


MINERVA

JOURNAL OF HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY

Volume 3, Issue 1, September 2022



ROMÂNIA DE MĂINE FOUNDATION PUBLISHING HOUSE



MINERVA

Journal of History and Philosophy

Volume 3, Issue 1, September 2022

Editor: *România de Mâine* Foundation Publishing House
Bucharest, Romania

<https://minerva.editurafrm.ro/2022/volume3-number1>
E-mail: contact@editurafrm.ro

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Bucharest, Romania, 2022

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ISSN: 2784 – 2002

ISSN-L: 2784 – 2002

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
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
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History



SZATHMARI'S PHOTO ALBUM ON THE DANUBIAN PRINCIPALITIES IN 1853

*At the origins of war photoreportage in the nineteenth
century*

Ph. D. Hernán Rodríguez VARGAS
Italian Institute for Historical Studies

Introduction

Many years before Tsar Nicholas I ordered his troops in Bessarabia in June 1853 to cross the Prut to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia, feelings of phobia towards Russia had been fuelled throughout Europe, mainly in France and England. Since the territorial expansion of the Russian Empire in the eighteenth century and, subsequently, by its demonstration of military strength against Napoleon, an image between fear, rejection and hatred had been created in oral, written and iconographic culture, which would be amplified with time, under the epithet of "Russian threat". In the mid-nineteenth century, to increase the feelings of Russophobia on the part of the British there was support for the Polish cause; while, to fuel these feelings on the part of the French and the rest of Europe, it was the violent Russian reaction to the revolutionary waves of 1848.^{1/2}

Even more important for the impact on public opinion was the fact that this military invasion by the Tsar represented the end of a long cycle of conflicts between two empires (the Sublime Porta and the Russian one) and became a European conflict capable of definitively splitting the

¹The documented foundation of the "Russian threat" was the so-called "Testament of Peter the Great," widely cited by Russophobic writers, politicians, diplomats, and military as incontrovertible evidence of Russia's ambitions for world domination. The "Testament", in reality, was a fake, created in the early eighteenth century by various Polish, Hungarian and Ukrainian figures connected to France and the Ottomans and passed through various editorial offices before arriving at the final version, which arrived in the archives of the Foreign Ministry French in the sixties of the eighteenth century. O. Figes, *Crimea, l'ultima crociata*, Torino, Einaudi, 2011, pp. 75-76.

² Ibid.

structure established in Vienna in 1815.³ Immediately after the invasion, the British and French mobilized their armies in the event of a possible war and since before these armies arrived in support of the Turkish ally, the first to land in the Danubian principalities, in Constantinople and on the Russian-Turkish front in the Caucasus, were the reporters of important newspapers such as *The Times*, *Le Moniteur Universel*, *The Illustrated London News* and *L'illustration Journal Universel*, as well as satirical-informative newspapers, among the most relevant *Le Charivari* French, and the *Punch* or *The London Charivari*.

From the beginning, Russian hostilities and the stance of the French and British empires, were the focus of attention of these newspapers, attracting more and more the interest of the public. From this point of view, the publications of July 1853 by *The Illustrated London News* and *the L'illustration Journal Universel* are particularly relevant. *The Illustrated London News*, on July 2, published on its front page an article entitled "The English and French camps", in which it highlighted, in addition to the cooperation between the Allies against the common enemy, the cultural-national differences between the two armies. The illustrations, in addition to Queen Victoria's visit to Chobham's field staff, depict the military types and equipment of both armies preparing to go to war.^{4/5}

Subsequently, on July 16, a detailed report on "les fortifications de Constantinople" appeared in *the Illustration Journal Universel*, which presented readers with an important historical excursus on Constantinople from the fifteenth century. On July 23, this same newspaper reported on the most important event of the week⁶, namely "la réponse de M. le ministre des affaires étrangères à la deuxième circulaire de M. de Nesselrode, publiée dans le *Moniteur* du 17 juillet". *Réponse* which the newspaper considers to be worthy, since 'le ministre français réfute victorieusement la partie de la circulaire de la chancellerie russe tendant à reporter sur la France et l'Angleterre l'occupation des principautés du Danube comme représailles de l'envoi des flottes dans les eaux libres de Bésika'.⁷

³ W. Baumgart, *The Crimean War, 1853-1856*, London-New York, Oxford University Press, 1999; T. Royle, *Crimea. The Great Crimean War 1854-1856*, London, Brown & C., 1999; H. Small, *The Crimean War. Queen Victoria's War with the Russian Tsar*, Stroud, 2007.

⁴ *The Illustrated London News*, 2 July 1853, p.537.

⁵ *The Illustrated London News*, 2 July 1853, p. 541.

⁶ *L'illustration Journal Universel*, July 16, 1853, p. 33.

⁷ *L'illustration Journal Universel*, July 23, 1853, p. 55.

At the same time, satirical-informative newspapers were preparing their audiences for war against the Russians. On June 11⁸, *Punch* features a caricature of the Russian ultimatum imposed by Alexander Menshikov, in which the hostility and disposition to combat by the Turks with the support of the other powers is appreciated. For the month of August, this time on the⁹ *Charivari* French, Honoré Daumier depicted the Parisians who studied through the different newspapers and in a very careful way "the Turkish question". Only two months later, Taxile Delord, politician¹⁰ and *rédacteur en chef* de *Le Charivari*, spoke ironically of the need to have two types of reporters for the Eastern question, namely, the pro-Turkish and pro-Russian reporters, since there was no talk of anything but the so-called "question of the East".»:

Si lit dans le Journal des Débats : il faut des correspondants pour tous les goûts, avons donc un correspondant philottoman et correspondant russophile. Ajour nous laissons parler le correspondant filottoman, le lendemain nous donnons la parole correspondant russophile. Et nous faisons l'éloge de l'armée turque par rétiaire du correspondant philottoman. Aujourd'hui nous publions une réclame rédigée en fa de l'armée russe par le correspondant russo¹¹.

In this first moment of the conflict there was a common attitude on the part of the newspapers: in the first place, that of informing and updating the public by increasing interest in the upcoming war. Secondly, to entertain through more engaging narratives and through the use of images, in the case of illustrated newspapers, creating a great sense of the plausible

⁸The presence of these satirical newspapers and their ability to engage the public in the interest of the conflict was fundamental, since *Le Charivari*, born in 1832 and the *Punch*, born in 1841, respect for *The Illustrated London News* and *Illustration*, anticipated the use of images to inform through their humorous content; and both in Paris and London, in the relationship between text and images, these newspapers had consolidated themselves as true instruments of politicization and iconographic consumption throughout Europe. J.P. Bacot «Trois générations de presse illustrée au XIXe siècle», in *Réseaux*, 111, 2001, pp. 216-234. To observe some of the most interesting caricatures produced throughout the conflict, see: <https://www.brandeis.edu/library/archives/spotlights/special-collections/2017/crimean-war.html>

⁹ *Punch or the london charivari*, 11 July 1853, p. 235.

¹⁰ Honoré Daumier, *Le Charivari*, 4 August 1853.

¹¹ Taxile Delord, *Le Charivari*, 28 October 1853, p. 3.

through the relationship between text and image. The ¹²*war artists* depicted all kinds of activities that might be of interest: from political, diplomatic and military events, to the recreation of scenes from that unknown and exotic East in which the conflict took place, recalling the narratives and illustrations of travel literature, also illustrated. ¹³ Some examples can be found in the book by Anatole de Démidoff, *Voyage dans la Russie Méridionale & la Crimée par La Hongrie, La Valachie et La Moldavie en 1837*, illustrated by Denis Auguste Marie Raffet, or in the numerous lithographs made by Théodore Valerio called «collection ethnographique». Finally, the last common element was the spread of a narrative characterized by a heated patriotism, which will be maintained throughout the conflict beyond the different ways of presenting the news by the newspapers. As for the representations of military events, it is important to underline the interest of the illustrated reportages for genre scenes, in which the fighters were depicted in their daily lives. In addition to the great heroes and the martial notability, the public's gaze was thus directed towards the individual soldiers-fellow citizens, called by the newspapers as "our soldiers" or "nos soldats".¹⁴».

In this way, one of the results of this great promotion campaign developed between information, entertainment and patriotism, was the publication in a few months, by the English newspapers, of the "petitions to the queen asking for a position", while the French newspapers continued ¹⁵to feed the desire to fight the historical Russian enemy. In the summer of 1854, in fact, the caricaturist Honoré Daumier depicted Tsar Nicholas I as a Goliath who unjustly challenges the little Turkish David, in need of the support of the allies. ¹⁶ From the point of view of illustrated reportage, between 1853 and 1854, the main *war artists* of the French and English

¹² W.H. Russell, *The British Expedition to the Crimea*, London, G. Routledge & Co., 1858; A.D. Lambert, S. Badsey (eds.), *The War Correspondents: The Crimean War*, Gloucester, Sutton, 1994.

¹³ E. Parinet, *Une histoire de l'édition à l'époque contemporaine, XIXe - XXe siècle*, Paris, Histoire, 2004.

¹⁴ C. Peltre, «Les "Géographies" De L'art: Physionomies, Races Et Mythes Dans La Peinture», *Romantisme*, No. 4, 130, 2005, pp. 67-79.

¹⁵ *Morning Post* 16 December 1853, *The times* 13 and 18 December 1853, *Sheffiel and Rotherdam Independent* 17 December 1853, *Chronicle* 23 DecandMbre 1853. In O. Figes, *Crimea...*, op. cit., p. 100.

¹⁶ *Le Charivari*, 11 July 1853, p. 34.

newspapers were painters and draftsmen; these sent their drawings to the *staff* of London and Paris where the engravers took care of printing them through the technique of woodcut on head wood. At that time, before the arrival of Roger Fenton in the Crimea, in 1855, and before the arrival of the subsequent English and French photographers, it was Carol Pop de Szathmari, a photographer originally from the city of Kolozsvár (Transylvania), who recorded the Russian invasion and the Ottoman resistance, opening the doors to what would have been the work of Fenton and the other war photo-reporter artists.¹⁷ It was therefore in the first place the eye of Szathmari's camera to propose a new look at the conflict, which would serve as a point of reference and comparison for subsequent war artists-photographers.

1. Carol Pop de Szathmari, *pioneer of war photoreportage*

The career of Carol Pop de Szathmari can be defined as that of a very successful artist. Belonging to a noble family, he abandoned his career in law to devote himself to painting, attending the Academy of Fine Arts in Vienna. After a trip through Europe, he settled permanently in Bucharest in 1843, where he worked for high society circles, including the reigning princes of Wallachia. Being a well-known painter, in 1848 he began his career as a photographer and in those years he opened his photographic studio, showing great skills to adapt to the potential of the new medium of image reproductions and to the new needs of the public¹⁸. During the invasion of the Danubian principalities, high-ranking officers who had attended his studio, asked him to accompany them and record some scenes of the conflict. In this way, Szathmari prepared for one of the most important imprints of his career. In April 1854, he filled a "photographic van"

¹⁷A.S. Lonescu, «Szathmári, a great documentary artist», *Riha Journal*, 2014/79, <https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/rihajournal/article/view/69846/67362>. In this article, readers will also be able to delve into further aspects of Szathmari's life and work that go beyond his reportage on the invasion of the Danubian principalities.

¹⁸A.S. Lonescu, «Szathmari: from a War Photographer to a Ruling Prince's Court Painter and Photographer», in Anna Auer and Uwe Schögl (a cura di) *Jubilee – 30 Years Eshph, Congress of Photography in Vienna*, European Society for the History of Photography, p. 80.

with his cameras, glass plates and went to the Danube border with the purpose of documenting the conflict and creating a collection. The result was an album that contained about two hundred images and that became famous thanks to its presentation at the Universal Exhibition in Paris in 1855, in which he received the second class medal. It was in effect the first war report whose results, unlike what happened in other previous conflicts (the United States War with Mexico, the barricades of Paris in 1848, and the defense of the Roman Republic in 1849), were disseminated when the war was then underway.

The effort to physically move all the tools required to make photographic shots, and to test his photographic skills in a hostile environment – such as battle scenarios – convert Szathmari into a pioneer of the modern practice of photographing and documenting war. After him, subsequent war photographers could add to their artistic and scientific recognition, even the status of heroes, since they themselves, in the commitment to make their own reportages, had to face the adversities of the conflict. So true is this condition of *war artist* who, risking being mistaken for a Russian spy, became a military target of the Turkish cannons, but he, courageously as Ernest Lacan recalls, remained there to make a spectacular photographic shot (¹⁹fig. 1).²⁰

The album was seen from the first moment as an important historical document that presented to the eyes of its viewers what was the beginning of the conflict. Many of the photographs in this album help to consolidate some codes of representation already present in other iconographic devices, as well as to configure new ones. The latter, subsequently, will be fully developed in conflicts such as the War for the South in Italy (1860-1870), the American Civil War (1861-1865), the War of the Triple Alliance in South America (1864-1870), the Austro-Prussian (1866) and Franco-Prussian Wars (1870-1871), as well as in the Second Carlist War in Spanga (1872-1876).

The codes of representation already present in other iconographic devices and which maintained a line of continuity with Szathmari's

¹⁹ Ernest Lacan was an important journalist and French critic, a specialist in photographic art. He followed very carefully the photographic works admitted to the Universal Exhibition of 1855 and wrote his texts for the important magazine *La Lumière, revue de la photographie*.

²⁰ E. Lacan, *Esquisses Photographiques a propos de l'Exposition Universel et de la guerre d'Orient*, Paris, Grassart, 1856, p. 167.

photography were mainly two: the landscape views and the portrait. The landscape views were one of the most important artistic objects of the great pictorial schools since the seventeenth century and now, through photography they were inserted in wider ways of diffusion thanks to the alliance between the new tool and the experience of travel and photographic excursions. As for the portrait, the depiction of the subjects through paintings, lithographs, miniatures and sculptures, which was a privilege belonging to the most important nineteenth-century celebrities at the governmental, social and military level, extended to other members of society. So, if on the one hand photography was only another iconographic tool destined to the affirmation of the ²¹*celebrity system* of the nineteenth century, the novelty, of which Szathmari participated, was then that of being able to depict also fighters and groups of fighters of lesser rank, who before the photographic invention, could never have been depicted or celebrated memorialistically. ²²

In this direction, one way of carefully examining some of the new codes of representation used in Szathmari's photographs is through the writing of the album, which consists of three large elements. The first element, in fact, is represented by the photographs of the most important protagonists of the Russian and Turkish armies:

Prince General Mikhail Dimitrievitsch Gortschakoff (fig. 2), Baron General Dimitri Erofeevitsch Osten-Sacken, Field Marshal Prince Ivan Feodorovitsch Paskevitsch, Commissioner Alexander Ivanovitsch Budberg, General Pavel Eustatievitsch Kotzebue Nicolaevitsch Lüders and two commanders who fell on the battlefield: Generals Selvan, killed at Silistra, and Soimonoff, killed at Inkerman. Following these portraits, there is one of Omer Pasha, the Turkish commander-in-chief, Iskender Bey (the Muslim name of the Polish Count Ilinski who volunteered in the Turkish army and distinguished himself in battle), the young Tefvik Pasha killed in Balaklava, Dervish Pasha and two officers of the British and French allied armies, Colonels Simmons and Dieu²³.

²¹ M. Warner Marien, *Photography A Cultural History*, London, Laurence King, 2002, p. 44.

²² A. Lilti, *The invention of Celebrity*, Cambridge, Polity press, 2017; E. Berenson, E. Giloi (eds.), *Costrutting Charisma. Celebrity, Fame and Power in Nineteenth Century Europe*, New York, Berghahn Books, 2010.

²³ A.S. Ionescu, «Szathmari: from a War Photographer...», op. cit., p. 83.

