1916"; but "researching further into Kremlin's basement, he came across the rest of the things deposited" (?!). In the Foreword to the volume *Studies on the treasury returned by the USSR*¹⁹, acad. G. Oprescu reports that General Vedenin assured him that "*the Soviet Government has decided that **everything entrusted to Russia in 1916 should be returned to Romania.***" In fact, acad. Oprescu reinforces Vedenin's words by saying, "*Our entire treasury remained intact... it had been carefully preserved by the Soviet Government and ...every work of art had been studied by a specialist, cleaned, and some paintings even restored.*"

There is very serious misinformation in the information brought in the public space on the occasion of this restitution, both by the Soviet side and by the Romanian side. Here are some of them: what the Soviet Government returned in **1956** was part of the second shipment in July 1917, which included archaeological and church art values, paintings, coins, documents – all of which were *partially deposited in Kremlin*, but mainly at the Moscow House of Deposits and Consignments. The return had nothing to do with the BNR's gold – which had been deposited in Kremlin's Weapons Hall; **this**

¹⁷ Apud *Tezaurul României la Moscova. Documente (1916-1917). Selectate, adnotate și comentate de Viorica Moisuc, Ion Calafeteanu, Constantin Botoran.* Coordination and Introductory Study by Viorica Moisuc, Globus Publishing, Bucharest, 1993, p. 13.

¹⁸ The information contained in the press release of the Soviet news agency is vague and confusing. As will be seen below, they contradict the statements made by the Soviet leaders on the occasion of the first confrontation that took place in Moscow between Ceausescu and Brezhnev, a few years later.

¹⁹ *Studii asupra tezaurului restituit de URSS*, Academiei R.P.R. Publishing House, Bucharest, 1958, p. 10. Apud *Tezaurul României la Moscova...*, pp. 11-13.

was never returned. Finally, acad. G. Oprescu states in writing that the entire treasury “remained intact” and that “**everything was returned today.**”²⁰ It is difficult to assume that George Oprescu was not aware at that time at least of Mihail Romașcanu’s book and collection of documents!²¹ However, there was the official censorship and the party control.

*

In the study that prefaced the volume *Romania and the Russian foreign policy. A century in the history of the Romanian Treasury “preserved” in Moscow. Study and documents*²², I was writing: “Nicolae Ceausescu was directly involved in the resumption by historians of the research on the issue of the Treasury confiscated by Russia, as well as on the history of Bessarabia. For this purpose, a large group of researchers from historical research institutes [the Institute of Historical and Socio-Political Studies, the Nicolae Iorga Institute, the Institute of Military History, the State Archives, the Institute of History A. D. Xenopol, the Academy of Economic Studies – ASE], to which all the funds of prohibited documents and publications were opened. In this way, several volumes of annotated and commented documents were made on the History of the Romanian Treasury evacuated to Moscow and confiscated by the Soviets, the History of Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transylvania,” and the series of volumes devoted to the topic *The Political-Territorial Status of Romanian until 1918*.

In the mid-1970s, the volume ***Tezaurul României evacuat la Moscova 1916-1917*** (232 p.) was printed in a small number (30) in the PCR printing house. Copies were numbered and sent to PCR senior management. The historians who compiled this volume were Viorica Moisuc (coordinator), Constantin Botoran, Ion Calafeteanu, Eliza Campus, Iulian Hațieganu²³. Copies of documents in the Archives of the National Bank of Romania (official documents signed by the Romanian and Russian Plenipotentiaries),

²⁰ Apud *Tezaurul României la Moscova...*, p. 11. About the contents of the 1956 restitution see pp. 12-15.

²¹ Mihail G. Romașcanu, *Tezaurul român de la Moscova*, Cartea Românească, Bucharest, 1924.

²² Viorica Moisuc, *Românii și politica externă rusească. Studiu și Documente*, Casa Editorială Demiurg, Iași, 2013, pp. 15-27. N.B.: excerpts from this study are included in this study so as not to repeat a whole series of information but also value judgments that I do not intend to change; what I added I pointed out in square brackets.

²³ Iulian Hațieganu, Eliza Campus and Constantin Botoran, colleagues, and friends, left us a long time ago.

documents from the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [notes, telegrams, diplomatic reports, minutes, memoirs, documents regarding the operations prior to dispatch, the execution of the two transports – December 1916, July 1917 – on the route Iasi-Chisinau-Ungheni-Odessa-Moscow, the action of depositing in Kremlin and inventorying the contents of the crates containing the NBR's gold stock, the minutes concluded on this occasion, documents regarding the confiscation of the Treasury, the arrest of the personnel of the Romanian legation in Petrograd and the unilateral rupture of the diplomatic relations with Romania on January 13th, 1918, etc.] were included in the volume; in addition to the shortcomings, some documents published after the war by Mihail Romașcanu were included in this volume.

The documentation on these issues subsumed to the history of the Treasury was echoed in the public space within certain limits, more in the university, intellectual world, but also abroad by the participation of Romanian historians in various international scientific events; however, it was used in the action of the country's governing bodies in relations with the USSR on the issue of the return of the Treasury; but, the cantonment of Soviet concern in matters of a territorial nature unrelated to the issue of the Treasury – the *“Romanian occupation” of Bessarabia, the damage caused by the Romanian army in the occupied areas during the years of World War II, etc.* – drowned in this avalanche of issues the real and permanently current issue of **the return of the Treasury** – which has fallen into a kind of *“derisory”*. We specify in the above-mentioned study – during the talks in Moscow between Nicolae Ceausescu and Leonid Brezhnev, *“the latter proposed that ‘the problem be closed’, because it is a matter of history, and there are no more current problems between the two countries that need to be solved. Ceausescu opposed it, agreeing only to interrupt the talks for the time being, but ‘the issue must remain open’. Due to this position of the Romanian leader, the issue of the restitution of the Treasury has remained present in the Romanian-Soviet and then Romanian-Russian relations, until today.”* The leader of the RCP, Paul Niculescu-Mizil, a member of the delegation that had these very tense discussions with Brezhnev, recounted in detail in his memoirs the meeting and confrontations in Moscow.²⁴

The treasury will be returned “in the hands of the Romanian people” – it is written in black and white in the Declaration of severance of diplomatic relations with Romania, signed by Lenin on January 13/26, 1918.

²⁴ Paul Niculescu-Mizil, *O istorie trăită*, vol. I-II, Enciclopedică Publishing, Bucharest, 1997, 2nd edition, completed and revised, 2002.

*If even during the regime patronized by the USSR, the Romanian people **were not able** to receive back the property confiscated in 1918, then... when?*

A remembrance, even a brief one, of those discussed in Moscow in **1965**, during the visit of the RCP delegation led by Nicolae Ceausescu²⁵, on **September 3-11** – as it appears from the *transcript of these discussions kept in the CC Archive of RCP, Chancellery Fund, file 124/1965, published by the historians Petre Otu and Ștefan Marian in “Magazin istoric” no. 9-10, also published (excerpts strictly referring to the issue of the Treasury) in the volume Tezaurul Băncii Naționale a României la Moscova (pp. 72-85)*, mentioned in other papers as well –, is useful for a more comprehensive understanding of the issue that occupies one hundred and twenty-five years the agenda of Romanian-Russian relations, but also for understanding the situation in the years that followed.

“We say: give us back what belongs to us, you say: we do not have to!”

The discussions were tense, the Romanian side proved with documents the motivation of the request for the return of the treasury, the Soviets arguing the refusal with theoretical speculations, with false information.

Thus, **Alexandru Bârlădeanu** began by sketching a short history of the problem, avoiding issues related to the abandonment of the Romanian ally by the Russian army – a situation that fully contributed to the fall of Bucharest under the German-Austro-Hungarian occupation, having as consequences among others the evacuation of the Treasury in Russia: *“During the First World War, when part of the Romanian territory was occupied by German troops, an agreement was reached in which, in order to be safe and to avoid a possible fall into German hands, the gold treasury and other values of our national economy as well as the values belonging to the Romanian House of Savings and Consignments were to be stored in Russia. As a result of this agreement, in **December 1916**, a number of 1,738 boxes containing almost the entire gold treasury of the National Bank of Romania as well as two boxes with the jewels of the Royal House were shipped to Moscow. All the boxes were stored in Kremlin, in a compartment reserved for*

²⁵ The delegation included Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Alexandru Bârlădeanu, Paul Niculescu-Mizil, Manea Mănescu, Corneliu Mănescu and others; the Soviet side was represented by Leonid Brezhnev, A.N. Kosagin, I.V. Andropov, A.A. Gromâko, N.V. Novikov and others.

the State Bank of Romania, here, in the Weapons Hall. In **July 1917**, a second transport was carried out containing 188 boxes with the rest of the gold treasury and other values of the House of Savings and Consignments...” Details were given regarding the total value of the Treasury, its content, existing data in the documents published both by Romaşcanu in the mentioned volume and in the specialized literature of the time. Continuing his presentation, Bârlădeanu referred, with exact data, to the restitutions from 1935 and 1956: “Twice, in 1935, after the revival of the diplomatic relations, and in 1956, **some of these deposited boxes were returned to us, containing archives, historical documents, works of art,...but the gold treasury of the National Bank was not returned, which represented the coverage of the national currency and a great wealth of the Romanian people.**”²⁶ At the end of his demonstration, A. Bârlădeanu formulated the conclusion: “**Today, ...we raise before you the issue of returning this gold deposit to its true owner – the Romanian people. We consider that this restitution... it also has a special political significance in that it accomplishes what Lenin still believes must be done...**” (emphasis added – V.M.).

In his reply, Brezhnev outlined Russia's position – the same, supported by Russian historians and politicians before and after the break-up of the Soviet bloc – on the issue of the Romanian Treasury confiscated in 1918, a problem he artificially and unjustifiably combined, neither legally, nor politically, nor morally, with Russian territorial and financial claims (“debts” imposed on Romania), issues unrelated to Russia's obligation to return to Romania its Treasury in full, as stated in the signed documents by Russian officials repeatedly in 1916, 1917, 1918: “This issue has been around for 50 years,” said Brezhnev, and refers to the **expenses** between tsarist Russia and royal Romania... After 50 years, suddenly, two socialist countries begin to remember the relations between the tsarist government and the royal government. **We were astonished by the very introduction of the issue...** What does the issue look like for us? It is clear from the existing material that in December 1916 an **unknown representative**, a not very representative figure – this action took place when the Germans occupied your country and presented a great danger –, allegedly, transmitted to the Command of the Southwest Front ... these treasure boxes... they were **transmitted on trust...** What happened next? Tsarism has been removed and **all these boxes have fallen into the hands of the interim government. This is where the information ends,**” Brezhnev said. **We can't find any more data**

²⁶ Apud Tezaurul Băncii Naţionale a României, pp. 72-74.

from any commission because the civil war started and then some of the gold was sent to ...Perm, Omsk, Kazan, Saratov..." However, the Soviet leader still gives some "information": during the Civil War, some of this gold **"has been robbed by white-guards."** The conclusion: **"There is no clear situation in the archives. When Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej and you raised the issue of returning this treasury, I returned these boxes for which complete lists existed"** (emphasis added – V.M.).

The data mentioned by Brezhnev are false, 1) the boxes containing the Romanian treasury **"fell into the hands of the interim government"**; 2) part of the gold **has been robbed by white-guards**; 3) the gold boxes **"for which complete lists existed" were returned**; 4) the treasury was sent to Russia **"on trust"**; 5) **"a unknown sent to the commander of the Southwest Front... these boxes containing the treasury..."**

Because the documents of the period after the February Revolution regarding the Treasury – documents from the Romanian archives – are published and can be consulted in any library, I review only the main data that refute Brezhnev's statements: **February 16th, 1917, Moscow – Protocol concluded with the occasion of the submission to Kremlin of the Romanian Treasury – values of the National Bank (first transport)** written in Russian and French, signed by delegates of the Ministry of Finance of Russia, the Russian State Bank and NBR's delegates; *The Memorandum* of the BNR's representative, Vasilescu, regarding the transport of the Treasury from Iasi to Moscow and the detailed inventory of **the 1,737 boxes – 13 823 bags containing gold coins and bullions**²⁷. All these values were deposited in the reserved compartment in Kremlin's Weapons Hall; document dated **May 25th, 1917, Moscow**, letter from the NBR's representative in Moscow, M. Demetrescu addressed to the Governor of the NBR informing him that: **"On Tuesday, May 23, 1917, at 11 a.m., accompanying Mr. Director T. Capitanovici, they were at the Kremlin where, in the presence of Mr. Kowalnitzki, the guarantor of the State Bank in Moscow, Weniaminoff, the director of the Moscow branch of the State Bank, Yakovleff, deputy director, and Mandrowski, secretary, they inspected the National Bank's treasury, where we found the 1,738 boxes of various gold coins, as well as 2 PR boxes [Queen Maria's jewellery], a total of 1,740 boxes that make up the entire stored National Bank's treasury"**²⁸.

²⁷ *Tezaurul României la Moscova...*, doc. no. 12, 13, 14, 15, pp. 42-57.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, doc. no. 17, pp. 61-62.

The mentioned documents are in the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania and the NBR's Archive.

In preparation for the departure of the second transport to Russia, we find a rich diplomatic correspondence even with the **Interim Government** on its conditions and content. **On July 27th, 1917**, in a letter to Finance Minister Nicolae Titulescu, Poklewsky-Koziell – Russia's Minister in Romania – announced **that the Russian government had granted him “full powers necessary to sign the Protocols on the evacuation in Russia of the securities belonging to the National Bank and other public institutions in Romania”²⁹**, which was done on the same day, **July 27th**, when, in Iasi, **the Protocol** was signed by the Russian Minister, Titulescu and the representatives of the NBR, **on the occasion of the departure of the second transport to Russia³⁰**. This transport, guarded by Cossack troops, arrived in Moscow on **August 3rd, 1917**, and was deposited at Kremlin in the Weapons Hall in the same compartment where the first transport had been deposited. An inventory was made – dated **August 5th, 1917** – of the contents of this transport, signed by representatives of the two parties.³¹

An interesting and as accurate as possible document in the BNR Archive, regarding the **“verification of the treasury's situation (first transport) deposited in Moscow”**, dated **August 12th, 1917**, report sent from Moscow to the NBR's governor by censors C. Nacu and N.C. Constantinescu, states that all the crates deposited in January 1917 were intact.³²

This is the **latest information** known so far from Romanian archive sources regarding the situation of the Romanian treasury deposited in the Kremlin. So, during the **interim government**, when the second transport of the Romanian values took place (BNR and House of Deposits and Consignments and other institutions), the negotiations took place with representatives empowered by that government and on **August 12th, 1917**, the last inspection made by the representatives of the NBR attest to the complete security of the values deposited in the Kremlin.

It follows only from these few documents that the information circulated by Brezhnev in 1965, which, in fact, **resumed and developed** the **“arguments”** supported by Russian diplomats in the so-called Romanian-

²⁹ *Ibid.*, doc. no. 21 , p. 65.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, doc. no. 22, pp. 66 -67 and doc. no. 23, pp. 68-70

³¹ *Ibid.*, doc. no. 24 , 25, pp. 70-73 (documents from the Archive of The Romanian MFA).

³² *Ibid.*, doc. no. 26, p. 74.

Russian negotiations of the 1920s and **remained unchanged in the fake inventory used by Russian historians and politicians from then until today, are specially tailored to “argue” the refusal to return the Treasury to the “rightful owner”**. As can be seen, the signatures of the Russian officials as well as the commitments not only of the governments of the Russian Empire, of the “interim” government but also of the Soviet Power, even the signature of the “father” of the October 1917 revolution, **V.I. Lenin**, on an official international act, have no value and are not taken into account – **not** by foreigners, but by the Russians themselves, if it is all about an **unjustifiable** seizure of material goods and territories.

The NBR archive as well reveals the situation from the next period, recorded by its representatives in Moscow in charge of supervising the situation of the Treasury.

In **December 1917**, *T. Capitanovici*, director of the National Bank, reported from Moscow to the Governor on **the situation of the Treasury after the October Revolution**:

*“On October 28th, a street movement began here that degenerated into a civil war and lasted uninterruptedly until 3th of November. The centre of these battles was the Metropol Hotel, where we lived, located near the local City Hall (Duma). For six days, we were bombed day and night; the hotel had started to collapse and even in some parts it caught fire. We, together with the other passengers, were locked in the cellars of the Hotel, where we stayed without being able to sleep and as food we had two baked potatoes per person. Our rooms were opened, the chests were broken and money, valuables, clothes, etc. were stolen and destroyed, the last remnants that we could still escape from the disaster in Bucharest. As the hotel could no longer be accommodated, we were taken by Mr. Guerin³³... a real providence for the Romanians in Moscow, who found us a room in the houses where he lives... The next day, **November 5th**, I was able to get the **first information about our treasury in the Kremlin**, where great artillery fighting had taken place, and **we were assured that our deposit was still in good condition but** had no one to contact to ensure its preservation in the future. The situation was immediately telegraphed to the government. **To this day, December 4th, 1917, nothing abnormal; the treasury is intact, the entrances have been checked and the doors and seals have been found intact**. However, I refused to ask for it to be opened in order to check the interior, so as not to attract the attention of the guard and especially of the Red Guard, advised by the former State Bank guarantor, Mr. **Kowalnitzky**,*

³³ Honorary Consul of Romania in Moscow.

who was replaced after he **was arrested** for several days for **refusing to hand over the keys to his bank's treasury**. The situation continues to be very difficult and insecure, an impossible atmosphere, **I do not know what will happen to our deposits or to us**. No action can be taken now, but as soon as things calm down – if they can calm down – I think **the treasury in Moscow will be lifted and brought, if not in the country, elsewhere, taking the agreement with the friendly powers and especially with America.**" Capitanovici then announced the arrival of a group of 19 people in Moscow³⁴ for guarding the treasury but, under the conditions existing then, they were to be used to guard the BNR printing house operating in Moscow ("where we have great values") printing bank notes. Capitanovici announces the Governor that on his departure from Moscow he will entrust the keys of the Kremlin Compartment where the BNR Treasury was stored to the engineer Dobrovich who remained in Moscow.³⁵

Therefore, **on December 4th, 1917, in the midst of the revolution, the treasury was still intact**, according to indirect information received by the director Capitanovici.

Given the uncertain situation after the events of October, the diplomatic action was initiated in Iasi in order to move the Treasury elsewhere. The telegraph correspondence was long overdue, in Paris as well as in Petrograd and Iasi, the provisions crossed roads, and in Russia, the situation deteriorated rapidly.

The attempts of the Romanian Government to gain Allied support for transporting the treasury from Moscow elsewhere have been belated, with events in Russia far ahead of these rather cumbersome negotiations. However, none of the Allies, including America, was willing to engage in this complicated and risky action.³⁶

Following the events, we find that all of Brezhnev's speculations about the fate of the Treasury deposited in the Kremlin (its appropriation by the *interim government*, *white-guards*, etc.) are blown up by **the first force of the Soviet power, on January 13th, 1918** when Romania's fortune is simply confiscated; the printing house of the National Bank and all the printed bank notes were also confiscated, in a total of 40,000,000 lei, as well as the values

³⁴ It was, in fact, a group of gendarmes armed (in civilian clothes) with the task of discreetly monitoring the Kremlin depots. The mission was not carried out because no one could enter the Palace without special permission issued by the Soviet authorities.

³⁵ *Cited work*, doc. no. 27, pp. 75-76.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, doc no. 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 48, pp. 108-113, 116-118.

and titles of the private banks and of the House of Deposits. *“National Bank’s materials and clichés were also seized.”*³⁷

Those who were the first to attack the Romanian Treasury **were neither the interim government nor the white-guards. It was the Soviet Power**; in order to implement the decision of confiscation, on **February 27th, 1918**, the **French consul in Moscow who has received in storage – after the rupture of the relations between Soviet Russia and Romania – the archive of the Romanian Consulate, the documents relating to the Romanian Treasury deposited in the Kremlin and in the Russian Deposit and Consumption House in Moscow**, as well as the keys to the Weapons Hall Compartment where the Treasury had been deposited and those from the Sudnaia Kassa, *“received a formal request, on behalf of the Soviet Government to hand over the keys to the Treasury to the Moscow Commissioner for Foreign Affairs”*. The French Consul – we read in the *Minutes of the report concluded by the French Consul in Moscow, Eirick Labonne*, dated **March 1st, 1918** and sent to the Romanian Government in Iasi – *explained to the Commissioner that in his capacity as representative of Romanian interests and responsible for a deposit of goods belonging to the Romanian Government, he could not consent to this transfer.*” But the confrontation did not end there: *The foreign commissioner said at the time that the values belonging to the Romanian Government, by the Decision of the People’s Commissars of Petrograd, had been simply confiscated by virtue of the state of war commissioners and he demands, if need be, even by force, the surrender of the keys.”*³⁸ The categorical refusal of the Consul E. Labonne changed the position of the Soviets, **not** on the basis of the problem but on the way it was expressed. By letter no. 7595 addressed by the same unreasonable commissioner to Consul Labonne, it is said: *“Mr. Consul, I hereby have the honour to ask you to give me the keys to the deposit room, which contains the values of the Romanian state, to take*

³⁷ *Ibid.*, doc no. 49 , p. 117 : the telegram of the honorary consul Guérin sent to the Romanian Government in Iasi through the French Consulate in Moscow, January 24th, 1918. According to Prof. C.I. Băicoianu, the printing house of the Bank (later of engineer Dobrovici) had printed bank notes in the total amount of 141,530,000 lei. Some of these bank notes were deposited in boxes that were deposited next to the values of the House of Deposits, at Sudnaia Kasa in Moscow (C.I. Băicoianu, *Istoria politicii noastre monetare*, vol III, pp. 153-154 and 215-216. Apud *Tezaurul României la Moscova...* p. 117, note 54).

³⁸ *Ibid.*, doc. no. 51, p. 119. MAE Archive, fond 71/ 1914, part I, vol. 183, pp. 84-85. Apud *Tezaurul României la Moscova....*, p. 117.

from there the boxes deposited in due course by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Moscow, and I believe I must assure you that the values of the Romanian state deposited there will remain untouched in accordance with the minutes you have."³⁹ It should be noted that when the boxes with NBR's values were deposited in the Kremlin in **December 1916 - January 1917, there was no People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs**, and the official documents drawn up by Romanians and Russians on the occasion of the inventory made then, but on other occasions as well, does not mention the existence of any box of Russian goods in the known compartment.⁴⁰

So, the lies are starting to pile up, I will record them below.

The French did not give in the French ambassador to Petrograd, Noulens, asked Labonne as early as **January 24 / February 6**, to make "an approach to the People's Commissars to signal that this treasury is under the guarantee of the Entente's powers". Noulens told Labonne, "From this moment on, I have officially warned the People's Commissars about the special rights that France and certain governments have over the Romanian treasury." As a result, Consul Labonne made the request to the Sovnarkom (Council of People's Commissars) in the form of **a verbal note read to Fritsche**, the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs⁴¹, the English consul being also present in Moscow. Things did not stop there. On **March 8/21, 1918**, following the strong pressure, Fritsche, claiming that **"the state of war between Romania and Russia gave him the right to confiscate Romanian property in Russia, formally maintained the request to be hand over the keys."** In the presence of the consuls of England and America, Labonne drafted a *Protocol* specifying the situation created. Until the next day, Fritsche picked up the "claimed" boxes from the Treasury and then returned the keys to the French consul. However, the Soviet side continued to make claims on the Romanian deposit. **There is no** report on the goods seized by the Russians from the compartment of the Romanian treasury, or other explanatory documents. Practically, **from that moment on, the Romanian side or its intermediaries did not have any control over the assets deposited in Moscow.**

However, Fritsche "worked" in the compartment in the Weapons Hall that housed the Romanian gold, to take the crates "placed there by the Soviet authorities", **a day and a night**, after which he returned the keys. But,

³⁹ *Ibid.*, doc. no. 52, p. 120.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, doc. no. 53, pp. 121-123. See also note 57, p. 120 and note 65, p. 122.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 118, note 55.

even after more than a century, the truth still comes to light. Revealing documents (unknown – it seems – not even by Russian-Soviet historians, much less by Russian politicians) have been preserved in *the State Archives of the Russian Federation*.

An Information coming from the State Treasury of RSFSR, dated February 21st, 1921, having no. 1676, referring to the **Romanian Treasury**, states that “On January 25th, 1918, 16 boxes of Romanian banknotes totalling 13,345,000 lei were seized by Commissioner Vladimir Maximovici Frice. Fritsche’s action is referred to as well in the Address of the State Treasury of May 21st, 1921, no. 2293, to the Deputy Commissioner for Finance Alski, an existing document in the Russian State Archive for Socio-Political History.”⁴²

Returning to the avalanche of lies on which the so-called “**right**” of the Soviets to dispose of the existing Romanian fortunes in Russia was built.

1. Throughout 1917, when the “*interim government*” was in power in Russia – the creation of the revolution of February 1917 –, the operation of evacuating the Treasury, of other artistic, archaeological, church, etc. assets, of the House of Savings and Consignments, of the banks and other private institutions, continued unabated, under the conditions organized by the two parties, on the basis of official documents – agreements signed by their proxies.

2. During this period there was no attempt by the white-guards to steal the Romanian treasure, neither during the transport by train nor later.

3. The first attack on the treasury belonged to the Soviet Power – **January 13th, 1918**.

4. **The state of war does not give any right to the aggressor over the goods of the attacked party. At the same time, it should be emphasized that in 1917-1918, Romania and Russia were formally allies in the coalition of Allied and Associated Powers and not “at war”.** Indeed, many centuries ago, even millennia ago, the conqueror had the (unwritten) “right” to appropriate, after victory, everything he wanted, to rob, to kill, to set on fire, to dispose as he wished of the goods and lives of those defeated.

5. **In January 1918, there was no state of war between Russia and Romania**, neither declared, nor undeclared. However, Russia’s aggression against Romania was obvious, the subject being in fact **Bessarabia**, which begun the self-determination process on **December 2nd, 1917**, proclaiming its independence on **January 24th, 1918** – acts announcing the Union with Romania. It was another element to consider by the Soviet power in its

⁴² Apud Ilie Schipor, *Destinul tezaurului României – Argumente din arhivele ruse*, doc. no. 60, 63, pp. 215-216, 220-221.

relation to Romania. The Romanian military victories in the summer of 1917 did not bode well for the evolution of the relations of the new Power in Russia with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Hence, the attempts to overthrow the Romanian political regime (Roșal episode, December 1917), the betrayal of the Russian army on the entire Eastern Front, the robbery and rioting unleashed in Moldova by the million rebellious Russians (thrown across the border by the Romanian army), the ultimate pressures for the acceptance by the Romanian Government of a separate peace with the Centrals and many others.

It should be noted that always, any event cannot be neither researched nor understood if it is not placed in the context in which it took place. *It is an axiom of historical research.* In this case, the coincidence of the dates of the events must be carefully observed.

Returning to the Romanian-Soviet negotiations of 1965.

To Brezhnev, **Ion Gh. Maurer** opposed the plea of truth with the clear statement: ***"I have proposed a simple solution: the restitution of the Treasury. This solution clearly results from the acts concluded between the leadership of the Kingdom of Romania and the Russian tsarist government of that time. But it also results from the clear commitments of the Soviet side, whom, by a decision of the Council of People's Commissars, pledged to hold this gold stock deposited by Romania and to return it to the Romanian people. I have considered that both you and us will agree with the fact that, at the moment, the Romanian people is the one exercising political power in our country and that therefore, in accordance with these commitments assumed by the Soviet Power, by the Decision of the People's Commissars of January 13 / 26, 1918, the Treasury must be returned to the Romanian people. ...I have proposed a very important political solution because, first of all, it results from the very clear commitments of the Soviet side."***

Referring then to Brezhnev's conclusions and quoting the proposed "solution" to "closing this problem", Maurer states without reservation: ***"This is not our point of view. We have opened the problem, the problem remains open... "We say: give us back what belongs to us, you say: we do not have to. But we do not agree with closing the issue; the issue must remain open, we did not agree today, we will discuss tomorrow, and we will have to agree on this chapter, in accordance with the commitments made..."***⁴³

⁴³ Apud Tezaurul Băncii Naționale a României la Moscova, p. 78.

The toughest confrontation between **Nicolae Ceausescu** and **Brezhnev** followed. The Romanian leader began by reading the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of 13/26 of January 1918, emphasizing the responsibilities voluntarily assumed by the Soviet Power, namely, **the intangibility of the Treasury, its preservation, its restitution "in the hands of the Romanian people"**. "So, we are not just talking about an agreement between two governments that have been overthrown by the revolution. **It is about** – said Ceausescu – **a public commitment of the Soviet Power... We addressed the Soviet Power with the request to respect its commitment made in 1918. You answered: we cannot give it.**" And he continued: "We say openly that we cannot share the considerations set forth by Comrade Brezhnev – they are not substantiated either from a legal point of view or from other points of view." He cites Romania as an example of correctness, which, during the 1939 invasion of Poland, received and housed part of the Polish gold and **returned it in full after the war**, then invited the interlocutors to "reflect" – an issue that Brezhnev did not comment upon. In obvious confusion, the Soviet leader turns the issue upside down and claims that, in fact, in 1956, "what was kept here in the Kremlin has been completely returned to you," echoing the false assertion that, after the Supreme Soviet decision of January 13/26, 1918 "this treasury was robbed by the white-guards, which – Brezhnev argued with false innocence – **absolves to some extent the Soviet Power of responsibility**", after which he crossed the t's: "**We have come to the conclusion that we consider this problem buried starting from to the idea of our brotherly collaboration.**"⁴⁴ (emphasis added – V.M.)

The issue of so-called "mutual settlements" raised by the Soviet side provoked a harsh exchange of remarks with the Romanians. "We are not raising this issue," Ceausescu said. *We have raised a simple thing: an agreement was reached between two governments signed by the then finance ministers; these values were given for storage; **they were not given as collateral on account of some debts.** According to all international and domestic regulations, if you let someone keep something, they are obliged to return it to you. The Council of People's Commissars – of which, as I recall, Lenin was a member – considered that it must assume its responsibility to preserve and return these values to the Romanian people, adopting a special decision in this regard. **This is a proof of observing the international law, the right of another people because, as it is said here, this treasury belongs to the Romanian people... We are only raising the***

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 80-81.

*issue of making a restitution of what has been deposited, and what the Soviet power has said it will give back to the Romanian people. **We do not understand why we should raise the issue of settlements. We do not understand why we should link this issue to the problems of the Second World War.***"⁴⁵

By abruptly raising the issue of so-called "settlements", the Soviet leaders sought to show that Romania's debt to Russia-USSR would far exceed the value of the claimed treasury and that non-acceptance of "expenses" would lead to great inconveniences for Romania, the balance of those "debts" being clearly unfavourable to Romania. There were disguised threats meant to determine the Romanian side to renounce its rightful claims. "What can we understand when it is said that this can lead to very unpleasant things with serious consequences? Serious for whom? Serious consequences can only be for those who exist today, that is, for the Romanian people, not for those who no longer exist!" Ceausescu replied. Regarding the so-called "settlements", he stated: "What we want to ask of you is that in discussing this issue, and, in general, any problems that may arise, we should not link issues that have nothing in common, because they cannot be interpreted, Comrade Brezhnev, except as **attempts to prevent us from raising again the issue of the return of the treasury. This cannot be a basis for the development of our relations.**"

The harsh exchange of Brezhnev-Ceausescu-Kosagin remarks on the issues of treasury restitution – the "settlements", the "burying" of the treasury issue, the insistent request of the Soviet side to permanently remove this issue from the agenda of Romanian-Soviet relations, ended with the conclusion formulated by Ceausescu: "**We realize that the problem cannot be clarified now. We agree to postpone it... It has to find a solution.**"⁴⁶

Thus, from 1965 until today, **the issue of the Romanian Treasury confiscated by Soviet Russia on January 13/26, 1918, and not returned, has remained open. And one more finding. What was said in Moscow on September 3-11, 1965, in support of the request for the return of the confiscated treasury has not been repeated since then and until today.**

*

I was writing, in 1993, in the *Introduction* to the mentioned volume, published then: "Made more than 18 years ago, it remained unpublished

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*,

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 84-85.

for easy-to-understand reasons. The discovery of the documents, their corroboration with information from various sources reveals an amazing page of history... What was sent to Moscow in 1916-1917 was a huge fortune, all that was most precious to Romania then – and its territory included only Oltenia, Muntenia, Dobrogea and Moldova to the Prut, without Bukovina –, starting with the entire National Bank treasury, Queen Maria's jewellery, the goods of the House of Deposits and Consignments, the immeasurable fortunes of art and antiquity museums, churches and monasteries, the values of the Romanian Academy and the State Archives, the State Art Gallery, other public and private institutions, as well as private individuals. Undoubtedly, the haste in which all these fortunes were gathered to be packed and sent to Iasi and from there, loaded in dozens and dozens of wagons, to Moscow, was one of the reasons why a relatively correct inventory and assessment, therefore a complete record of them, does not exist. Secondly, the pilgrimages of papers during the years of occupation (Bucharest - Iasi - Bucharest) with the relocation of state institutions, central administration, government, etc., led, of course, to the loss of records, minutes, inventories (originals or copies); finally, the post-war administrative reorganizations, in turn, had negative consequences for the bureaucracy, so that, again, the packages of documents – minutes, letters, telegrams, memoirs, records, lists, etc. – regarding the history of the evacuation of the Treasury, suffered serious losses."

Here are the calculations made in **1990** regarding the total amount of gold sent to Moscow, calculations made by the wisest specialists of the time: I specify that in the work of Mihail Romaşcanu – **the only one published until 1993** – there is no updated assessment (1924) of the lost treasury. Here are these calculations as I recorded them in **1993**, page 6 of the volume published at the time: "The value of the gold treasury evacuated to the Kremlin, belonging only to the National Bank of Romania, has been **estimated at 314,580,456.84 gold-lei, treasury consisting of bullions, different coins, and medals; to this Queen Maria's jewellery is added, estimated at 7,000,000 gold-lei.**

To give us some idea of the value – at today's level (1990) of this treasury, we made the following calculation: given that the parity (content) in fine gold of a gold-lei in that period [1916-1917] was 0.29032258 g fine gold, in accordance with the provisions of the Law for the establishment of a new monetary system of March 29 / April 11, 1867, valid in 1916, it results the amount of **93.36206 tons of fine gold, equal to 3,001,657.70 ounces. At the level of 1990, one ounce of fine gold was valued at about US \$ 400.**

Thus, the current value [1990] of the 93,36206 tons of fine gold in the treasury would be **US \$ 1,200,663,081.56.**"

I insert here the footnote from p. 6, explanatory: "Here is the calculation confirmed by specialists from BRCE [Romanian Foreign Trade Bank], whom I thank in this way for the support provided: $321,580,456 \times 0,29033258: 1,000,000 = 93,36206 \text{ tons of fine gold} \times 32,150.72 = 3,001,657.70 \text{ ounces} \times \$ 400 = \$ 1,200,663,081.56$ ".

In 1993, when I have published the volume of documents containing these considerations, I have also made some reservations as follows: "However, the figures are far from reflecting the reality, because the NBR's treasury was mostly composed of gold coins – Napoleons, Ottoman pounds, Austrian crowns, pounds sterling, etc. and medals, or their value **is not calculated in gold-weight**. From 1916 until today [1990], the value of gold coins and medals has greatly increased. For example, in 1916, a one-pound gold coin was worth \$ 4.8; today [1990], the same currency is quoted at US \$ 100. As the NBR's treasury in Moscow contained 88,000 gold pounds, they are now worth US \$ 8,800,000. That is why we can only have a relative image in figures of the value of the NBR's thesaur, a treasury that constitutes only a part of the evacuated assets."

These are the figures put into circulation through the work *Tezaurul României la Moscova. Documente 1916-1917*, published in 1993 in Bucharest, Globus Publishing House.

The subsequent papers poached these figures with reference to either the volume published in 1993 or the one published in 2013. I mention: *Tezaurul Băncii Naționale a României la Moscova – Documente*, Foreword by Ph.D. prof. Mugur Isărescu. Historic comment and edition by Cristian Păunescu, Marian Ștefan, Historical Magazine Cultural Foundation Publishing House, Bucharest, 1999; Ioan Scurtu, *Tezaurul României la Moscova. Note și mărturii despre activitatea Comisiei Comune româno-ruse (2004 – 2012)*, Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2014. Pavel Țugui published a very interesting study on the first attempt to approach the "restitution" of the Treasury made by Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, followed by the act of **1956** of returning a small part of the values deposited by Romania in Russia in 1917 (second transport): "Hrușciov, Gheorghiu-Dej și Tezaurul României la Moscova. Anii 1955-1956 (I)," in *Culture*, weekly edited by the Romanian Cultural Foundation, year VIII, no. 26 (430), pp. 18-21 and the continuation in no. 27 (431), August 1st, 2013, pp. 16-18.

*

The 1990s brought radical changes to the political physiognomy of the “Soviet bloc.” The USSR no longer exists, and Russia affirms democratic principles in its domestic and foreign policy. Theoretically, **the problem** of Bessarabia would no longer exist either; the **independent and sovereign state The Republic of Moldova** unreservedly expresses its European option and belonging to the Romanian historical-cultural-linguistic space. *“The Trojan Horse”* called *Transnistria* and the *sine die* settlement of the 14th Russian Army on the territory of a foreign state, Moscow’s disregard of all international decisions regarding *the liberation of the Republic of Moldova, the perpetuation of the Russian political-military outpost on Transnistrian territory, announces plans of imperial origin aiming the presence and the control in a territory that no longer belongs to it.*

The legacy left by the Soviet empire to **Ukraine** – the northern half of **Romanian Bukovina** – falls into another sphere of concern and problems but it concerns the entire Romanian nation left under foreign **occupation**, even if the term is no longer used in diplomatic and political vocabulary in the area. The phrase *“minorities rights”* has a mutilated meaning for the native Romanians in that part of the Romanian country traded almost a century ago by the two dictators – Hitler and Stalin – who set Europe on fire.

How is the approach to the issue of the Romanian Treasury outlined in the new political situation? From the side of the European Union? From the Russian side? From the Romanian side?

There are three major problems to which clear and definitive answers cannot be given. At least from a historian. Because, as “comrade” Brezhnev said in 1965, we are dealing with a *“political problem”* that does not belong to the brotherhood of historians.

I. Territorial issues between Romania and Russia, more precisely *the obstinate claim of Bessarabia* present in the Romanian-Soviet discussions from the pre-war period, have disappeared in June **1940**, following the Soviet aggression against Romania; subsequently, the secret or less secret agreements between the new allies – the USSR, the USA, Great Britain – during the war years perpetuated – through the peace treaty of **1947** – the provisions of the ultimatum aggressively imposed on Romania in 1940.

The issue of the Treasury was no longer intertwined with that of the possession of Bessarabia. However, the aberrant issue of “expenses” remained.

But *“both the Romanian treasury and other values, whose fate underwent changes during the years of the Second World War, have become issues of international interest entering the attention of the European*

*Union.*⁴⁷ In 1995, Romania has initiated a Resolution draft followed by Motion no. 7356/2 July 1995; *its discussion at the level of experts was rejected by Russia, the reason invoked being the existence in the Duma debate of a bill providing for the return of material goods of other states, deposited in the USSR during the war.* It was unfortunate that *the Russian State Duma rejected the plan to return those goods*; the result is known – nothing has changed.⁴⁸

The Committee for Culture, Education and Science of the European Commission has drawn up a report stating that in the years of the First World War Romania sent to Moscow for safekeeping values which belonged to it, and which must be returned to it. After all, who expected an EC's *recommendation* to be considered by Moscow?⁴⁹

Romania has the status of a full member of the European Union and a member of NATO. Russia **does not**; it has only **one status**: that of *great power* and it assumes its "*rights*" accordingly. Treaties, principles, obligations, commitments, international morality – these have a special meaning for Russia. In the interwar period, the USSR did not consider, as I mentioned, the decisions of the international community regarding the Romanian Treasury, it did not respect its own signatures on international treaties on peace and general security, why would it do it now?

II. *The Treaty of Cooperation, Good Neighbourly Relations and Friendship* between Romania and the USSR signed by Presidents Ion Iliescu and Mikhail Gorbachev on *April 4th, 1991* (after its initialling by Foreign Ministers Adrian Nastase and Alexandr Besmertny on March 20th) has also addressed the issue of the Treasury; Gorbachev repeated the old *unawareness* "excuse", promising, like his predecessors, that "*he will look into it.*" The Moscow putsch in August 1991 has led to the disappearance of the title "**USSR**" but has not brought anything new to the so-called "*outstanding problems*". The new Moscow administration, which claims to be democratic, has condemned the Hitler-Stalin pact of August 23rd, 1939, but set aside its **consequences**, many and heavy, even after nearly a century from their accomplishment.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ See Viorica Moisuc, *Romania's Treasure evacuated in Moscow in 1916 and confiscated by the Soviets – a Present International Problem*, Augusta Publishing House, Timișoara, 2001, chapters VII–VIII.

⁴⁸ Apud Viorica Moisuc, *Românii și politica externă rusească*, pp. 24-26.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁰ See Emilian Bold, Ilie Seftiuc, *Pactul Ribbentrop-Molotov și implicațiile internaționale*, 2nd edition revised, Iași, Demiurg Plus Publishing House, Iași, 2010.

This treaty was a good opportunity for some Russian historians (A. Iazkova, Vinogradov, etc.) to claim that the whole “story” of the Romanian Treasury, old and “unknown” to them, is the task of historians to study, being a controversial issue and whose documentation is deficient. The concealment of the truth about the Treasury and the throwing into the garden of historians the “mission” to investigate all these problems whose solution was beyond their remit is nothing more than the endless repetition of what had already been said decades ago: “**we do not give**”!

In the hope of not abandoning the road full of papers to the desired restitution, in the ministry of prof. Adrian Năstase at Foreign Affairs, a Commission was set up consisting of specialists – historians, archivists, economists, military historians, research institutes of the Academy, Universities, The National Bank, the National Museum of Art, etc., whose mission was to compile as complete a documentation as possible on the issues of the Treasury. Made available to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, all this documentary material would have been used to resume talks with the Russian side.

In **2003**, the *Basic Treaty between Romania and Russia* contains an *Annex* stating the need to set up a *Romanian-Russian Joint Commission* of specialists to investigate the “*issues of common interest*”, including the issue of the Treasury, the issue of the Soviet-German pact of August 1939 and others. The Romanian side of the Joint Commission was composed of the specialists mentioned above. Prof. Ioan Scurtu had, among his many duties and responsibilities, also that of coordinating the activity of the Romanian side of the Joint Commission. The development of its activity is recorded in general in its mentioned work.⁵¹

In retrospect, especially after the publication of Ilie Schipor’s book, it is clear that the aim pursued by Russia through the provisions of this *Annex* was to postpone *sine die* what Romania had demanded for a century and more, **the return of the treasury** confiscated in January 1918. Here I would like to emphasize that from 1918 until today, **Russia has never challenged Romania’s ownership of the Treasury**. But this **right** was and is seen and considered as a kind of “*theoretical right*” belonging to an ancient history that left no trace. “*Imaginary*” history that we only talk about while we “*nurse the fire*”!

⁵¹ Ioan Scurtu, *cited work*. See also Viorica Moisuc, *Românii și politica externă rusească*, pp. 23-27.

The Romanian side of the Joint Commission – which I was part of – resumed the activity of ordering the existing documents already in our portfolio, their completion, inventories verification and re-verification; synthesis materials were prepared on the issue of the Treasury, of the other issues specified in the Annex to the Treaty of 2003, legalized copies were made according to the original documents from 1916-1917-1918 regarding the organization of transport, shipment of goods, arrival at Kremlin and other deposits, the inventories made in those years in Moscow by the representatives of Romania and Russia; other synthesis materials included the Romanian-Soviet relations and the negotiations from 1919-1924, copies authenticated according to the documents existing in the Romanian archives, in films, the issue of 1934-1935, the situation created in 1940 and its consequences, the 1956 restitution and others. All this documentation would be the basis for the Romanian-Russian Joint Commission's discussions. *It is worth noting that amongst the tasks of this Commission it was not provide in the Annex to the Treaty or in any other joint documents – brought to the attention of the members of the Commission – that this body should have provided the “**solution**” to closing the dispute concerning the Treasury, i.e. its **restitution** as it was handed over for safekeeping or its **equivalence** in some way.*

Thus, the Romanian historians from this Joint Commission provided the Russian colleagues with an almost complete documentation on the history of the Treasury during the period from the first negotiations for its transfer to Russia to the present day, as it appears from the Romanian archives. In opposition, and during all meetings in Bucharest and Moscow, the Russian side asserted the old thesis of the “*unawareness*” of these documents, their lack from the Russian archives, the lack of time for extensive investigations, which was tantamount to denying, in fact, the authenticity of the documents presented by the Romanians. More recently, during the talks, it was stated that such documents regarding the Romanian Treasury and its pilgrimages would have been “*classified*” in Russia, that removing them from this regime would be a long and very difficult operation – misinformation about which I will refer to below.

At the same time, placing itself on Brezhnev's position in 1965, the group of Russian historians tried to transfer all the weight and interest of the discussion with the Romanians on issues unrelated to the Treasury, within the framework offered by the so-called mutual “**settlements**”. It goes without saying that, in fact, “*reciprocity*” did not fit into these accounts at all: the Romanians owed Russia for the “*occupation*” and “*exploitation*” of Bessarabia – “*Russian land*” – from 1918 to 1940, then from 1941 to in 1944,

for the “*exploitation of Transnistria*”, for the “*robberies*” attributed to the Romanian army during the “*occupation*” of Northern Bukovina – which became “*Russian land*” as well –, for the “*robbery*” attributed to the Romanian administration during the occupation of some Ukrainian territories during the war and many others. For all this, Romania was – according to the Russian account – indebted to Russia for many generations, so the value attributed to the Treasury was ...nothing!

At the basis of such a “*expense*” was the mentality according to which Bessarabia, N. Bukovina, Hertza and other Romanian territories (which did not even appear in the *ultimatums of June 1940*), simply occupied by the Soviet army, were “**Russian lands**” – **released from the Romanian occupation!**

As for Russia’s “*debts*” to Romania, the issue was “*settled*” by Brezhnev in 1965: in the archives, Brezhnev said, “*there is a document showing that Royal Romania has debts to Tsarist Russia for arms deliveries and other things in the amount of US \$ 300 million, which corresponds to 274 tons of gold...*” And further: “*the commissions of proxies that established the losses caused by the war in Odessa and Crimea, as well as from documents referring to the actions of the Romanian troops, the losses caused exceed 100 times what we are discussing today. ...The whole people, the whole party knows that the war reparations of 300 million dollars paid by Romania were only symbolic. Did only these 300 million dollars were enough for the restoration of Crimea and Odessa?*” Brezhnev’s calculations go so far as to deny Lenin’s statements about the “*Romanian gold*” made in the document of January 13/26, 1918, a document quoted by A. Bârlădeanu in his speech and then widely repeated by N. Ceausescu. The Soviet leader stated that “**Lenin says that the Romanian archives should be kept, but he did not refer to these boxes. No. Because the war started, and this territory was conquered. We don’t know if they were stored there or taken out. But, after such serious events, it is difficult to restore what happened... If we also start to unravel this old problem, ...this could inevitably lead to the appearance of undesirable phenomena and the incitement of passions.** Brezhnev’s conclusion, mentioned above, was that **the issue of the Treasury “must be buried”, a thesis categorically rejected by the Romanian delegation.**

Russia’s plan to abolish Romania

General Mossolov – appointed in November 1916 Minister Plenipotentiary of Russia in Romania in Poklevski-Kozell’s place – has a meeting with Nicholas II before leaving for office, during which the Tsar states: “*I grant you powers that are not even given to ambassadors*”; the two

talk about “a secret” that should not be known “except in the Imperial Quarter”, where the telegrams sent from Romania by Mossolov will be deciphered and then presented to the Tsar. At the end of the meeting, Nicolae states again: “I give these instructions personally to Mossolov and **not to the minister in Romania**”. Impressed by what the Tsar had entrusted to him as a “secret mission,” Mossolov said: “I feel the supreme support you are kind enough to give me. With such support, I believe that I will be able to carry out the mission of high responsibility that you have given me.”⁵²

Who was General Mossolov and what superior reasons required his appointment to Romania in a “diplomatic” position? Count de Saint Aulaire, Minister of France in Romania, close collaborator of I.I.C. Brătianu, a keen observer of the events taking place in Romania at the time, notes in his memoirs: “Mossolov, director of the Imperial Chancellery, affiliated with the Germanophile group protected by the new Prime Minister Störmer and – as it was said – also by Rasputin... enjoying great confidence in the Imperial Court... had (in Romania) an attitude of satrap or viceroy.”⁵³

What secret mission was the Tsar preparing for his “ally” Romania? The owner of the secret, General Mossolov, says nothing but confesses that his relations with the emperor were “direct”, “secret”, and “of great responsibility”. Existing documents and testimonies show quite clearly the Russian plans for Romania in those years.

Mossolov had practically to execute the decisions taken at the highest Russian political and military level some time before. The Russian archives shed light on the far-reaching action taken by Russia to **liquidate** Romania, which had already begun by failing to fulfil the military obligations assumed under signature by Russia in 1914 and 1916.

⁵² A.A. Mossolov, *Misiunea mea în România. Curtea imperială a Rusiei și Curtea Regală a României în timpul războiului (Memorii)*. Edition prepared for printing, prefaced, and annotated by Marin C. Stănescu, Silex, Bucharest, 1997, p. 34.

⁵³ Comte de Saint-Aulaire, *Confession d'un vieux diplomate*, Flammarion, Paris, 1953, p. 379: “...affilié à la coterie germanophile protégé du nouveau premier ministre Stürmer et, disait-on du Raspoutine ...pourvu d'un grand crédit à la Cour de Russie..., à Jassy il y faisait figure de satrape ou de vice-roi”. After the fall of tsarism in Russia, Mossolov was removed from office and – says Saint-Aulaire – left without any income, on the street. With the support of Brătianu and the French minister, the daughter of the former Russian minister obtained a job as a typist, her salary being the only source of livelihood for Mossolov, who had a considerable fortune in Russia.

One of the eloquent examples is how Stavka approached the obligation that incurred to Russia through the aforementioned Conventions on the Dobrogea's Defence. I prefer to refer to foreign testimonies that cannot be suspected of "bias." Saint-Aulaire's judgment: *"The relentless abandonment of Dobrogea, despite its solemn commitment to defend it, was in line with Russia's political strategy as well as Russia's military strategy. No less. 'Holy Russia' was ready to treat enemies as allies and allies as enemies, when it took Bulgaria to its bosom, Bulgaria who took advantage by stabbing the dagger in the back, to suffocate Romania or make it perish by starvation. It / Russia / saw in Bulgaria a way to achieve its goal: Constantinople; in Romania it saw an obstacle."*⁵⁴

I return to the testimonies contained in the documents kept in the Russian archives, researched, and published by Ilie Schipor: the tragedy of Romania carefully woven in Petersburg appears in a manner that, perhaps, we would not have suspected. From the avalanche of new information, I will stop at what seemed to me to draw in essential lines a part – only – of the Russian plan for the liquidation of Romania.

On **October 28th, 1916**, the Minister of Finance, P.L. Bark, sent General M.V. Alexeev, the head of the Supreme Command of the Russian Imperial Army, the proposal to "suggest" to the Bucharest authorities the need for the National Bank of Romania to be evacuated to Russian territory⁵⁵, by asking *"if it would not be appropriate to take suitable measures to protect the reserve of the National Bank of Romania?"*, stating without reservation that, if the answer was affirmative, *"do not hesitate... to propose to the Government of Romania our services regarding the transport of the Romanian gold in one of the branches of the State Bank, where it could be kept in the future until more favourable events."*⁵⁶ Two days later, Alexeev sent General Beliaev, on the Romanian front, Bark's request, asking him to find out the *"opinion of the Romanian Government"* and *"if it agrees, to proceed now with*

⁵⁴ Ibidem, p. 365: „L'abandonne sans coup-férir de la Dobroudja, malgré l'engagement solennel de la défendre, répondait à la stratégie politique comme à la stratégie militaire de la Russie... La <<Sainte Russie>> n'en persiste pas moins à traiter l'ennemi en allié et l'allié en ennemi, à embrasser la Bulgarie qui en profita pour la poingarder dans le dos, à tenter d'étouffer la Roumanie ou à la faire périr d'inanition. Elle voit dans la Bulgarie un pont vers son rêve : **Constantinople** ; dans la Roumanie, un obstacle".

⁵⁵ Ilie Schipor, cited work, p. 10.

⁵⁶ Ibidem, doc. no. 1, pp. 129-131 (The document comes from the Russian State Military Archives).

these measures.⁵⁷ On **November 2nd**, Beliaev informed his superior that the National Bank had already evacuated its gold reserve to Iasi.

Thus, after witnessing the military disaster of the Romanian Army, the *selfless* Russian help to “save” the National Bank’s **gold** by bringing it to Russia was what this “*great ally*” offered to Romania.