The case of the picture of General Michail Dimitrievitsch Gortschakoff (fig. 2), is exemplary because it highlights some fundamental aspects of the shots made by Szathmari to these prominent figures. The first concerns the composition of the scene, which is made in an intimate environment and enhances the dignity of the character in military uniform, flaunts his medals and poses as a real gentleman. The second, however, concerns the fact that the photograph, a few years later, would be used in a report by *The Illustrated London News*, in which the general is described as "a very able command, throughout the protracted, from time to time, in our Journal²⁴"; this element is fundamental because it represents a clear example of the spread of the work of photographers in other media and of the continuous interest of the public for every detail concerning the war, including prominent figures of the enemy army. Finally, the fact that, with regard to the photographic compositions of the two warring factions, Szathmari was the only photographer to make portraits of both the most important figures of the Russian and Turkish armies, as in the case of the Ottoman general Omar Pasha, also the protagonist of numerous reports within the illustrated newspapers²⁵. This element makes Szathamri's album a precious and unique material among the reportages made over the duration of the conflict, especially considering that once the conflict moved to Crimea, no other photographer managed – due to the heavy conditions of the conflict – to make further photographs of members of the enemy army. In fact, this was one of the features that most attracted the attention of Napoleon III on Szathmari's album during the Universal Exhibition of 1855:

M. de Szathmari, l'habile amateur photographe de Bucharest, dont nous avons annoncé dernièrement l'arrivée, a eu l'honneur d'être reçu mercredi soir par l'Empereur. LL. MAI. Ont voulu voir toutes les épreuves que renferme son magnifique album; les portraits des généraux russes et turcs les ont surtout vivement intéressés. Témoin oculaire de bien des scènes qui se rattachent à l'histoire de la guerre d'Orient, ayant connu la plupart des hommes qui se sont distingués dans cette grande lutte, M. de Szathmari a pu donner des détails curieux et qui ont fixé l'attention de LL. MM. L'Empereur a félicité l'auteur de cette intéressante collection, dont il a accepté l'hommage. Nous sommes heureux d'annoncer ce succès, qui honore la photographie, et qui montre avec quelle bienveillance LL. MM. accueillent et encouragent les progrès de notre art²⁶.

²⁴ *The Illustrated London News*, 3 novembre 1855, p. 528.

²⁵ Examples include *The Illustrated London News*, 22 October 1853; October 20, 1855; December 16, 1856.

²⁶ *La Lumière*, 9 June 1855, p. 89.

Another important aspect is that many of the photographs of the album were taken outdoors and were built with great care, taking care of every detail of the composition. If it is true that from the beginning "the Photo is like a primitive theater", it is also true that in that itinerant studio of Szathmari – continuously conditioned to the dynamics of the war – the photographic compositions became a theater in all respects. An example of this is Szathmari's photograph of ²⁷*the Turkish Cavalrymen* from 1854 (fig. 2), in which four Turkish fighters pose together with their horses. Inside the image, the two central figures look at each other, while the soldier on the left turns his gaze towards the first on the right, who is the only one looking at the camera while resting his right arm on his horse. It is a photograph in which both the courage of the fighters and their readiness for battle are represented.

The second element concerns Szathmari's commitment to compose "scenes of battles". Through these images "nous sommes dans le camp russe, sur le sommet d'un mamelon, au bord du Danube". In this description, Lacan also reflects on the ability of photography to portray large war scenes and the technical difficulties of capturing movement. In his analysis he believes that the artist's work responds positively to this difficult need, such as when it captures, beyond the unsatisfactory quality of the image, the moment of a retreat²⁸:

Des chevaux sans cavaliers, des fourgons remplis d'objets de toute nature, défilent pêle-mêle avec les soldats. Cette colonne se déroule, comme un immense serpent, sur le chemin qui monte vers les hauteurs, pendant que des retardataires, arrêtés au bord du fleuve, y laissent boire leur monture et s'y désaltèrent eux-mêmes. On ne saurait composer un tableau plus animé ni plus vrai²⁹.

This limitation of depicting moving scenes was a widely discussed topic in nineteenth-century scientific journals specializing in photography, from *the Daguerrean Journal* to *The Practical Mechanic's Journal*³⁰. It was

²⁷ R. Barthes, *La Camera Chiara, nota sulla fotografia*, Torino, Einaudi, 1980, p. 13.

²⁸E. Lacan, *Esquisses Photographiques...*, op. cit., p. 160.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ *The Practical Mechanic's Journal*, Vol II, April 1854-March 1855, London, published for the proprietors by George Herbert 88 Chapside.

this limitation that made the work of photographers, draftsmen and engravers within the illustrated newspapers a complementary work. The artists were in charge of realizing what photography was not yet able to do and that belonged to the long tradition of paintings and battle scenes. Not surprisingly, to pay homage to the participation of the French, Napoleon III ordered the construction of the ³¹*Salle de Crimée* inside the Château de Versailles. The great novelty in the elaboration of this room was that many of the paintings were realized thanks to the photographs that the *war artists* sent by the emperor himself had made of the battlefields: the photographers Jean Charles Langlois and Léon Méhédin.

Beyond the potential and technical limitations of photography it is possible to understand the ability of these photographic compositions to involve the viewer, which also highlight the way in which the courage of the Turks earned " la sympathie des grandes nations »³². In this sense the album proved to be not only an artistic device, but also a political one, since it contributed, at the dawn of the war, to confirm to public opinion the affinity of the Allied powers for the Turkish cause.

Finally, the third element of great importance of Szathmari's album concerns the photographic approach of an ethnographic character and the interest in portraying *the types* of other cultures. "[In the album] there are also various types of local soldiers and people, infantrymen and Cossacks of the Russian forces, Turkish bashibouzouks (irregular knights) and nizamyie (regular infantrymen), Austrian lancers, dragoons and infantrymen, some gypsies and Romanian merchants and craftsmen»³³. As well as the Ukrainian Cossacks, the Turkish, Arab, Greek bashi-bazouks and even the gypsies, who in Bucharest served as "violinists for peasants and slaves of the boyars»³⁴. In short, it is a complex intercultural look through war photography, complementary to what already existed in other iconographic devices³⁵, in travel painting and genre scenes related to the

³¹L. Da Vinci, *Trattato della Pittura*, Rome, Carabba, 1947. Text in which he defined the rules of their composition, and which have as their purpose the universal representation, higher and nobler of what was lived (just as the portraits leaned towards the true representation of the incarnate subject. A. Blunt, *Le teorie artistiche in Italia dal Rinascimento al Manierismo*, Einaudi, 2001, p. 47.

³² E. Lacan, *Esquisses Photographiques...*, op. cit., p. 161.

³³ Ivi, p. 162.

³⁴ Ivi, p. 164.

³⁵ C. Peltre, «Les "Géographies" De L'art: Physionomies, Races Et Mythes Dans La Peinture», *Romantisme*, No. 4, 130, 2005, pp. 67-79.

iconographic activities of colonial enterprises³⁶, and which are continually found in Szathmari's later photographic works. Such is the case of the multiple genre photographs dedicated to the typical subjects and traditional costumes of Romanian culture. Examples are the photographs presented with great success at the Universal Exhibition of 1867 in Paris and in 1873 in Vienna. The photograph dedicated to a group of women in regional costume of 1866 (fig. 4) was one of the many representations that Szathmari dedicated to enhance his culture, showcasing clothes, customs and cultural practices.

Returning to the album dedicated to documenting the beginning of the conflict, this can then be defined as "une oeuvre artistique dans laquelle le peintre, le poète et l'historien trouveront un égal intérêt; c'est, déplus, une des productions les plus remarquables que la photographie ait enfantées, si l'on tient compte des difficultés de l'exécution»³⁷. Examining all three aspects named, one can see how they are also the result of Szathmari's various aesthetic interests as a painter: portraiture, battle paintings and genre scenes, as well as his great skills in social practices associated with photography and his fascination with nineteenth-century society. In this sense, his ability to re-propose these motifs as new subjects of the photographic gaze, in a context of war, can also be interpreted as a reference point for photographers who after him would dedicate an important part of their work to war photography. Considering the proximity of an artist like Roger Fenton, the most important and remembered photographer of the war, to the British crown, it is not difficult to imagine that this came to know about Szathmari's work, even if at the time of the delivery of the Romanian artist's album to Queen Victoria and the participation of it in the Universal Exhibition, Fenton had already left for the Crimea. In fact, in the Victorian court's enthusiasm for photography, the British government felt the need to send its own photographers to the Crimea as well, in order to derive the results before the Universal Exhibition ended in November 1855. Since this is also the exhibition that started the industrial development of photography, further expanding its relationship with the public, it is clear the desire on the part of the British to be the first, if not to document the conflict, to leave artistic registers of great quality and destined for posterity.

³⁶ M. Warner Marien, *Photography A Cultural History...* op. cit., p. 127

³⁷ E. Lacan, *Esquisses Photographiques...*, op. cit., p. 165.

While Roger Fenton worked in the Crimea between March and June 1855, Szathmari became a great celebrity during the Universal Exposition and became, first, a guest of Napoleon III in private audience in June of the same year and, in the following month, of Queen Victoria. On both occasions, the artist offered the two sovereigns his album as a gift, and on the second occasion he was awarded by the queen with a gold medal³⁸. The visits were followed and documented by the newspaper *La Lumière, revue de la photographie*³⁹, and on Fenton's return to England, both photographic works were the great protagonists of the exhibition, becoming models to follow for the most important international photographers who had been part of the exhibition and who would play a leading role as *war artists* in subsequent conflicts⁴⁰.

2. From the reportage of C.P. Szathmari to that of R. Fenton

Although it is difficult to investigate the extent to which Szathmari's album and the codes of representations he employed during the invasion of the Danubian Principalities directly influenced the work of English photographers such as Roger Fenton, James Robertson and Felice Beato, and French photographers such as Charles Langlois and Léon Méhédin, who went to the site in order to make their own photographic reportages⁴¹, it is essential to consider some points in common with these important artists, especially with Roger Fenton, whose task, in the service of Queen Victoria's government, consists, in addition to improving the hostile attitude of the English public towards the conflict, in confronting and in many ways overcoming the work carried out by his Romanian colleague.

Before Fenton's arrival, the British crown had already sent some photographers to crimea. One of the first to hold this position was a photographer named Gilbert Elliott, who in early 1854, made callotypes of

³⁸ E. Lacan, *La Lumière, revue de la photographie*, Samedi 29 juillet 1853, année 23, p. 118.

³⁹ E. Lacan, *La Lumière, revue de la photographie*, Samedi 9 juin 1853, année 23, p. 89.

⁴⁰ Szathmari's photographic work can be consulted online on the website of the Romanian Academy Library:
<https://biblacad.ro/catonline.html?fbclid=IwAR3SvUx65JZEZ4sDKYa2TMHY4esnqmvW5ZrmKNmRMJyKmr6XmI3DG1gnNOE>

⁴¹ B. A. Hensch & H. K. Hensch, «James Robertson and his Crimean War Campaign», *History of Photography*, 26/4, 2002, pp. 258–268.

Russian fortresses, in order to measure the defensive strategies and weapons of which the tsar's military forces were provided, in order to organize the plans of attack. Along with Elliott, two British soldiers named Brandon and Dawson were appointed photojournalists, who, prepared in a hasty manner by the expert photographer Jonh Jabez Edwin Mayall, were not able to create good quality images. Finally there was the unfortunate Richard Nicklin, who, unlike Brandon and Dawson, was a photographer by profession, but his equipment and callotypes drowned with him in the port of Balaclava, during the storm of November 14, 1854.

The Nicklin incident gave the final impetus for Fenton to sail for the Crimea aboard the *Hecla* in February 1855, travelling under royal patronage and with the assistance of the British government. Roger Fenton's choice for the post was well deserved. In addition to his knowledge of photographic art, he was a fellow of the *Royal Academy* and first secretary of the *Royal Photographic Society*, founded in 1853. In 1852, he had also stayed in Russia to document the construction of a suspension bridge over the Dnieper River in Kiev, Ukraine. So both from a technical and political point of view, he was the most suitable artist to document with the camera the events in Crimea.

From the point of view of the unfolding of the conflict within public opinion, the arrival of Roger Fenton in Sevastopol coincided with one of the most critical moments. To the carnage that turned out to be the battle of the Alma, beyond the eventual victory of the allies, were added the testimonies of the terrible sufferings of the sick at the front. More men died in hospitals from infectious diseases and cholera than from wounds in battle. To this were added the poor conditions and the lack of preparation of the British to face the winter of 1854-55⁴².

In this way towards the end of winter and the beginning of spring 1855, Fenton was faced with a great political-iconographic challenge. Proof of this is that since his arrival he had numerous opportunities to photograph the dead and wounded. In fact, among the victims of the fighting was his brother-in-law, Edmund Maynard, but the Crimean photojournalist decided not to make overly realistic representations from the point of view of the horrors of war. In this sense, one can think of three reasons why Fenton decided not to make this type of images. The first of all was political: with the support of the royal family and the British government, he had to help

⁴² S. Cavicchioli, *Crimean War: National Memories and Democratization Processes*, «Contemporanea», XXIV/2 (2021), pp. 177-209.

counter, through his photographic compositions, the discrediting campaign that some media such as *The Times* or the satirical newspaper *Punch* had carried out. The second, concerned a commercial motivation, since Fenton also counted on the financial support of a publisher, Thomas Agnew, who hoped to publish the set of photos and put it up for sale, and for this reason there was a need to make a series of images that depicted a more romanticized version of the conflict; among other things, because in this task he had to surpass in terms of quality and composition of the images the work done by Szathmari. As a result, in addition to the five photographs of the cemeteries in Sevastopol and the elaborate scene in which a foodie and a Turkish soldier recreate the moment of assistance to the wounded, Fenton avoided any form of re-enactment of suffering and death, such and as Szathmari himself had done at the beginning of the conflict.

On the basis of these premises, Fenton's aesthetic choices are even more important, which helped to consolidate a real aesthetic of war photographs, already begun by Szathmari and which focused on four types of subjects and scenes: portraits of the leading figures of the Allies, landscapes and views, group photographs, and finally, compositions on the daily activities of soldiers or some individuals that may be of interest to the public. All four elements in common with the registers made by Szathmari and similar to the sensitivity of nineteenth-century spectators. The first three were part of the existing iconographic genres; the last category, on the other hand, adapted to the new sensitivity towards individual soldiers, seen as compatriots and, in some cases, to the ethnographic interest in fighters belonging to other types of cultures, such as the Zouaves, Croats, Turks, Montenegrins or Tatars.

In establishing some points of comparison between Fenton's work and that of Szathmari, a series of similar compositions emerge between the two photographers. A clear example is the similarities between the scene of Szathmari *Turkish Cavalrymen* (fig.3) and photographs *The Pipe of Peace*⁴³, or *Reverend Mr Butler and officers of the 47th Regiment*⁴⁴ (fig. 5) by Fenton. As for the ethnographic interest in fighters not belonging to the

⁴³ R. Fenton, *The Pipe of Peace* or 'Costume of the Camp', print on salt paper, 13.9x13.2cm, *Fenton Exhibiton Catalogue*, no. 2., 1856.

<https://www.rct.uk/collection/search#/8/collection/2500423/the-pipe-of-peace>

⁴⁴R. Fenton, *Reverend Mr. Butler and Officers of the 47 Regiment* 1855, paper on albumin, 14.4x18.9cm, *Fenton Exhibiton Catalogue*, no.9 1856. <https://www.rct.uk/collection/search#/8/collection/2500443/reverend-mr-butler-and-officers-of-the-47th-regiment>

British or French armies, there is the photograph *Group of Croat Chiefs*, also published on December 29, 1855 in *The Illustrated London News* (fig. 6). In the newspaper's commentary on the image one can appreciate both the ethnographic interest and the continuous promotion and exaltation of Fenton's work:

CROATS AT THE SEAT OF WAR

The characteristic group engraved upon preceding page is from one of Mr. Roger Fenton's beautiful photographs in the Crimean Exhibition. One of the most striking attractions of this collection is the great variety of national character which it presents, arising from the multiplicity of people engaged in the great war. Had the contest lain between two individual nations, the impersonations or portraitures would neither have been so varied not numerous as in the Crimean Collection, from wihc we have taken several Illustration. Croats, it will be remembered, have been variously employed at the Balaclava, were vividly sketched by our Artist and Special Correspondent, in his letter at page 310 of the present volume. In the photograph her engraved is a family in the trenches; where the superior Croat has "the badge of authority – a stick", which is mentioned in our Correspondent's letter⁴⁵.