The Russian military and political authorities were closely following the development of the “**gold**” action. The Russians’ concerns about the fate of the “*gold*”, the actions taken to “save” it by bringing it to Russia coincided with the concerns of the Prime Minister I.I.C. Brătianu for the *fate of the conquered Romanian land, the fate of Bucharest on the verge of being occupied*. On **November 2nd, 1916**, Brătianu made a *very urgent* appeal to General C. Coanda, the Romanian representative in Stavka, urging him to ask the “*allies*” not to remain “*impassive*” in the face of the prospect of occupying Bucharest, to make “*a rapid movement of Russian troops on the left bank of the Danube, which – Brătianu hopes – could avoid disaster*.”⁵⁸ But Brătianu’s request did not interest the Russians; it is known today – countless military, diplomatic, political documents, testimonies of all kinds (e.g. the accounts of General Ludendorff who considered that the inactivity of the Russian army in the battle of Bucharest would have been decisive for the German victory) that “**Russian military aid in the battle for Bucharest did not exist**”. In fact, the documents published by I. Schipor reveal an unparalleled cynicism in the attitude of Russia even in those fatal days for the fate of the capital of an allied country: to the urgent call of the Romanian Prime Minister on **November 2nd**, Stavka answered only on **November 14th**, **when the capital had already surrender**, in a telegram addressed to General Beliaev, in Romania, from which it results the Russian vision on the notion of “*ally*” and “*contractual obligations*”. As if the clear and precise text assumed by Russia of the 1916 **Military Convention** did not exist, the mentioned document clearly states: “*The plight of the Romanians obliges us, by virtue of our moral obligations to the Allies, to help them. The loss of Bucharest will have a colossal moral impact. Our Western Allies are constantly making efforts to help Romanians.*” Sure, the Russians would have helped the Romanians promptly, but Stavka’s explanations sound like this: a part of the 9th Russian Army that should have been sent to the Bucharest area, “*refusing even the offensive scheduled for November 15th*” was a failed project – because “*the Romanians cannot provide the necessary number of trains, especially now that there is an intense evacuation of*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, doc no. 3, pp. 134-135 (the same source).

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, doc. no. 6, p. 140 (the same source).

Bucharest.” But, troubled by the concern for his “ally”, *“the tsar was kind enough to order the troops of the Danube Army to be sent to Romania’s aid as soon as possible.”*⁵⁹ We were dealing with other promises empty of content.

Even in those tragic days, the supplies of the Russian army on Romania’s territory could not suffer any delay, for which reason, the **National Bank** “depending on Romania’s Government” had allocated to the Russian ally “12.5 million lei – of which 6 million 900 thousand lei are intended especially for the supply of the Army in November.”⁶⁰

Only on **November 25 / December 8**, the Russian Minister Poklevski-Koziell informed the Russian MFA that Finance Minister E. Costinescu was delivering to the Russian Government the following message: *“The Romanian Government would now like to transfer to Moscow its gold stock and some documents and papers; for this, it requests that a train consisting of 25 solid freight wagons and 5 passenger wagons for the personnel accompanying the Romanian values be made available to it in Iasi, as soon as possible.”* The Romanian Government – Koziell adds – *“asks the imperial government not to refuse the request to take over the guarding of these values during their transport to Moscow.”* Poklevski’s telegram is shown to the Tsar, who, with his own hand, stated, *“We must agree,”* *Tsarskoe Selo*, November 27th, 1916.⁶¹ On **November 28th**, hence after three days, the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded positively to the Romanian request communicated by its minister in Iasi.

On **November 26 / December 9, 1916**, the Mossolov character appears in Iasi, the Tsar’s trusted man having the special “mission” entrusted to him in the tête-à-tête conversation on the eve of his departure for Romania.

As soon as he took office, Mossolov acted in a new position: *“What were the first steps I had to take? First of all, measures had to be taken to transfer Romanian gold to Russia.”* Judgemental towards Prime Minister I.I. C. Brătianu, who had already informed his predecessor, Poklewski-Koziell, that the measure proposed by him regarding the “transfer” of Romanian gold to Russia was “inappropriate”, the Tsar’s envoy notes: *“...I was of the opinion that, given the disaster in which Romania was, it was necessary to transfer the Romanian gold to Russia without delay because, at one time or another, the Military convention could have been annulled!”* Was Mossolov anticipating

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, doc. no. 7, p. 141 (the same source).

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, doc. no. 8, p. 142 (the same source).

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, doc. no. 10, pp. 144-145 (The document comes from the Russian Federation State Archives).

a definitive withdrawal of Romania from the fight, its total occupation by the Centrals? But he continues the reports about his efforts to convince the Romanians of the “necessity” of hastening the desired evacuation of gold in Russia: *“Early this morning I went to Brătianu to discuss this issue with him. Without opposing my proposal, however, he considered the transfer of gold untimely and asked to wait a little bit longer, not to be in too much of a hurry. I explained to him then – Mossolov argues – that the solution of the problem cannot be delayed because **the Imperial Quarter was beginning to be credited with the idea that a big mistake had been made when it was decided to extend the line of our front in Romania. Those who now lamented Romania’s unlucky intervention in the war feared new complications... The train shortage could delay the arrival of Russian troops on the Romanian front.**”* And Mossolov brings in his plea the “supreme argument”: *“**The shipment of the Romanian gold to Russia was meant to further strengthen the alliance ties between our two countries and... the arrival of Russian reinforcements will thus be much eased.**”!*⁶² (emphasis added – V.M.)

The Romanian Prime Minister refused – diplomatically – the general’s honest offer and we find out that *“Brătianu sent me to Emil Costinescu, the then Minister of Finance, whom – Mossolov notes with satisfaction – I managed to convince him of the usefulness and necessity of these measures, insisting on **the full security that Russia offers, even when certain political unrest occurs.** After the meetings I had with Brătianu and then with Emil Costinescu, the decision was made to transfer the gold immediately. Two or three days have passed. Faced with this new delay, I went to Queen Maria, who sent me to Prince Stirbei.”*

In truth, the Russians were worried about the repeated delays in transporting the long-awaited **gold** transport. General V.I. Gurko, who at that time was replacing General M.V. Alexeev, sent a letter to Mossolov in Romania on **December 5th**, in which he expressed the fear that the Romanian authorities **are deliberately delaying**, under various pretexts, the shipment of the **gold** and stated, *“...I conclude that the Romanians are dodging to put into practice their initial intention and that they have decided to probably to resolve that issue without our participation and, perhaps, **without taking into account our interests... the change in this regard of the Romanian Government’s intentions I consider it undesirable and unacceptable.**”*

Gurko asks Mossolov *“to insist in the strongest and most energetic way with the Romanian Government on the need to also send other Romanian*

⁶² Mossolov, *cited work*, p. 66.

values to Russia, emphasizing that this operation... appeared at the initiative of the Romanians themselves and that the reference to the fact that the cargo is not ready for shipment is unfounded, as its transport to Iasi has already been carried out and we do not see what could be the obstacles to send it further to Russia.” In the few lines handwritten by Gurko at the end of the letter, he again expresses his determination that **the Romanian gold** should come under Russian control as soon as possible.⁶³

The Russian plan to “save” the Romanian **gold** in Russia was fulfilled on **December 14/27, 1916**, when the first transport left Iasi station for Moscow. Satisfied, Mossolov writes in his *Memoirs*: “Finally... the gold was loaded and shipped in my presence. The train set in motion; it was guarded and escorted by a Russian detachment. I had no peace until I found out that the convoy had crossed the border into Russia.”⁶⁴ Immediately after the departure of this transport, Russian Minister Mossolov sent a telegram to Emperor Nicholas II on **December 15th** announcing that “the shipping of this Stock [Romania’s gold stock] took place only today, December 14th, after many delays and postponements, due to the Romanian procrastination; I also suspect a Germanophile Jewish influence of the banks’ leaders,”⁶⁵ Mossolov added.

*

From the documents in the Romanian archives, published in the volumes to which I have always referred to in the previous pages, the sequence – in short of the events ending with the departure, on **December 14/27, 1916**, of the train carrying the Treasury of Romania to Russia – is as follows:

17/30 November 1916 – Decree no. 3120 signed by Ferdinand I and Victor Antonescu, Minister of Justice, by which it is decided to move the NBR headquarters to Iasi.⁶⁶

⁶³ Schipor, *cited work*, doc. no. 17 (The document comes from the Russian Federation State Archives).

⁶⁴ Mossolov, *cited work*, p. 66.

⁶⁵ Schipor, *cited work*, p. 169, doc. no. 26 (The document comes from the Russian Federation State Archives).

⁶⁶ On **October 11, 1916**, the General Council of the NBR had taken the decision “to relocate the residence and the legal and de facto headquarters of the National Bank” to Iasi, the place where the official residence of the Romanian Government would be according to the already existing decision. (C.I. Băicoianu, *Istoria politicii noastre monetare și a Băncii Naționale 1914-1926*, vol. III, Bucharest, 1933, p. 133 and following (according to V. Moisuc, *Românii și politica externă rusească...*, p. 121).

December 2nd, 1916 (old style)⁶⁷ – The General Council of the National Bank of Romania decided to relocate the Treasury to Russia “only” after the Russian Government met the conditions required by the NBR, including ensuring its safekeeping, recognizing the Bank’s ownership of the Treasury by signing official documents.⁶⁸

December 11th, 1916 (old style) – Address no. 1152 of the Ministry of Finance to the NBR in which Minister E. Costinescu informs that General Mossolov told G. Danielopol (authorized by the NBR to discuss the issue of treasury transport, storage, safekeeping with the Russian Minister) that he was authorized by the Russian Minister of Finance to sign the Protocol to this operation.⁶⁹

December 11th, 1916 (old style) – Letter no. 1151 of the Minister of Finance, E. Costinescu addressed to the NBR announcing that General Mossolov “gave verbal assurances” that he would sign the delivery and receiving Protocol of the “Bank’s metal stock” on behalf of the imperial government “containing all the necessary insurance for the Bank, both for the transportation of that stock and for its storage in the Kremlin’s Imperial Treasury.”⁷⁰

December 11th, 1916 (old style) – Confidential Telegram no. 149 of the Imperial Russian Legation to the Romanian Ministry of Finance, through which the Russian Foreign Minister, Pekovsk, announces that the Minister of Finance, Bark, has delegated General Mossolov to sign on his behalf the Protocol stating that “a number of crates with the value declared by the NBR were loaded onto the train and that the Russian Government guarantees their integrity, both during transportation and during storage in Moscow.”⁷¹

December 14th, 1916 (old style) – Note no. 1267 addressed by the Russian Minister of Finance, Bark, to A. Costinescu announcing the empowering of State Councilor Kowalnitsky to sign on his behalf the Protocol of reception and “storage in Moscow, **with the guarantee of the Russian government, of the sealed crates of National Bank, with declared value.**”⁷²

⁶⁷ Viorica Moisuc, *cited work*, doc. nr. 3, p. 123.

⁶⁸ C.I. Băicoianu, *cited work*, pp. 139-140.

⁶⁹ Viorica Moisuc, *cited work*, doc. no. 4, p. 124.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, doc. no. 6 and note 12, p. 126 (The document comes from the NBR Archive).

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, doc. no. 8, p. 128 (The document comes from the Romanian MFA Archive).

⁷² *Ibid.*, doc. no. 7, p. 12 (The document comes from the NBR Archive).

December 1916 – The note sent by the NBR leadership to the Russian Minister informing him of the conditions of the evacuation, the delivery-reception procedure, the transport, the deposit in the reserved compartments in the Kremlin, inventory, security guard, the signing by both parties of the Protocol.

December 14th, 1916 – The protocol concluded in Iasi, between the Minister of Finance of Romania, Victor Antonescu, and the Minister of Russia, A. Mossolov, on the occasion of sending to Moscow the Romanian Treasury (BNR values) – *the first transport*. This act specifies: *“The treasury of the National Bank of Romania, as well as the other two creates⁷³ are, since the day they were entrusted to the delegate of the Imperial Government of Russia and loaded into wagons, under the guarantee of the Imperial Government of Russia in terms of transport’s security, security of storage, and return to Romania.”⁷⁴*

The documents and testimonies inserted in the above sketch regarding the first transport of the National Bank of Romania’s values to Russia represent the current state of knowledge of these events. The conclusions are defined differently, given the bringing to light of documents from the Russian archives – unknown to Romanian historians when the volumes of documents and works published until 2021 were elaborated.

It is clear from the above that Romania’s military disaster after the war, largely due to Russian betrayal, has created the desired conditions for the implementation of the plan designed at the highest political, military, and financial level of Russia, to dispossess Romania of the entire gold stock of the National Bank that guarantees the country’s monetary policy.

This action was only one of the chapters of Imperial Russia’s plan to **liquidate** Romania as a state in this part of Europe targeted by Russian imperialism.

Once the first part of the mission entrusted by the Tsar was completed – **the evacuation of gold** –, Mossolov proceeds to the next major action planned by the Russians: **the evacuation of Romania**. In the above-mentioned telegram sent to the Tsar on *December 15th, 1916*, the Russian minister wrote: *“It would be highly desirable for a direct train from Iasi to Petrograd to be organized at least once a week in the shortest possible*

⁷³ In the two creates mentioned separately, were the jewelry of Queen Maria with a declared value of 7 million gold-lei.

⁷⁴ Viorica Moisuc, *cited work*, doc no. 10, p. 129 (The document comes from the Romanian MFA Archive).

time, which would make it possible for the most hesitant part of society to flee from Romania, to gradually relieve the city of its presence."⁷⁵

Mossolov makes a trip to Galati where General Sakharov, the supreme commander – at the time – of the Romanian Front was, where *"we discussed at length and in detail the issue of rail transport"* and, of course, the issue directly related to it, namely the evacuation of Romania.⁷⁶ Sakharov demanded that *"Romanian troops and their French instructors be deployed to the Russian territory to facilitate the operations of our army on the Romanian front... The presence of Romanian troops in the immediate vicinity of the front hindered our movements and, in their state of moral depression after the recent defeats, the Romanians could give in to the slightest failures and attract the Russians in their hasty retreat."* *"We failed to persuade General Berthelot to accept our point of view,"* said Mossolov. *"French instructors did not agree with the evacuation of the remains of the Romanian army in Russia... Berthelot denies the need for the Russians to have a larger field of manoeuvre, he categorically opposes the evacuation of Romanian troops to the east."*⁷⁷ (emphasis added – V.M.)

The Russian minister's *"personal"* opinion on the military mission led by General Berthelot is unreservedly expressed in these terms: *"...For these officers – 'of exceptional value' – admits Mossolov, who had fought on the western front, the sending to Romania was a kind of rest. They had a limited influence on demoralized and discouraged soldiers... I considered that the evacuation of the remnants of the Romanian army in Russia and the encampment in Russian villages would have been very desirable for the soldiers..."* This evacuation, said the Russian diplomat, meant *"from our point of view that we too should take part in the reorganization of the army and the reconstruction of the railways, and that the credit for this should not be attributed only to France after Russia sent a strong army to stop the German invasion of Romania"* (emphasis added – V.M.) *"It was my duty to explain to the French the reasons why it was so necessary to evacuate the Romanian army, what it was left of it, to Russia. I did not want to give this issue the form of an ultimatum addressed to Romanians so as not to create divergences between us and the French."*⁷⁸

In this regard, it should be noted that Mossolov's statements fully confirm what General Berthelot, on his way to Romania with the French

⁷⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 170.

⁷⁶ Mossolov, *cited work*, p. 64.

⁷⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 81.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

military mission⁷⁹, had learned from talks with Störmer, Russia's prime minister, and General Alexeiev, the supreme commander of the Imperial Army. In fact, the French Military Archives provide rich and revealing documentation on Russia's policy towards Romania in these years of disaster. In the report no. 12 of **1/14 May 1917**, entitled ***Coupe d'œil rétrospectif sur l'action russe en Roumanie depuis l'entrée en guerre de cette Puissance*** (*Retrospective look at Russian action in Romania since the entry of this Power into war*), Berthelot presents the French Ministry of War a realistic analysis of how the Russian "ally" not only failed to fulfil its contractual and, in fact, moral obligations to Romania, but acted to bring it out of the fight and liquidate it as a state: *"I think it is not opportune to present to you, with all sincerity – Berthelot begins his report – my personal opinion on the role played by Russia in all this Romanian drama. All the reports I have sent you since my arrival in Romania, they have showed you, successively, the disappointments we had from the Russians. Convinced that they acted like loyal allies, we hesitated to interpret the facts, limiting ourselves to recording them. Thus, between October 15 and December 1, we witnessed the repeated postponement of the Letchisky offensive.⁸⁰ I noted the inexplicable delays of the Russian forces [which should have been] involved in the battle for Bucharest... then the withdrawal of Sakharov's army from the moment its first divisions were deployed on Ialomitsa; the evacuation of Buzau without a fight. Established on the Ramnic line, the Russian army could have withstood having the mountains on the right, the Danube on the left, at the same time having organized formidable positions in Dobrogea, in the narrowest part. In the two parts of the river, we saw the same thing: the Germans were putting pressure on a retreating division, others are only thinking of retreating. In this way, all the land south of Siret*

⁷⁹ On October 15, 1916, the French military mission arrived in the country with 1,200 combatants, including 400 officers. In a conversation with General Joffre on the eve of his departure for Romania, he told Berthelot: *"Russia does not welcome you. Be careful!"*, apud Sainte-Aulaire, *cited work*, p. 346: *"La Russie ne vous verra pas d'un bon œil. Méfiez-vous-en"*.

Shortly after the arrival of the French military mission, the Russian military mission, led by General Beliaev, also arrived in Romania. The purpose of his work was defined by the top leadership of the Russian army: *"Remember that our main goal is to prevent the success of the French mission"* (*"N'oubliez-vous pas que notre objectif essentiel est d'empêcher la mission française de réussir"*); apud Saint-Aulaire, *cited work*, p. 349.

⁸⁰ The commander of the Russian army in the battle for Bucharest.

and Dobrogea was lost. This was not a battle; it was an evasion or a **defection**. I uttered the word defecation. As for the soldiers, the term is not valid, because they were doing what they were told to do, ...it is valid for those who directed this drama.”

“I am convinced that – General Berthelot points out – **Romania’s entry into the game, which was not wanted by the Russians because a great Power was created alongside [Russia], determined the decision to abandon Romania, not to do anything to help it: hence the abandonment of the Romanians in front of Bucharest, the evacuation of Dobrogea and the retreat to Ramnic.”**⁸¹ Or on the line of Siret, as General Alexeev has stated on **October 13th, 1916**, pointing with a ruler on the map: **“Romanians must resist here. The rest does not matter.”**⁸²

Romania’s tragic situation had not yet reached its climax. However, Russia had achieved two of its objectives: had captured Romania’s **gold**, had abandoned the battlefield in Dobrogea, Muntenia, had also seen the capital fall under German-Austro-Hungarian occupation, and had also seen the refuge in Moldova of all the authorities led by King Ferdinand and the whole Royal House. But, as I said, that was not all Russia wanted.

Mossolov returns in his *Memoirs* to the issue of the “evacuation” in Russia: *“This evacuation is the order of the day at our headquarters. Or, in Iasi, the Romanians, especially the King and Queen, did not even want to hear about such a thing. Brătianu also strongly opposed such an eventuality. It was as clear and natural as possible at the same time – the Russian minister admits – that neither Regina nor Brătianu would admit that Romania*

⁸¹ Vincennes, *État-major de l’Armée de Terre* (from now on EMAT – Vincennes), Carton 17 N-540, (no page number)

Mission Française en Roumanie, Rapport no. 12, 1/14 May 1917, Chap. V: *Coup d’œil rétrospectif sur l’action russe en Roumanie depuis l’entrée en guerre de cette Puissance*.

⁸² *Ibidem*. See also the confirmation of Alexeev’s “recommendation” related by Saint-Aulaire: When, on the way to Romania General Berthelot stopped in Stavka for a meeting with Alexeev, he wished him “good luck” but added: **“Make those people understand that Romania should not defend the Carpathians but Siret.”** And with a coup-papiers, he showed on the map that the rupture between **“Wallachia which must be evacuated and Moldova which must be defended”** (Saint-Aulaire, cited work, p. 350) **“Puisque les Roumains tiennent tant à vous avoir, bonne chance, mais surtout tâchez de faire comprendre à ces gens – là que la Roumanie ne se défend pas sur les Carpates, mais bien sur le Sereth. Et, d’un coup – papiers, il me montrait sur la carte, qu’il frappait à coups redoublés, la coupure entre la Valachie à évacuer et la Moldavie à défendre, comme glacis de la Russie.”**

would become a state without territory. Brătianu firmly believed in the final victory of the Allies and rightly believed that Romania would be in a bad position if it ceased to exist for some time.”⁸³

The opposition met by the Russians to their evacuation “offer” did not discourage Mossolov or his superiors. Intense preparations were being made in Russia. Mossolov was asked for exact information about the institutions to be evacuated, about the transportation of the diplomatic corps, the deployment of public services, private individuals, etc. Unable to meet these requirements, Mossolov asked to be sent from Petrograd “a very experienced official who worked in the Ministry of the Interior. According to Mossolov, he was to deal with all the issues related to the evacuation of Romanians and to successfully coordinate the measures we will take with the instructions we will receive from the various Russian ministries which were directly responsible for Romanians’ deployment into Russia.” The imperial prime minister urgently sent Chamberlain Yachevsky to Iasi.⁸⁴

“As soon as he came to Iasi – Mossolov notes –, Iachevski visited **all Romanian ministries to draw up lists of senior officials to be evacuated.**”⁸⁵

Another official was also sent to Iasi with the task of **distributing the evacuees on Russian territory, to ensure liaison with the various ministries.** At the same time, in Russia, action was taken to organize the evacuation of Romania as soon as possible. On **December 11th, 1916**, Russian Prime Minister A.F. Trepov asked the Tsar for approval to set up an **Interdepartmental Commission** to deal with and be responsible for all this complex evacuation of Romania: “The extremely rapid evolution of the preparatory measures and the execution in order to **evacuate Romania** – Trepov wrote in the letter to the Tsar – demands the urgent need to concentrate all power in the hands of a single person – Senator **Zasiadko.**”⁸⁶

On the same day, December 11th, the Zasiadko Commission was convened at the Council of Ministers of Russia, which included only highly trusted persons, including: Count V.B. Frederiks (**Minister of the Imperial Court** and Commander of the Imperial Headquarters), D.S. Shuvaev (**Minister of War**), A.A. Makarov (**Minister of Justice and Attorney**

⁸³ Mossolov, *cited work*, p. 82.

⁸⁴ Reliable and experienced person – he had been the secretary of several Russian governors in Poland.

⁸⁵ Mossolov, *cited work*, p. 85.

⁸⁶ I. Schipor, *cited work*, doc. no. 21, p. 160 (The document comes from the Russian Federation State Archives).

General), N.N. Pokrovski (**Foreign Minister**), P.L. Bark (**Minister of Finance**), Prince V.N. Tchaikovsky (**Minister of Industry and Commerce**), A.A. Doljenski (**Head of the Chancellery of the Supreme Commander of the Russian Army – Stavka**), A.D. Protopopov (**Deputy Minister of the Interior**), P.F. Iordanov (Deputy Head of the **Sanitary Evacuation Service**), General V.I. Gurko (**General Alexeiev's Deputy**), S.A. Poklewski-Koziell (**former Russian minister in Romania** – replaced by General Mossolov in November 1916) and others.⁸⁷ As it turns out, the “**evacuation of Romania**” was a matter of major interest to Russia, this is why the Tsar himself dealt with it and the composition of the “**Evacuation Commission**” amply demonstrates this interest. The Tsar approved the composition and **mission** of the Commission, which was defined in the above-mentioned meeting as follows: “**the deployment of the Romanian government, the National Bank and its deposits in Russia**”⁸⁸, the evacuation of the population, the army, institutions in the Russian governorates, the hosting of the Royal Court of Romania in Kherson etc.⁸⁹

Zasiadko and his commission immediately took over. Arriving in Iasi, he and Mossolov drew up a concrete plan for **the evacuation of Romania**, which, among other things, provided that the transfer of the royal family from Romania to Russian territory should be the responsibility of the Ministry of the Imperial Court; for the accommodation of the Romanian evacuees to be made available the cities of Nikolaev, Kherson with the surrounding areas and the list was long⁹⁰.

The Russian minister complained that the evacuation plan was jeopardized by the constant and categorical refusal of the King and Queen, the Prime Minister, and the French military mission. (Berthelot – writes Mossolov – “*strongly opposed the departure of Romanian troops from their country*”)⁹¹ and, in addition, the refusal of foreign diplomats accredited in Iasi who “*were very hostile to the project of an evacuation to Russia*” – complains Mossolov. “*It was especially important – the imperial minister notes – to convince the Queen of the need to abandon Iasi – I even told her that it would be possible for her to live on a Romanian warship anchored in*

⁸⁷ *Ibidem*, doc. no. 22, pp. 161-162 (the same source).

⁸⁸ At that time, the BNR Treasury had not yet been shipped to Russia.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, doc. no. 23, p. 164 (the same source). On 28 July 1917, the Provisional Government decided that the tasks of this Commission should be taken over by the Evacuation Commission of the Special Defense Committee.

⁹⁰ Mossolov, *cited work*, pp. 84-85.

⁹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 88.

Russian waters”! Mossolov laments the stubbornness of the Romanians who did not understand that *“this evacuation was urgently required”* whose preparations were completed by the Russians and could have been carried out – he estimated – *“in two or three days, without haste and without panic!”*⁹² Overwhelmed by their inability to complete their mission, Mossolov and Pokrovsky decided that *“general evacuation would be subject to the emperor as supreme commander of the imperial army.”*

Hence, at the end of 1916 and the beginning of the next one, when Romania lost, with the very interested *“help”* of the Russian ally, most of the country’s territory, lost the Treasury, faced the military and economic disaster, the ravages of famine and typhus, was about to be liquidated as a state, swallowed up by Imperial Russia.

Here is what General Berthelot wrote in a report to Joffre after a long conversation with General Gurko, Alexeiev’s replacement at Stavka: *“Regarding the reconstruction of the Romanian army, I felt that General Gurko had hidden thoughts. When I spoke about the interest in reconstituting the Romanian army as soon as possible... he said to me: ‘but what interest do you have for this army to go into battle so early – and, regarding its reconstruction – you seem to be much more Romanian than Romanians’.* I responded by supporting the need for all Allies to take immediate action.” Berthelot referred to the need for the Allies to make greater efforts to decide the fate of the war and, he explained, *“for this I call for swift action as well as the urgent reconstitution of the Romanian army.”* But Gurko had other priorities. Insisting on food shortages, he crossed the t’s: *“it is absolutely necessary, without hesitation, to rid Romania of such a large number of mouths to feed and he estimates necessary – Berthelot reported – to evacuate at least 200,000 people to Russia.”*⁹³ Regarding his findings during

⁹² *Ibidem.*

⁹³ EMAT – Vincennes, Carton 17 N-540 (no page number), Annex to Report no. 8, January 18/31, 1918, *Note relative à ma conversation avec le gén. Gourko : „Relatif à la reconstitution de l’armée roumaine j’ai senti que le général Gourko avait une arrière-pensée. Lorsque je disais l’intérêt qu’il y avait à reconstituer cette armée roumaine le plutôt possible, celle – ci me paraissant susceptible de rendre des services à la cause commune, ...il m’a dit : «mais quel intérêt avez-vous donc à ce que cette armée entre en ligne si tôt» et, dans la question de sa reconstitution – «vous paraissez être beaucoup plus roumain que les roumains»” „il était nécessaire de débarrasser de toutes façons la Roumanie d’un assez grand nombre de bouches inutiles et qu’il estimait nécessaire d’évacuer en Russie en moins 200 000 personnes...”*

the period of “collaboration” with the Russian allies, the head of the French military mission made a realistic remark about how the Russians used the food crisis in the interest of removing Romania from the game: *“It is undeniable that we are heading for a serious food supply crisis for the population and the military. In fact, the Russians are relying on this crisis to evacuate the Romanian army beyond the national territory.”*⁹⁴

Moreover, Berthelot conveyed in his reports pertinent remarks on Russia’s intentions towards Romania; in that *Coup d’oeil rétrospectif* to which I referred above, he said: *“The reasons that led to the abandonment of Romania by the Russians have not disappeared: they have their origin in the profound differences of race and interests. Undoubtedly, the government saw the possibility of making Romania an object of exchange by giving the Wallachia to Austria, Dobrogea to the Bulgarians, keeping Moldova for itself, with the consent of Germany.”*⁹⁵

The truth “hidden” in the Russian archives

As it can be seen, the truth of Ilie Schipor’s work is that the evacuation of the Treasury to Russia was mainly due to Russian desire and pressure. Checking this issue in the above-mentioned Romanian works, I found that there were some question marks regarding the interventions made by General Mossolov – the successor of the Russian Minister in Bucharest, Poklewsky-Koziell –, to the country’s leading dignitaries to speed up the evacuation of the Romanian gold, but the matter did not go further due to the lack of adequate documentation. All those of us who dealt with the history of the Treasury did not pay much attention to the information in Mossolov’s memoirs, which, moreover, were accessible to us very late. The expressions used by Mossolov in narrating the facts related both to the history of the Treasury and to the relations between Romania and Russia during the war years are deliberately confused and implicit, sometimes allusive.