As for the numerous portraits of political and military personalities, the works of both photographers are complementary: Szathmari created the register of the most important leading figures of the Russian and Turkish armies, Fenton instead, of the English and French ones, and as in the case of the photography of Gortschakoff (fig. 2) and the *Group of Croat Chiefs* many of Fenton's photographs were used by *The Illustarted London News* , in order to produce the illustrated chronicles of the conflict. Among the many examples is one of the photographs of General French Pierre François Joseph Bosquet (fig. 7) published later in a reportage of October 6, 1855, in which the photographer exalts, as in the entire series of shots taken of this general, his leadership. It is no coincidence that there are two famous photographs in which General Bosquet himself strives to remain still while the photographer captures the exact moment in which he gives an order (fig. 8). In the staging we appreciate the great commitment of the general and his men in maintaining the position during the realization of the photographic process⁴⁶.

⁴⁵ *The Illustrated London News*, 29 December, 1855, p.754.

⁴⁶ *The Illustrated London News*, October 6, 1855, p. 405th

It is from this effort to produce moving images that an important difference emerges between Szathmari's photographs and Fenton's. While the former in some moments strove to reproduce very lively scenes (fig. 1), preferring the documentary character on the final result, Fenton proved to be much more careful in preferring the quality of the images and to elaborate even more calculated scenes for the purpose of winning consensus. In following Fenton's example, in subsequent conflicts photographers will avoid any effort to try to process moving images, thus leaving the task of creating the scenes full of movement: explosions, charges, hand-to-hand clashes, etc., to designers and painters.

It was then Fenton's aesthetic choices, in his effort to configure scenes suitable to earn the favor of the public and to give the greatest protagonism to the two Western allies, to bring him a step forward compared to the work of Szathmari, who had made his album taking as a starting point the origins of the conflict, then the Turkish and Russian armies. In this dynamic, Fenton had also left a large heroic register of future victors, exalting even more the collaboration between the Allied powers, as in the famous photograph depicting the council of war – *the morning of the successful attack on the Mamelon* – between the three great allies Lord Raglan, Marshal Pélissier and Omar Pacha, made on June 7, 1855. The aim of the photograph was to depict, in addition to the symbolic and effective union of the three great allies, the precise moment in which the decision to attack Mamelon Vert was made. The shot was actually made later, but was celebrated by Queen Victoria herself as one of Fenton's most successful photographs in which "Lord Raglan, Pélissier and Omar Pacha, sitting together on the day of the capture of Mamelon" appear (fig. 9). In addition, in his album, Fenton had celebrated the collaboration between the soldiers and the cohesion of the group, leaving some scenes of daily life in the camp, he had also exalted the nursing work and, finally, he had left a register of ruins, desolate landscapes and cemeteries, capable of evoking death and sacrifice, while avoiding the real horrors of war.

In summary, if Szathmari had left the register of the first enthusiasm for the war, Fenton had contributed through an important corpus of images to counter the great environment of pessimism and anger towards the multiple losses and sufferings experienced by the British, while he managed to bring the images produced closer to the perception of immediacy and documentary quality of information with respect to

conflicts.⁴⁷ Hence the continuous and greater exaltation of many of his contemporaries, including Ernest Lacan:

Elles ont un intérêt historique qui suffirait pour les désigner à l'attention du public d'artiste; il voulait se rendre en Orient et reproduire, par la photographie, les grandes scènes que les premières phases de la guerre faisaient prévoir. Ce projet, il l'a exécuté ; sans s'inquiéter des fatigues, des privations et des dangers que ses amis lui prédisaient, il partit au commencement de cette année pour la Crimée, et, pendant cinq mois, il est resté devant Sébastopol, partageant la ration et la couche du soldat. Aussi, lorsqu'il revint, il y a eu quelques semaines, à Londres, il rapportait environ trois cents vues et portraits composant une des plus intéressantes collections que l'on puisse citer⁴⁸.

In this dynamic, a final difference between Szathmari and Fenton, concerns an aspect that goes beyond their artistic work of both photographers. Although interest in Szathmari's work remained in the years following the conflict, and further copies of the album came into the hands of Emperor Franz Joseph, Tsar Alexander II and Grand Duke Charles Alexander of Saxony, the international publicity that supported Fenton's work was much more robust and systematic. Beginning with ⁴⁹*The Illustrated London News* itself, which during the years of the conflict and in the following ones, published more photographs of Fenton than of any other English photographer of the time and claimed on several occasions his presence in Crimea as that of the greatest artist photographer who had participated in the conflict. Effort in which Fenton himself took part. One of his most famous self-congratulatory photographs, the one concerning the *Photographic Van* (fig. 8), later published on November 10 in *The Illustrated London News* and in other illustrated newspapers of the time, such as the Italian newspaper *Il Fotografo*⁵⁰, it is a clear example of the way in which it was the artist himself who drew the way he wanted to be remembered.

⁴⁷ In any case, it is essential to point out that beyond this enthusiasm shared by a part of the public, within the broader war of opinion experienced by the great allies of the Turks in the West, a mostly pessimistic and negative opinion prevailed, as well as a high general contempt for the conflict, especially in England where, unlike the control that the Second Empire maintained over the media, disheartening and unpleasant information circulated more freely..

⁴⁸ E. Lacan, *Esquisses Photographiques...*, op. cit., pp. 98-99.

⁴⁹ A.S. Ionescu, «Szathmari: from a War Photographer...», op. cit. cit., p. 83.

⁵⁰ *Il Fotografo, Giornale Illustrato*, Milano 1855 (Year 1). The newspaper was also distributed in Tuscany, Modena, Parma and the Papal States.

Similarly, while Szathmari's album circulated between the narrower circles of the aristocracy and the courts of powerful Europeans, the photographs of Fenton's album circulated beyond these spheres and in a broader and somewhat more popular way became part of the bourgeoisie of the most important European capitals, starting from London and Paris. As a result, although it was Szathmari who was the true pioneer of war photography in the context of the conflict between the Russian and Turkish Empires, it was Fenton's photographs and his artistic work that eclipsed this early participation and made Crimean photoreportage the first photoreportage in history.⁵¹

3. Szathmari was the first war photojournalist in history?

Of the early use of daguerreotype and calotype in relation to war events, and of the renewed interest of artists in the use of these techniques during conflicts, conceived as great historical events, are an example: the aforementioned cases of the daguerreotypes of the war between the United States and Mexico, between 1846 and 1848, the daguerreotypes of the barricades during the revolution of 1848 in France, those made by the hobbyist doctor and photographer John McCosh during the Second Anglo-Sikh War (1848-1849), the callotypes after the defense of the Roman Republic of 1849 by the photographer Stefano Lecchi and, subsequently, those of the Burmese war, even closer to the conflict in Crimea, between 1852 and 1853, always made by McCosh himself⁵². In fact, these conflicts dispute each other for the place among the first *photoreportages* in history, just as their artists dispute each other for the place of the first photojournalists in history.

But before establishing one of these photographic registers as the first war photo reportage, one must take into account the elements that during the Crimean War make the work of their *war artists*, starting from that of Szathmari, if not the first examples of photo reportage, certainly a very modern version of the relationship between photography, dissemination of

⁵¹ G. Cojocariu, *Carol Popp De Szathmary, The First War Photo Reporter, A Pioneer Of Photojournalism*, «Economics, Management and Financial Markets»; Woodside 6, N.º 2, (Jun 2011): pp. 907-915.

⁵² Some of these photographs are kept in the online collection of the National Army Museum in London: <https://collection.nam.ac.uk/detail.php?acc=1962-04-3-294>

news and the growing interest of the public in obtaining the news and images directly from the battlefields.

Diffusion. Regarding the relationship between the production of photographs and the diffusion of them in other visual media, such as lithographs and albums⁵³, but above all in the illustrated newspapers able to involve a very large audience, it must be remembered that it was the conflict in Crimea «the first war in which journalists and photographers had attempted to capture events in ways that had not been possible before and which set a new pattern for reporting war»⁵⁴. In volume 27 of *The Illustrated London News*, which includes the issues from July to December 1855, there are numerous shots taken by Roger Fenton, adapted in the *London Staff* through the technique of woodcut on head wood. Along with each of these images is the text that explains Fenton's work and the importance of the character depicted. After that, some of these photographs were part of the exhibition dedicated to *the Wars of the Orient* of the Universal Exhibition in Paris in 1855.⁵⁵, and in the following year an exhibition was again held in London dedicated exclusively to Fenton's work, "under the royal patronage of Her Majesty and with the approval of the commanders-in-chief", and the illustrated album of the war went on sale.⁵⁶ This phenomenon is intertwined with another contemporary, namely the relationship between the illustrated means and the telegraph, a communication tool that from the beginning of the war, after a few months, significantly improved the speed in circulating the news, giving that sense of immediacy of information, which until now had never existed.

During the Crimean War the news traveled even faster, thanks to the telegraph lines built from time to time to connect the zones of the fighting to the European capitals. At the beginning of the Crimean

⁵³ M. Bianchi (curated by), *Arte e arti. Pittura, engraving and photography in the nineteenth century*, Milano, Skira, 2020.

⁵⁴ Janina Struk, *Private Pictures Soldiers' Inside View of War*, London, Routledge, 2011, p. 41.

⁵⁵ Ernest Lacan, *Esquisses Photographiques a propos de l'Exposition Universel et de la guerre d'Orient*, Paris, Grassart, 1856.

⁵⁶ *Exhibition of the Photographic Pictures taken in The Crimea, by Roger Fenton-Under the especial patronage of her MOST GRACIOUS MAJESTY and with the sanction of the Commanders-in-Chief, The Gallery, 53, Pall Mall, printed for Thomas Agnew and Sons, 1856. Royal Collection Trust.*

campaign the quickest news could reach London in five days: two for the crossing on steamboats in Balaklava in Varna, three to arrive with messengers on horseback to Bucharest, the nearest telegraph station. From the winter of 1854, after the French built a telegraph in Varna, a news could reach its destination in two days; at the end of April 1855, when the British laid a submarine cable between Balaklava and Varna, the information arrived in London in a few hours⁵⁷.

The relationship between photographs and the public. The numerous formats and public spaces in which the photographs circulated, not only of Fenton, but also of the various English and French photographers, contributed, on the one hand, to the increase in public interest, and on the other, to configure their memories. In addition, he conditioned the attitude of viewers towards clichés, directing their gaze towards the understanding of every single photograph as a faithful copy of reality and what happened. This helped to affirm photography as an "autonomous visual support with extraordinary power in evoking vague and powerful expectations of progress and in dynamizing the processes of industrialization, commercialization and massification of visual consumption.»⁵⁸.

In this context it is important to underline that the Universal Exhibition of 1855 was an opportunity for the most important American and European photographers to present their works and to confront the singularity and novelty of the photographs of Szathmari and Fenton, including Jean Batiste Louis Gros, Gustave Le Gray and André Adolphe Eugène Disdéri⁵⁹. Among them, also the French, rooted at that time in Italy, Alphonse Bernoud⁶⁰; the

⁵⁷ Although, as Figes himself observes, "the telegraphs were intended for military use; journalists were not allowed to clog the lines with long reports, so a time interval was created between the receipt of the titles of a report, which arrived in the editorial office by cable, and the complete reportage, which would arrive by steamship. This often caused fake news». O. Figes, *Crimea...*, op. cit., pp. 316-317.

⁵⁸ G.L. Fruci, A. Petrizzo, *Visuality and great media transformation in the long nineteenth century*, in V. Fiorino, G.L. Fruci, A. Petrizzo (eds.), *Il lungo Ottocento e le sue immagini, Politica, media, spettacolo*, Pisa, Edizioni ETS, 2013, p. 12.

⁵⁹ Ernest Lacan, *Esquisses Photographiques...*, op. cit., p. 43.

⁶⁰ Ivi, p. 146

Italians Pietro Dovizielli and the Alinari brothers⁶¹; finally, the American photographer Levi Hill⁶².

In this way, the English and French illustrated newspapers, spread throughout much of Europe, and the first exhibitions, soon revealed themselves as fundamental spaces in which photographs circulated and artists exchanged forms of observing reality through the lens. A set of elements articulated in this way is not traceable in previous conflicts. As for the war between the United States and Mexico, some sources report an anonymous photographer who managed to shoot a series of fifty daguerreotypes covering a wide range of subjects, from portraits of generals and infantrymen to landscapes and scenes of places intended for the burial of the dead after the fighting. Some of these images are available in the *Amon Carter Museum of American Art*, such as that of *the General Wool and staff in the Calle Real* in Saltillo, Mexico, where you can see the effort by the photographer to capture moving images⁶³. But in any case, it is difficult to know the degree of circulation of these daguerreotypes, since there are no records of additional lithographs or lithographic albums, in which they may have been disseminated. In addition, the first American illustrated newspapers such as the *Frank Leslie's Illustrated News Paper* and *Harper's Weekly Journal of Civilization*, date back to 1855 and 1857 respectively, thus restricting the possibilities of circulation of these photographs. A similar case was that of the callotypes concerning the Second Anglo-Sikh War (1848-1849) and the Burmese War (1852-53), whose images once made by McCosh, did not have a great circulation either in other formats, or in illustrated newspapers, remaining as silent iconographic vestiges and subsequently as important visual registers of a documentary nature.

On the other hand, there are the photographs in Rome in 1849 made by Stefano Lecchi, a pupil of Daguerre, and which circulated in some lithographic albums. Among these, the one composed of the "forty-one salted cards bound in an album and originally belonging to Edward

⁶¹ Ivi, p. 108.

⁶² Ivi, p. 52.

⁶³ S. Oliver Debroise, *Mexican Suite: A History of Photography in Mexico*, Texas, University of Texas Press, 2001, p. 164.

Cheney»⁶⁴. In general terms, however, "there are no precise data on the number of photographs that made up the reportage nor on their diffusion and their economic evaluation: only a few but significant indications on the circulation of these images in a precise Garibaldian context thanks to the memory of Jessie White Mario and thanks to the discovery of the photographs that belonged to two men of '49: Agostino Bertani and Alessandro Calandrelli»⁶⁵.

Indeed, Lecchi's photographs were taken in the aftermath of the fall of Rome, on July 3, in such a way that rather than making a widespread reportage during the conflict, he notes the intention to keep the consequences in light through the ruins and to leave a testimony of what was the defense of the republic⁶⁶, unlike the daguerreotypes in the aftermath of the barricades perceived, by the many people who had in their hands the July 1, 1848 edition of *L'Illustration Journal Universel*, as a more immediate account of what happened⁶⁷. So, more than in the genre of reportage, and beyond the documentary ambitions, these images are then part of those first efforts that would have shaped the ways of recording the war and interacting with the public only after the events that involved first Szathmari and then Fenton to take the role of the first war photojournalists in history. Szathmari was the first to elaborate an accurate collection of photographs, the circulation of his album during the following years and his participation in the Universal Exposition had that impact on the public of immediacy and storytelling *in real time*. Fenton, completed that work in the

⁶⁴ M.P. Critelli, «Roma 1849: Stefano Lecchi The first war reportage", Ministry for Cultural Heritage and Tourism Activities, Library of Modern and Contemporary History, The Getty Research Institute, in: <https://www.movio.beniculturali.it/bsmc/stefanolecchi/it/22/il-reportage>.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ C. Bertolotti, «The ruins of the Republic. Reportage, view and religion of the tombs", *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome - Italie et Méditerranée modernes et contemporaines*, 130-1, 2018, pp. 97-104. In this article readers will also find the numerous iconographic documents made with the occasion of the defense of Rome, the motif of the "ruins of Rome" made in the aftermath of the end of the republican experience, and the subsequent multiplicity of iconographic devices made after 1870 that connected that past with the present of the new pan-Italian political reality.

⁶⁷ M. Pizzo, «Risorgimento ruins: images of the Rome of the 1849», in https://stage.modaliamedia.it/gds/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/05_PIZZO-Rovine-risorgimentali-immagini-della-Roma-del-1849.pdf

Crimea and through the dissemination of his photographs on the pages of European illustrated newspapers, as well as on the various photographic exhibitions that contributed, moreover, in the following years, to configure the memory of the conflict, especially among the English public and French of the second half of the nineteenth century.

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Figure 1. Carol Pop Szathmari, *The Oltenitza Quarantine*, 1854, carta su albumina, 13.3x22cm, Private collection of Dr. Adrian-Silvan Ionescu http://www.luminous-lint.com/app/vexhibit/_THEME_War_Earliest_01/6/25/12150342389871279906/



Figure 2. *The Illustrated London News*, «Prince Gortschakoff commander in chief of the Russian army in Crimea—from a photograph by M. Szathmari» novembre 3, 1855, p. 528.




Figure 3. Carol Pop Szathmari, Turkish cavalymen, 1854, carta su albumina, 13.3x22cm, Private collection of Dr. Adrian-Silvan Ionescu http://www.luminous-lint.com/app/vexhibit/_THEME_War_Earliest_01/6/25/12150342389871279906/



Figure 4. Carol Pop Szathmari, Tranchtengruppe in Campulung, 1866, carta su albumina, 29.7x36.4cm, Colonia, Agfa Photo Historama, <http://www.zeno.org/Fotografien/A/Szathmari,+Carol>



Figure 5. Royer Fenton, *Reverend Mr Butler and officers of the 47th Regiment*, carta su albumina, 14.4x18.9cm. Fenton exhibition catalogue, no. 38, 1855. London, Royal Collection Trust.

<https://www.rct.uk/collection/search#/8/collection/2500443/reverend-mr-butler-and-officers-of-the-47th-regiment>




Figure 6. A sinistra: Royer Fenton, *Group of Croat Chiefs*, carta su albumina, 19.3x15.6cm. Fenton exhibition catalogue, 1855. London, Royal Collection Trust. A destra: The Illustrated London News, «Croats» 29 dicembre 1855, p. 754.



Figure 7. *The Illustrated London News*, «General Bosquet-From the Exhibition of Photographic Pictures Taken in Crimea, By Roger Fenton» 6 ottobre1855, p. 528.



Figura e. Roger Fenton, General Bosquet giving orders to his staff, 1855, carta su albumina, 15.8x15.5cm, London, Royal Collection Trust. <https://www.rct.uk/group/421/content/collections/photographs-collection/record-of-historical-events/general-bosquet-1>



Figure 9. *Royer Feton*, Council of War held at Lord Raglan's Headquarters the morning of the successful attack on the Mamelon, *carta su albumina*, 14.4x18.9cm. *Fenton exhibition catalogue*, 6 giugno 1855. London, Royal Collection Trust. <https://www.rct.uk/collection/themes/exhibitions/roger-fentons-photographs-of-the-crimea/the-queens-gallery-buckingham-palace/council-of-war-held-at-lord-raglans-headquarters-the-morning-of-the->



Figure 10. *Royer Feton*, Photographic Van, *carta su albumina*, 17.4x15.9cm. *Fenton exhibition catalogue*, 1855. London, Royal Collection Trust. <https://www.rct.uk/collection/2500439/photographic-van>

**UN POINT D'HISTOIRE VÉCUE,
DANS SOCIETAS ACADEMICA DACOROMANA,
ACTA HISTORICA, TOMUS I, 1959**

Nicolae PETRESCU-COMNEN

Abstract: *This article represents the presentation of a text written by Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen, diplomat, politician and sociologist. To highlight the nuances and preserve the author's unmistakable style, the editorial board of the publication decided to deviate a little from the established rules, and publish the original text, in French, so that the discerning reader can extract the details and savor every word of the content. The text is accompanied by images of the original article, courtesy of university professor Dr. Viorica Moisuc. It is a unique documentary treasure, to which the general public has not had access until now.*

Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen (1881-1958), specialist in law, diplomat, Romanian politician. During the years of the First World War, he campaigned in Switzerland for the Romanian cause (see *Notes sur la guerre roumaine*); collaborated with President Edvard Beneš in the Czechoslovak National Council, with leaders of the national liberation movements abroad. He participated as a delegate of Romania at the Paris Peace Conference from 1919-1921. In 1919, during his mission in Hungary, he was contacted by Count Banffy who advanced the proposal of a "dual" Romanian-Hungarian monarchy under the scepter of King Ferdinand. In diplomacy, he stood out for his special qualities as a negotiator, analyst, clairvoyant, always animated by strong feelings for his country. In an official mission in Germany in the years 1927-1937, a period of affirmation of the far-right movement, National Socialism (Nazism), he worked for Romania's interests in terms of economic, political and diplomatic relations with Germany. It is worth noting the attention he gave to counteracting, through the means at his disposal, the support given by Nazi Germany to the Iron Guard, personally to Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu and other guards leaders.

After the Anschluss (annexation of Austria to Germany), he was appointed Foreign Minister. He dominated through his actions, his personality, his firmness, the policy of stopping the Nazi offensive against Czechoslovakia, of mutilating the territory of this country, considering that maintaining the independent and sovereign Czechoslovak State, with untouched borders, is an imperative for stability, security and peace in the Center and South-Eastern Europe is an imperative for the peace of the continent, threatened by the revisionism and imperialism of Nazi Germany and its allies. This major objective of that time led him to carry out a diplomatic activity of unusual strength for the observance by France, England, the USSR of the obligations assumed by them through the Covenant of the League of Nations which, through articles 10 and 16, obliged its members to the mutual respect of the territorial status quo and the solidarity assistance of the member state that would have become a victim of an aggression by any state.

Apart from the revisionist and revanchist states, the other European states, including the USSR, had signed the London Convention of July 3 and 4, 1933 defining aggression and territory, the Briand-Kellogg Pact outlawing war, many other treaties and bilateral and multilateral conventions that included clearly defined obligations of political, diplomatic, military assistance of Czechoslovakia in case of threat of force or use of Force. The policy of releasing the great powers - France, England, USSR, USA - from all existing contractual commitments and abandoning this state to aggressive German, Hungarian and Polish plans, was harshly sanctioned by Romania through the voice of Petrescu-Comnen, the official statements of the king Carol II, by the Romanian press, by public opinion.

As proven by countless documents of the era - diplomatic, memorial, historiographical, journalistic -, Romania was then the only country that supported Czechoslovakia, beyond all its official commitments. After the abolition of this state by the German-Hungarian coup of March 15, 1939, Romania sheltered thousands of refugees from Czechoslovakia on its territory, which caused a serious crisis in relations with Germany and Hungary. The troops massed at the western border and the ultimate pressures of the Reich determined the signing of the economic treaty with Germany that had been being negotiated for months in Bucharest, the Romanian side delaying the works to avoid this act that seriously affects the interests of the country. Anyway, the treaty signed on March 23, 1939, was not applied, the prime minister, Armand Călinescu and the new foreign

minister, Grigore Gafencu, considering that the signing, which took place under the mentioned conditions, was "a diplomatic act" to remove the danger of aggression from the Western border (on March 20, partial mobilization was decreed in Romania, given the gravity of the situation). In the period that followed, Grigore Gafencu continued the foreign policy line of his predecessor; the combined German-Soviet attack (September 1 and 17, 1939) against Poland and the dissolution of this state posed new and serious problems for Romania.

In January 1939 Petrescu-Comnen was appointed ambassador to Rome; the last period of his life was spent abroad, together with other Romanian diplomats, such as Viorel Tilea, (former minister of Romania in London during the same period of the Czechoslovak crisis). Grigore Gafencu (his last position in diplomacy was as minister of Romania in Moscow - after May 1940) and many others.

Attentive to the evolution of the situation in Romania, Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen remained the same person dedicated to the interests of his country, harshly criticizing the abuses and policies of the new regime established by the Soviet occupier. From this period date his works of recent history such as *Preludi del grande dramma, I Responsabili...* and others.

The present study, published in 1959 in Rome, demonstrates once more the deep attachment for his country, for respecting the historical truth, against the denigration of Romania by the acolytes of the new pro-Soviet regime.

I add at the end of this short note about the Romanian diplomat Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen, two pieces of information:

1 / After the "dark decade of the 1950s" - which actually lasted until after the "Declaration of April 1964", when there was a certain "liberation" from the tutelage of the Soviet culturalists, of the pro-Soviet Roller's line in historiography, the first book published by Romanian Academy Publishing House in which the Czechoslovak crisis was analyzed based on documents, highlighting the truth about Romania's diplomatic action to support this country, the prodigious activity of Petrescu-Comnen, as well as the situation of Romanian-German economic relations, the economic treaty of March 23, 1939 and its consequences, was Romania's Diplomacy and the problem of defending national sovereignty and independence in the period March 1938 - May 1940, Academy Ed., 1971, 324 pages. The book, written by the undersigned, was blocked by the censorship (still dominated

by "illegals" and polytricks) for a year, it was published with great difficulty, the circulation was only put on sale to a small extent; the book was sold after about ten years at a "reduced price" on the street corner. In the meantime, she had been awarded the "Nicolae Bălcescu" award by the Romanian Academy.

2 / In conditions of "revival" of the defeatist line in Romanian historiography, denigration of the historical past, labeling of nationalism and patriotism as variants of chauvinism and products of "nostalgia" for the times gone by in 1989, I managed to create the only volume of diplomatic documents dedicated to the Czechoslovak crisis and the activity of Romanian diplomacy, but the immensity of the documentary material collected not only from the Romanian archives, but also from those of France, Germany, England, etc., only allowed me to present the events of September 1938. And this volume of documents was pursued by the unfortunate excessive politicization of history, so that it became, from the very beginning, a "rare book": Romania and the Czechoslovakian crisis. Documents, September 1938, Historia, Bucharest, 2010 (820 p.).

Viorica Moisuc
June 2021, Curtea-de-Argheș

Footnotes to N. P. Comnen's article – *Un point d'histoire vécue*.

I have included in the Appendix all the notes, specifying which ones belong to Comnen himself.

Societas Académica Caesaromagensis, "Acta historica",
Tome 1, Romae, 1959.

N.P. COMNÈNE

UN POINT D'HISTOIRE VÉCUE (x)

p. 344

Un ami vient de me signaler "La Revue d'Histoire", n.5. de 1956, publiée par l'Institut d'histoire de l'Académie de la République Populaire Roumaine, où figure une "Etude sur l'attitude du Gouvernement roumain envers la Tchécoslovaquie à l'époque de Munich (1938)".

Cet article est signé par un certain M. Benditer (Jassy), dont personne n'a su me dire ni qui il est, ni de quel pays il vient, ni à quel genre d'activité il s'adonne.

L'article en question, - traitant d'événements auxquels j'ai été témoin, et souvent acteur, en qualité de Ministre de Affaires étrangères de mon pays - falsifient grossièrement la vérité historique; je crois de mon devoir de dénoncer publiquement l'imposture de son auteur.

Le nom du personnage permet de croire qu'il n'a rien de commun avec le pays roumain. Si pourtant, grâce à qui sait quelle étrange circonstance, il était réellement roumain de naissance, son cas est plus grave encore, car sa prose tend à ternir l'une des plus belles pages de notre histoire diplomatique.

Si je devais signaler toutes les contre-vérités, les omissions et les citations tronquées dont cet article est émaillé, je devrais le reproduire presque en entier. Je me bornerai à relever seules les plus énormes inexactitudes ou omissions volontaires, je dis volontaires, car si cet auteur avait

Au carton lui 479 Livre

Note in verso

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veulu laisser à la postérité une étude vraiment scientifique, digne de l'importance du sujet, les Archives du Ministère de Bucarest, des Légations de Roumanie à Paris, Londres, Prague et Berlin lui auraient fourni des documents qu'il passe cependant sous silence. Au surplus, il feint d'ignorer les documents officiels publiés depuis par les Gouvernements français, anglais, allemand et américain, les Mémoires des Ambassadeurs Noël et François-Poncet et de l'Ancien Ministre Georges Bonnet, de même que la très importante étude publiée par le Prof. R.C.D. Laffen du Queen's College de Cambridge, sous les auspices du célèbre historien ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE.

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proba En bref, l'article de H. BENDIER tend uniquement à démontrer que la Roumanie, de même que la Yougoslavie, non seulement n'a pas aidé la Tchécoslovaquie pendant la crise qui a abouti à son partage, "mais - écrit l'auteur - (le Gouvernement de Bucarest comme celui de Belgrad) ont fait tout ce qui était en leur pouvoir pour accélérer la vente (sic) du peuple Tchécoslovaque et de sa souveraineté nationale" (p.8).

Et plus loin de renchérir encore: "Les milieux officiels de notre pays appuyaient l'agression hitlérienne contre la Tchécoslovaquie".

Il y a plus de quinze ans, j'ai publié dans différents journaux et périodiques étrangers des articles substantiels démontrant quelle a été la politique étrangère de tous les Gouvernements roumains, sans exception, entre les deux grandes guerres. Je ne bornerai à reproduire ici quelques brins de ces articles, qui

it The crisis over Czechoslovakia, Oxford University Press, London, New York, Toronto, 1951.

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n'ont pas été écrits pour les besoins de la cause, qui ont été recueillis dans l'un de mes ouvrages, publié en français et en italien, il y a quelque treize ans, et dont les principaux acteurs ont en connaissance, en commençant par feu M. Bénès lui-même, ainsi que par ses collaborateurs les plus qualifiés, en l'occurrence: le Ministre Tchécoslovaque à Bucarest, M. Veverka, et celui de Berlin, M. Mastny.

Pendant que l'Europe tremblait au son de la voix d'Hitler, s'inclinait devant toutes ses exigences et dépeçait, à Munich, la Tchécoslovaquie, la Roumanie seule - le dis seule - et M. le président Bénès et M. le ministre Krofta, ainsi que les archives diplomatiques de Prague, de Bucarest, de Paris, de Londres, de Varsovie, de Belgrade sont là pour en témoigner - osait élever la voix en faveur de sa malheureuse alliée et luttait de toutes ses forces pour l'aider à sauver au moins l'essence de son Etat,

Si ce pays *peut* survivre, pendant l'automne de 1938, aux différents coups de poignard qu'il recevait de toutes parts, c'est à la Roumanie qu'il le doit en grande partie. Lord Halifax M. Georges Bonnet, les ministres tchèques Chvalkovsky et Veverka, le reconnurent honnêtement et lui rendirent, plus d'une fois, un chaleureux hommage.

Mais précisons un peu les faits dans leur succession.

Dès le mois de Mai 1938, alors qu'il existait de notre alliée Tchécoslovaque semblait être sérieusement menacée, je ne cessai, au nom de mon Gouvernement, d'intervenir à Berlin, à Londres, à Paris et à Belgrade en faveur de notre amie.

2 N. P. Connors, Anarchie, Dictature, ou Organisation Internationale Genève 1946, Ferret Gentil, pp. 127 et s. id., Saggiamenti per la Pace, Milano, Bompiani 1943, pp. 128 et s. id., Preliudi del grande dramma, Roma, Sansoni, 1947, p. 212, 215 etc. s.

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p. 319
Le 22 Mai, pour ne citer que cet exemple, ayant reçu en audience, à 10 heures du matin, le Ministre d'Allemagne Fabricius, je lui parlai de la crise tchécoslovaque, je lui rappelai les liens d'alliance, d'amitié et d'intérêts communs qui unissaient nos deux pays et j'eus même le courage — que d'aucuns qualifièrent de témérité — de lui déclarer que "tout ce qui menaçait l'existence de la Tchécoslovaquie ne saurait nous laisser indifférents".