I have shown above how I understand the framing in the time context of the issue regarding Mossolov’s role in the Romanian Government’s decision to *“shelter in Russia”* the country’s treasury. There are still question marks,

⁹⁴ *Ibidem*, Report no. 8, January 25 /February 7, 1917

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, Report no. 12, le 1/14 may 1917, Chap. V.: *„Les motifs qui ont amenée l’abandon de la Roumanie par les Russes n’ont pas disparu : ils sont basés sur une différence profonde de race et d’intérêts. Sans doute, le gouvernement avait – il entrevu la possibilité de faire de la Roumanie, un objet d’échange, en donnant la Valachie à l’Autriche, la Dobroudja aux Bulgares et en gardant pour elle-même la Moldavie, avec l’assentiment de l’Allemagne”.*

which are still unclear, regarding the way in which the Romanian decision-makers approached and responded to the “offer” made by the Russian Government to transfer the Romanian gold to Russia, about how they responded to the “*Russian pressures*” and many others. In the light of documents known so far, including those from the Russian archives, this issue remains open to research.

Another major chapter of new information from the Russian archives shows that the highest governing bodies of the USSR and its subordinate authorities closely monitored the situation of the Romanian Treasury in its entirety; the use of confiscated gold for various purposes was permanently reported accurately, the transfers of initial deposits to various other institutions were coordinated from the central level, etc.

One finding is clear from all these: the deliberate ill-will of all those (historians, Russian politicians, publicists, etc.) who have stubbornly claimed that **there are no accessible documents in the Russian archives regarding the Romanian Treasury**. Ilie Schipor found and published them, in **original** and in Romanian translation. Perhaps it will now be possible to inform the Russian historians, deprived, it seems, of the access to their own archives, accessible “*only*” for our colleague, Ilie Schipor.

It is not in the economy of this chapter to present – beyond the subject of the Romanian Treasury confiscated by Russia – the countless negative aspects of the relations with Imperial Russia, **the immeasurable moral and material damage to the Romanian people throughout history** by repeated tsarist occupations, the onerous transactions with the Ottoman Gate, with Napoleon’s France, with Austria and, later, the transactions of the Soviet Power with Germany, with the Allies from the Second World War, **all** centred on **the seizure of Romanian territories** and their exploitation, associated with the annihilation of living Romanians in the occupied provinces.

But I will show documents from the Russian archives and published by Ilie Schipor which **refute** the “*non-existence*” thesis, *the impossibility the Russian historians to access their own archives* and all other untruths circulated for decades, for one purpose: **the refusal to give accurate and documented explanations on the fate of the Treasury after its confiscation in January 1918, the refusal to return it either in the form in which it was sent to Russia and sealed in the compartment of the Kremlin Weapons Hall as well as in Sudnaia Kassa, or in an equivalent calculated at the current price.**

Comprehensive and well-documented is the way in which the Soviets disposed of the Romanian gold confiscated in January 1918 – without any

holdback; Ilie Schipor makes a detailed analysis of the documents that show that the situation of the Romanian Treasury was of most interest to the Soviet authorities up to the highest level, shows how Romania's gold was used to pay Russia's foreign debt, to support subversive actions against the Romanian state (action that also included the Communist Party of Romania – a subsidiary of the Comintern) and many other uses of the confiscated Romanian assets.

– As mentioned above, the first breach of the Kremlin deposit occurred on **January 25th, 1918**, when Soviet Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Vladimir Maximovich **Fritsche**, **picked up 16 crates of Romanian banknotes** on the pretext that they were crates “*deposited there*” by the Soviet authorities – which did not exist in January 1917. The information appears in documents kept in the **State Archives of the Russian Federation** and in the **Russian State Archives for Social-Political History**.⁹⁶

– In the meeting of the Political Bureau on **February 28th, 1921**, the “**Romanian goods**” were discussed: “*Comrade Krestinski is in charge with opening the warehouses with the Romanian goods and to clarify their content*”, on **14th of May**, at the suggestion of Foreign Policy Commissioner, Cicerin, the so-called “Başa Commission” was set up, whose mission was to “**effectively open rooms with such special values and hand over those goods to Soviet institutions for evaluation, storage, etc.**”⁹⁷

– The “Başa” Commission reports shortly (June 1921) that the crates containing the Romanian valuables deposited in July 1917 in Sudnaia Kassa were transported to the Kremlin; the detailed accompanying annexes to the Proceedings prove the existence of these values, at that date, data that confirm in general the inventories from 1917.⁹⁸

– The situation of the gold stock and other Romanian values was carefully monitored, Lenin personally requesting to be informed about the “**spending of the gold stock**” and stating that their “*movement*” should be monitored and regularly updated.⁹⁹

– On **August 5th, 1922**, an extensive document from the RSFSR State Archives speaks of the opening of a number of crates in the Kremlin deposit

⁹⁶ Ilie Schipor, *cited work*, doc. no. 60, 63, pp. 215-216, 220-221.

⁹⁷ *Ibidem*, doc. no. 61, 62, pp. 217, 218, also in the Archive for Socio-Political History.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, doc. no. 65, 66, 67, pp. 225-229, in the State Archive and the Archive for Socio-Political History.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, doc. no. 70-73, pp. 233-240

and the verification of their content – these were the values sent with the second shipment from July 1917 – and the summary inventory realised on that occasion.¹⁰⁰

– In August **1923**, documents from the RSFSR State Archive refer to the inventory that was organized regarding the Romanian “*museum and archival goods*”.¹⁰¹

– Of special interest is the document from **December 13th, 1924**, a “*strictly secret*” report on the Romanian Treasury evacuated to Russia, also in the State Archives of the RSFSR.

The document specifies:

“... The values of the Kingdom of Romania evacuated to Russia consisted of:

- a) the gold stock;*
- b) the values of the royal family;*
- c) simply banknotes and various assets of the Bank of Romania;*
- d) other values of private banks.*

The values in points (a), (b) and (c) were deposited in the Kremlin’s Arms Palace depots.

The first opening of these deposits was made in February 1919, by the director of the People’s Bank, comrade Commissioner S. Ganețki who took the values (brilliants) of the Royal Family and some of the banknotes. Then, in the fall of 1919, during Denikin’s offensive, the gold reserves were sent as follows:

In Samara – Tashkent:

- a) the English pounds;*
- b) the Turkish lira;*
- (c) the German marks.*

In total, in the amount of about 59,650,000 gold roubles.

To Perm:

- a) the Austrian crowns..... 548 boxes;*
- b) the German marks 77 crates.*

The French francs, the Romanian money, and other currencies, in the amount of about 18,300,000 gold roubles were left in Moscow.

Thus, the Gold Stock was valued at 117,800,000 + 118,000,000 gold roubles.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, doc. no. 77, 78, pp. 246-254.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, doc. no. 89, 91, 96, pp. 276, 281, 296-298, etc.

..... After the return to Moscow... the French francs, the British pounds and the German marks were sent almost entirely and at various times abroad, at the disposal of the People's Commissariat for Finance.

The Austrian crowns were kept at the Treasury and were handed over at various times to the State Bank's Emission Section."¹⁰²

Neither this explanatory document seems **to have been accessible** (!?!) to Russian historians nor to Soviet politicians who permanently denied having known anything about the fate of the Romanian Treasury! Another synthesis document regarding the history of the Romanian Treasury is the "*Report*" dated **February 28th, 1940**, signed by the director of the *Central State Archive of the October Revolution*, Kostomarov¹⁰³ in which the gold, jewellery, artistic values, archives, etc., its pilgrimages, repeated inventories, transfers to various places are recorded.

Perhaps knowing the current stage of the pilgrimages of the Romanian Treasury – a treasury that had to be preserved and returned – but which was unscrupulously rubbed by the Soviet power, we can better understand two issues: 1) **why**, even from the first so-called Romanian-Soviet negotiations from the 1920s until the last bilateral meetings of the Joint Commission established under the 2003 Treaty, the Soviet side did not deviate in the slightest from the thesis of combining the Treasury issue with unrelated issues: Bessarabia, reciprocal settlements etc.; 2) **why**, the "*political problem*" (The Treasury) was transferred to the field of "*historical controversies*" and thrown into the garden of the historians.

It is clear to everyone that what the power in Moscow did with the confiscated wealth of the Romanian state, disregarding treaties, its own commitments, denying its own signatures, violating international civic morality, secreting hundreds of documents from its archives to erase any trace represents a truth that is hard to admit, hard to recognize, but to which no lie, no matter how crafty, can change its face. As I said above, the "*negotiations*", the "*bargaining*", the "*debates*" between Romania and the Russian Imperial Power were, in fact, a permanent and unequal confrontation *between the force of law violated by the law of force*.

The chapter "*The final assault: looting*" from Ilie Schipor's book is incomprehensible to any Romanian who still believes in justice and truth.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Apud Ilie Schipor, *cited work*, doc. no. 121, pp. 339-340.

¹⁰³ *Ibidem*, doc. no. 157, p. 407. See also doc. no. 159, pp. 416-417.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 48-50.

The efforts of the Romanian-Russian Joint Commission for the Treasury issue have ceased during the mandate of Mr. Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu as Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The volume of Russian documents published by Ilie Schipor shows that the robbery went to the last leu of this Treasury, that we have little to talk about the *“restitution” of the assets of the Romanian people in the care of the Russian “ally”, and the “revaluation” and “equivalence” of these assets appropriated by the Soviet Power will always be opposed by the mutual “settlements” trouvaille.*

It is another black page in the history of the Russian-Soviet politics towards the Romanian people.

*

I conclude this study on what is still called Romania's “Treasury Problem” confiscated by the Russians, with excerpts from an article published in *April 2001* in the Romanian newspaper *Cuvântul românesc (The Romanian Voice / La Voix Roumaine)*, year 27, no. 291, Hamilton / Ontario, Canada, p. 23. The intervention, entitled “Igor Stroeve and the Study of the Problem of the Romanian Treasury Confiscated by the Soviets”, was motivated by the statements made by this person – President of the Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation – during his visit to Romania in April 2001. Mr. Stroeve, I wrote in that article, *“thought it was his right to say casually that the problem of Romania's treasury deposited in Moscow during World War I ‘can be studied historically and scientifically’, saying that between the two states ‘there is no international treaties or agreements governing the return of property to Romania’ and that there is no official document by which ‘Romania could issue guardianship claims on those values’.*

Assuming that the Russian dignitary came to visit Romania *uninformed* on the issues to be discussed, I briefly presented the official documents on the basis of which the treasury was evacuated, deposited in the Kremlin, and finally confiscated with the rupture of diplomatic relations with Romania. I emphasized at the end of the article the conclusions of the Official Declaration of 13/26 January 1918, *“This Declaration of the Soviet Government represents in itself: 1) a clear recognition of the existence, in Russia, of the Romanian treasury, 2) a recognition of Romania's property rights over it, 3) an assertion of the fact that the Soviet Government confiscates, but it does not appropriate these values, 4) the commitment of the Soviet Government to keep hold of (preserve) the*

Romanian treasury, 5) **the commitment of the Soviet Government to remit these values to their rightful owner**". I emphasized that the Declaration of 13/26 January 1918 *"strengthens and does not avoid"* the provisions of the Romanian-Russian Conventions of 1916-1917 regarding the evacuation of the Treasury to Russia. At the same time, I specified that *"subsequently no other agreements were concluded between the two states to cancel the above-mentioned ones. Moreover, there are countless documents attesting that, during the Romanian-Soviet negotiations from 1919-1924, the Soviet side implicitly and explicitly recognized Romania's right of ownership over the Treasury. **This right has never been revoked by anyone and nothing.**"* Finally, referring to the Russian politician's "recommendation" for the historians, I pointed out that, in fact, the *"historical and scientific study"* of the treasury problem *"provides support and motivation for the current political approaches."*

As I said, the *"political approaches"* regarding the Treasury have ceased to exist for years. What we should know, as *"owners"*, is the answer to the question *"Does the issue of the Treasury still appear on the agenda of the Romanian-Russian bilateral relations? If so, how? If not, why not?"*

At the end of a century and a quarter of struggles, of hopes, of trials we were left with these questions, probably unanswerable.

Scrisoarea nr. 496, transmisă – la 28 octombrie 1916 – de către P.L. Bark, ministrul rus de finanțe, generalului M.V. Alekseev, șeful Statului Major General al Comandamentului Suprem rus

221

В. Срочно.

Совершенно доверительно.

МИНИСТРЪ
ФИНАНСОВЪ.

Милостивый Государь
Михаиль Васильевичъ.

УГЕНКВАРВЕРХ.
— 29-ОКТ.-1916 —
ВХ. № 30144

29. X. 1916
Министру
финансовъ.
Секретарю
М. В.
Можно ли попросить
оказанія помощи
вслучае необходимости
защиты своихъ
интересовъ

V
по резолюции
П

Въ виду происходящихъ событій на Румынскомъ театрѣ военныхъ дѣйствій и возможной, въ связи съ ними, въ болѣе или менѣе близкомъ будущемъ, эвакуаціи Бухареста, не признавали ли бы Ваше Высокопревосходительство своевременнымъ принять соответствующія мѣры въ смыслѣ охраны золотого запаса Румынскаго Национальнаго Банка.

Въ случаѣ если Ваше Высокопревосходительство раздѣлите эту точку зрѣнія, я покорнѣе просилъ бы Васъ не отказать, при посредствѣ военныхъ властей въ Румыніи, предложить Румынскому Правительству наши услуги въ отношеніи перевозки золота въ одно изъ Отдѣленій Государственнаго Банка, гдѣ таковое могло бы храниться впредь до болѣе благоприятныхъ событій.

Вмѣстѣ съ тѣмъ, такъ какъ организація такой перевозки требуетъ извѣстнаго времени, я бы Его Высокопревосходительству

М. В. АЛЕКСѢЕВУ.

покорнѣйше просилъ Ваше Высочайшее
въ случаѣ согласія Румынскаго Правительства на
наше предложеніе, сообщить мнѣ о семъ по воз-
можности незамедлительно, дабы я могъ заблаго-
временно дать нужныя инструкціи для организа-
ціи приѣмки золота въ Яссахъ и дальнѣйшей его
отправки вглубь Имперіи.

Покорно прошу Ваше Высочайшее
принять увѣреніе въ совершенномъ почтеніи и
искренней преданности

Иванъ

28 Октября 1916 года.
№ 496

Scrisoare, din 5 decembrie 1916, a generalului V.I. GURKO către ambasadorul rus în România,
A.A. MOSOLOV

(extras)

Секретно.

Слѣжно.

НАЧАЛЬНИКЪ

ШТАБА

ВЕРХОВНАГО

главнокомандующаго.

5 Декабря 1916 г.

Милостивый Государь

№ 1820

Александръ Александровичъ,

Ставка.

Ссылаясь на телеграмму Д.С.С. Поклевскаго отъ 25 Ноября с.г. № 719 по вопросу о перевозкѣ въ Москву Румынскаго золотого фонда, поспѣшаю увѣдомить Ваше Превосходительство, что поѣздъ просимаго Румынскимъ Правительствомъ состава былъ своевременно поданъ на станцію Яссы. Нынѣ изъ телеграммы завѣдывающаго передвиженіемъ войскъ при Румынской Главной Квартирѣ, Подполковника Остафьева, я освѣдомился, что Национальный Банкъ чрезъ своего Директора Болтіано сообщилъ названному офицеру, что грузъ къ отпавкѣ не готовъ и потому поѣздъ съ назначенными къ сопровожденію указаннаго груза лицами возвращается въ Одессу.

Считая ссылку на неготовность груза

Его Прев-ству

А. А. Мосолову.


къ отправкѣ лишь отговоркой, заключаю, что Румыны повидимому уклоняются отъ приведенія въ исполненіе первоначальнаго своего намѣренія и рѣшили распорядиться въ этомъ дѣлѣ безъ нашего участія и, можетъ быть, не въ согласіи съ нашими интересами.

По соображеніямъ политическимъ признаю необходимымъ, чтобы Румынскій золотой фондъ былъ переданъ на храненіе намъ, и перемену на сей счетъ намѣреній Румынскаго Правительства считаю нежелательной и недопустимой.

Посему покорнѣйше прошу Ваше Превосходительство самымъ рѣшительнымъ и энергичнымъ образомъ настоять предъ Румынскимъ Правительствомъ на необходимости вывоза нынѣ же Румынскихъ цѣнностей въ Россію, указавъ при этомъ, что дѣло это возникло по почину самихъ Румынъ и что ссылка на то, что грузъ неготовъ къ отправкѣ, неосновательна, такъ какъ перевозка его до Яссы уже произведена и мы не видимъ какія могли явиться нынѣ препятствія къ дальнѣйшему направленію его въ Россію.

Примите увѣренія въ отличномъ почтеніи и преданности

*Я сроднился довершился
Горамъ и ея горамъ вѣра*



DIPLOMATIC MEMOIRS AND THE VALUE OF SOLIDARITY - EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY AND SOLIDARITY A BOOK REVIEW

Ioan VOICU


The title of these notes is inspired by the reading of the book *Diary* by Constantin Vlad, published in 2020 by Top Form Publishing House, Bucharest.

From the preface of the book, we understand that it is an “uncensored and intermittent” journal covering the years 1972-2019. The author of the book informs us: “I also hope that my efforts reflect – of course modestly – the Romanian tradition of this kind of study and memoirs.”

Constantin Vlad (September 8, 1926 – May 20, 2021) defines himself in this volume as a “diligent student, not really a leader, but determined to study thoroughly, then a young professor, researcher, science manager, author of studies and books”. Then comes a confession: “Later, I added the diplomatic activity, with the orientation of scientific activity and journalism towards the field of international relations and diplomacy.”

Among the 12 books dedicated by Constantin Vlad to diplomacy, it is worth mentioning, first of all, *Diplomația secolului XX* (Diplomacy of the 20th Century), published under the auspices of the European Titulescu Foundation, 2006; *Puncte cardinale îndepărtate* (Distant cardinal points: Helsinki, Tokyo, Canberra, with the subtitle: Notes of a Romanian ambassador), Romanian Academy of Scientists Publishing House, 2011; *Solilocvii* (Soliloquies), 5 volumes, Top Form Publishing House, Bucharest, 2011-2019; *Istoria diplomației. Secolul XX* (History of Diplomacy. 20th Century), Cetatea de Scaun Publishing House, Târgoviște, 2014.

When the volume *Diplomacy of the 20th Century* (2006) was published, the author sent a copy dedicated to the venerable historian and member of The Romanian Academy, Dinu C. Giurescu. Ambassador Constantin Vlad notes in the Diary: “He was among the few who responded to me, in a letter with the following quoting: ‘It is the first synthesis and analysis of such proportions, where we find the goals and perspectives of the main actors of



diplomacy, but also those of Romania, over a century. Your long practice in diplomacy as well as in research ensures the acuity and quality of interpretation. It is a much-needed reference work for a large number of readers, from students to teachers, to politicians (if they sooner or later decide to read...), to researchers, to young diplomats, to all those interested in world history. Congratulations on this *opus magnum*, which arrives on time and will not be matched in the foreseeable future.” (p. 227)

Teachers and expectations

Referring to his teachers, the author confesses: “I adored my good teachers (and there weren’t too many of them), I’m always hungry for the companionship of valuable books, I’m always looking for life, beyond the often misleading appearances – but I’ve always come back to myself.” (p. 58)

This return to itself inspires interesting ideas and expectations about memorialism in general and especially about diplomacy, still deficient in Romanian literature, militating in favour of cultivating this literary genre. These ideas and expectations deserve to be widely disseminated in the author’s own language: “I know people with high professional qualifications and outstanding academic performance. In addition, the same people held important public – political and state positions at certain times. Of course, I can’t name some person, because I hope that this note will see the light of day. I only notice that such people do not consider it a duty to put their own experience on paper, beyond scientific research, teaching activity etc. and it is a shame. Because, as far as I know, they saw politics from the inside, they coordinated the policy of the Romanian state in matters of historical importance after December 1989. They, I emphasize, they, not their subordinates, even if they were brilliant (which didn’t really happen), they felt like our partners and allies really are, what real interests they defend, beyond beautiful principles and words. I may be wrong. But I think politicians, when they really have something to say, should be their own columnists. Of course, there is a risk of subjectivity, but memorial literature has its specific role in knowing the unfolding of events. And at any time, this literature can and is confronted with realities (facts), both by contemporaries and by those who come after. I recall in this regard the brilliant example of Winston Churchill. He did not limit himself to publishing his speeches, the speeches inherent in his duties, but recorded, by dictation, everything that happened, with his participation or in his presence, during the Second World War. The outcome? Magnificent work in six volumes, a unique work in universal literature, which no serious historian can ignore.” (p. 283)

As a result of these demands, the author proves to be a careful hermeneutic of the diplomatic events he experienced, and his diplomatic diary offers historical evidence for understanding the place of Romanian diplomacy in the world arena, the activity in the field of global and European multilateral diplomacy.

Opinions and confreres

We will give readers the pleasure of navigating through the events described in the journal and through those described in the five volumes of *Soliloquies*. In these lines, we limit ourselves only to highlighting some very current opinions on diplomacy and some points of view on the universal value of solidarity, a topic that has recently returned, as we will see, in the public debate in Romania. Of course, the author's theoretical conception of diplomacy must be analyzed primarily based on his comprehensive work on twentieth-century diplomatic history, but the author's sensitivity in all his journal accounts to the realm of diplomatic affairs directly experienced by him is remarkable.

The author brings into discussion in this context a thesis of permanent interest, namely that it is not the balance of forces that ensures peace and the peaceful settlement of disputes, but the demilitarization of relations between states. "When problems arise between states, the supreme authorities should not call the chiefs of staff, but diplomats, to put them to work." (p. 80)

The academic activity of Constantin Vlad is not separated from the permanent obligation of the diplomat to cherish his confreres. In this context, it is worth mentioning a unique initiative in the Romanian practice of honouring the memory of an elite diplomat post-mortem. It is about the successful proposal to admit posthumously the honourable Romanian diplomat Valentin Lipatti among the members of the Romanian Academy of Scientists.

Here are some ideas from the report prepared on this topic by Constantin Vlad and published in the journal. It is recalled that Valentin Lipatti (1923-1998) studied in Romania and France and was a professor of French literature at the University of Bucharest. His diplomatic mandates are mentioned: Representative of Romania to UNESCO, 1962-1972; Head of the Romanian MFA Delegation to the Preparatory Meeting of the CSCE, 1972-1973; Head of the Romanian MFA Delegation at the Geneva Negotiations, 1973-1975; Deputy of the Romanian Delegation to the First Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki, July 1975;

Head of the Romanian MFA Delegation at the CSCE Meeting in Belgrade, 1980-1981; Director for Cultural Affairs at the MFA; Ambassador at Large.

Valentin Lipatti has prepared several promotions for graduates in French literature and was one of Romania's most successful representatives at UNESCO, bringing many benefits to Romania – scholarships for young people, restoration of historical monuments, etc. It is noted that "Studies published by him on cultural diplomacy are still models of action in the field." Valentin Lipatti proved to be a high-ranking diplomat in multilateral diplomacy, an active diplomat, deeply devoted to national interests. Such qualities have been concretely highlighted in what is called the CSCE Process. His book *In the Trenches of Europe. Notes of a Negotiator*, Military Publishing House, 1993, is a true treaty of multilateral diplomatic negotiation" (pp. 325-326).

Unknown episodes of Romania's activity in the field of multilateral diplomacy are brought to the readers' attention. Thus, Constantin Vlad reminds that on December 28, 2019 at the European Titulescu Foundation took place the launch of volume 12 documents from the series *Romania – survival and affirmation through diplomacy during the Cold War*, series coordinated by Ambassador Nicolae Ecobescu. The mentioned volume deals with the activity of the Romanian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly since 1971. The documents cover a wide variety of topics, but those on the restoration of the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China to the UN predominate. Until 1971, China's place at the UN was occupied by Taiwan, with the support of the United States and other UN members. The Romanian delegation was led by Corneliu Mănescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs. His deputy was the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Nicolae Ecobescu. In the weeks leading up to the fall of 1971, Romania made a decisive contribution to the expulsion of Taiwan and the establishment of the People's Republic of China at the United Nations. Week after week, the Romanian delegation insisted on restoring the PRC's legitimate rights. Dozens of telegrams from New York or Bucharest record repeated displacements in power relations between R.P. Chinese and Taiwan supporters. In the end, the supporters of the PRC were victorious and China is now making a decisive contribution to the UNO and to upholding the principles of the UN Charter. (pp. 357-358)

In addition to Valentin Lipatti, the author of the Journal evokes other Romanian diplomats. He regrets that "Mircea Malița left us. He burned like a torch, until he consumed his last painting of energy. When you remember how much he did, when you see the list of books written and published, you

wonder how much I can fit in an ephemeral human life. I have always placed him among the leading diplomats of the country in the post-war period, together with Ștefan Andrei, Corneliu Mănescu, George Macovescu, Nicolae Ecobescu” (p. 251)

Readers will also find interesting references about other leading Romanian diplomats, such as Ion M. Anghel, Vasile Gliga, Sorin Ducaru, Teodor Marinescu, Gheorghe Dolgu, Ion Datcu, Nicolae Mareș and Traian Chebeleu. Ambassador Constantin Vlad is entitled to declare, “I think I have done my duty to the memory of those who, four decades ago, were part of the elite of Romanian, European and world diplomacy, and who are hardly mentioned today” (p. 151)

European diplomacy and solidarity

The author has a critical attitude towards the interpretive excesses found in the evaluation of the results of European diplomacy. Thus, participating in a symposium organized by the European Titulescu Foundation on the topic, “Rome Summit and EU perspectives” follows the interventions of two foreign MEPs and one Romanian, all members of the socialist group. “Many well-known things are said. We hear the loudest statement from the Romanian MEP – usually a well-informed man and a good speaker. He states, *By integrating into the European Union, Romania has regained its identity*. I’m ashamed of his shame and I refrain from asking him for an explanation. Many talk about the goal of social Europe. But, just words. Someone in the audience is asking whether the Socialist Group will aim to remove EU neoliberalism, which has provoked recent crises. The question remains unanswered, apparently due to lack of time. If the talks had continued, what would have happened to those concerned? Judging by what is happening in the EU – and not only –, social democracy seeks only to mitigate the negative effects of neoliberal policies. If it intends to eliminate such policies, it should engage in anti-capitalist positions, that is, proclaim and pursue alternative policies to those that, in fact, support the establishment, and therefore the capitalist rules as a whole. What, obviously, social-democracy, as a political-ideological movement, does not aim at in any way.” (pp. 192-194)

Particularly interesting are the author’s recollections on the work of the Commission for establishing the motto of the Romanian Presidency at the Council of the European Union in 2019. There were 45 proposals submitted by the members of this commission. Five were selected, among which the proposal of Constantin Vlad *Common Destiny by Consensus*. The other proposals selected were “Solidarity, balance, common values”; “European

standards and values for all EU citizens”; “One Europe”; “Europe, solidarity that inspires you”. The author emphasizes, “Maybe I’m subjective, but my choice seems the most appropriate and suggestive. When I decided for it, I didn’t think about the words, but I wanted a form that could be a kind of response from Romania to the current search for reform of the European Union.” The author further informs us that “There is broader support for the *Solidarity, Balance, Common Values* proposal. It is appropriate to eliminate the term *equilibrium*, as it has no obvious meaning in the EU.”