En langage diplomatique on sait ce que cela veut dire.

Or, j'avais d'autant plus de mérite de m'exprimer en ces termes, en parlant au représentant du Reich hitlérien, que notre traité d'alliance avec Prague ne prévoyait qu'un seul adversaire commun éventuel: la Hongrie, et que c'est pour garantir nos frontières envers cet unique Etat, que "la Petite Entente" avait été créée.

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Le même jour, à 11 heures 30, le Ministre de France, M. Adrien Thierry, ayant demandé à me voir d'urgence, me fit part des préoccupations de son Gouvernement quant à la tournure que prenaient les rapports germano-tchécoslovaques. Il me déclara que Paris et Londres étaient décidées de mettre désormais un terme aux manœuvres agressives d'Hitler et me demanda quelle serait l'attitude du Gouvernement roumain dans l'hypothèse de graves complications. Je le félicitai tout d'abord de ce qu'il venait de me communiquer quant aux "heureuses" intentions de la France et de l'Angleterre et le mis au courant de la conversation que je venais d'avoir avec son collègue allemand.

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Il en parut enchanté et me pria de lui permettre de noter sur une feuille de papier le texte exact de la déclaration que je venais de faire à M. Fabricius, afin de la transmettre incontinent au Quai d'Orsay.

A midi, je reçus M. Novotny, le Chargé d'Affaires de Tchécoslovaquie, auquel je fis part de mes conversations avec M. Fabricius et Thierry. Il m'en exprima toute sa gratitude et m'assura qu'il en ferait immédiatement un rapport circonstancié à Prague. ³ ~~14~~ ¹⁵

L'effet de l'attitude ferme de Bucarest ne se fit pas attendre.

Par son télégramme n. 1364 du 24 Mai suivant, le Ministre de Roumanie à Prague nous informait que le Président Bénès, en présence des Ministres Krofta et Samuel, l'avait chargé "de remercier chaudement M. Comnène pour ses interventions faites auprès du Ministre d'Allemagne, qu'il considèrait très utiles". Dans mes archives, je conserve le texte officiel de cette dépêche.

Le jour même, le directeur politique du Ministère de Prague réitéra à notre Ministre la reconnaissance de son Gouvernement en termes touchants: "Votre démarche, dit-il, a profondément ému le Gouvernement Tchéque, qui voit, en elle, une nouvelle preuve d'amitié, de laquelle il n'a jamais douté, mais dont la manifestation, en ces circonstances graves, lui est particulièrement précieuse". ¹⁵

Mieux encore, depuis des années les Gouvernements de Paris et de Prague s'efforçaient d'obtenir des Gouvernements roumains et polonais successifs l'autorisation, en cas d'agression

⁶ 3 Cfr. mes Preludi del grande dramma, pp. 55-56.

⁴ 4 Cfr. mes Preludi..., p. 57. Voir aussi Georges Bonnet, De Washington au Quai d'Orsay.

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p.320 allemande contre la Tchécoslovaquie, du passage des troupes soviétiques à travers leurs territoires.

Une vieille expérience nous avait enseigné que les armées russes, une fois entrées dans un pays étranger - à quel titre que ce soit - , il était bien difficile de les en faire sortir. Aussi, Varsovie, de même que Bucarest, avait-elle résisté à toutes les pressions exercées sur elle surtout par Paris et par Prague. Mon premier contact avec M. Georges Bonnet, le Ministre français des Affaires Étrangères, qui eut lieu à Genève, lors de la session de Mai 1938, nous permit d'examiner de près la question Tchécoslovaque, qui entrait précisément dans sa phase aiguë. Il ne manqua pas, bien entendu, d'aborder d'abord la question du passage éventuel des troupes russes à travers notre territoire. Ma réponse fut, une fois de plus, catégoriquement négative, mais je plaidei de mon mieux la cause tchécoslovaque en confirmant une fois de plus notre solidarité avec la France et nos autres alliés en cas de conflagration. ^{(16) (17)} Et pour démontrer jusqu'à quel point nous étions décidés à aider - dans la mesure de nos moyens - la Tchécoslovaquie, je rappelai le nombre d'avions, cédés par les Soviets à notre alliée, que nous avions laissés traverser notre espace aérien sans difficulté. De plus, lorsque certains de ces appareils, à la suite de quelque panne de moteur, étaient obligés d'atterrir sur notre territoire, nous permettions à leurs mécaniciens de procéder aux réparations nécessaires et de reprendre leur vol. Un de ces cas eut lieu en Avril 1938, ce qui nous attira des remontrances de la part de M. le Colonel Beck, notre autre allié de Varsovie, qui nourrissait des sentiments tout autres qu'amicaux à l'égard de la Tchécoslovaquie.

(16) → Cf. Georges Bonnet, De Washington au Quai d'Orsay, Genève, Bourquin, 1946, p.126 et suiv. Id., La politique extérieure de la France en 1938-1939, Milano, Angelicum, pp.9 et 10. ainsi que mes responsabilités, pp.24, 36 et suiv.

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Sur ces circonstances, après la guerre, l'ambassadeur Thierry a publié dans "Le Monde" de Paris un important article qui confirme en tous points ce qui précède.

Mais M. Bendixen insinue que notre attitude manqua de loyauté même lorsqu'il ne s'agissait plus de revendications Allemandes mais aussi de celles de la Hongrie envers la Tchécoslovaquie.

Avec un peu plus de bonne foi, si cet auteur s'était donné la peine d'étudier sérieusement les dossiers du Ministère, de cette époque, il aurait trouvé une riche documentation démontrant précisément le contraire de ses allégations.

Ainsi, lorsque le Gouvernement de Budapest nous proposait, à la Yougoslavie et à nous, de signer un accord de non-agression avec l'omission de la Tchécoslovaquie, (teleg. n. 2710, du Ministre Bosny ⁽¹⁷⁾ du 6 Août 1938), par mon télégramme n. 48.677 du 12 Août 1938, je chargeais nos Ministres de Budapest et de Belgrade d'informer les Gouvernements respectifs, que "nous ne signerions à aucun prix un tel accord avec la Hongrie, sans la Tchécoslovaquie". ⁽¹⁸⁾ ⁽¹⁸⁾

p. 324 Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Hongrie, M. de Kanya, étant revenu à la charge (voir teleg. du Ministre Bosny de Budapest, n. 2803 du 16 Août et n. 2819 du 19 Août ainsi que son rapport n. 2822 du 19 Août), je donnai l'ordre à notre représentant de s'en tenir strictement à l'esprit et à la lettre de mes instructions antérieures.

Je maintins cette attitude inflexible, d'accord avec mon Gouvernement, en ma double qualité de Président du Conseil de la Petite Entente et de chef de la diplomatie roumaine, pendant toute la durée de la crise, ainsi qu'on peut le constater

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des innombrables témoignages d'admiration ou de gratitude qui nous vinrent, à l'époque, de toutes parts (19) (19)

En pleine crise germano-tchèque, au mois de Septembre 1938, me trouvant à Genève en qualité de Membre du Conseil de la Société des Nations et de Premier-Délégué de mon pays à l'Assemblée, je ne perdis pas une seule occasion d'appuyer les efforts des diplomates tchécoslovaques, qui espéraient encore s'assurer l'appui de leurs amis et alliés, et particulièrement de la France et de la Grande Bretagne, laquelle était déjà embarquée dans la mission Runciman, de fâcheuse mémoire! (14) (20) (20)

(21) Après mes conversations avec mes amis et collègues Paul Boncour, (22) Georges Bonnet, (23) Herriot, (24) Butler, Lord de la Warr, ainsi qu'avec l'envoyé spécial de M. Beck, (25) le Comte Michel Lubionsky et le délégué yougoslave, le Ministre Andritch, ayant constaté combien ces personnages -- fascinés par le seul danger hitlerien -- se rendaient peu compte des dangers que le révisionnisme hongrois, appuyé par Varsovie, pouvait faire susciter en Europe danubienne et balkanique, j'envoyai à Bucarest les télégrammes n.19 et 29 du 17 et 19 Septembre 1938 où, en résumant la situation, je demandais l'assentiment de mon Gouvernement pour faite auprès des quatre Grandes Puissances, de même qu'à Varsovie et à Belgrade, des démarches en vue de calmer le révisionnisme de Budapest et d'éviter de nouvelles et dangereuses complications.

L'assentiment demandé me parvint le jour même avec le télégramme n.5333c.

Outre les instructions que je donnais immédiatement à nos agents, dans le sens voulu, j'en saisissai personnellement

(26) Voir à ce sujet les citations publiées dans mon livre, Anarchie, Dictature ou Organisation Internationale, Genève, Perret-Gentil, 1946, p.128 et s.

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eussent M. Butler (l'actuel Membre du Gouvernement Britannique), qui se trouvait en ce moment à Genève à la Société des Nations. Il semble fort impressionné par l'exposé que je lui fis et me donna l'assurance qu'il interviendrait aussitôt à Londres (Chr. mon télégramme de Genève, n.32 du 20 sept.1938). Les résultats de cette démarche ne se firent pas attendre. Le 22 Septembre le Comte de la Warr, premier délégué britannique à la S.d.N. vint me voir à mon hôtel pour me communiquer qu'à Londres on a pris acte de nos appréhensions et que "le Gouvernement britannique était décidé à s'opposer à toute tentative de partage de la Tchécoslovaquie" (Chr.mon télégr.n.44 du 23 Sept.de Genève). Ce qu'ont valu ces assurances, soit dit en passant, on l'a vu par la suite! Mais ce qu'il importe de démontrer ici, c'est que la Roumanie n'est pas restée les bras croisés pendant cette époque - ainsi que l'affirme le Sieur Benditer -, mais qu'au contraire elle a fait tout ce qui était dans ses possibilités, et surtout bien plus que d'autres amis ou alliés de la Tchécoslovaquie, y compris la Russie Soviétique.

La démarche que j'avais ordonnée à Belgrade ayant été accueillie par M.Stoïadinovic²⁴ avec un enthousiasme plutôt mitigé, j'invitai notre représentant dans cette ville, par mon télégramme n.35 du 22 Septembre, de faire une nouvelle démarche auprès du Président Yougoslave, nette, précise, rédigée en six points, qui ne permettaient plus aucune réticence ou confusion. L'un de ces points était stylisé en termes amicaux mais qui ne laissent plus lieu à aucune réserve: "Nous avons - disais-je - une responsabilité historique et il est probable qu'un jour on nous posera la question: comment a-t-il été possible que les Gouvernements de Bucarest et de Belgrade n'eussent pas tenté,

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par une action diplomatique, d'empêcher l'annexion de la Slovaquie par la Hongrie, ce qui signifierait d'ailleurs le commencement d'une révision totale des clauses du Traité de Trianon...?"

Je ne veux pas m'attribuer le don de préséance, comme le fait M. Benditer, mais il ne fallait pas être grand clerc pour prévoir, d'abord et avant tout, qu'une fois les écluses du révisionisme ouvertes, après la Tchécoslovaquie notre tour, ainsi que celui de la Yougoslavie, n'allait pas tarder.

Devant notre insistance, M. Stojadinovitch acceptait notre point de vue (télégr. de Belgrade n. 2956 du 23 sept. 1938). Cela m'autorisait à télégraphier à Bucarest (télégr. n. 4) du 23 sept.) que le Président Yougoslave semblait avoir modifié son attitude en se déclarant d'accord: de ne pas mettre en discussion pour le moment, l'existence de la Petite Entente, ainsi qu'il en avait manifesté l'intention; et de faire ensemble, avec nous, les démarches que j'avais suggérées, afin d'empêcher que la Slovaquie aussi soit perdue par nos amis de Prague".

Ces interventions furent faites et, le 6 oct. suivant, le Ministre Grigoresca de Londres nous rapportait avec le n. 274/6/X/38, que "...le Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat en a été visiblement impressionné". Il finissait son télégramme en concluant (qu'il était convaincu que l'intervention que nous suggérions serait faite à Budapest". Et elle le fut, ainsi qu'on le verra tout à l'heure.

A la suite de mes instructions, le Ministre Cesianu de Paris télégraphiait avec le n. 5329 du 8 oct. 1939: "J'ai exposé au Ministre des Affaires étrangères ce dont vous m'avez chargé avec vos instructions n. 59.590. Il considère le point de vue de Gouvernement roumain d'une importance capitale et il m'a assuré qu'il en a fait part aussi au Gouvernement britannique. Il a,

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d'autre part, ajouté qu'il a invité d'une manière catégorique les représentants de la France à Budapest et Varsovie à faire auprès des Gouvernements hongrois et polonais des démarches urgentes en ce sens..."

Par son télégramme n.4421 du 12 oct., notre ²⁵ Ambassadeur à Varsovie, M.Franassovici, me confirmait que "notre attitude ferme a fait grande impression aussi bien ici qu'à Budapest".

p.323 Par son télégramme n.2735 du 10 oct., M.Crutzesco m'informait de Prague que le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Tchécoslovaquie lui avait exprimé: "...la chaude reconnaissance de son pays...pour la haute bienveillance du Souverain roumain, pour la fidèle et compréhensive sympathie du Gouvernement et du peuple roumain, pour l'appui infatigable et perspicace du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, M.Cornène. Des paroles de sympathie - ajoutait-il - nous en avons reçu à profusion, mais nous n'oublierons jamais que les seules preuves effectives d'amitié nous sont venues de votre part. Dans ces moments douloureux, le seul espoir qu'il nous reste est que la Roumanie nous gardera, à l'avenir aussi, les mêmes sentiments d'amitié".

Avec son rapport n.2741 du 11 oct. suivant, notre Ministre à Prague, M.Crutzesco, nous informait encore que si la question du partage de la Slovaquie "...semble être entrée dans un stade favorable (pour la Tchécoslovaquie), cela est dû en premier lieu aux interventions de Votre Excellence...".

Trois jours plus tard, le 14 oct., suivant, par son télégramme n.2780, M.Crutzesco nous rapportait qu'au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères à Prague on affirmait que si la Tchécoslovaquie a pu éviter un plus grand désastre "...cela est dû en large mesure aux démarches du Gouvernement roumain pour lequel on ne

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trouve pas assez d'expressions de reconnaissance".

Le 20 octobre, par son télégramme n.5360, M.Gesianu, notre Ministre à Paris, nous informait que son collègue tchécoslovaque, M.Osuský, lui avait exprimé "le reconnaissance de son peuple pour l'attitude ferme et claire de la Roumanie".

Par son télégramme n.277, du 31 oct.1938, M.Brabetziaanu, notre Chargé d'Affaires à Berlin, nous informait que son collègue tchèque, M.Mastný, avait demandé à le voir pour lui exprimer "...la reconnaissance de son pays pour l'attitude chevaleresque de la Roumanie...et pour l'appui donné par M.Cornéliu à son pays, pendant la crise...".

Je pourrais arrêter ici ces lignes. Mais pour qu'il ne subsiste aucun doute dans l'esprit du lecteur désitant connaître de plus près cette importante question, j'apporterai encore quelques informations supplémentaires:

Le 3 octobre 1938 à 11 heures du matin, je reçois le Ministre Veverka qui venait d'arriver de Prague et qui avait demandé une audience urgente.

"Je suis chargé par mon Gouvernement, me dit-il, de vous exprimer notre reconnaissance pour tout ce que vous avez fait pour nous. Et comme première preuve de notre gratitude, mon Gouvernement me charge de vous proposer l'acquisition d'une partie de notre matériel de guerre, devenu pour nous inutile, et de vous offrir une partie de notre industrie qui ne serait plus viable dans un pays réduit comme celui qui nous restera".

Mais, pour sauver la Tchécoslovaquie, le Gouvernement roumain lutte de toutes ses forces non seulement contre les appétits d'Hitler, mais aussi contre l'action mal inspirée de son

708r.I Preludi..., pp.212, 215 et s.d'après la note officielle du 3 oct.1938.

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aliée polonaise, dont la politique étrangère était alors entre les mains du Colonel Beck.

Par la voie de notre Ministre à Prague M. Grutzesco, le Président Bénès, personnellement, nous priaît d'intervenir auprès de M. Beck, pour lui conseiller un peu plus de prudence et de modération à l'égard de son infortunée Patrie (télégr. de Prague n. 2673 du 4 oct. 1938).

Je ne manquai pas de faire aussitôt de s démarches en ce sens à Varsovie. Je fis même plus, après en avoir délibéré avec les membres du Gouvernement et examiné derechef avec le Roi, l'étrange attitude de M. Beck, qui prenait journellement des initiatives dangereuses au mépris des obligations de consultation avec nous, dérivant de notre traité d'alliance; je mis en oeuvre une Conférence avec mon Souverain, l'ambassadeur polonais Comte Raczyński et moi-même. Elle eut lieu le 5 octobre à dix heures du matin, au plus fort de la crise tchécoslovaque. A l'occasion de l'audience que j'avais eu, la veille, à 22 heures 30, chez mon Souverain nous avons examiné de près la situation et mis au point les questions que nous devions discuter avec le diplomate polonais. Le Roi était, à juste raison, outré de la conduite de M. Beck, qui, oubliant les obligations formelles de consultation dérivant de notre traité d'alliance, lançait des ultimatums à droite et à gauche, pouvant provoquer des conséquences extrêmement graves, sans se donner même pas la peine de nous en prévenir. Nous préparâmes donc la mercuriale que le Roi se proposait de servir, le jour suivant, au représentant polonais. Il le fit, comme il convenait, avec courtoisie, mais avec fermeté. Il déclara entre autres qu'en ce moment particulièrement préoccupant, il adressait directement au Président Moscicki un pressant appel personnel en faveur de la France, qui fut obligée plus d'une fois de faire des remontrances à Varsovie. Cf. à ce sujet les mémoires de l'Ambassadeur Léon Noël, passim.

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faveur de notre malheureuse alliée..." et il plaïda avec ferveur la cause de la Tchécoslovaquie⁹.

Deux heures plus tard, je recevais moi-même, au Ministère, le Comte Raczinsky et insistais encore sur l'importance du message que le Roi venait d'adresser, par son entremise, au Président polonais, en soulignant que "...lorsque l'Europe est menacée par tant de dangers, nous devons faire l'impossible pour que la Tchécoslovaquie survive, devienne viable et reste notre amie. Plus faible sera-t-elle, plus facilement deviendra-t-elle la proie des imperialistes, augmentant d'autant la force de nos adversaires, et, par conséquent, les dangers pour nous-mêmes..."¹⁸⁻²⁸

Voilà ce que le pseudo-historien bolchéviste de Bucarest a l'audace de dénoncer à la postérité comme un appui consenti par le Gouvernement roumain aux agressions hitlérienne, polonaise, hongroise contre la Tchécoslovaquie!

Pendant toute cette crise, je l'affirme et je défie qui que ce soit de me démentir, le Gouvernement Royal Roumain s'appliqua avec une énergie et une persévérance qu'on n'a pas rencontrés, hélas, dans d'autres Capitales amies et alliées, à aider de toutes ses forces l'infortunée Tchécoslovaquie¹¹⁻²⁹.

Et pour mieux encore mettre en lumière la ligne de conduite du Gouvernement roumain de l'époque, il convient de citer aussi la Conférence que le Roi et moi-même eûmes, le 19 octobre 1938, avec M. Beck à Galatzi.

Ce Monsieur s'étant rendu compte qu'il avait trop tiré la corde, et que sa politique, hautement fantasiste, avait singu-

28 H9 Cfr., I Preludi..., p.216.

19-10 Cfr. ibid. ibid.

20-11 Il voit aussi, entre autres, les articles de l'ancien Ambassadeur de France, M. Thierry dans "Le Monde", du 18 nov. et 11 dec. 1947.

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lièrement refroidi ses rapports avec Paris et Bucarest, tenta d'y porter remède, au moins en ce qui nous concernait, Il me fit donc savoir, le 12 octobre, par l'entremise de M. Richard Franasovici, notre Ambassadeur à Varsovie ^{12¹⁵}, qu'il désirait avoir avec le Roi et moi-même "une explication franche et directe sur tous les problèmes du moment". (Télégr.n.4465 du 15 octobre 1938).

Malgré le fait que le Souverain devait assister en ce moment-là à d'importantes manœuvres militaires et désirant titer, un moment plus tôt, au clair les intentions du Ministre polonais, nous acceptâmes incontinent la proposition et décidâmes que la Conférence allait se réunir le 15 octobre suivant, sur les lieux mêmes des manœuvres, à Galatzi, à bord du Yacht royal "Lucea-féru", où se trouvait le Quartier Général du Souverain.

Les intentions de M. Beck nous apparurent, dès ses premières paroles, extrêmement claires. Il considérait la Tchécoslovaquie comme un cadavre, dont il convenait que ses voisins, après l'Allemagne, se partageassent les dépouilles, et finit par nous proposer, ni plus ni moins, d'annexer tout bonnement une partie de la province orientale tchécoslovaque, connue sous le nom de la Russie subcarpathique, et de ne pas faire obstacle aux visés hongroises sur la Slovaquie.

Inutile de dire que non seulement nous refusâmes avec horreur ses suggestions, mais que nous plaidâmes derrière la cause Tchécoslovaque, en invoquant en sa faveur aussi bien des arguments d'ordre moral faciles à comprendre, que "...l'intérêt qu'avait la Roumanie à ce que la Tchécoslovaquie pût survivre" et cela non

MM 12 qui vit en ce moment à Paris.

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seulement dans son propre intérêt, mais aussi dans celui "de tous les autres Etats de cette région...", la Pologne y comprise ^{13/150} 15/150

Notre attitude ayant été connue à Prague, M. Chwalkowski, le nouveau Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Tchécoslovaquie, s'exprima d'en remercier chaudement notre Ministre dans cette Capitale, auquel il déclarait, ainsi qu'on l'a vu plus haut, que son pays "ne l'oublierait jamais" (Cfr. teleg. n. 2863/20 octobre 1938).

p. 326 Le 20 octobre, à 21,30 le Ministre Veverka vint à son tout me voir pour me déclarer que son Gouvernement, ayant eu connaissance de notre attitude "inflexible" lors de l'entrevue avec M. Beck, l'avait chargé de nous réitérer "l'expression de sa profonde reconnaissance". Le Ministre s'acquitta de sa mission avec une effusion vraiment émouvante,

La gratitude du peuple tchécoslovaque envers nous allait si loin, que notre Ministre à Prague nous transmettait, le 22 octobre, à titre de curiosité, avec son rapport n. 2884/16, de petites affiches, largement diffusées dans cette ville, préconisant l'union personnelle entre nos deux pays, comme unique moyen de sauver encore l'existence d'un Etat Tchécoslovaque. On me rapporta plus tard, qu'on parlait aussi au Château de Hradčany, la résidence du Chef de l'Etat, de donner mon nom à l'une des rues principales de Prague.

Animé par des sentiments similaires, le Gouvernement de Prague chargeait M. Veverka le 26 octobre suivant, de communiquer à la presse un message officiel adressé à la nation roumaine, dans lequel il lui exprimait en termes émouvants la reconnaissance du peuple tchécoslovaque..."...pour la fidélité et les preuves

^{16/30} 13 Pour plus de détails, voir mon article: L'entrevue de Galatz, dans "Les Ecrits de Paris", n. 44, Juin 1948, p. 30 et s., ainsi que mes Responsabilités, p. 298.

Cfr. aussi les très importants articles publiés par "l'Indépendance Roumaine" du 21 octobre 1938, par "Universul" de Bucarest du 22 oct. suiv., et ceux parus entre le 22 et 24 octobre dans le "Viitorul", le "Neamul Românesc", le "Prager Presse" et le "Venkov" de Prague, le "Temps", le "Figaro", le "Times", "Daily Telegraph", etc.

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d'amitié qu'elle lui a prodiguées durant les heures douloureuses qu'il vivait".

Mieux encore, lorsqu'il fut question d'un arbitrage entre la Hongrie et la Tchécoslovaquie, pour régler les controverses territoriales qui divisaient à ce moment-là les deux pays, le Gouvernement de Prague proposait pour arbitre la Roumanie, tellement grande était la confiance qu'il nous accordait (Cfr. télégr. de Prague, n. 2930 du 25 oct. et n. 2994, n. 2947 du 26 oct. 1938).

Je pourrais citer à l'infini les actes persévérants et courageux accomplis par la Roumanie pour sauver ce qui pouvait encore être sauvé de la Tchécoslovaquie.

Je me bornerai d'évoquer encore deux autres actions qui méritent d'être relevées ici.

Sous le prétexte d'une chasse, le Roi invita le Prince Régent Paul de Yougoslavie à se rendre en Roumanie. Nous avions senti le besoin d'éclaircir aussi certaines attitudes du Gouvernement de Belgrade, qui ne nous semblaient pas claires. Après la chasse, le 5 Novembre (1938), nous eûmes une longue Conférence au Palais Royal de Bucarest à laquelle prit part le Prince Paul, le Roi et moi. A cette occasion, il fut convenu entre autres, sur ma proposition, que, lors des visites officielles que les deux chefs d'Etats et moi-même allions bientôt faire à Londres, nous devions inviter l'Angleterre et la France à se rappeler pour le moins leurs engagements "de garantir à l'avenir l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale du nouvel Etat tchécoslovaque, les conditions prévues par les Accords de Munich étant réunies"¹⁴ (1731)

Douze jours plus tard, le 12 Novembre, à Londres, je ne perdais pas l'occasion, lors de l'une de mes premières rencontres

14 Cfr. I Preludi, p. 363.

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avec le Ministre britannique des Affaires Etrangères, Lord Halifax, d'aborder le problème tchécoslovaque en lui démontrant, avec force arguments à l'appui, "la nécessité pour toute l'Europe que la Tchécoslovaquie pût vivre comme nation indépendante... et, pour avoir plus de prise sur l'esprit de mon illustre inter-

locuteur, je ne manquai pas d'évoquer l'autorité de Bismark qui affirmait que "celui qui tient la Bohême, tient l'Europe Centrale". Il fut convenu que nous allions en reparler dans l'après-midi, lors de la Conférence officielle qui devait avoir lieu au Foreign Office.

Cette Conférence eut lieu, en effet, le jour même à 5 heures de l'après-midi. Outre Lord Halifax et moi-même, étaient présents le Secrétaire Permanent Sir Alexander Cadogan, l'un des précieux collaborateurs de Sir Austin Chamberlain, que je connaissais bien de Genève, le Conseiller Sir Frederick Leith Roos, le Ministre de Roumanie Vasile Grigoresca, l'un des nos meilleurs diplomates, et d'autres conseillers et secrétaires.

Ayant été invité par Lord Halifax à prendre le premier la parole "pour examiner les question que j'estimais d'intérêt commun", je commençai encore par la Chécoslovaquie. A cette occasion aussi, je développai longuement la thèse que "le Gouvernement Royal Roumain considérait comme extrêmement urgente la question des garanties des nouvelles frontières de ce pays, formellement promises à Munich".

La réponse évasive du Ministre britannique m'incita à insister sur l'importance qu'il y avait à donner à cette question, sans retard, une solution positive. "Tout retard, toute hésitation - ajoutai-je - constituerait une invite aux voisins de la Tchécoslovaquie à rouvrir une nouvelle crise en Europe

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Centrale".

Et, comme le noble Lord persévérerait dans son attitude ambiguë, au risque même de l'indisposer, je ne permis de revenir encore, et toujours sur ce problème. Dans mes "Preludi del grande dramma" j'ai noté, avec maints détails, cette dernière tentative que je fis pour venir au secours de notre Alliée. Je renvoie le lecteur désireux d'une plus ample documentation aux pages 382-387 de cet ouvrage.

X
X X

Je pense avoir amplement prouvé l'imposture du Sieur Benditer.

Mais pour mettre en lumière, encore plus, la mauvaise foi de ce triste personnage, je ne puis m'empêcher de démontrer que ce quidam ne s'est pas borné à omettre ou à dénaturer des faits désormais historiquement établis; il n'hésite pas à en inventer même de toutes pièces.

Ainsi, à la page 17 de son écrit, il affirme qu'une entrevue aurait été organisée par Stoiciadinovici entre lui-même, Göring et moi, où, entre autres, il aurait été question aussi de la Tchécoslovaquie. A cette occasion, dit-il, Göring nous aurait assuré que lorsque l'heure du partage de la Tchécoslovaquie aura sonné, l'Allemagne s'arrangerait "...de manière que les obligations de la Roumanie et de la Yougoslavie fussent inopérantes" Au surplus, p. 389 le gros Maréchal nous aurait donné des assurances formelles contre les convoitises hongroise, à condition que nous restions neutres et que nos yeux"...ne glissent plus tantôt vers Moscou, tantôt vers Paris". Et cet "honnête historien" de conclure:"...ces déclarations ont produit une vive satisfaction dans les milieux dirigeants

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de Bucarest".

Eh bien, une telle réunion Göring-Stoiadinovici-Commène n'a jamais existé. Cet écrivassier qui, pour donner plus de crédit à ses affirmations, a bourré le rez-de-chaussée de ses pages de citations, sur le fait qu'il rapporte, pourtant d'une importance considérable pour sa thèse, n'est pas capable d'apporter aucune preuve, il ne peut même pas préciser le lieu, la date, les circonstances dans lesquelles il se serait produit.

Voilà, pour ce qui est de ce mystificateur.

Mais par-dessus la tête de cet inconnu, le blâme que tout lecteur de bonne foi doit infliger à l'imposture, va à l'Institut d'Histoire de l'Académie de la République Populaire Roumaine, directement responsable du choix de ses collaborateurs et du sérieux de leurs écrits.

L'Académie Royale Roumaine de jadis jouissait d'un grand prestige et à l'intérieur de notre pays, et à l'étranger. Aux débuts de ma carrière, j'ai eu l'honneur de voir l'un de mes ouvrages couronné par l'Académie et j'ai retenu cette distinction comme l'une des plus précieuses que j'ai reçues durant ma vie. Aussi n'est-ce pas sans une profonde amertume que je vois cette Compagnie se compromettre chaque jour davantage, et perdre chaque jour un fleuron de plus, grâce à des collaborateurs de la qualité de l'auteur dont j'ai cru devoir dénoncer, dans les pages qui précèdent, le manque de probité professionnelle.

Florence

N.P. Commène
Ancien Ambassadeur
et Ministre des Affaires
Etrangères de Roumanie

Endnotes

1. Orenstein – Benditer Janeta, born Botoșani, March 12, 1917; member of Romanian Communist Party since 1944. Arrested and deported to several labor camps for political prisoners. Professor at the University "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" from Iasi, Faculty of History. Author and co-author of works and studies on the history of Romania and universal history in the Soviet vision.

2. The 1950s constitute the saddest and darkest period of Romanian historiography. Dominated by the pro-Soviet orientation represented by Mihail Roller's "school", Romania's history was falsified, distorted, so that theses such as Romanian "imperialism", the "aggressiveness" of Romania's foreign policy, its anti-Soviet character, the exploitation and discrimination of "cohabiting nationalities", the "multinational" character of the Romanian state and everything that derives from these theses, were supported in a large number of works, elaborated not by specialists, but by technicians, such as J. Benditer, Angara Fedotova Niri, Maia Kertesz, Nicolae Goldberger, Vasile Liveanu Olivenbaum and others. During this time, the Universities experienced the action of "purging" Romanian scientists, prestigious specialists (many of them arrested, interned in labour camps, sent to the famous "Danube – Black Sea Canal", or in prisons where many died) who were replaced by all kinds of "illegals", polytricks, uneducated people brought in - it is not known from where.