However, the author remains critical of this solution and states, “I personally appreciate that the term *Solidarity* remains abstract, with each EU Member State having its own interpretation of its content. For example, Macron and Merkel want the solidarity of the Member States to be built around them, around the positions adopted by their countries. And the words *common values* has become, over time, part of a jargon, a wooden language specific to Brussels, brought back into public discourse by the elders of the EU, especially when they have something to blame the East. At the same time, I argue that, if each term proposed in the motto has its meaning, this meaning would be enhanced and specified if they were related to each other. For example, in the Solidarity formula based on common values. It was not accepted, because in this way the motto becomes... too long. However, I do not oppose the consensus so as not to create difficulties for the Commission. But I remain deeply dissatisfied that Romania will have the Presidency of the Council of the European Union under a slogan without a clear message, which would show openly and (why not: and subliminally) how Bucharest conceives the reform and future development of the European Project. Of course, I would not have changed such a position, but at least we would have adopted a dignified attitude.” (pp. 216-18) Another Commission meeting is taking place. In which a final decision is made, “We are communicated – and required to agree to – the following wording of the motto: *Solidarity – common value*. Those present take it upon themselves. However, it is better than the previous versions. From my point of view, the same shortcoming remains – Merkel and Macron want solidarity in support of their proposals. From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture and National Identity, I am awarded the Diploma for the special contribution to the process of establishing the Motto of the Romanian Presidency of the Council of the European Union. It is a distinction received by all members of the Commission.” (p. 218)

It should be recalled that solidarity is already recognized as a universal value proclaimed in the Millennium Declaration, adopted by the UN Summit

on 8 September 2000 and reaffirmed in many other global and regional documents, including at European level. Thus, in the Sibiu Declaration of May 9, 2019, in which the leaders of the European Union unanimously agreed on ten commitments, the second commitment has the following content: "We will remain united, for better or for worse. We will show solidarity in difficult times and we will always stand by each other. We can and will not express ourselves in unison." This commitment must be strengthened by convincing action, given the precarious state of solidarity in Europe in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. The issue of strengthening solidarity remains open at both global and European level.

On July 13, 2021, at the Cotroceni Palace, took place the launching event of the national debate on the future of Europe. Solidarity was mentioned 9 times in the speeches made on this occasion. From the transcript of the speeches, we note that the President of Romania, Klaus Iohannis, stated, "A Union of the Future is, in Romania's view, an indissoluble project linked to the idea of European unity and solidarity for the benefit of all, a project in which we must be concerned with the well-being of all Member States and European citizens alike." The practice of European solidarity must be assessed with the utmost lucidity and responsibility. Constantin Vlad writes in his Diary, on January 11, 2019, "I watched with interest the event at the Romanian Athenaeum dedicated to the official takeover by Romania of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. And with great pleasure, after that, the Concert. Regarding the speeches of the guests and the hosts: many beautiful words, of complacency. A kind of diplomacy that mimics its purpose. On the whole, it was very clear that things remain as they have been so far. So nothing new." (p. 275) Referring directly to solidarity, Constantin Vlad consciously warns, "*The Great Ones* in the European Union want the solidarity of the whole Union with their positions, positions formulated starting first of all from their interests. In other words, *The Great Ones* want nothing more than the subordination of the Eastern and Central European states. Noting that such subordination, if carried out, would affect all small and medium-sized member states of the Community Club." (p. 263)

Lessons for the future

Constantin Vlad's diary, which covers almost half a century, contains valuable urges to vigorously promote multilateralism in the world arena on the basis of fundamental principles of international law and the need for the dynamic re-engagement of Romanian diplomacy in the process of effectively solving the global problems of mankind. In the current circumstances,

diplomatic experience is called upon to have its say. Here is the reflection on this topic of a Romanian diplomat, Ambassador Ion Jinga, in full action, as Romania's permanent representative to the UN. He confesses, "After 28 years spent in the Romanian diplomatic service, I dare say that diplomatic skills are the result of a process of professional training and accumulation, not qualities received at birth. No one is born with the talent to practice international diplomacy, which involves understanding different societies and cultures from the one in which you grew up, the ability to influence foreign governments, the ability to negotiate, the ability to anticipate threats and seize opportunities for your country. These qualities are acquired. Diplomacy is learned from both books and practice. A professional diplomatic service involves the specialized training of staff, career development plan, tools, resources and the authority necessary to carry out the mission."

These findings are immediately relevant and interesting, in a time of unprecedented complexity in international relations, in which the lessons of the past should be a real guide, able to encourage a fruitful activity of Romanian diplomats guided unwaveringly by the perennial national interests of Romania, in a world characterized by vulnerabilities, perplexities and global discontinuities, accentuated even more by the crisis generated by the COVID-19 pandemic whose effects have radically changed the style and ways of action of bilateral diplomacy and especially those of multilateral diplomacy. In this complex and worrying process that diplomacy is currently going through, the guiding light should be the truth convincingly formulated by UN Secretary-General António Guterres, according to which "Solidarity is humanity. Solidarity is survival." António Guterres has a second term as UN Secretary-General since 2022, and his vibrant calls for a new era of "Solidarity and equality" should be treated with genuine responsibility by the entire community of nations.

IOAN VOICU: Doctor of Political Science from the University of Geneva (1968), doctor honoris causa in international law from the Assumption University of Thailand (1998), career diplomat; Romania's Deputy Representative to the United Nations Security Council (1990-1991); member of the Administrative Court of the United Nations (1987-1993), Romanian ambassador to the Kingdom of Thailand and permanent observer with international organizations based in Bangkok (1994-1999), associate professor at Assumption University in Thailand (2000-2019).



Philosophy



TRADITIONS AND CURRENT MEANINGS OF ROMANIAN PHILOSOPHY

Ph.D. Ioan N. ROȘCA

Abstract: *Culturally situated between the West and the East, Romanian philosophy was concerned with both man and the community, combining Western individualism with Eastern holism. Thus, interwar philosophers understood man as a creative being – individual and social – (C. Rădulescu-Motru, L. Blaga and others), they defined values as national and universal appreciations (P. Andrei, T. Vianu, D.D. Roșca, L. Blaga, etc.) and explained history mainly through its ideational-value substratum, both individually and collectively (A.D. Xenopol, N. Iorga, P.P. Negulescu and others). Their anthropological, axiological and of the philosophy of history ideas are important and capitalizable also in the contemporary philosophical context.*

Keywords: *individualism, holism, creative being, value, philosophical anthropology, axiology, philosophy of history*

X

The fundamental idea of this study is that Romanian philosophers, being formed at the confluence of Western and Eastern culture, approached the issue of man, values and history in a balanced spirit, of the reciprocity between individual and community, combining Western individualistic humanism with Eastern European holism. This spirit runs through Romanian philosophy from Dimitrie Cantemir, the creator of the first Romanian philosophical work, *The Content of the Sage with the World*, and to Constantin Noica, one of the last creators of the philosophical system, *Becoming a Being*. However, I will continue to deal only with the interwar period, because then, in the conditions of the destruction caused by the First World War, the interwar thinkers treated in a special way and theoretically deepened the problem of concordant affirmation of peoples and nations through authentic social values. Implicitly, but also explicitly, they took into account the affirmation of the Romanians through the values of the culture and, thus, of the collective personality of our people.

I. The philosophy of man

In the conception of man, the emphasis placed on both man and community is exemplary in C. Rădulescu-Motru and Lucian Blaga's works.

In his masterpiece from 1927, *Energetic Personalism*, as in other later writings, Rădulescu-Motru argued that people, through whom cosmic energy comes to be personalized, can be professional personalities or people of vocation. Through their profession, they both serve society, but the professional personalities seek to satisfy their personal interests through their competent activity, while the vocation people act selflessly in the service of the community. Rădulescu-Motru also referred to the collective personality of peoples and nations and to the relationship between individual and collective personalities. He stated, especially in the notes printed posthumously under the title *Revisions and Additions*, that the evolution of mankind is moving towards a prevalence of the collective personality of peoples, but in principle spoke in favor of reciprocity between individual and state, between individual and society.

He based his balanced view, which supports both the importance of individuals and the community, on the well-founded argument that social, community consciousness consists of the common elements of individual consciousness, so that the spirit of the state and social institutions is in line with the consciousness of their members.

But, as post-war realities have shown, especially those of today, there is or may be a disagreement between the thinking of the state, the state and the thinking of the majority of citizens, or a significant part of them, when the state – using the trainers of opinion, to a large extent those from the media – manipulates citizens and promotes the interests of the government as general interests, although they do not express the interests of citizens and in some cases do not even respect their fundamental rights. In this way, a pseudo-social consciousness is formed in a part of the population, which the state, through its institutions, seeks to forcibly inoculate to the majority of its members. Obviously, in this case, there is not a harmony, but a domination of the individual by his own state. Rădulescu-Motru also predicted the importance of social factors, somewhat external to individuals, through his theory according to which the consciousness of individual people, although it resides in their soul substance, in its innate tendencies, asserts itself or not depending on the social courts, which can be either favorable or unfavorable.

Similar, but also different from Rădulescu-Motru, Lucian Blaga treated the relationship between man and community in several of his works grouped in philosophical trilogies, especially in the *Trilogy of Culture* (1944)

and in the work “Anthropological Aspects” (1947) from the *Cosmological Trilogy*. He defined man as a being in mystery and for revelation, so as a creative being, projected into the non-immediate, into mystery, which, however, as he argued, he does not end up exhausting. According to him, creations from different forms of culture and value are individual, but the unconscious factors from which they spring and which consciously embody form a stylistic matrix specific to the members of a people and, therefore, to each people. In other words, the abysmal factors of a certain stylistic matrix (spatial horizon, temporal horizon, axiological accent, anabasic or catabasic attitude and formative aspiration) unify individuals with the cultural community of which they are part. Blaga also admitted the possibility for some individuals to distinguish themselves from the stylistic matrix of the respective people, but only through certain secondary stylistic factors. He argued that “usually a stylistic matrix varies from individual to individual... only by certain completely secondary or accidental determinants”¹⁰⁵, and for those that differ “by abysmal categories of prime importance” from the ethnic group in which they participate, however, the ethnic group “forms their background”¹⁰⁶.

Although the notions of *stylistic matrix* and *soul substance* admit the existence of a unity between individuals and community, there are also differences between them. First, as it follows from the above, the notion of *stylistic matrix* explains the orderly character of the unconscious, while the notion of *soul substance* suggests only a certain complexity of the unconscious by the idea of tendencies of the soul substance, different from people to people. Secondly, but equally important, the stylistic matrix and the substance of the soul also differ in the way in which the two thinkers conceive their relationship with the social-historical conditions. Blaga tended to absolutize the *a priori* character of any stylistic matrix and thus evade it from becoming social-historical, while Rădulescu-Motru argued that the tendencies of individual or collective soul substance assert themselves or not depending on the social conditions existing at a time. Therefore, his conception was appreciated as *functionalist*, the function being “a relationship between the elements of two different classes”¹⁰⁷, in this case between the subjectivity that is internal and the external social-historical environment. However, it should be noted that Blaga also referred, for

¹⁰⁵ Lucian Blaga, *Trilogia culturii*, Bucharest, E.L.U., 1969, p. 112.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 362.

¹⁰⁷ Claudiu Baci, *Ideea de vocație la C. Rădulescu-Motru*, în vol. *Simpozionul național „Constantin Rădulescu-Motru”*, Ediția a II-a „Maiorescu și maiorescienii” Târgu-Mureș, 2017, Editura Academiei Române, București, 2018, p. 149

example, to the bitter historical conditions, which determined that, for several centuries, the Romanian stylistic matrix asserted itself only in folk creations, not in works of major culture. In essence, through his conception regarding the Romanian *apriorism*, Blaga emphasized more the *apriorism* unity between the cultural community and the individual cultural affirmations, while Rădulescu-Motru considered that this unity manifests itself and is formed under the impact of history.

Through the categories of *soul substance* and *stylistic matrix*, Rădulescu-Motru and, respectively, Blaga denote a certain influence from Freudianism, present at the time, and Kantian *apriorism*. They differ, however, from Freud, who regarded the unconscious as a chaotic mixture of elements. Or, Rădulescu-Motru affirms the constancy of the unconscious tendencies, which implies a certain structuring of them, and Blaga, moreover, argues the structural character of the unconscious, imprinted by the abysmal factors. The two thinkers also differ from Kantian *apriorism* in extending this *apriorism*, from the level of sensible and intellectual knowledge to which Kant referred, to the level of the unconscious which is reflected in the consciousness and which leaves its mark not only on empirical or theoretical knowledge, but also of other forms of cultural creation.

In essence, the two thinkers supported the communion between individuals and the peoples they belong to as cultural solidarity. They explained this interconnection through the deepest, most unconscious common elements of the consciousness of individual people and, therefore, of the collective consciousness, and considered that the abysmal depths of consciousness penetrate in both directions: both from individuals to the community and vice versa. Nor did they neglect the influence of the social environment on consciousness. Generally valid, their conceptions had and still have a national, patriotic coloration, as they aimed, in particular, at affirming the Romanians according to the socio-cultural desideratum of the Romanian people and, at the same time, the creation, by the Romanian state and other national institutions, of an environment materially and spiritually favorable to human affirmation.

II. Philosophy of value

In the interwar period, Romanian thinkers combined the individualist and the communitarian point of view in **the field of philosophy of values**, an applied philosophical discipline that was founded at that time, called **axiology**. Values involve not only a knowledge of different objects, but also an appreciation of them as important or unimportant for different human

needs. Romanian axiologists considered that values depend on both the individual and society.

At the beginning of the last century, when axiology was established, individualistic-psychological conceptions predominated, which considered that the basis of value is either the feeling or the will of individual people. The psychologism of value had been taken over by the historian A.D. Xenopol, who, in his 1910 work *Théorie de l'histoire*, without dealing more extensively with axiology, thought that the historian could not explain historical facts as valuable facts, because he would introduce his own subjectivity in appreciating facts as significant or insignificant in value.

The one who initiated in us the systematic approach of values and overcame axiological psychology was Petre Andrei through his doctoral thesis *Philosophy of Value*, defended in 1918 and published posthumously in 1945. He overcame psychology, first of all, by the fact that he considered feelings of value as dependent on judgment, on the thinking that knows the goods to be appreciated and reaches truths common to all, so that thought enlightened feelings will have a general human character.

In this regard, according to him, "the phenomenon of value is a feeling that accompanies a judgment and seeks to concretize its object in the form of a purpose"¹⁰⁸. Secondly, he understood that individual appreciations become social ideals not only by their concordance with thought, but also by the fact that they receive the assent of other members of society, in other words, by the fact that they satisfy both individual needs and social requirements. Therefore, he argued that, in any field of activity, every man should cultivate the morality of debt, assert himself as a personality and thus assert the personality of his people.

Petre Andrei admitted that there are also two types of **hyperpersonal values**, in the sense that it would depend only on the individual, not on social factors, namely logical and mathematical values. He pointed out, however, that logical principles, for example, on which concepts and judgments are based, represent values by their generic nature, present in any thinking subject. In addition, logical values, called hyperpersonal, are integrated into social values, which depend on both the individual and society, as any social value includes cognitive elements as well.

As for the **social values**, Petre Andrei was concerned to show that they depend not only on individuals, but also on the various elements that exist in society. As types of social values, he mentioned and analyzed economic,

¹⁰⁸ Petre Andrei, "Filosofia valorii", in *Opere sociologice*, vol. I, Academiei Publishing House, Bucharest, 1973, p. 188.

legal, political, ethical, historical, aesthetic and religious values. The economic value, he said, depends not only on individual needs, but also on *social factors*, such as work, through which individuals cooperate. He also stated that the legal and political values are determined by the *regulatory elements* of society, the legal ones referring to the organization of life together, to the relations between individuals, and the political ones – to the relations between individuals and the state. With regard to this report, he challenged both *personal* axiologies, which asserted the supremacy of the individual, and *transpersonal* axiologies, according to which the state enslaves its individuals, while ruling for a state as a unit of individual will, in which individual goals are socially subsumed. About other types of values, such as historical (as a sum of different types of values), biological and religious, he mentioned that they are determined by the social environment as a whole. For example, religion, through its feelings, is individual, but through its cultic form, it depends on society.

Other Romanian axiologists, including D.D. Roșca, Tudor Vianu and Lucian Blaga have stated similar and balanced conceptions about values as both individual and community values given to different objects, which satisfy either material needs or spiritual demands.

A problem that preoccupied the Romanian philosophers of value from the interwar period and that involves the relationship between individual people, on the one hand and state and society, on the other hand, is the hierarchy of values, especially the relationship between spiritual values and material values. In general, they argued that spiritual values should be cultivated as a goal, because people are superior to them, and material values should be used as a means of acquiring spiritual ones.

D.D. Roșca, in his book *The Tragic Existence* of 1934, argued that excessive assertion only through a certain type of values, either spiritual or material, is harmful because neither people nor peoples can subsist only by spirit, as they cannot claim to be genuinely human just by meeting biological needs. In this context, he stated that the exclusively economic capitalist assertion unilateralized man, transforming him into a *homo economicus*, who “made the means of living a purpose, and spiritual values a means subservient to that purpose.”¹⁰⁹

In other words, what is happening today as well, the richer a man is materially, the poorer he is spiritually, the more he *has*, the less he *is*. In the same book leading up to World War II, the philosopher observed that, like

¹⁰⁹ D. D. Roșca, *Existența tragică*, Științifică Publishing House, Bucharest, 1968, p. 121.

human relations, relations between capitalist states became conflictual and aggressive, focusing on economic and political domination of one over the other and not on fair trade.

DD Roșca explained the reversal of the natural relationship between spiritual and material development both by the fact that individual people were absorbed in the concerns for material well-being, without worrying about their moral and spiritual elevation, as well as economic relations and capitalist social policies, based on competition and making as much profit as possible. Consequently, he argued that it is necessary, especially, for people to change their inner attitude and to cultivate, in addition to the scientific-technical values, necessary for material production, values not enslaved to the biological and still to a large extent, but also the society must radically transform and revolutionize.

As for spiritual values, unlike Blaga, who argued that, stylistically, there is a parallelism between the different spiritual values and not a hierarchy, meaning that they all intend to reveal the mystery, but none of them end up exhausting it, Petre Andrei and Tudor Vianu considered that religious values are the highest, because they are *integrative*, that is, they unify the other values, including the highest truth, the good and the beautiful.

In this sense, Petre Andrei stated that in the religious ideal “the supreme consciousness of good, truth and beauty is synthesized”¹¹⁰, and Tudor Vianu argued that religious values “integrate, unify, constitute in a unitary and coherent whole all the values that are contained in human consciousness”¹¹¹ because only in their light other spiritual values can as well be understood as absolute values, otherwise they remain conceived only in the form of creations at the human level, without an unshakable foundation, which would be most closely supported by all members of society.

The major ideas of the Romanian interwar axiologists are still relevant today, when the options of minority groups or states claiming universal values, which oppose the perennial values, which are truly eternal, regarding the importance of the traditional family for the continuity of each people, or the importance of the material and spiritual culture of any people for non-discriminatory communication with others. Regarding the relationship between material and spiritual, it is essential to cultivate spiritual values as an end in itself and material values as a means for both individuals and peoples

¹¹⁰ Petre Andrei, *Filosofia valorii*, cited work, p. 334.

¹¹¹ Tudor Vianu, “Introducere în teoria valorilor întemeiată pe observația conștiinței,” in Tudor Vianu, *Opere*, vol. 8, Minerva Publishing House, Bucharest, 1979, p. 118.

to overcome economic unilateralization and interpersonal and interstate conflicts, respectively. In this context, the value of the sacred must not be minimized or even removed, precisely because, by its absolute character, it integrates the other values and saves us from relativism, bringing us all closer to the divine self, which is, even if only latent, in the depths of human consciousness.

III. Philosophy of history

In the field of philosophy of history, some Romanian historians from the interwar period concerned with philosophy, such as A.D. Xenopol, Nicolae Iorga, Vasile Pârvan, and some philosophers who leaned on history at the same stage, such as Rădulescu Motru, P.P. Negulescu and L. Blaga have explained historical evolution through innovative ideas or through the ideals and values espoused by both individuals and peoples. At the same time, they thought that ideas and ideals alone have no power to change history, without individual and social activity to translate them into life, so without their concretization in different fields of activity. Consequently, distinguishing between the determining factor and the dominant factor, they kept the idea that the spiritual, ideational, valuable element is the determining factor of history, but they also raised the issue of the relationship between social domains in which this factor manifests itself, more precisely the issue regarding the dominant factor, as well as the issue of other factors with an impact on history. In general, I have maintained the predominance of spiritual culture, without neglecting the influence of the economic field.

A.D. Xenopol appreciated, in his *Theory of History*, published in 1910, that history “rests” on “public ideas” or that “the spirit... gives rise to the forms of civilization,” that the socio-political field is, usually, dominant, but also that “there are a lot of historical facts, ultimately explainable by economic considerations”¹¹², insomuch as the economic form “is in its turn influenced by science, law, morality, political and social forms, all of which exert a strong action on the way goods are produced and distributed.”¹¹³

N. Iorga argued that new ideas are the determining factor of history, namely the ideas that constitute an ideal, because they ensure the progress of mankind and, once realized, justify “societies and the complicated buildings” and become a “principle, which supports a tradition that enshrines,”¹¹⁴ as

¹¹² A.D. Xenopol, *Teoria istoriei*, Bucharest, 1997, p. 328.

¹¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 334.

¹¹⁴ Nicolae Iorga, *Generalități privind studiile istorice*, 3rd edition, Bucharest, 1944, p. 74.

were, for the modern world, the ideas of the French Revolution. He did not indicate a particular historical field as dominant, considering that the guiding ideas could be political, or religious, such as the ideas of Christianity, or otherwise, provided that he proposed an ideal that would conquer the people. At the same time, he considered the land and the race, understood as repeatable factors of the life of each people, as permanent of history, but he relativized their importance, rejecting their absolutism by geography and, respectively, by racist point of view, because history overflows the stability of these factors.

P.P. Negulescu, in his pentalogy *The Destiny of Mankind*, explained, in his turn, the history through the spiritual factors that are manifested both at the level of the individual man and at that of the human community. He considered that the role of historical factor in conjunction with moral sentiment was the determining factor. According to him, the cause of the crisis of humanity that led to the outbreak of World War II was selfishness, a moral feeling which manifested itself both internally, through hatred between social classes, and externally, by the fact that "some of the European powers, animated by a national selfishness that I believe to be holy, pursue – hiding in vain, in words, the intentions that are betrayed at every step, in deeds – goals that cannot be achieved without the deep damage of the interests of others."¹¹⁵ Consequently, he concluded that humanity can have a better future through progress not only intellectually but also morally, in a democratic state, not a dictatorial one.

Like the anthropological or axiological ideas, the main ideas of the philosophy of history affirmed by the Romanian interwar thinkers remain significant in the current context, because even today there is an economic and political hegemony of the strongest states, and many countries also face dissensions. internally. In addition, the world is also divided by the alternative of globalism versus sovereignty. Without a successful education, which will train innovative skills and spirits in every country, but also without more morality, fairness and justice within each state and between the states of the world, neither the prosperity of each people nor the progress of mankind in ensemble cannot be achieved. An intelligent and moral sovereignty is not opposed to globalization, just as an intelligent and moral globalism is not hostile to sovereignty, because it presupposes a unified humanity by harmonizing the states of the world and not a planetary neo-slavery in the service of a supranational elite blanket.

¹¹⁵ P. P. Negulescu, *Destinul omenirii*, vol. I, 2nd edition, Fundația pentru Literatură și Artă „Regele Carol II, Bucharest, 1939, p. 14.

ABOUT MAN

1) C. Rădulescu-Motru (1868-1957): *Energetic personalism* (1927)

- professional personalities – *people of vocation*

2) L. Blaga (1895-1961)

- *man in the given world horizon – man in the mystery horizon*
- being in mystery and for revelation

3) D.D. Roșca (1895-1980): *The Tragic Existence* (1934)

- man = heroic existence

4) C. Noica (1909-1987)

- man = being in becoming

ABOUT VALUES

1) Petre Andrei (1891-1940): *Filosofia valorii*, 1918, 1945

- the complex nature of value

2) D. D. Roșca (1895-1980) + T. Vianu:

- the affective nature of value
- the myth of utility (*being and having*)

3) L. Blaga (1895-1961)

- utilitarian values – spiritual values

ABOUT HISTORY

1) A. D. Xenopol (1847-1920): *Theory of History* (1910)

- historical fact, determining factor – dominant factor

2) N. Iorga (1871-1940): *General information on historical studies*

- the premises of history: the idea, the land and the race (*biological and cultural background*)

3) C. Rădulescu-Motru

- determining factor (technical and moral) – secondary factors (geographical factor, race)
- collective personalities (*globalism versus sovereignty*)
- the meaning of history

4) P. P. Negulescu (1872-1951): *The Destiny of Mankind*, 5 volumes

- the crisis of mankind and its causes

5) L. Blaga (1895-1980): *The Historical Being* (1947, 1977)

- cultural historical fact
- historical continuity through communicability
- technical, not value progress

PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION: THE SCHOOL AS A MEANS OF TRAINING

Melina ALLEGRO

Vicepresident of Istituto Teseo, Italy

Abstract: *When I think about school, I can't help but think about life, about my life. Indeed, school has been the constant of my life.*

I have gone through all the grades of the school and in the various grades, I have also changed types of schools; moreover, today, I find myself teaching in primary school for 28 years now, and tomorrow... Maybe!

Anyway, now I'm here and I'm looking over my shoulder for a thin thread, the texture of my life. Perhaps this is not what I have to talk about, perhaps the style I am using is not suited to this treatment, perhaps I should be more impersonal, use a more objective style, but all this is not said by chance, even if by chance many of our choices are determined.

Keywords: *philosophy, education, school, vehicle, multiplicity*



Introduction

So, we come to the subject of this article, we come to the definition of the function that we attribute to the school. The school as a means of training. Speaking of training, it is necessary to establish who and in what way. We come to who: this question could simply be answered "the learning subject", but by asking ourselves the problem of "how", new problems arise that we are going to face considering the need for training as necessary for the child, as for the adult, to the construction of tools for research and understanding of the multiplicity of contexts of life, understood as freedom.

Here it is necessary to clarify what multiplicity is and therefore why it is here understood as freedom.

To clarify it is necessary to make a premise; and, that is, to speak of the school as the place within which the child makes contact with life, therefore with himself and with others. He therefore makes contact with the multiple, with the multiple places of being, he enters a workshop from which, in a perspective of continuous training, he will never leave it again. The German biologist Haeckel, at the end of the last century, wrote a thesis on the study of the evolution of man. For Haeckel, cosmic and organic evolution, including human, are governed by the “biogenetic law” according to which the development of the individual, or ontogenesis, summarizes the development of the species, or phylogeny.

Following this thesis, the English positivist H. Spencer (1820-1903), in intellectual, moral and physical education, arrives at a pedagogical perspective understood as self-development: if the succession of knowledge acquired by mankind had been transmitted by inheritance, in the same order to subsequent generations, then the education of the child must be “in a small way a repetition of civilization”.

At this point, faced with the work that was considered a sort of manifesto of positivist pedagogy, we need to ask ourselves which civilization Spencer was referring to. If the civilization that Spencer had in mind was the one that solved the problem of knowledge as scientific knowledge, that is, as it went beyond subjective impressions and reflections, then it is necessary to restore to the subject one's position, that is, one's role as protagonist; an “objectivity” without the subject is unthinkable. So who is the Subject of this civilization? He is the man, a man halfway between Doctor Faust and Renzo. Both of these figures live their history as men; both are looking for answers. The one, perhaps – Doctor Faust, I mean –, is the architect of his story, a story that would like to be a multiple story, just as there are many possibilities that life has within itself. Faust in his choice, in his encounter with the devil, frees himself, with a last extreme act, of his essence, of his subjectivity, of his ability to choose, of his reason, as if in this act, in fact, he wanted to contain all the infinite choices, to disperse his unique subjectivity involved in all those infinite choices, to raise one's spirit above things and dominate them.

For the philosopher Hegel, human existence, until it rises to reason, is restlessness of the spirit. And it is Faust's restlessness that he describes:

Faust wants to understand the foundation of things, the secret spring of the manifestations of the physical and moral world, he wants to understand the one who gave everything an order.

In vain! He moves on the stage of life, where vices and virtues are intertwined, where good comes from evil and evil from good. The spirit is increasingly confused. (.....) The spirit must leave everything to its external course and, on the other hand, a deep darkness and a gloomy silence envelop all the powers that it does not perceive and that only seem to deride it. Everything is dark for the spirit of man and it is itself an enigma. (HEGEL, pp. 70-71)

Hegel wants to solve the riddle; in fact, he solves it in the awareness that nothing in the world is enigmatic, everything is as it manifests itself. There is no evil power that deceives man, and not even an occult good or truth that must be painfully or painfully discovered beyond appearance and evil. Everything is substance, everything is to be true, everything is reason. In every moment, that world so dark in Faust is a world fully clear to itself, good and truth are constant presence. Provided, however, that we do not stop immediately, at the single choice, provided that the relationship that binds one to the whole is maintained firm and aware, the determination to the substance, the manifestation to the essence; the need for freedom. In this conception, however, Hegel does not ignore the lacerations of being, he does not ignore the eternal passing of everything. In this conception, Hegel elevates immediacy to reason, relates the given to the universal. And then, precisely the splits, the becoming, the contingency, appear as a guarantee of the freedom of the spirit – that same spirit of Faust enveloped in the “profound darkness” and the “gloomy silence” of the infinite hidden possibilities. And this guarantee is given precisely by their nature, that is, as the manifestation of reason, which always takes away its moments in itself, to regain its unity at a higher level, and thus to give its freedom a fuller effect, more aware of its own unfolding in the world, in history.

The other, that is Renzo, is a simple man, he is a man who does not have the problem of infinite choices, he is a man who, as his only choice, wants to marry Lucia: this is the only story he would like to live, he is looking for nothing else. But here is the story, indeed the infinite stories of other men who stand between his only choice – the promise – and the possibility of making it come true; and anger is not needed, the animosity with which Renzo almost rebels against the many adversities, the multiple

offerings of life in all its facets: it is life itself that dominates it, it is this multiplicity that prevails.

However, Renzo seems to live the enigma that surrounds him, the enigma of infinite events, of the continuous succession of events, with the same restlessness as Faust; Renzo like Faust, despite him, “moves on the stage of life, where vices and virtues intertwine, where good comes from evil and evil comes from good”. Indeed, Renzo does not get upset, he stays there. He awaits events, of course. And while he awaits them, more than restless, he seems to have revealed the mystery that surrounds him: there is no evil power that deceives man, and not even an occult good or truth that must be painfully or painfully discovered beyond the appearance of evil. In every moment, the world is fully clear to itself, good and truth are constant presence. This is how the world appears to Renzo: pure adherence to himself.

The Odyssey of these men, therefore, their meeting and colliding with the multiple routes that life offers them, seems to be a single journey through their own humanity – whether elevated to spirit, or as acceptance of the world –, through the their very finitude as men, as if, in the end, it is the conquest of a greater humanity that counts, a humanity that has conquered itself with the acceptance, this time, of the supreme value of facts, of events thus how they unfold and how they, men, act to determine them.

Thus the facts, the events, the unfolding of the world, in other words its manifestation, thus become the co-protagonists of History, of Faust, of Renzo – of Goethe, of Manzoni –, and of the many stories of men, of all men.

The intent was, therefore, to delve into the multiple; the intent was to define the multiple, indeed, the multiplicity. But how? Speaking of freedom. In what terms should we now address the discourse on freedom? In terms of research, of a constant and continuous search for contents, values, means. The research stems from the need to concretize our concepts, from the need to experience, to experience reality, the world as it arises, as it presents itself to us, at first in a confused way, almost as if the world and I represent an everything from which it is difficult to separate. How to overcome the split? For Hegel the overcoming of the split belongs to reason, indeed it is the essential task of reason, nor can there be reason if this task is not fulfilled. With this Hegel agrees with the tradition, but divides it as regards the way to fulfil the overcoming.

For Hegel the one and the multiple are the elements of a whole, of a circular process in which one term represents the negation of the other as multiple taken away, and not as cancelled; in the unity of the two extremes lies the category of *et-et*, not of *either-or*, as an intrinsic presence of being itself. The way lies in the recognition of the dialectical nature of reality. It is not by excluding one of the two terms of the contrast that the split is overcome, but by thinking of unity in the split, as an organic totality that develops. Therefore, the only way to overcome the split is to accept it as a reality, both logical and ontological, proper to thought and being. There must be no difference between thought and reality: thought must be a self-reflection of the world. What, then, is the point of contact between thought and reality, the point of conjunction? The limit. The concept of limit contains that of freedom, not as a universal potentiality of the will, not as an indeterminate possibility, but as a determined possibility, therefore limited. The limit therefore represents the real sphere of freedom, therefore it is not something less than the potential freedom of choices, but something more, because it makes it real, possible.

Therefore the limit to the unlimited will of man is the other, it is the will of others; therefore, being free means accepting the other as a limit, that is, as a means of realizing a certain possibility.

Freedom then is not inherent in being, in man, but it is a process, it is the development of reason that conceives itself as other than itself, and the other as a part, and the driving force of this process is the negative (moment of the dialectic) as a real force, as an immanent principle in the determinations and in this it is the potentiality of change, it is becoming as a structure of the world. It is a potential unity as a limit, that is, negation of something, determined, with its own content, The negative is itself a positive, the contradiction goes beyond itself, it removes itself as such, the self and the other identify themselves as persons, being and thought reach an absolute identity; identity of being as a subject. A subject, a person, a free person: such is the outcome of the development of the individual as a being in the world, as a unity of the many. As a child, man became great. From an indistinct whole between me and the world he split off and then rejoined it again as a being conscious of himself and of the world, as one in communication and in relationship with everything, as reason.

Giovanni Gentile said that the child was not loved enough by the adult, "because (the latter) saw him as small in front of him, and so different! Unable at first even to stand on his legs and stand up and raise his forehead as is typical of man, who looks in front of him because he has

become aware of himself, and measures himself with the world around him, and in which it touches him to affirm and live. He saw him from the beginning inept to express his thought of him and lacking in this characteristic which is the prerogative of man among all living beings, language; and deprived of that reflection so that man watches over his motions, reasoning and therefore proportionally in practice his ends to the means at his disposal, he does not want the impossible, he does not expose himself to useless risks; he controls, corrects and directs his will with greater and lesser caution and circumspection. In short, he saw him as inferior to himself because he lacks that attribute which makes him stand out as a man from the rest of all beings: the attribute of freedom. Without this attribute, although susceptible to come into possession once. Hence the need for education.” (G. GENTILE, pp. 34-35)

In the place where education takes place – the school – the child knows the world with the tools of reason. One reason, the one of him, in evolution, in growth. The tools of reason, of thought thus become the tools of communicating, of language, indeed of the multiplicity of languages that thought uses.

So how does the school educate the child to communicate with himself and with the world? By placing and addressing the child, it too, as a language, as a means of accessing all languages, as a window open to all possible windows. The knowledge of the child, in its evolution, passes through phases that the neuropsychologists of the developmental age identify in the neurological, psychological, social, motor, affective aspects; phases in which the child experiences, constructs, elaborates mental schemes, mental images to which he refers from time to time, experimenting, building, re-elaborating, thus incorporating the new experience into the others, not as a sum of experiences, but as organic inclusion with the whole.

The physical, psychic, social and affective development then become a single development in which all the aspects progress in parallel in a unique way. The child experiences himself and the world through sensory perception, manipulation, observation of what surrounds him; sensation becomes the tool of experience just as, later, when he has conquered the ability to abstraction, the image will become the tool of thought. When I speak of image I am not referring only to the visual data, but to everything that evokes an experience, an inner sensation in the child. Probably the visual image is more immediate, it immediately puts the data in contact with the thought, the sender with the receiver.

Today we live in the society of the image and the debate on the more or less positive effects that the image, mediated by television and technology has on children is very heated. What is certain is the very nature of the image as an immediate emitter of lights, colours, shapes, things: pieces of the world, of that world that the child wants to know, experience, see.

And if, of course, the image cannot be the only vehicle of experience, it is certainly a good vehicle for openness, for branching out sensations in the construction of ideas. The interaction itself with the image in digital language provides tools for what goes on to develop perceptual-motor learning, which, based on the repeated simulation of reality, is based on learning by trial and error.

Then the school, as a means of accessing all languages, must educate the child in the construction of the same languages, in the penetration of languages, of codes to ensure that he takes possession of the codes themselves and becomes capable of constructing new ones as well as new forms of communication that put him in constant contact with himself and with the multiple.

To do this, the school must start from the data, from the concreteness of the communication itself, which cannot but take place in life: from the reality of the child himself, as the bearer of his own subjectivity in the making, to the reality, varied and multiple, of which the world is composed.

In reconstructing the variety and multiplicity of the world, it is to history that the school must turn, as a methodology for investigating the self of the child and the self of humanity, as a unitary development of the journey of man in history, as the conquest of an everlasting greater awareness of one's role in history, in one's own history as men, as free of the world. A world that is at the same time infinite places, infinite times, in which the man-child is free to project himself in search of his own world, of his own Ithaca. And this is the world of imagination, where everything is possible, even choosing a possible way, not as the only way, but as one among the others and where you can experience the multiple possibilities of accessing reality, in life as being free to express, with the infinite languages of thought, his own essence of man, as the bearer of an ever richer and more complete humanity.

And if "from the Renaissance magic of Neoplatonic origin the idea of the imagination as communication with the soul of the world starts, an idea that later will be of Romanticism and Surrealism" (I. CALVINO, page 98), this idea school must return to connect the soul of the world with the soul of the child.

Conclusion

Therefore, the school is a vehicle for the construction of the means to research and understand the soul of the world, in life, in history, in itself, as a synthesis of the unfolding of civilization projected into the future.

Educating the child then means educating him to freedom, to the freedom of thought to imagine, to invent things as true or as possible.

Ernest Hemingway was saying:

The job of writers is to imagine or tell big lies and Gregorio Sansa replies: The job of the true writer consists in telling the truth.... Or in imagining it, of course (Certo... certius!).

PHILOSOPHICAL REASON MEDIATING IN THE CONTEXTS OF THE RECURRENCE OF SOCIO-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

Ph.D. Professor Acsinte DOBRE

Abstract: *In researching the knowledge and practice of human subjects, which are part of a historical path, we will note some limitations of classical atomistic methodologies, whether rationalist or empiricist. Such methodologies blur – by focusing on the relationship between the particular and the general – a more fruitful path, namely, aiming at the concrete totality, focusing on individuals, proceeding from part to whole and reciprocally. At the same time, an excessive cognitive optimism masks the impossibility, for man, to reach an absolutely valid knowledge of the concrete, as a result of the ontological situation of the subject: respectively, of the fact that the human individual is himself part of everything, which determines the meaning of particular human events and deeds.*

Keywords: *Knowledge, Socio-Cultural Differences, Established Human Reality, Morality, Fate*

In a world of Heraclitus, of rapid change, aiming at all relations between individuals and between human communities, the search, especially through philosophy, as well as through religious reflection, for mediating bridges and structuring meanings and ideals for the variety of human aspirations and projects it appears as a pressing commandment of the times in which we live. In terms of spiritual-discursive projection, M. Foucault highlighted – in a related perspective – how “under an apparent veneration of discourse... lies, in our civilization, the fear of a great proliferation of discourse; an anguish towards everything that can be outlined here as violent, as dangerous, as disorder”. (*L’ordre du discours*, Gallimard, Paris, 1971, p. 52)

In researching the knowledge and practice of human subjects, which are part of a historical path, we will note some limitations of classical atomistic methodologies, whether rationalist or empiricist. Such methodologies blur – by focusing on the relationship between the particular and the

general – a more fruitful path, namely, aiming at the concrete totality, focusing on individuals, proceeding from part to whole and reciprocally. At the same time, an excessive cognitive optimism masks the impossibility, for man, to reach an absolutely valid knowledge of the concrete, as a result of the ontological situation of the subject: respectively, of the fact that the human individual is himself part of everything, which determines the meaning of particular human events and deeds.

In the more precise knowledge of the concrete individual, of its meanings, it is not possible to establish prime principles, somewhat absolute evidence, because the object of the research itself is multiple and contradictory. That very object will make the attempts at description partially valid, limited, even invalid at the same time; any starting point or principle of thought will need, here, to be completed by its opposite. The great thinkers – including Pascal and Kant – did not reduce the contradictory, somewhat paradoxical, character of human life only to the realm of behaviour, morals, and faith (correlated with so-called practical philosophy). There is no autonomy in the authentic human life of the theoretical, respectively of the practical, contrary to some classical rationalist or empiricist postulates. The attempt to understand the individual man or another established human reality, on a purely theoretical level, will therefore appear to be true and false at the same time. As L. Goldman notes, it will be true “insofar as it finds certain actual relationships between data, but also false, insofar as it necessarily separates the objective aspect of these facts from the all-encompassing action, from their becoming, and their trends, and of values, respectively” (*Le Dieu caché*, Gallimard, Paris, 1959, p. 279). In order to aim at the concrete totality of the human world, we need a synthesis of the theoretical and the practical, in the absence of which we move away from the truth and the meanings of depth. Pascal remarked, in the same sense, that “we have neither truth nor good, except in part and mixed with evil and false” (*Pensées*, fragment 385, in the Brunschwig edition). And M. Foucault, in *Hermeneutics of the subject* (Polirom, Iași, 2004, p.299) considers that the human subject, through exercises of spirituality, must gradually transform its way of being, in order to have access to the truth.

Unlike Descartes, for whom it was enough for the subject to be what he is, in order to have (through knowledge) access to the truth, Foucault emphasizes “self-concern” and will postulate the need not only for knowledge-based information, especially external to oneself (*savoir de connaissance*), but also for knowledge based on spirituality (*savoir de spiritualité*). Leveraging the ideas of the Stoics, Foucault correlates the

logos with the ethos, through the vision developed in the last part of his life. Overcoming atomistic philosophical-epistemological programs, whether rationalist or empiricist, by focusing on complex part-whole relationships, will also mean a change in the overall image of man. In addition to the two generally accepted orders, that of the sensible and that of the intelligible, corresponding to the two human faculties (sensitivity and intellect), modern philosophical thought has introduced a third; the latter assures man the possibility and reality of the synthesis of opposites, in a broad sense. More narrowly, it also ensures the synthesis of the two previously admitted faculties: sensitivity and intellect. This third faculty, called by Pascal heart or charity, and by Kant and Hegel, reason, brings together, from the perspective of competence related to individual performance, the theoretical and the practical.

In many ways, it intersects with what Foucault calls spirituality-based knowledge. A central function of that reason is the design and realization of a synthesis of opposites, a synthesis that gives meaning to both individual human life and creation, and to broader historical processes. In the new perspective, there can be no pure intellectual truth, since any true knowledge inevitably presupposes the diversity of behavioural, extra-conceptual actions; at the same time, in man, active accommodation with the external world is not only realized outside consciousness, but also in and through it.

Returning to the analysis of the complexity and rapidity of socio-cultural changes in today's world, it is necessary to call for a mediating philosophical vision, within that complexity, to guide, even implicitly, individuals in the turbulent landscape of their kaleidoscopic life. The different visions of the world: Platonism, classical rationalism, empiricism, pragmatism, the dialectical vision tending to synthesis, are established not as empirical realities, but as great conceptualizations, which guide us, among others, in the study and understanding of genius thinkers or artists. The great literary and – more broadly – artistic works were elaborated as expressions of broader visions of the world, thus proving the persistent strength and combustion of these visions. Such a view of the world – which is more of a phenomenon of collective consciousness involving difficult gestation – rises to a maximum of conceptual and sensitive clarity, precisely in the spirit of genius thinkers and artists.

The fact that philosophies or literary-artistic creations are possible, which retain their value beyond the place and time where they were born (ancient Greek tragedy, Plato's dialogues, the work of Dante or Shakespeare, etc.), is explained precisely by the fact that they express,

inevitably, the historical situation, transposed on the plane of the great fundamental problems, which man's relations with other people or with the universe pose; and the number of coherent human answers to this set of problems, being limited, by the very structure of the human person, each of these great coherent answers can be correlated with several historical situations, some even opposite. (See L. Goldman, *cited work*, pp. 30-31) It can be considered that the elaboration of a typology of world visions is a main task of the historian of philosophy (artistically, of the art historian), which would correlate with the philosophical anthropology; that task would be similar to the elaboration of the great systems of physical and cosmological theories, being the crowning of a series of partial studies, which, in turn, the respective typology will shed light on and specify.

Referring to the current state of history, as a discipline and to its discourse, M. Foucault will emphasize the event and the series of events. He will argue that, for postmodern historians, the fundamental notions he works with are no longer those of consciousness (correlated with freedom) and continuity (correlated with the idea of causality), but precisely those of *event* and *series of events*. The latter will, of course, be correlated with the ideas of *chance*, *risk*, *discontinuity*, *transformation through the opposition of opposites*. Without being properties of material bodies, events consist in the relation, coexistence, cutting, accumulation, selection of material elements; such a philosophy of events would advance in a somewhat paradoxical direction, namely that of a type of materialism of the incorporeal (see Foucault, *L'ordre du discours*, p. 60). Thus, the discourse of many historians of the more recent period no longer seeks to understand events through a game of causes and effects, in an informal unity, of a great becoming, vaguely homogeneous or clearly hierarchical; through their cognitive-discursive approach they would establish series of events, various series, often divergent, but also intersected; which allows to circumscribe the location of the event, the limits of its variations, its conditions of occurrence.

For example, the history of science will make, instead of a superficial chronicle of discoveries or descriptions of external influences on (innovative) scientific ideas, a serial reconstruction, as a "coherent and transformable set of theoretical models and conceptual tools." (*Ibidem*, p. 74) There is, to a large extent, an analogy here with the vision of Th. Kuhn on the emergence of research paradigms and their irreversible change.

Extending the approach from science and its history to culture in the broadest sense (as an objectified spirit), cultural anthropology research has shown that, since human cultures are highly context-dependent systems, it

is almost impossible to treat a culture appropriately only from within, or only from the outside, without reference to another culture. In this sense, human subjects with a background in two or more cultures (including multilingualism) are favoured in their investigations of various cultural events and situations.

In a study of *Rationality and Cultural Difference*, R. Rorty raises some controversial axiological and philosophical issues. Thus, he asks himself, According to what criteria do we prioritize different cultures and choose one or the other, as being superior? Is the dependence on context, for the subjects who ask such questions, surmountable, in the sense of a high standard of objectivity? Are there more effective ways to do this, philosophically and scientifically, artistically or religiously? In order to obtain the most accurate answers possible, Rorty will propose a hierarchy of culture, as well as of human rationality, on three levels of construction and interaction. Type 1 culture is aimed at a set of shared habits of action that allow members of a community (e.g., a village, a Buddhist monastery, or a company with production or sales objectives, etc.) to get along well with each other and with the environment. Type 2 culture would mean high culture, which is acquired and developed through systematic education; it involves the ability to convey abstract ideas, to cultivate scientific, artistic, philosophical values, and functions as a characteristic of members of society, possessing a higher degree of wealth and freedom of assertion. Type 3 culture would aim at the field of values and ideals centred on overcoming the subhuman, of the oppressive baseness and irrationality, through universal-human aspirations, such as freedom, tolerance, and justice. Partially covering types 1 and 2, type 3 will synthesize a bunch of values, especially moral-practical ones, that all people with a certain education are able to recognize, respect and promote.

A theoretical-practical tension in terms of the dynamics of types of culture could be formulated as follows: any entity that needs a long time to develop and consolidate (as is the case of type 1 culture, but also of a species of living beings) deserves to be cultivated and preserved; on the other hand, there is the practical need to diminish, even to remove, certain (sub)types of cultures, such as that of the big mafia clans or of some sects that propagate the extermination of that sect and even of other people. In even more complex situations, such as the relationship between the science-and-technology culture of the West and that of the Orient, focused mainly on religions, the criteria of ranking and choice are problematic and often contested. The secular humanism of the modern West has been blamed for promoting a non-self-critical culture, which, while proud of its

well-being and tolerance, is committed to destroying many opportunities for cultural difference. Philosophical-ethical analyzes can bring clarifications in addressing and diminishing such cultural issues and conflicts. To the question: which of the activities of type 2 culture are in the best position to mediate between type 1 cultures, so as to promote type 3 culture, involving freedom and tolerance, while avoiding violent clashes, Rorty proposed the following direction, for an appropriate answer. It is about the special contribution of some great creators – especially novelists – who have lived in their own lives, tensions between different languages and cultures.

During their own creation and their own work, they had to find concrete ways – not just theoretical ones – to combine, for example, the culture of the modern West with one or more non-Western cultures. Such creators include Salman Rushdi, Ismail Kadare, Mircea Eliade, Mario Vargas Llosa and, of course, many others. In this way, we can find foundations for intercultural mediation and creative constructions of the future. In the open direction of such great creators, as an alternative to sterile conflicts and domination, the same Rorty puts his imagination to work to discover innovative ways forward. “I suspect that the real work of a global multicultural quasi-utopia will be done by people who, in the next few centuries, will unravel each type 1 culture into a multitude of delicate components, and then weave these yarns, along with equally delicate yarns, from other crops; thus promoting the kind of diversity in unity, characteristic of high values. The resulting tapestry will be, with good luck (including, we believe, the avoidance of war and the irreversible degradation of the environment and the human being), something we can hardly imagine now.” (*Truth and progress, Philosophical Essays III*, Polirom Publishing House, Iași, 2005, p.49)

Possible creative solutions to the problem of complex, constructive relations between the various national cultures, in the age of globalization, are also offered by some works of P. Ricoeur. Starting from the translations from one language of one culture to that of another, Ricoeur proposes as a model of the close interference between cultures precisely the paradigm of translation; which is all the more significant as we lack models of integration that take into account both the cultural identity of Europe and the otherness of the participating national cultures. At the basis of the translation paradigm is the possibility of translating, postulated as a somewhat a priori condition of communication; namely, in the form of the principle of universal translatability. Then, at a practical-empirical level, the paradigm presupposes the presence of bilingual translators, as mediators, which also implies

ensuring the assimilation of at least two living languages, through the education system, especially. From a spiritual point of view itself, the translation paradigm demands “the extension of the spirit of translation, to the relations between the cultures themselves, respectively to the contents of meaning, conveyed by translation. This requires translators from culture to culture (cultural bilinguals), able to accompany this operation of universal mental transfer of the other culture, in full respect of the customs, basic beliefs, major beliefs, in short, all its sense landmarks” (*About translation*, Polirom Publishing House, Iași, 2005, p. 49). In other words, “to truly live with the other, so that you can then guide him to yourself, through a qualified approach of linguistic hospitality” (*Idem*).

The tasks of a good translator – as a mediator – do not consist, according to Ricoeur, in the ascent from word to phrase, to text, then to the whole of a culture, but in a reverse approach; impregnated with vast readings of the spirituality of a culture, the translator descends to the text, to the phrase and to the word (see *ibidem*, p. 115).

Ricoeur’s application of the translation paradigm addresses religious conflicts. The French thinker will also support, in the direction of intercultural rapprochement, especially in Europe, the use in conflict resolution, along with the model of translation, another model, called forgiveness. And the application of this model is based on the specifics of faith; the latter does not refer to privileged, isolated sentences, nor even a doctrinal body (as a chain of sentences), but to the so-called *packages of meaning*. For example, a convinced Catholic will freely adhere to such a package of meaning, which includes, among other things: a tradition identified by a valuable reputation, an authority, a wide spread, and a reputedly beneficial influence.

In order to overcome the conflicts between denominations (for example: Catholicism – Orthodoxy), according to the mentioned models, it is necessary to carry out two hermeneutic tasks. The first requires us to be able to understand in a nuanced way how a certain point of the conflict has been reached. And the second will ask us to move beyond the point of conflict, putting into practice the two complementary paradigms (models): translation and forgiveness. Therefore, the rules governing the transfer of meaning from one linguistic ensemble to another will therefore apply to those distinct *packages of meaning*, aiming at opposable denominations. The translation model offers not only rules and techniques, but also a spirit of translation, which consists in the meeting of two intentional manifestations: that of moving in the universe of meaning of the foreign language (or confession) and that of appropriately receiving the other’s speech, in the

universe of meaning of the host language (respectively of the opposable confession).