3. Léon Noël (1888–1987), French diplomat. High Commissioner of France in the Rhineland (demilitarized zone under the provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty with Germany). Minister Plenipotentiary in Prague (1932–1935), ambassador in Warsaw (1935–1940). Member of the French Academy.

4. André François Poncet (1887–1978), French diplomat. After the war, he represented France in the International Economic Mission in the USA. Delegate of France to the League of Nations. Ambassador to Germany (1931–1938). Arrested by the Gestapo during the occupation and imprisoned for three years. Commissioner of France in Germany (1949–1955). Member of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences.

5. Georges Étienne Bonnet (1889–1973), French politician, leader of the Radical Socialist Party. Minister in several cabinets. In April 1938 he was appointed foreign minister by the new prime minister Ed. Daladier. Involved in the Czechoslovak political crisis, Bonnet promoted and supported a policy of disengagement of France from its contractual obligations to help Czechoslovakia in case of aggression. He accepted the mutilation of the territory of this country in favor of Nazi Germany, being co-author, along with Daladier, of the Munich Dictatorship of September 30, 1938. He was investigated after the war within the Commission established to analyze the foreign policy of France in those years.

6. J. Toynbee, *The crisis over Czechoslovakia*, Oxford University Press, London, New York, Toronto, 1951. (Note Comnen)

7. Edward Beneš (1884–1948), Czechoslovak politician. Leader of the liberation movement of the Czechs and Slovaks, he collaborated with Take Ionescu, the president of the Romanian National Committee based in Paris, as well as with the other leaders of the subjugated nations of Austria-Hungary. Involved in the 1919 war against the Hungarian Red Army. Minister of Foreign Affairs, he signed the bilateral treaties with the Kingdom of Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian and with the Kingdom of Romania - treaties that formed the basis of the establishment of the Little Entente. President of the Republic 1935-1938.

8. Ferdinand Veverka, Czechoslovak diplomat, minister plenipotentiary in Bucharest. He signed the bilateral treaty with Take Ionescu in 1921.

9. Vojtech Mastny, Minister of Czechoslovakia in Berlin. See N.P. Comnen, *Anarchie, Dictature ou Organization Internationale*, Genève, 1946, Perret-Gentil, p. 127 et suiv.; *Suggerimenti per la pace*, Milano, Bompiani, p. 128 et suiv.; *Preludes del grande dramma*, Rome, Sansoni, 1947, p. 212, 215 et suiv.

10. Kamil Krofta (1876–1945) Czechoslovak historian, politician and diplomat, as foreign minister during the political crisis of 1938-1939, supported President Beneš in the defense of his country against Nazi and Horthy aggression. He collaborated closely with Romania. Among his works: *Short History of Czechoslovakia*, *Czechoslovakia and the Little Understanding*, *Hungarian Revisionism*, etc.

11. Halifax (Edward Frederick Lindley Wood, Viscount of) (1881–1951), British politician. Viceroy of India, Foreign Minister in N. Chamberlain's cabinet. He promoted and supported the "appeasement" policy, translated into the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia to "safeguard" peace in the West.

12. Wilhelm August Julius Fabricius (1882–1964), jurist, German diplomat. He represented Germany in various capitals. In the years 1936 - December 1940 he was minister plenipotentiary in Bucharest.

13. Adrien Thierry (1885–1961), French diplomat. Minister Plenipotentiary in Romania during the Czechoslovak crisis 1938–1939. He demonstrated against the conciliatory policy promoted by Bonnet. He collaborated with the foreign minister N. Petrescu-Comnen in diplomatic actions to support Czechoslovakia.

14. Cf. mes. *Preludi del grande dramma...*, p. 55-56. (Comnen's Note)

15. Idem, p. 57. Voir aussi Georges Bonnet, *De Washington au Quai d'Orsay* (Comnen's Note)

16. Cf. Georges Bonnet, *de Washington au Quai d'Orsay*, Genève, Bourquin, 1946, p.126 et suiv. Idem, *La politique extérieure de la France en 1838-1939*, Milano, Angelicus, p. 9 et 15. Ainsi que mes *Responsabili...* p. 24, 26 et suiv. (Comnen's Note)

17. Raoul Bossy (1894–1975), jurist, career diplomat. Minister Plenipotentiary in Helsinki, Budapest (1936–1939), Rome, Bern, Berlin, Copenhagen, etc. After 1943 he took refuge in Switzerland. He published numerous works on the history of Romania, the history of international relations and diplomacy. As a minister in Budapest during the Czechoslovak crisis, he collaborated closely with Foreign

Minister Comnen to counter the aggressive policy of Horthy Hungary against Czechoslovakia and Romania. He was one of the most brilliant Romanian diplomats from the interwar period.

18. The draft of this treaty proposed by Hungary to Romania and Yugoslavia had the purpose of isolating Czechoslovakia from its allies. Neither Romania nor Yugoslavia followed through on this offer.

19. Voir a ce sujet les citations publiées dans mon livre *Anarchie, Dictature ou Organisation Internationale*, Genève, Perret-Gentil, 1946, p. 128. (Comnen's Note)

20. Lord Walter Runciman's "mission" to Czechoslovakia, in the midst of a political crisis, initiated by London and Paris, had the stated purpose of "mediating" the conflict between the government in Prague and the German minority in the Sudetenland. In fact, it was about new and strong pressures on President Beneš and the government to accept the demands of the Sudeten Germans, that is, the dismemberment of the territory of Czechoslovakia.

21. J. Paul-Boncour (1899–1986), law specialist, politician and French diplomat. Deputy from 1909, then senator, he got involved in foreign policy and international relations. A formidable orator. Member of several cabinets, minister of foreign affairs, he promoted and supported the collective security policy as well as France's participation in bilateral and multilateral alliances to stop the revisionist and revenge policy of Nazi Germany. He was replaced at the Quai d'Orsay, in April 1938, by Georges Bonnet, the follower of the "appeasement" policy, in the government led by Ed. Daladier.

22. Edouard Herriot (1872–1957), French leftist politician. Entered politics in 1919. Prime Minister in 1924–1925. In 1940 he was arrested by the Gestapo and deported to Germany (1942–1945).

23. Joseph Beck, colonel (1894–1957), Polish politician. In 1930 he became head of Foreign Affairs, leading Poland's diplomacy until 1939. Raising territorial claims against Czechoslovakia (Teschen region), Poland did not accept collaboration with the Little Entente. Through his policy, Beck tried to keep the balance between Germany and the USSR, concluding a non-aggression treaty with the eastern neighbor in 1932 and, in 1934, accepting a declaration to the same effect from Germany. Beck believed that through these documents, Poland's security is ensured from those two dangerous neighbors. Taking advantage of the Czechoslovakian crisis, Beck joined with Hungary to acquire the claimed region. In November 1938, Hitler and Mussolini won the territorial claims of Hungary and Poland. The attack of Nazi Germany and the USSR on Poland on September 1 and 17, 1939, respectively, resulted in the division of this country between the two invaders and the erasure of the third independent and sovereign state from the map of Europe. The Polish government, led by the President of the Republic, Ignacy Mosciki, as well as the army and a large number of civilians took refuge in Romania.

24. Milan Stojadinović (1888–1951), Yugoslav politician. Prime Minister in 1935–1939 and Minister of Foreign Affairs. With pro-German views, Stojadinović distanced himself from France and the allies of the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente, concluding, in 1937, treaties of "eternal" friendship with Italy and Bulgaria. Stojadinović was dismissed from his position by Regent Paul and exiled to the British colony of Mauritius.

25. Richard Franassovici (1883–1964), law specialist, Romanian diplomat. Collaborator of Ion I.C. Brătianu. He represented Romania in different countries. In 1938-1939, as minister plenipotentiary in Warsaw, he carried out a sustained action to convince Beck not to join the Horthyist Hungary's game of attacking Czechoslovakia. In 1947 he settled in France.

26. Cf. *I Preludi ...* p. 212, 215, note officielle du 3 octobre 1938. (Comnen's Note)

27. Il en était de même la France, qui fut obligée plus d'une fois de faire de remontrances à Varsovie. Cfr. à de sujet les *Mémoires* de l'ambassadeur Léon Noël, passim. (Comnen's Note)

28. Cfr. *I Preludi ...* p. 216. (Comnen's Note)

29. Voir aussi, entre autres, les articles de l'ancien ambassadeur de France, M. Thierry, dans „*Le Monde*” du 18 nov. et 11 déc. 1947. (Comnen's Note)

30. Pour plus de détails, voir mon article *L'entrevue de Galatzi*, dans „*Les Écrits de Paris*”, no. 44, Juin 1948, p. 30 et suiv., ainsi que mes *I Responsabili ...*, p. 298. Cfr. aussi les très importants articles publiés par „*L'indépendance Roumaine*” du 21 octobre 1938, par „*Universul*” de Bucarest du 22 oct., et ceux parus entre 22 et 24 octobre dans „*Viitorul*”, le „*Neamul Românesc*”, le „*Prager Presse*”, „*Le Temps*”, „*Le Figaro*”, le „*Times*”, „*Daily Telegraph*” etc. (Comnen's Note)

31. Cfr. *I Preludi... p. 363* (Comnen's Note)

150 YEARS SINCE THE BIRTH OF POLISH MARSHAL JÓZEF PIŁSUDSKI (Part II)

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Marshal Piłsudski was one of those people who, giving everything to his people, rises above what is the special essence of a nation and thus integrates into the vastness of humanity.

Nicolae Iorga, May 1935

Abstract: *Part two of an extremely well-documented and exciting study of the life and political work of the great statesman Józef Piłsudski. Certainly, due to the unfortunate historical situation in which the second great world conflagration ended, from 1945 to 1989, neither in Warsaw nor in Bucharest about Piłsudski and the Romanian-Polish alliance was spoken much too little or biased. This, especially for fear of disturbing the "big brother" of the East, it is known that from his youth Tsarist Russia had punished the young Piłsudski with exile in Siberia. Analyzing his activity today, we can easily conclude that Piłsudski was the one who fully contributed to the building of close, mutually beneficial Romanian-Polish relations. We can say with certainty that even so far the fundamental documents in the archives, libraries and newspapers have not been highlighted on the subject.*

The new head of foreign affairs on the Polish side

On July 22, 1920, after the portfolio of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was occupied by Take Ionescu, a politician with rich experience and well trained, Alexandru G. Florescu reports to him how: "The armistice conditions set by Mr. Lloyd George, as a result of the intervention of Poland in addition to the Supreme Council, produced here an impression of stupefaction and special irritation. The line of withdrawal that was imposed on Poland is the one that had been established by the Supreme Council since December 8, 1919 and in which the Allies allowed Poland to establish its administration (...). The armistice also provided for an area of 50 km.

between both armies in a word along this line, but only up to the border of Eastern Galicia".



Take Ionescu, Ministry of Romanian Foreign Affairs from July 1920

Florescu also informed his superior that in Warsaw it was considered that England - everywhere else - was decidedly hostile to Poland. A conference was to be convened in London to examine the Russian question in its entirety with delegates from Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Galician envoys listened as informants.

In case of non-acceptance of the terms of the armistice by the Soviets, the Allies declared themselves obliged to come to the aid of Poland.

I mentioned above the impression of amazement and irritation caused by these conditions - mentioned the Romanian diplomat. The start against England was still huge. England at Gdantzig, England in Eastern Galicia, England in Lithuania, England seeking to thwart Poland's attempts to go hand in hand at the Warsaw Conference with Finland and Latvia, England not quite partial in the plebiscites in Warmia and Masuria, England lifting the blockade of Russia Sovietists, England being forced in the first months of the year to give advice either to conclude peace or to end the war, England not sending ammunition, England talking to Litvinov and Krasin,

England everywhere more decidedly opposed to Poland came this time with proposals of truce unbearable for the pride and aspirations of the Poles.

All of the above raised a great and justified concern for the minister plenipotentiary Al. Florescu. Those opinions, he said to the Bucharesters with some anxiety, but in time, must have been retained by Take Ionescu, who will realize, even better, the dangerous dimension of Bolshevism in this area and will pronounce without any ambiguity on the side Poland. This time in the direct dialogue he had in London a short while ago. At the same time, all the elements that Florescu learned from his counterparts quickly arrived in the country, where the Romanian leaders learned from this source that France, having to recognize the Soviets, had not accepted the proposal of Mr. Lloyd George, but still he had taken part and rallied in its elaboration.

"Poland was thus considered completely without support"

The respective state of affairs made Romania's intentions count in Warsaw, where they wanted their intentions to be known. Florescu wrote that there would be "many of those - politicians and people from society - who seek to touch us on Romania's intentions, to show the danger of Bolshevism for the whole of humanity, but especially for the immediate neighbors of the anarchic outbreak and keep asking us with a pained voice why don't we come to their aid". He also recalls that: "you could feel discouragement and hopelessness everywhere", which overwhelmed the Poles. The description of these facts, before the decisions that will be taken in Spa regarding Poland, helped Take Ionescu to formulate Romania's position - understandably favorable to Warsaw - and for the implementation of which he asks Titulescu to act as such on the spot, where he is.

The Romanian diplomat also reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that in Warsaw there were three currents that manifested themselves in the press and in the Diet: "some -- the extreme left -- (who) preferred direct negotiations with the Soviets; those on the right maintained their opinion of entrusted everything to the fate of the Allies, approving Grabski's approach, they also admitted accepting the conditions -- and between these two currents, the strongest manifestation was the rejection of the conditions and continuation of the fight to the extreme".

"The blow was very painful for those who dreamed of the borders of 1772 and who suddenly woke up with the headlands of the Niemen, the

Bug and the Zbrucz! And despite all this, with all the expressed desire to reject England's proposals, if would have penetrated into everyone's soul, most would have discovered the secret hope of a swift acceptance by the Soviets of the conditions, in order to avoid the advance of the Red armies, to save Warsaw from the occupation of the enemy and Poland from Bolshevism".

Blame for the defeat of the Polish armies

It did not throw himself on the insufficiency of the Command, on the decrease in morale of the fighters, but on England, which had dared to propose such conditions, and on Mr. Grabski, who had not been shy to accept them.

"Prince Sapieha gave the press the order not to attack England and (the) Allies from whom, thanks to a more moderate attitude, perhaps better peace conditions could be expected at the London Conference. Some newspapers presented the terms of the armistice more as simple military stipulations, which would not prejudice the final part, and demanded that the political parties and public opinion show decency, in order to be able to usefully influence, through this testimony of political maturity, the decisions of the Great Powers".

"However, not all the newspapers observed the same moderation - noted Florescu. Mr. Lloyd George was not spared, not least the President of the Council. The attacks against Mr. Grabski were as many indirect attacks against England. The President of the Council was accused of receiving terms of the armistice, had weakened Poland's situation both externally and internally. This was the argument of the left-wing newspapers, and those on the extreme left added to this accusation brought against the previous government for not having concluded the peace a few months ago, when it could have been concluded on terms better".

The right-wing forces attack the Head of State with particular vivacity

With undisguised sadness, the Romanian diplomat informed Bucharest that: "The right-wing newspapers in Poland retaliated that, if Mr. Grabski had to obey the decisions of the Allies, it was due to Mr. Piłsudski's reckless policy in Ukraine in particular. The head of state was thus attacked with a special vivacity".

"However, time was not to be lost in sterile discussions about the past. I will not fail in a close report to seek, only as a document of retrospective policy, to establish the answers that press upon everyone in this drama that could have endangered the very existence of Poland". Amazing and rare concern for a foreigner, be he a diplomat. And here is what followed. "After a week and more of waiting, the Soviets' answer was finally known. The answer had been intercepted in Warsaw, but not quite well deciphered. At first it was believed here that it was not really the Soviets' answer, but some kind of message, as they are used sometimes to send some of the leaders of Bolshevism to the proletariat".