In order to avoid, at least in part, the danger of “betrayal”, translation (especially in the absence of a standard canonical text, which harmonizes the foreign text with its translation, in our language) requires an ever-resumed work of retranslation, as and multiple interpretive exercises, in which “the hospitality of language” is realized. We will inevitably encounter some inconsistencies of residual meanings, due to the finite comprehension of the linguistic-cultural heritage. At this level of inconsistencies, Ricoeur proposes to complete the translation model by appealing to the forgiveness model. This encouraging model, addressed, for example, to denominational reading and interpreting communities, will proclaim, according to Ricoeur, that: “there is more meaning than you think in the very things you say with conviction; and the surplus of meaning can be said elsewhere, by others rather than by yourself” (*Ibidem*, p. 109).

Translation – considered a paradigm of the development of cultures – is essentially a mediation between the plurality of cultures, on the one hand, and the characteristic of *rational unity of humanity*, on the other. Without such mediation, we would live exclusively in a world that would embody the Tower of Babel, a world dominated only by global dispersal and confusion. That is why, as Ricoeur will point out, translation in the general sense is “a paradigm for all exchanges; not only from language to language, but also from culture to culture, thus facilitating the opening to *concrete universals*, not to an abstract universal, detached from history ” (*Ibidem*, p. 130).

WAS THE MODERN COSMOPOLIS TRANSFORMED INTO A POST-MODERN GLOBAL VILLAGE?

Ph.D. Constantin STOENESCU
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest

Abstract: *I argue in this paper that the shift from modernity to post-modernity was accompanied by a deep change of some presuppositions shared by all the people who belong to this tradition. Following Stephen Toulmin's idea about the age of modernity from his book *Cosmopolis, the Hidden Agenda of Modernity*, I try to reveal that post-modernity replaces the so-called project of Cosmopolis with that of a global village. In other words, there is a difference between what we want to build and what we have built in fact. The main reason for this process is the invasion of a new kind of subjectivity in all areas of social life.*

Prologue: post-modernity and postmodernism, two in one

When we think about future, we do it in a *horizon of expectations* framework. Our beliefs and foresights are shaped by the limits of present because we want to do and we want to decide to do only desirable things. In this sense, our capacity to forecast is limited and any imaginable future will look like the present. Therefore, I don't want to make here a prediction about the course of events in the future, but only to describe a trend and to explain on this basis what has happened and, insofar the future looks like the past, to announce a possible future. Anyway, although we take the past as an ally, the idea about the future must be viewed as a product of speculative imagination, because, as we know from Hume, we have no reliable epistemological reason to think that things will be like as in the past.

The question from the title of this study is put forward as a weak commitment for an answer. As we know, a question contains itself a selected answer, it is a constraint or a framework for uncertain possibilities. The project of Modernity was equated by Toulmin with the project of a Cosmopolis: starting with the 17th century "humanity seemed to have set aside all doubts and ambiguities about its capacity to achieve its goals here on Earth, and in historical time, rather than different human fulfilment to an Afterlife in Eternity – that was what had made the project of Modernity

rational – and this optimism led to major advances not just in natural science but in moral, political and social thought...”¹¹⁶ If the Cosmopolis was a philosophical or an ideological construct of Modernity and we accept this idea as an unproblematic statement, then my main aim here is to describe this state of fact and to offer an approach for the so-called state of arts in the present, in times of a new cultural age, post-modernity. And the new question is if the Cosmopolis is still available or it was demolished by the architects of post-modernity. I prefer to use the expression *post-modernity* as a name for a process with at least two phases, modernity and post-modernity, and to let aside the expression *postmodernism*. The two, post-modernity and postmodernism, overlap and have in common a hard core, but differ as type of succession: post-modernity is a new form of modernity, postmodernism is another age, it is a case of secession, even a clash with modernity, not just a simple succession. Post-modernity is a new phase of modernity in the same tradition or an effect of modernity, postmodernism is a destruction of modernity or of so-called weak modernity, if we may use Vattimo's idea about weak thought and his nihilistic reading of history.¹¹⁷

What relation is then between the modern Cosmopolis and the global village? First of all, I think that globalization is the end of modernity, only of modernity, not of history, as Fukuyama stated.¹¹⁸ This means that the old Kantian ideal about a common peaceful world was fulfilled in this manner, as a global world, even if somebody may not like this or may not recognize in it a Kantian ideal. Kant wanted to change the world through the forces of peace, rationality and law, first of all. This historical project was the basis of modern society with the national state as a cell of global order. However, the technological evolution and the market economy changed the society and the national state became something old fashioned. The new aim is a global order based on transnational processes and the new brave world looks like a village, like a global village in which every person can know almost everything, if she or he wants, about everybody. We, the citizens of global village have in common new values and try to live together, face to face, connected to mass-media, ready to take a job in the benefits of our global community. Is this a real picture or just another ideological movement? Let's see!

¹¹⁶ Toulmin, 1992, p. IX.

¹¹⁷ See Vattimo, 1991, for this nihilistic understanding of our history.

¹¹⁸ See Fukuyama, 1992.

Secession and succession: a terminological debate or a real change of the world?

The debate about the changing world began in architecture after the First World War regarding the new style proposed by Ludwig Mies van der Rohe and then by some of his contemporaries, among them Walter Gropius and Le Corbusier. Their minimal buildings, made from steel and glass, guided by the principle that *less means more*, became a new pattern, the so-called *skin and bones* design, for the architectural development of cities/towns and for urban planning. This anonymous simplicity has as a result the lack of specificity and a similarity in high degree between the public buildings, especially those for offices. This style was named Modern, because it was conceived as a style of Modern times, in opposition with the Classical style of Antiquity and the Gothic style of Medieval Age.

After the 1970, a new generation of architects and designers, with Robert Venturi as leader, appeared. They tried to give back to architecture the imagination, especially the historical references and decorative elements. Their criticism against modernity wasn't in fact a critique of modernity as a whole, but just this particular movement in architecture initialized by Mies and named modernism. Therefore, the postmodernism in its first phase is a particular movement and has as its aim only to stop and to surpass or to overcome the modernism in architecture. It wasn't its aim to finish with modernity or to replace modernity with something like post-modernity.

On the other hand, understood as a critique of modernity, the postmodernism undermines the authority of modern tradition and that of modern institutions. First of all, the idea of universality is under attack because the new preferred approaches are the deconstruction and the analysis of little fragments. As a cultural movement, the postmodernism is opposite to modernity. In literature, postmodernism has led in the end to the break with the realism and chosen to explore and to enter into the inner space of conscience or in the virtual space of dreams. Writers as Joyce and Fowles ceased to describe objectively the facts and use the subtle capacities of language in order to express thoughts, actions and attitudes. The term postmodernism was used by Jean Francois Lyotard in the year 1979 in his book *La condition post-moderne*. Is postmodernism something new in philosophy, entirely different from modernity? Using the Wittgensteinian model of language games, Lyotard has tried to describe the new rules of the postmodern age. In *Stanford Encyclopedia*, postmodernism is defined as a set of critical practices employing concepts such as difference, repetition, the trace, the simulacrum, and hyperreality in order to destabilize concepts such

as presence, identity, historical progress, epistemic reality, and the univocity of meaning. Do the postmodernists use a new list of speech acts? Not even if we take into account the style of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. The critiques of philosophical systems built after a Hegelian pattern is one of the common job of postmodern philosophers. In the same time, any subjective approach, like that used by Nietzsche in his theory of values, is considered at least a sign of the post-modernity.

Some philosophers think that there is a secession war between modernity and post-modernity, a violent separation and a clash between tradition and the new age of postmodernism. Two of them are E. M. Cioran and Michel Henry. Both of them have described the contemporary times as an age of barbarians. Cioran wrote in terms of a deep gap between us and modern tradition: "We no longer have a past, or rather, there is nothing left of the past which is our own, no longer a chosen country, no longer salvation, no refuge in yore. Our prospects? Impossible to distinguish them, we are barbarians without a future."¹¹⁹ Michel Henry¹²⁰ has described the secession like a fight between good and evil. The ideal aims of modernity, the universal and objective science and the quest for truth led to the elimination of subjectivity and sensibility from culture and society. Although science isn't bad through itself, it became a social and cultural monster because it promoted a way of life without humanism, without the values of subjectivity, therefore, without real life, namely, without art, religion and ethic. In fact, science and technology have no ethic because they are objective.

Therefore, as a reaction against bad objectivity, some people think that the first move on the way to postmodernism belongs to Kant and is related with his "Copernican Revolution": the subjectivity was rediscovered, the knowing subject was put in the spotlight and the object was put in dependence from the subject. Objectivity becomes in Kantian terms objectivity in a weak sense, namely, transcendental subjectivity. Remembering Vatimo's idea about weak thought we could summarize that all the modern strong claims for objectivity and universalism were put into question by postmodernism.

Shortly speaking, the term "modern" is asymmetrical. After Latour, it is doubly asymmetrical because "it designates a break in the regular passage of time, and it designates a combat in which there are victors and vanquished."¹²¹ I think we can also apply this idea to the word "postmodernism". This means that we could speak about a translation and a

¹¹⁹ Cioran, 1998, p. 89.

¹²⁰ See Henry, 1987.

¹²¹ Latour, 1993, p. 10.

purification in the passage from modernity to postmodernism. But it isn't here the place for such a discussion about humans, things and hybrids. Anyway, after Latour modernity is a double process, a *translation*, on the one hand, and a *purification*, on the other hand. Through translation, we create new types of beings; through purification, we create two distinct ontological zones, nature and culture.

The modern Cosmopolis

The general framework of understanding is given by the idea that the struggle for social and political stability interact with the quest for scientific and intellectual certainty and stability in the modern Cosmopolis from the beginning.¹²²

But, first of all, the modern Cosmopolis was a social project. The idea of a change in modern tradition, especially in society, politics and economy was taken into account by Stephen Toulmin in his book, *Cosmopolis. The Hidden Agenda of Modernity*. His thesis is that, at the beginning of modernity, in Descartes's times, the issues of certainty, rational consensus and necessity weren't just some challenges for philosophy, but they were also responses to practical and historical challenges, first of all, the need for a new social and political order after the Thirty Year War. The general crisis (economic and social, intellectual and spiritual) in the early 17th century broke the public confidence in the older consensus and the Age of Modernity was in fact an effect of several different attempts to build a new one.

In the year 1965, Peter Drucker has published the book *Landmarks for Tomorrow* in which he has expressed the belief that we had to make a difference between the sovereign national state in the age of modernity, understood as a political and economic unity, formed in the seventeenth century, and the new type of transnational institutions who serve to some transnational aims. The loyalty for national state is replaced with transnational interest. The national language as a sign of identity became sometimes an obstacle.

This social project has some deep philosophical roots. The Cartesian program leads philosophy into a dead end. In a Cartesian world which has its own intellectual goals, first of all, to make clear our ideas and to gain certainty step by step by rational proof, rhetoric was subordinated to formal logic: "the validity and truth of *rational* arguments is independent of *who* presents them, to whom or in what context – such rhetorical questions can contribute nothing to impartial establishment of human knowledge. For the

¹²² Toulmin, 1992, p. 92.

first time since Aristotle, logical analysis were separated from, and elevated for above the study of rhetoric, discourse and argumentation.”¹²³ The basic Cartesian distinction was the Mind-Body dichotomy and as a result of this was the distinction between the rational freedom and the causal necessity, between the word of human experience and the word of natural phenomena.

An interesting topic related with these changes of the world is the link between science and modernity. Was science the most fruitful creation of modernity? What could we say about the reciprocal relations between science, technological development and industrial revolution as a whole? Most of the thinkers of that times thought that the development of science was the sign of the new age of modernity. Few of them, as William Blake and Friedrich Schiller, cautioned about the “inhuman” nature of Newtonian science.

Regarding the educational institutions, it is important to mention that the culture of modern Cosmopolis was socially divided into two parts or two traditions. Therefore, the university training given to the higher civil servants or to the administrative group had as background literature, Latin language and philosophy, while the engineers were trained on the exact sciences.¹²⁴

The Cartesian dichotomy interacted with the need for absolute claims. The modern Cosmopolis was thereby built based on some such claims:

- the new European system of states was built on the absolute claims to nationhood;
- the new political balance of power was built on the claims to stability;
- the new system of social relations within each nation was built on the basis of a new horizontal social class structure;
- the new science was built on the absolute claims to certainty.

And all these steps were the result of a rational conduct to the aim of objectivity.

A new subjectivity

The relationship between modernity and rationality seems to be without any doubt the hard core of any approach. But this new order of modern Cosmopolis based on rational control over nature and society, rules and hierarchy, had some unexpected consequences at the levels of social structure and personal subjectivity.

¹²³ Toulmin, 1992, p. 75. Similar ideas, as Toulmin himself has mentioned, may be found in Dewey, 1930, Rorty, 1979. Anyway, the question “Why did educated people find the quest for certainty so attractive?” become in the end a Cartesian rhetorical statement.

¹²⁴ See Snow, 1998.

First of all, it is impossible to rationalize and control everything. For example, in the modern society some groups cannot be controlled and administrated. The persons belonging to these groups are perceived as strangers. Bauman understand the stranger as a person who is unfamiliar and because of these is seen as a threat. In the same time, another source of uncertainty is globalization because we are not able to direct events while our affairs take place in a global market on a global scale.¹²⁵ Secondly, our society transforms a society of producers to a society of consumers. This shift from modernity to post-modernity assures more freedom for the individuals, but as consumers, not as citizens. They have the freedom to consume and to enjoy their lives. Third, as I have mentioned above, the social quest for certainty transformed scientific knowledge into a pattern for all the other intellectual activities. The universal and objective truth become the main goal of science and this process leads to a new type of subjectivity, let's name it a subjectivity without sensibility. According to Henry, in our barbarian times, science tends to exclude or to minimize art, religion and ethics.

Therefore, the modern Cosmopolis was built on the values of tolerance, reciprocity and trust in a world of certainty and stability. But how did we react against the different threats, for example, when we met the stranger or when we are the strangers? The individuals try to invent or to discover new ways of life and new organizational frames in order to reduce the uncertainty and insecurity. In fact, we passed, in Bauman's terms, from a solid modernity to a liquid modernity.¹²⁶ Social forms of life and institutions haven't enough time to solidify and the individuals need to switch from one choice to another. The result of this social metamorphosis is described by Bauman: "Insecurity affects us all, immersed as we all are in a fluid and unpredictable world of deregulation, flexibility, competitiveness and endemic uncertainty, but each one of us suffers anxiety on our own, as a private problem, an outcome of personal failings and a challenge to provide our *savoir/faire* and agility. We are called, as Ulrich Beck has acidly observed, to seek biographical solutions to more systematic contradictions: we look for individual salvation from shared troubles."¹²⁷

On the other hand, as Antonio Gramsci has observed in a brilliant remark, "the crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the

¹²⁵ See Bauman, 1991.

¹²⁶ See Bauman, 2000.

¹²⁷ Bauman, 2001, p. 144.

new cannot be born; in this interregnum, a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.”¹²⁸ There are many levels of this crisis, but the most important is that of Western culture as a totality. This interregnum when the modernity collapsed and the post-modernity was the new comer still unborn was perceived and described by the philosophers as a cultural crisis.

For example, Edmund Husserl, in his Vienna Lecture, which was held in May 1935, known under the title “The Crisis of European Humanity and Philosophy”, wrote about the cultural roots of European crisis in the terms of the need for a humanistic reform after the fail of modern rationalistic culture: “The European nations are sick: Europe itself, it is said, is in crisis. We are by no means lacking something like nature doctors. Indeed, we are practically inundated by a flood of naïve and excessive suggestions for reform. But why do the so richly developed humanistic disciplines fail to perform the service here that is so admirably performed by the natural sciences in their sphere.”¹²⁹ For Husserl, the new cultural movement must be a reiteration of the European spiritual shape under the supervision of Humanities, because, without any doubt, “our surrounding world is a spiritual structure in us and in our historical life.”¹³⁰ We could also mention the approach proposed by Oswald Spengler in his controversial book *The Decline of the West*.¹³¹ Although I do not entirely share the content of Spengler’s thesis, I think that the postmodern subjectivity is due to a spiritual crisis and that the roots of it are in the quest for objectivity and certainty. Among others, the cynical nature of modern civilization gave rise to a new attitude towards the uses of technologies.

Mass-media and the new neighbourhood

Lyotard noted in his book about the postmodern condition that the computer and new technologies have transformed knowledge into information. This means that knowledge has been reduced to its propositional dimension, more accurate, to semantic information. Knowledge is seen as a final product split from the process by which the knowing subject obtained it. We can manage information as a useful thing with a market value, but all these technologies and commercial operations have no connection with the knower’s feelings. As a result, we can build different language games, using multiplicity of meanings and the diversity of subjective understanding.

¹²⁸ Gramsci, 1971, p. 276.

¹²⁹ Husserl, 1970, p. 269.

¹³⁰ Husserl, 1970, p. 170.

¹³¹ See Spengler, 1926.

But another effect of new technologies is the so-called suspension of space. Using the computer and the virtual web we can be in real time connection with any person, we can see his or her pictures, we can change impressions about an event, being in a state of neighbourhood, without borders or other obstacles. We can learn almost anything about anyone from anywhere in the world. Bauman has tried to show how the computers produced the decline of traditional public space.¹³²

Instead of a Cosmopolis and an order of national states, we have a network of people who are connected like in a global village. It is easy to travel far and wide so that the planet became a common space for all its citizens. We live in a world in which time is accelerated and space is compressed. But even under apparently conditions for an unlimited access to Internet, the global village suffers from the so-called “digital divide”: different groups of a community or society haven’t an equal access to new technologies. Moreover, we could speak also about a global digital divide on an international scale between developing and developed countries. If we take into account the content, which is transmitted, then we can identify a second level digital divide between the producers and the consumers of content. So, the global village, far from being an open space, lead to further internal fragmentation.

According to Henry, in mass-media we find the highest expression of barbarism because the subjectivity and the sensibility are minimized, deleted and replaced by technical procedures in the name of communicational efficiency. For example, television reduces life to an event. A suicide becomes an event for the prime times news and the journalists don’t pay any attention and respect to the human despair or to the human dignity. Television reduces all events to incoherent and insignificant facts.

Henry claims that the mass-media is the best example of mediocrity in social life. Mass-media becomes in time the root of the evil. Although initially mass-media seemed to be an element of a rational and free society, it was used as a means for social control. Mass-media has become – let’s use Marcuse’s terms but without his ideological commitment – a source of one-dimensional man. The question raised by Marcuse becomes an exercise in rhetoric: “Can we really distinguish between the mass-media as instruments of information and entertainment, and as agents of manipulation and indoctrination?”¹³³

¹³² See Bauman, 1998.

¹³³ Marcuse, 1964, p. 8.

A new agenda

Is there an antidote to all these? I will try to portray a modest and minimal improving way to overcome the bottlenecks. In the paragraph "From Leviathan to Lilliput"¹³⁴, Toulmin asserts that we need a new intellectual agenda that binds us to shift the focus from stability and system to adaptability and function. For instance, sovereign nation state has led to inequality at the international level. We need to take into account the sub and transnational levels and to consider seriously multinational institutions and procedures.

The things already have happened in this way in science. We passed from a disciplinary approach to subdisciplinary, transdisciplinary and multidisciplinary perspectives. We have given up looking for a universal method and we make science in a new mode, opened to the context and centred on the needs of society.¹³⁵

Undoubtedly, we are dealing with a change in all areas of society. But what have we to do if we want to do the best? Toulmin notes some trends, philosophically supported, that could be seen as a revival of culture.

Let's enumerate them:

– Return to timely. Philosophy worked traditionally with universal timeless questions but it's time to look at this strategy with scepticism. Even if our goal is to describe the order in Nature, it is a mistake to describe everything in terms of stability and hierarchy, using the pattern of cosmology. Biology, for example, suggests a discourse in terms of adaptation. Anyway, we don't deal only with abstract ideas, but also with fresh and blood human beings. Like in clinical medicine, we must follow the "course" of a disease and to change the procedure.¹³⁶

– Return to the oral tradition. In the last decades, the text was recontextualized after a long period of decontextualization. Modernity keeps the text as such in its letter and the moderns focused over the rationality and meaning of different parts of language, preferably, over the printed text. But the return to oral language means the revival of discourse, rhetoric and communication. The philosophical movement from *propositions* to *utterances*, *speech* and *forms of life* was made gradually by Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, Gadamer and Habermas. The logical validity remains important but it doesn't capture anything from the linguistic interactions between subjects in the context of discourse. Moreover, the reasoning itself depends on its context.

¹³⁴ Toulmin, 1992, p. 192 and the next.

¹³⁵ For a larger debate on this topic see Gibbons *et al.*, 1994.

¹³⁶ For this analogy see Toulmin, 1992, p. 189.

– The return to the particular. Modern Science has imposed the idea that knowledge is equal with the discovery and the understanding of universal. A scientific experiment must be intersubjective testable in order to be available. But the temptation to generalize was challenged, first of all, by moral philosophers. They discussed the so-called ethics case and rediscovered the casuistical traditions. Life isn't something abstract, real processes aren't just effects of essences and actions aren't entirely the results of pure rational decisions. Applied ethics is as important as moral philosophy.

– The return to the local. Modern philosophers thought that human nature is universal and we needn't use our time for ethnographical or anthropological studies. The factual realities and the cultural differences don't matter in the search for the truth about human person and peoples. But this view was overturned. Researchers are now taking into account the facts in their local context in trying to reconstruct the historical forms of life in their uniqueness.

In my view, one way to unify and to save all these returns or reversions is to rediscover the nature and to overcome the modern dichotomy between nature and culture. The global village would be really designed starting from the natural dimensions of our life on our planet. In this respect, the environmental movement belongs to post-modernity. As environmental patterns of thought, I could mention Barry Commoner's book *The Closing Circle* or *Silent spring* manifesto published by Rachel Carson and the idea of a "deep ecology" launched by Arne Naess. If we judge positively and optimistic, then we could claim that the modern Cosmopolis could be really replaced in an ecologist way by a global village. As the environmentalists say, we are all in the same boat.

Bibliography

1. Aylesworth, Gary, "Postmodernism", in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, [www: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/postmodernism](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/postmodernism), 2011.
2. Bauman, Zigmunt, *Modernity and Ambivalence*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1991.
3. Bauman, Zigmunt, *Globalization. The Human Consequences*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998.
4. Bauman, Zigmunt, *Liquid Modernity*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000.
5. Baumann, Zigmunt, *Seeking Safety in an Insecure World*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2001.
6. Cioran, Emil M., *The Temptation to Exist*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, trad. Richard Howard, 1998.

7. Commoner, Barry, *The Closing Circle: Nature, Man and Technology*, Knopf, New York, 1971.
8. Dewey, John, *The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1930.
9. Fukuyama, Francis, *The End of History and the Last Man*, Free Press, Illinois, 1992.
10. Gibbons, Michael, Camille Limoges, Helga Nowotny, Simon Schwartzman, Peter Scott, Martin Trow, *The New Production of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies*, Sage, London, 1994.
11. Gramsci, Antonio, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, International Publishers, New York, 1971.
12. Henry, Michel, *La Barbarie*, Grasset, Paris, 1987.
13. Husserl, Edmund, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy*, translation and introduction by David Carr, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1970.
14. Latour, Bruno, *We Have Never Been Modern*, translated by Catherine Porter, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1993.
15. Lyotard, Jean Francois, *The Postmodern Condition. A Report on Knowledge*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, trad. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, 1984.
16. Marcuse, Herbert, *One-dimensional Man. Studies in Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1964.
17. Rorty, Richard, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1979.
18. Snow, C. P., *The Two Cultures*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, 1998.
19. Spengler, Oswald, *The Decline of the West. Form and Actuality*, trad. Charles Francis Atkinson, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1926.
20. Toulmin, Stephen, *Cosmopolis. The Hidden Agenda of Modernity*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992.
21. Vattimo, Gianni, *The End of Modernity – Nihilism and Hermeneutics in the Postmodern Culture*, translated by John P. Snyder, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991.

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SURVEILLANCE IN THE MODERN ERA

Ph.D. Alessandro DENTI
Università di Roma 3

Abstract: *Police visual state as David Lyon says, in the contemporary period the great affirmation of social mobility and economic deregulation combined with the technological enhancement of information infrastructures have developed a real "surveillance society": in which society itself self-monitors. A "leap forward", in the systematic overcoming of the old boundaries of traditional supervision and with the superimposed diffusion of different models of control, corresponding to equally different interests and areas, in which "surveillance" becomes so much the task of watching over the public order of police forces, as well as commercial surveillance on their businesses, or private gadgets on proprietary and private territories. On the one hand, the diffusion of video surveillance certainly derives from a political climate, we would say world-wide, which a very specific geopolitical and ideological situation has helped to spread. In this sense, the year 2001 certainly represented an "ideological leap".*

Keywords: *visual, public, parastatal, surveillance, artificial eye.*

Introduction

Capable of affirming a sort of generalized vigilance over multiple spaces, in a delicate evolution that has delegated a whole series of powers to state or parastatal, police, military or paramilitary "security structures", and as such is still a reason for continuing concern about freedoms civilians, emblematic case the Patriot Act in the United States. In this climate, the great narrative of the "terrorist threat" and the figures of terrorism as such play a central role, involving a reinterpretation in the sense of fear of the social territory itself: cities, vehicles, events felt for years as potential targets, ideal places-objects of terrorist threat, in a transformation of the perception into reality both of the environment and its civilized places, as well as of the next unknown, redesigned in the sense of an always possible threat, of an anonymity that could suddenly explode.

All this is so fresh and evident that it does not need to be further explored here, also due to its socio-political implications already addressed by various analyzes, and not entirely pertinent to the reasons for this research. From another point of view, however, the affirmation of video surveillance seems possible to reconnect it to a deeper way of being of the capitalist-industrial civilization itself: which, finding a highly developed sense of ownership - in turn, joins to reconnect to the powerful self-determination in an individualistic sense of the distinctive bourgeois subjectivity, and to its atomization - with an overwhelming massification of the city environment, it has begun to proceed with the involution of a fear of the other and of a general fortification of one's own spaces, to defense of more or less invisible but always looming threats. In this sense, the need for surveillance lies between the loss of the community bond and the affirmation of mass anonymity, in the free flow of metropolitan movements and the conflictual "tribalization" of urban territories, which occurred after the 1960s. 900: a development that generates widespread social insecurity, on which the need for a collective if not personal defense begins to develop from those years onwards - think of the various solitary "punishers" or "cleaners" proposed by cinema and literature, starting from that period: Taxi driver (1974) or Inspector Callaghan (70s saga) among many, among the most tangible examples of the phenomenon - to which the technological development of the following decades adequately responds. Which begin to exploit artificial visualization techniques and the progress of miniaturized and sophisticated vision and recording devices by technological evolution, and which begin to spread in parallel to more or less massive armor systems, which have come to fortify doors, gates - a place that later became a crucial place for remote surveillance - buildings, public and private spaces.

1. The way of the artificial eye is a very precise presupposition of a social order

The way of the artificial guarding eye, then, is based on this very precise presupposition of a social order, to be recognized in a mentality that over time has crept into collective feeling and is directed towards a way of fear that is always suspended in the face of an everyday landscape that has become indecipherable, and always potentially full of dangers. It is the certainty of having to fear, what finally convinced the city to fortify itself, thus exploiting all the technological possibilities, also and above all technological, capable of better satisfying this need, and thus creating an increasingly schizophrenic path in the contemporary city. Which, on the one hand,

develops and multiplies an attractive, intimately commercial seduction of its places, therefore euphoric and hypercommunicative at all their possible levels, but on the other hand it approaches an ever greater work against it, of selection, filter, control, if not of relational refusal to its own entry.

A dissociated path, this, recognizable for example in many moments of entertainment, free time or entertainment: discos, concerts, stadiums, all situations in which the natural condition of attraction and playful-artistic fun is increasingly combined with a real and its own selective repulsion, pending threat to the public or its agreed patrons. In different ways each time, this public is stopped, searched, blocked, held in suspense outside - the entrance, then, becomes something fatal -, selected according to its document, and increasingly observed in the meantime. - inside, especially then inside these "play centers" - by the technological devices scattered almost everywhere, within these same places. It is emblematic that, precisely where there was fun intended as lightheartedness, today instead control or concern grows, which have inevitably become surveillance and denial. Because behind every surveillance there is always the threat of a negation, of a complete repulsion, which in the meantime is suspended. From integrated urban control, consisting of a few crucial institutional and above all military spaces, in the space of a few decades, we have thus passed in the space of a few decades to the idea of a control as extended as possible over the most capillary territories of the various cities, all of which have become a little "of quartz ", spreading out in myriads of places and moments of social life.

2. A "new utopia"

For every infringement and accident, here is the almost automatic security social reaction, promptly invoking the "new technologies": "let's put a camera on every bus", an Italian mayor once said (but perhaps, at the same time and in the same way, the said many other mayors in many other cities), or, after a theft or an attack in some club, public opinion raises in the newspapers, with stereotypical phrases such as "let's place cameras in the bathrooms of discos"; thus sowing the tree of electronic surveillance from the Pentagon to the local butcher's shop, or the village kindergarten. In reality, it is important to demonstrate how all this surveillance and technological evolution of the metropolitan custom is based, in fact, on a real utopia, a "new utopia" like a new land discovered by our time. This utopia is one based on the belief of being able to watch over the entire territory of social relations and personal movements. To be able, through

the advancement of surveillance technologies, to really penetrate everywhere, and in this way control everything, everything that happens on the face of the Earth. Now, it is true that, however, feared and in some way denounced by various authors, such as David Garland, or Virilio himself and other critics, a technology, above all by satellite, is developing, capable of penetrating into the lowest terrestrial recesses and of locating even minimal. However, the real possibility of being able to see everything seems to remain utopian, in order to reconstruct the dynamics and memory of everything. That is, to organize a truly total coverage - "coverage", a typical word of security jargon - of the living that appears and gives itself, articulating a total vision capable of supporting a total understanding of life lived, past, recorded, and therefore seen, and therefore finally understood, by the action of this whole virtuous circle of visual recognition.

The controlled place, that is, always escapes at least a little from its vision and control, because it is the life within itself that is always at least a little subversive - in the inevitable home run existing outside the view fixed in surveillance, but even in the intentional inside of one's own irreducible phenomenon, whose presupposed intentions or existential recesses are far more unfathomable than a simple trace of the passage, in a decisive difference, here, to be conceived between the life that passes and the existence that gives itself a ' intention. Two coexisting levels of the world, but different in essence and quality, then confront each other on this oscillating ridge of representation, because the life-that-passes - the one that is nakedly visible, in front of the surveillance machines - does not betray all its intentions, causes, reasons, as predecessions and purposes that created and implied it; the life-that passes is not, in fact, the existence-with-the intention, that intimate, invisible part of the being that gives itself an intention.

Utopia, therefore, in this original sense, is no longer that of a dreamed and not (yet) existing positive place, as in its classical philosophical tradition, but rather evokes a re-seen negative place, and always (inevitably) at least in some of his part escaped.


Thus we discover a profound divergence that is insinuating itself into the philosophical heart of Western society. In fact, in such a context two diametrically different practices of the concepts of vision and truth oppose each other, which in the case of video surveillance understands them in the form of enlightened totality - one dependent on the other: vision as a vision of truth, as a vision of the existing totality, and truth as a visual illumination of the whole.

Conclusion

Truth as a vision is a practice now conceived in a purely material, quantitative, inferior sense; unlike the other conception often prevalent, however, in the Western philosophical tradition, that of vision as the pleasure of higher truths, qualitative and sublime truths. In the latter, the vision is not reduced to a pure material passage, of a certain reality-truth: it is rather aimed at practices of aesthetic and, at the same time, spiritual elevation, in which the generating idea of the vision is contemplation, the contemplation of beauty, as for example Neoplatonism has professed by fertilizing centuries in its cult of vision understood as enlightenment, both external and internal. Seeing, in the culture of the past centuries, was a knowledge for the soul, as for the happiness of the gaze, to discover the truth that shines, but that is higher - while today, among the video surveillance that has grown like a fortress, seeing is becoming only to discover, to verify the hidden evidences and the most abject realities, to know the naked truth-clue, which is lower.

The physics of video surveillance can be distinguished in two distinct precise moments, one identifiable, one in the physiology of the fixed vision of the moment of shooting, first of all, and the other in its corresponding display on the monitor, in the control units of the images taken. , parallel but distinct from the first phase. These two phases reveal, each in its own specific way, a completely new way of developing what, undoubtedly, must be identified as a peculiar type of representation.

It is clear, in fact, that the model of representation constructed by video surveillance perfectly interprets that type of "representation output" defined by us as an indicative discount, of which video surveillance is in fact one of the most emblematic and tangible cases.



HENRY MURRAY'S PERSONOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF NEEDS

DPSY Stefano AMODIO
Istituto Teseo, Italy

Abstract: *One of the theories I have examined is that of Henry Murray, who, as in the case of Allport, shares the need for an approach to personality that considers the complexity and uniqueness of the individual, and therefore to the deepening of personological subjectivities without renounce the identification of regularities or general rules. Compared to Allport, Murray attaches great importance to the past experience of the individual, demonstrating in his assumptions that he is influenced by the psychoanalytic vision of the feudian type, with the concepts he elaborated and changed of id, ego and super-ego, and by the Jungian analytical psychology.*

Keywords: *personality, motivation, behavior, proactive, reactive.*

The study of personality on Murray

In Murray, the study of personality coincides with the study of the history of personality, where personology aims to capture the distinctive elements of unity and globality. Like most psychodynamic authors, Murray recognizes motivation as a central role in the study of personality. According to Murray, for personality we must refer to the variety of directional tendencies that are the result of the interaction of biological and social factors. Motivation is an essential element in Murray's theory, as the motivation that is defined starting from the study of needs, environmental pressures, states of tension and conflict, is what allows us to determine the real unity of the conduct, which in turn it can determine the prediction and control of behavior and from which one can arrive at the core of the personality. The personality therefore coincides with the knowledge of the variety of needs which in different ways affect the stability and development of the personality. The need can be deduced from the form and result of a behavior and in particular from the subjective condition that determines its trigger, from the attention and selective response to a particular class of stimuli. Murray distinguishes needs into psychogenic and viscerogenic, the

former connected to psychological-social factors, the latter to organic factors. The viscerogenic needs find their justification and cause within needs of an organic type, psychogenic needs are causally determined within individual psychic experiences, born from interaction with the external world. The needs in turn can be classified into manifest, latent, proactive, reactive, focal and widespread. Needs are interconnected, for example the satisfaction of primary needs anticipates and conditions the development of secondary needs, ie psychological ones; the needs in turn into overwhelming needs with respect to others and subsidiary or instrumental needs with respect to others. Speaking of the motivational process, Murray states that the motivational process depends both on the environment which on the one hand provides the various opportunities for satisfaction, and on the environment itself that exerts various types of pressure on the individual. In fact, while the individual is the bearer of needs, the environment in which the subject lives and works is the seat of pressure (press). Murray, distinguishes two types of pressures, the Alphas which are substantiated in the physical and objective characteristics of the environment, and Beta pressures, which correspond to how the subject himself perceives the pressures. Determining the personality of an individual therefore means defining his biography to capture the salient experiences in events. The event, in fact, constitutes the meeting point of needs and pressures, constituting "the most real object, the concrete unit of analysis for the personologist".

Conclusion

Thematic analysis is therefore the best way to describe and understand an event. In defining the thematic analysis, Murray comes very close to social sciences such as sociology, anthropology, ethnology, useful for a comparative understanding of the whole. The analysis of personality cannot in fact ignore a global and overall vision that does not contemplate the great variability of socialization processes, which act as a background for the constitution of different personalities in cultural contexts. Attention must be paid both to the relational processes between parents and the child of the first years of life, on which a large part of the child's developmental development depends, and to the different practices that characterize the phases of mating, rearing, education relating to adulthood.

NEURO-LINGUISTIC PROGRAMMING IN DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATION

Motto: "In the beginning was the Word.."

Alexandra RADU
Professor and Researcher, Istituto Teseo, Italy

Abstract: *Neuro-linguistic programming is a relatively new science that combines the principles of cognitive psychology with the fundamental laws of cybernetics, allowing complete control of the basic components that make up human experience.*

The application of this new science in order to streamline communication at the diplomatic level could yield outstanding results, and the possibilities in this regard are still far from being fully exploited.

The members of diplomatic corps from different countries, participants in various seminars, were interested in techniques of neuro-linguistic programming. This has served as an impulse to write the present article. I tried to describe some techniques of influence through neuro-linguistic programming.

Keywords: *neuro-linguistic programming, improvement, communication, diplomatic behaviour.*

Introduction

Neuro-Linguistic Programming was founded by behavioural modellers John Grinder and Richard Bandler to analyze and explore the patterns governing such complex processes of human behaviour. The basic premise of NLP is that there is a redundancy between the observable macroscopic patterns of human behaviour (for example, linguistic and paralinguistic phenomena, eye movements, hand and body position, and other types of performance distinctions) and patterns of the underlying neural activity governing this behaviour.

The term programming refers to the human ability to program the way he thinks, feels and behaves in the multiple situations of life. In this sense, we can establish an analogy with computer science: matter (the human body) is the hardware system – we have a brain and a nervous system.

What is changing is the programs (software) that we have to use our material (body). "Programming" refers to the unique way in which we manage our neurological systems. The term is borrowed from computer science and was chosen mainly to emphasize that our own brain is "programmable", meaning we can substitute programs (strategies, pathways, techniques and methods by which we perform various tasks, more or less complex), which we already have with others, more "performing", which will lead us in the chosen direction.

This programming is done at the neurological level, the human brain and nervous system being responsible for the perception of the environment, as well as the ability to select certain information received from it to the human individual. It is this organization of information at the neurological level that is the object of study of the NLP: how the environment is perceived, what are the parts of the environment retained and neglected, what are the representations about themselves and others, how information is stored in memory and how this information is accessed when needed.

The activity carried out at the neurological level, be it routine or programming, is materialized in messages transmitted further to the whole "software" or "organism". Nothing becomes reality until it is verbalized (*"In the beginning was the Word..."*). The term "linguistic" refers to the systems of verbal communication (language) and nonverbal communication (body language) through which we "map" the reality around us. Thus, we use language to communicate with others as well as with ourselves. But, this term also refers to both conscious and unconscious communication. The structure of the speech is the one that reflects the way a person thinks and feels, it gives us information about how that person built their life experience.

Therefore, choosing the optimal ways to express one's thoughts, feelings, experiences, etc., as well as identifying effective ways to receive and correctly interpret messages from the environment is both the key to effective communication and the "secret" of a person's success.

What does neuro-linguistics actually propose? Deciphering how the brain ("neuro") operates by analyzing patterns of language ("linguistic") and nonverbal communication and applying the results of this research to a step-by-step strategy ("program"), a strategy that can be used to transfer skills considered useful to others.

NLP is a multidimensional process that involves the development of behavioural competence and flexibility and includes strategic thinking and an understanding of the mental and cognitive mechanisms behind behaviour. Neuro-linguistic programming addresses two significant areas: self-influence,

self-suggestion in order to achieve performance, and influencing the partner in order to make him proceed in the way we want.

It is therefore clear that programming at the neuro-linguistic level can bring huge benefits in communication of any kind and the need to apply the principles of neuro-linguistic programming in areas where effective communication is the key to success becomes even more evident.

The object of diplomacy is, using peaceful methods and the practice of efficient communication, to strengthen the ties of one country with others in different geographical areas, to develop friendly relations with neutral countries, and to mention relations with hostile governments. If in terms of friendly relations, the diplomatic representative can rely solely on etiquette and protocol, without excluding, of course, effective communication practices, in order to maintain and improve more strained relations, effective communication and negotiation skills are needed. Diplomacy is a special art that is not confused, neither by object nor by methods with other human activities, and, as such, needs specialists who devote themselves with passion and total devotion to it and who benefit from a special training, having the possibility to use to one's advantage modern tools and innovative communication techniques.

Basically, in the relationship with a hostile or less "friendly" partner, the diplomat is in a position to reconstruct a communication experience, to create a favourable perception based on the messages he sends to all the stimuli of the discussion partner, "messages" which can be analyzed and structured through NLP (body position, facial expressions and gestures, gaze, voice quality and words used by each person in the complex process of interpersonal communication). These messages become, through the application of innovative NLP techniques, true tools with which one can build a positive experience, a favourable perception first in relation to the communicator himself and then to the whole reality that he represents.

1. Establishing the Favourite Communication Channel

First of all, in order to position oneself correctly and advantageously in terms of communication and NLP practices towards the partner, it is necessary to identify his profile as a communicator, the predominant communication channel he uses, objectives achievable by highlighting some physical and personality features, easily perceived from the first contact. In the table below are written some such features, useful in outlining a communicator profile as faithful as possible to the partner.

Type	Characteristics	Personality	Behaviour
SANGUINE	face round to oval predominance of the median plane wide fairy sharp mouth and nose	dynamism sociability extrovert optimism irritability	calm, patient, comprehensive, cordial he speaks openly, attracting sympathy emotional arguments
CHOLERIC	face almost square, retracted ten, in general, mat In general, the features of the face are long and denote impassivity, even malice	“cold” energy intransigence authoritarian, domineering feel practical very balanced being	logical, precise, calm, patient express arguments on fundamental grounds, logically justified precise, even exact arguments
NERVOUS	predominance of the upper plane of the head, sharp chin the type of intellectual	mobility permanent nervousness introvert subjective fragility imagination	calm, comprehensive, cheerful arouses curiosity and imagination original arguments (it's a brain!)
LYMPHATIC	predominance of the lower plane of the head, strong chin In general, it is short, “thick”, even heavy	latent passivity slow reactions indecision conservatism	concrete, simple, practical, calm simple, reassuring argument (it's an instinct!)

The information and principles for identifying the profile will of course be evaluated in terms of their own communicator behaviour, in order to identify the profile and adapt it to the profile of the discussion partner.

But how do we proceed to recognize and / or identify the privileged sensory channel of communication called by the interlocutor? The answer consists in revealing the “predicates” (of verbs and / or expressions) preferentially called and used by each person, depending on their own privileged sensory channel of communication.

PREDICATES	
VISUAL	VERBS / NOUNS / ADJECTIVES: to realize, to see, to foresee, to see, vision, point of view, image, clear, bright, colour, colourful, tint
	EXPRESSIONS: to set up, clear (clear as daylight), to make an opinion, from the point of view, at first sight
AUDITIVE	VERBS / NOUNS / ADJECTIVES: to hear, to say, to sound, to accentuate, to dialogue
	EXPRESSIONS: to resonate with, to emphasize, to sound false, this aspect tells me / suggests something
KINESTHETIC	VERBS / NOUNS / ADJECTIVES: to feel, to contact, to tingle, to hold in tension, sensation, to shake, to notice, consistent, resistant
	EXPRESSIONS: to keep in touch, to be with one's head on one's shoulders, not to see one's good work, to exert pressure
NEUTRAL (NON-SPECIFIC)	to believe, decide, think, motivate, change, plan, advise, learn, anticipate

2. Establishing the Interpersonal Relationship

By excellence, diplomats are good observers. In this context, their sensory acuity will develop as they practice and pay more and more attention to detail. Because, although few always admit, the details are what “make the whole”. And, from the “signs” perceived by our interlocutors, to their habits regarding the calling of a preferable sensory communication

channel, it is only a “single step”. This “single step” is called, in PNL, “report” and it is the direct result of the process of establishing a positive contact with the interlocutor.

Let’s suppose, for example, that we follow two people conversing. We will be able to notice very quickly that these people have similar attitudes, more precisely, their positions, facial expressions and gestures are in harmony, somewhat even synchronized. If we can hear the conversation, it is very likely that we also notice that the voices of those people (tone, volume, rhythm, intonation, choice of words, etc.) are in agreement. The phenomenon is all the more remarkable, as everything happens as if one of the two people “guides” the other, and this, in turn, influences the first, etc. If one person changes the tone, rhythm or “posture”, the other will follow. This is what we find in PNL under the name of “leadership of the interlocutor”, in order to establish a “report” as efficient as possible.

Whatever the subject of the conversation, the “report” is absolutely necessary, otherwise it becomes impossible to achieve the goal. In other words, without establishing an effective “relationship” or in its absence, interpersonal communication does not take place.

Also, in order to establish an effective “relationship” with the interlocutor, that “area” (distance) must be maintained to ensure one’s own safety (usually, this must be equal to the length of an arm). How many times have we not simply felt “assaulted” by the interlocutor who “gets into us”, especially out of an excessive desire to convince us “at any cost”? In such situations, the effect obtained will be exactly the opposite of what is desired, risking even the “removal” of the interlocutor and the manifestation of his desire to “get rid” as soon as possible, if not “at any cost” of us.

Schematically, the establishment of an efficient “relationship” between two interlocutors is shown in fig. 1. From its content results, finally, the very purpose of adapting one’s own behaviour to that of the interlocutor, as well as the achievement of the aims and / or objectives. So, even in this case, PNL ensures an easier understanding of what is familiar to us, so that we are finally able to “seduce” the interlocutor and create his (undisguised) desire to see us again as soon as possible.




Fig. 1. Establish an effective report and improve the communication

3. Establishing the Purpose and / or Objectives in the Context of Neuro-linguistic Programming

Regardless of the “style” of communication adopted, in order to achieve the desired results it is necessary to know optimally your own goals and / or objectives. We cannot fail to point out, even at the risk of repeating, a fact so (apparently) banal and often used to the point of exasperation: the most important thing for us, at any moment of the actions taken, is to know each other and to know, each other, we consistently pursue the proposed objective and / or purpose(s)!

It is more than obvious that people who succeed in what they undertake have a common feature: they are able to define, very precisely, their purpose and objectives. The better and more clearly we succeed in defining what we want to achieve, the more generously we will be able to offer ourselves the means to succeed in our quest for success. In this context, PNL shows us that, in order to better define an objective, we must be able to build, related to it, an image that can be expressed in a single way. More precisely, the image related to the objective must be clear, concrete and positive. For example, if we aim for freedom, it will be necessary to provide the answers to the concrete meaning of the term “freedom”: do we have the freedom to do what we want ?; do we have the freedom to organize our time the way we want ?; do we have the freedom to choose our friends?; do we have the freedom to say everything we think, without being afraid of the consequences?; and so on

In general, in its approach to proposing an “objective strategy”, the PNL asks seven fundamental questions, starting from what we want to do (or from facts and / or things about which we have a precise idea). The general tendency of these questions is to allow us to know, as a matter of priority, how and, at a later stage, what to do.

4. Modelling Communication Behaviour Based on the Interlocutor's Answers

In their approach to convincing all readers of the importance of detailed knowledge of their own goals and / or objectives, Grinder and Bandler relied on the experience and results of the work of American linguist Noam Chomsky, insisting on three elements of maximum utility for (self) behavioural modelling, depending on the answers received to the questions we asked the interlocutor, respectively to omissions, generalizations and distortions.

Omissions are a phenomenon of “experience modelling” that allows us to ignore certain information, to the detriment of others. In other words, it is about the principle of selective choice of information, a principle that we apply, in and with different degrees of will, knowledge and conscience, in most of the expressions formulated to our interlocutors. In general, there are the following three categories of omissions that we resort to in order to achieve the intended purpose and / or objective:

Simple omissions related to verbs. These are the most common, because the verbs are always more or less precise. For example, when a person tells us, “This news surprised me!”, we try to give free rein to our imagination, because we do not know, not even approximately, how that person was caught. In this case, in reply, it is appropriate and advisable to ask a question such as “What does it mean to you to be surprised by certain news?” or “How (in what sense) did this news surprise you?”... Certainly, the answers “generated” by such questions will be able to provide us with important and useful elements of reflection. Or, to use other examples: (answer: “Roads are dangerous in winter”) – Why, in particular? (answer: “You will take the exam very seriously!” – “Specifically, how will you prepare it?”, etc .).

Simple omissions by comparison. In their case, we start from the fact, obviously, that any comparison presupposes and implies the existence of two terms. In the opposite situation, the comparisons no longer have their meaning or place, being necessary, on our part, to “bring back” the interlocutor to the subject subject to comparison. For example, in the statement “I paid more for the detergent I bought last week,” the appropriate question is, “More expensive, compared to what?” or, to such a “generous” question, “Do you want to be a billionaire?”, the question we can ask is, “Whose money?” In general, this type of omission is so common that, not infrequently, it goes unnoticed at a first “audition”, because we tend (obviously, subjective) to accept some messages as they are “delivered” to us, without “blocking” them. It is essential, however, to “challenge” them as soon as possible, so as not to leave room for any ambiguity, through questions asking for additional clarification.

Complex omissions (modal operators of necessity or possibility). And this type of omission is also common and is generated, almost exclusively, by the use, “in abundance”, of verbs such as to have, to want, to be able, to be necessary to (in the case of operators modalities of necessity). If we

refer to the modal operators of possibility, the most frequently encountered examples can be of the form It is impossible for me!; I cannot!; We are not able to overcome our condition as Balkans!; and so on. Therefore, these verbs and / or expressions introduce a wording that indicates a limit or an impossibility, but does not offer any element or indication capable of clarifying the factual situation. For example, in a sentence like, "I can't talk seriously with any of my colleagues," we are clearly told of an impossibility, but we are not given any indication that could suggest the reasons. Generators of such a situation, I simply ask, "Why?" It is obvious that we will be able to get more clarification (for example, "I can't really talk to any of my colleagues because I don't trust them"). In order to be able to solve a possible "trap" (in the sense that some omissions are specifically addressed, to make us ask things for which the answer is already prepared), it is advisable to "supplement" the initial question with one like "In what sense do you not trust them?" Obviously, the question may seem downright stupid, but at the same time, it can be very effective for the person who asks it. Or, in order to provide another example of a question that should be asked in such a form, in the "complaint" such as "I can't seriously talk to any of my colleagues", we can reply: "What is stopping you to do it?" Such questions have, not infrequently, the "gift" of "blocking" the interlocutor and / or (re)bringing him to a more realistic (or more explicit) position regarding his own opinions and / or formulations.

Distortions are the third appealable element in our approach to (self) modelling behaviour, depending on the answers received from the interlocutor. They are able to make "substitutions" of data in the experience we have, as they can be generators of creativity and inventiveness. But, at the same time, distortions can cause us great handicaps, especially in situations where they take the form of assumptions, causal relationships for arbitrary effects, as well as risky interpretations and / or anticipations. The most common distortions are:

"Nominations", respectively those linguistic "phenomena" that turn a process into an event (for example, often love is transformed into love). In the vast majority of cases, "nominations" are indicated by abstract words (love, freedom, decision, well-being, creativity, imagination, wealth, poverty, hope, etc.), hence the fact that their meaning may differ from one user to another. In this context, asking questions capable of clarifying, in a clear way, both interlocutors, can prove to be most effective. For example, in the wording "I want to get an improvement in working conditions", the question

"How would you see them improved?" it can be followed by a formal answer: "Well, first of all, I would need a little more space, a better lit office, equipped with modern and functional furniture, etc." It should be noted that between "an improvement" and the (very) precise elements that proved to the person how she "sees" the "improvement", there is a big and significant difference of ambiguities, the more we will generate a simpler, more direct and efficient interpersonal communication;

"Deities" are based on the supernatural qualities that (still enough) many people suspect they have and are revealed by expressions such as: "Yeah, I know, sure, what you're thinking!" The reply may be, "Yes, but how do you do it?" "I already know what he will say when he returns!" Reply: "I would be grateful if you could learn how too?!" "Surely this will please him!" he replied: "I did not realize this fact, not even once!"; and so on. As can be seen, verbs like think, believe, feel, judge, appreciate, etc. they can often lead to "deities." In such a context, it is effective to resort to empathy and inferiority. For example, by inferiorizing ourselves, we "bring" the interlocutor (depending on the purpose we are pursuing) "with our feet on the ground", and we determine him to be eager to explain to us what and how...;

"Cause-effect" relationships. Paradoxically, these seem extremely common, normal and logical! But the abuse and misuse of "cause-and-effect" relationships can cause, not infrequently, the most contradictory and even bizarre situations. Usually, establishing a "cause-and-effect" relationship is reassuring and comforting, but this is often completely inaccurate, especially since, in general, it is unlikely that an effect will be generated by a single cause! In other words, reducing the explanations to a single element can be an important limitation ("barrier") in the way of the options that could exist and would be able to clarify much more complex a certain state of affairs. This is why it is (at least) advisable to "check" the way in which our interlocutor really knows what he wants, "appearing" to him, depending on the case, in any contextual-specific situation. For example, in the wording "I would go to the mountains, but I don't have a car!", one of the most appropriate remarks may be: "I understand that if you have a car, you will go to the Mountains!?". Since the formulation of this question, although we have not changed, practically, the content of the conditional statement of the interlocutor, the reformulation called will be likely to lead us to obtain at least two things: the first is to verify the "cause-effect" relationship, and the second, in "opening the door" to a challenge to the previous one: "Frankly speaking, it's not really like that." From this moment on, the discussion is "relaunched" and "open", especially since I demonstrated to the interlocutor

that his departure to the mountains is not, at all, conditioned by the existence of a car.

Conclusion

The behaviour of the communicator is essential in establishing interpersonal relationships, and in diplomacy educating one's own communication behaviour and learning to use tools that help shape the interlocutor's reactions is an essential skill both for establishing new relationships and for creating favourable communication contexts in existing relationships.



ISSN 2784 – 2002
ISSN-L 2784 – 2002



ROMÂNIA DE MĂINE FOUNDATION PUBLISHING HOUSE