This time the Soviets challenge England's right to intervene as an intermediary between Poland and Russia. He challenges - at the same time - Mr. Lloyd George's "right to speak on behalf of the League of Nations, of which Russia is not a member. He declares himself in favor of negotiating peace directly with Poland, assuring that "they will show better dispositions than the Allies, as they they will recognize more advantageous confrontations than those established in 1919 and which feel the influence of the Russian reaction". The Soviets rejected the proposal of the London Conference, the peace with Lithuania is concluded, and with Finland and Latvia it is to be concluded soon. In the given situation , Sir Horace Humbold advised the Polish Government to make a direct appeal for an armistice and peace to the Soviets. Warsaw's response was delayed not only by internal political disputes, but rather, Florescu aptly observes, because:

The old fame of Polish willpower was expected to appear

"Then the military circles still hoped for an improvement in the situation at the front. They stubbornly did not see the morale depression of the troops, the panic that had gripped some units, the insufficiency of reserves, the incompetence of the Command in some places, the lack of officers, the delay the arrival of the munitions. They did not see that even the fiery appeal of the Head of State, of the political parties, of the various associations had not produced the contingents of volunteers that the first start allowed to be glimpsed. The closer the red troops got, the less the enthusiasm. And the troops the Reds kept advancing, and they didn't advance after who knows what grueling battles, but without encountering even opposing troops in front of them. The Romanian diplomat's conclusion - issued on that date - was that the morale was broken in the ranks of the Polish army.

"And that's why a lot was counted - he wrote in Bucharest - on the reserves of volunteers, in order to be able to reawaken the enthusiasm and the old fame of Polish valor. During this time, Wilna, Lida, Brodno fell one after the other. The country's prominent leaders they feared that Red troops would soon pass through Lithuanian territory and attack the Poles in the rear. Well-informed foreign diplomats in Warsaw confirmed that regular Bolshevik troops had indeed entered Lithuania. The foreign chief regarded them as gangs, contradicting the English minister accredited to Poland".

Next comes the formation of the Witos government which had in its composition the head of the socialists Daszyński, Sapięha for foreign affairs, Skulski for internal affairs, Grabski for finance plus specialists from different parties. France and England sent a diplomatic-military mission to Warsaw with the task of studying the political and military situation in Poland. The mission was composed of Lord Abernon, the English ambassador in Berlin, Mr. Henkey and General Radcliffe on the English side, and Jusserand, the French ambassador to Washington, Signon and General Weygand, Marshal Foch's Chief of Staff, on the French side. Florescu's opinion was that: Poland especially needs the makeover of its soul because: "the foreign mission, apart from emboldening the Poles and sending a warning to the Soviets, could do nothing".



Wincenty Witos

Without being a trained soldier, like some of the Florești people of the last century and from which he was drawn, the Romanian diplomat considered that: "Poland needs men, ammunition, equipment, planes, tanks. And more importantly, it needs need to transform the souls of the

fighters. Time passes and in a few days the enemy may be at the gates of Warsaw and with him Bolshevism in the line of Poland". And the golden mouth that he proved to have more than once, made everything happen soon as he predicted.

The sacred union was made - under the given conditions - around the Head of State

"A few days before, in a meeting of the National Defense Council, the Head of State, (became) the target of many passionate attacks, asked for a vote of confidence, and he got it unanimously. It is true that he would have been it is inadmissible that, in addition to the difficult problem of Poland's very existence, a presidential crisis should also occur. What happened to Dmowski under the given conditions? He withdrew from the Council and remained <aside>". Specifying the difficult situation in which Poland was internally, from which only strikes were not absent, Florescu believes that if "from the final confrontations that were expected to take place and from which she would be victorious, Bolshevism would hardly penetrate the country. With a defeated Poland, low in her pride, reawakened from her dreams of aggrandizement, this security loses its power".

In the few pages of this report, the diplomat captures the entire struggles of Polish society seen - from the inside - worth as much information as the tens of thousands of pages that were written about the prologue to the outbreak of the historic battle on the Vistula, then continued with the miracle that took place and which the Romanian diplomat lived at the highest tension. We are surprised - even today - by the foresight with which Minister Florescu (inter)saw in the person of the supreme commander the turn that he continues to give him, reporting to Bucharest that Pilsudski is the one who bore the brunt of the war of non-independence, there is a suspicion that he will be the one which will stop everything at the edge of the precipice. Nothing to take away, nothing to add in this . The words judgment. The words of the Romanian diplomat constitute a medallion to be framed, including by Polish historians, especially by those who only today find out that these thoughts were put on the page, in Warsaw, during the fiery days of July 1920, by a Romanian, wonder they are still untapped today.

Although Mr. Pilsudski has recently been the object of passionate attacks, I still believe that his presence at the head of the State will be a sign that Poland will stop on the edge of the precipice. His popularity,

indeed very great still among the lower classes, will be able to be a strong bulwark against the dangerous currents. Very low in the upper classes, it represents for the lower ones the memories of a still recent revolutionary past and will perhaps be able to channel the unhealthy beginnings in the name of which the red armies seek to penetrate as deeply as possible into the heart of Poland¹.

The desperate situation of August 1920 in Poland The enemy at the gates of Warsaw

One of Minister Florescu's credible Warsaw interlocutors was Prince Sapieha, the head of foreign affairs, to whom the Romanian diplomat appreciated, among other things, his stubborn optimism - which was not true in any way regarding the stopping of the Bolshevik attack. From the reports of the military missions in Warsaw, it appears that where the Polish troops wanted to fight, they managed to keep the enemy in place, even drive him away. Where not, they advanced. His conclusions at the time were that: "the Polish soldier is indeed good, but the officer is often weak." "The escapes from military service are very numerous and sanctions are not taken" - the report mentions.



Eustachy Sapieha

"First the need to pass it on to others, then the need to retain as much as possible the Diplomatic Corps in Warsaw, where the situation not only internal but also of the Government - due to its special currents - forces it to

¹ AMAE, Fond 71-1920, Dosare Speciale (AMAE, Fund 71-1920, Special Files) vol. 35, pp.247-250

stay until the last moment". he gave assurances that "he will inform us of the moment from which the Government further declines its responsibility for our safety. We also find out what the atmosphere was like among the diplomats. These - in the great majority "would have liked to take shelter as soon as possible", the most lacking in courage being those of the neutral countries, the allies having concrete tasks in the communication between the governments, acted like brave men. As for Alexandru Florescu, he considered it appropriate, as a minister of a neighboring and friendly country, that his place is next to the allied heads of mission. But unlike his French, English, Italian and American colleagues, the Romanian minister not only did not have their logistics, but he did not even have a truck or a car, let alone a personal guard or his own soldiers: "like the English or the French" that he had taken as an example. And, when the French and English military missions decided to hasten the departure of the Diplomatic Corps from Warsaw, the Papal Nuncio (Ambrogio Damiano Achille Ratti - Pope Pius XI, from February 6, 1922 to February 10, 1939² - Pope Pius XI, - from June 7, 1929 Sovereign of the Vatican City State until February 10, 1939, as well as the Minister of Italy (to whom Florescu felt closer), stayed further in Warsaw in order not to leave it together with the Polish government until the last moment.

"Prince Sapieha was in no hurry to facilitate the departure of the Diplomatic Corps to Posen (Poznan) due to considerations related to the situation in the government. As I had the honor to telegraph to Your Excellency, there had been talk at the beginning of the possible stay of the government in Warsaw. It was assumed that Mr. Piłsudski had whose situation has become very difficult, he might be tempted, in order to improve it, to remain in the Capital with the elements of the left and extreme left and to set up, even with the Red armies in Warsaw, a government of peasants and socialists that would be could wrest from the Bolsheviki more advantageous peace conditions".

The dangers turned out to be quite high, especially through attacks planned even by the communists themselves. "Finally, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Railways and some services of a more scientific nature, of the Ministry of War, were moved to Posen (Poznan), the others were moved to Krakow. Among the initiated it was known that Mr. Piłsudski and Mr. Daszyński will never come to Posen, where various combinations aimed at overthrowing not only the government, but also (the) Head of

² <http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C5%81acina>

State were being planned. Understandably, these intentions were subordinated to the military situation."

"The conquest of Warsaw by the Bolsheviks - Alexandru G. Florescu also considered - would give Poland three governments, one communist in the Capital, another of the left and the extreme left, in Krakow, and a third more right-wing in Posen. In the latter city the foundations were laid for the formation of three divisions under the guise of the civic guard, but in reality with a purely military character, intended to defend Posnania against the Bolshevik invasion and possibly go to the aid of Warsaw, intended to defend perhaps other purposes as well. Dmowski who for a long time in Posen he was at the head of the movement to overthrow both the government and Pilsudski".

In contact with the head of the opposition, he allegedly told Florescu: "Quand nous aurons fini avec les bolschevistes, il faudra balayer toute la maison". To the reply of the Romanian diplomat that such a move would be dangerous, that it would shake Poland's situation even more and would perhaps delay the process of achieving Polish unity, Dmowski insisted: "Il faut absolument balayer la maison", a measure considered by Florescu a kind "delenda Carthago". In Dmowski's eyes, the Head of State was burdened with all the sins of Israel. In the sense that he would not be a perfect friend of the Allies because he looks at them through the prism of his hatred against Russia, that he would also be a partisan of the rapprochement policy between Poland and Hungary, respectively that he manifested himself as a protagonist of more extreme ideas in internal politics, that he would not have collaborated well with the French, etc.

Florescu did not hesitate to consider that "some of these accusations" would be accurate. And he refers to: "The resistance to give more effective leadership to the French officers, and that it contributed much to the disaster of the Polish armies. What a capable command means can be seen from the new turn which, at least for the time being, the course of operations around Warsaw seems to have taken, thanks to the more active initiative that was left to General Weygand in drawing up the city's defense plan".

"Prince Sapieha felt that Mr. Pilsudski's resistance could be defeated no matter how strong the opposition of the organizer of the Polish legions and the winner of Kyiv acclaimed by a delirious population."

"The Prince's belief was that the Poles must rely only on their own strength. Before appealing to others, a people must find within itself the

power to defend its existence, and the Poles had not given this proof. The strength of the national feeling had indeed recorded regrettable declines".

Hungarian help or intrigue?

Exactly at the time when the English prime minister "had thrown the heaviest accusations against Poland, two or three Hungarian people appeared in Warsaw who had come here to promise Hungarian help. Florescu proved to the Polish interlocutors that this was nothing but a intrigue, because the peace treaty of Versailles limited the Hungarian military forces, and Budapest did not take into account the opposition of Romania and Czechoslovakia. The intrigue was perhaps little said because, due to the lack of a common border, "help" was a word in the wind or a "suggestion strange", the Romanian diplomat also appreciated.

Florescu is not shy to propose to the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs that more work should be done on the Hungarian issue both in Paris, in London, in Rome, in Washington, including in Warsaw - where political circles and public opinion: "must be enlightened on the danger that it offers the illusion of being able to attract Hungary to the side of the Allies. The Allies have already committed the great mistake of the World War of imagining that Bulgaria will go with them. The mistake is repeated with Hungary". Moreover, the distinguished diplomat notes the fact that: "in Poland, the dogma of the need for a common front between this country and Hungary has penetrated deep into all layers of society, an aspect that in the years '38-'39 will be a kind of olive branch on which Beck he also presented it to King Charles II at the meeting he had with the Romanian sovereign in Galați, an approach that for a while affected bilateral relations, the failure of which the Polish minister blamed on his counterpart, Petrescu-Comnen, who would not have understood him the message.

Germany will never resign itself to its shrinking

It was one of the conclusions reached by the Romanian diplomat at that time and which will be maintained forever, when talking about the Polish-German dispute. At the time, it was also linked to the Russian and German danger to Poland. He wrote at the Sturdza Florescu Palace: "Russia can forget over time the rounding of its borders, especially if the rounding is done ethnically. There would be no solutions of continuity in its territory otherwise, while Germany will not resign itself to the cut that was

practiced by the Treaty of Versailles in her territory (emphasis mine - N.M.), leaving East Prussia cut off from the rest of the Reich. It is precisely the cause that started the Second World War. All her (Germany's) efforts will tend to bring it together again these two pieces. What foresight! A common border with Hungary would therefore not be a benefit, but rather a disadvantage for Poland". Let's not forget that this happened in 1939, Colonel Beck who ardently wanted to achieve that objective - immediately after Munich - Poland acting decisively in this direction, without even informing his Romanian ally, practically abolishing the Little Understanding.

The Romanian diplomat warned the Romanian authorities saying: "But the more Poland feels that the Allies also see the possibility of attracting Hungary to their side, the more difficult it will be to remove this fixed idea from the minds of the Poles".

Minister Florescu - in frontline conditions - on duty

Facing the Bolshevik attack, the first extraordinary envoy and Romanian minister plenipotentiary in Poland, Alexandru G. Florescu, did not leave the mission (he could easily return to Bucharest, where his family was, his life not being in any way threatened here). The Romanian diplomat decided to remain on duty, together with members of the Polish government, and acted for a better knowledge of the facts also from Poznan (Posen), where the members of the state leadership and the diplomatic corps were transferred, fulfilling his exemplary mission. He and the apostolic nuncio had the most modest living conditions, compared to his French or English colleague, the two of them lacking both a car and aides, professional companions, etc., etc. At the end of the military hostilities, Florescu returned to Warsaw, and on August 26, he will write three anthological reports that he will submit to Minister Take Ionescu. In them, the "analyst" describes what he experienced, with the feather of a shaved writer. At the same time, he captures some essential elements from the guidelines (directions of action) of the Polish leadership, which he renders with great finesse:

a). Poland needs peace (foreign minister Sapieha had told him that he would have been "very moved by the sympathy that Romania had shown to Poland throughout the war").

And also from Prince Sapieha, he learns about Warsaw's sincere desire to conclude peace with the Soviets, as Poland needed peace,

namely that this would also be the desire of the Allies, of all Allies. He also learns that "Poland has reduced its territorial claims under the condition that the Allies settle the question of Eastern Galicia and Danzig. Poland needs definitive confrontations and a well-clarified international situation in order to be able to consecrate itself in complete peace and safety in its economic and social organization and strengthening".

b). Danzig and Eastern Galicia would be the equivalent with which, in exchange for the sacrifices made, the Polish Government could present itself to public opinion. He reminds that Prince Sapieha does not admit a provisional government and a plebiscite for Galicia, although he would not be afraid of an electoral consultation. The atrocities committed by the Bolsheviks in the regions they temporarily occupied so deeply revolted the inhabitants, regardless of nationality, that they would certainly demand their annexation to Poland. There is even talk of a delegation of Zionists soon going to London to set forth their determined desire to see Eastern Galicia remain with Poland.

c). Regarding Gdanzig, "The Polish Government demands compliance with the Treaty of Versailles, that and nothing more. Sir Reginald Tower would be far from working in accordance with that Treaty. Since he has been Allied High Commissioner, he has worked more to make Danzig a free city of a free State. Now, the Treaty of Versailles gave Poland the external representation of the city, and gave her the post and railways and the use of the port. Danzig is also part of the Polish customs territory. Danzig has the same currency like Poland. But nothing of these precise stipulations has been carried out. And the Allies still have military contingents at Danzig."

d). The advance of the Polish troops would stop on the former line of defense of the Germans, as being a good strategic line, and which would begin about below Vilna, and, passing through Baranowicz, would go along the river Stopod, descending straight into Eastern Galicia. The question of Vilna and Grodno will not be discussed with the Bolsheviks, but directly with the Lithuanians.

e). The Russians abroad are stirring again. "This is since, with the Polish advance, the Russians in Paris, London, Rome began to stir again, insisting with all their heart that we should not be allowed to penetrate too deeply into the interior of Russia. These Russians, enlivened again by of General Wrangel's successes, they want him alone to have the credit for having cleansed Russia of the Bolsheviks, and they are now beginning to


count on his imminent entry into Moscow. A collaboration with the Poles could give a reinforcement to the territorial claims arising from the advance of their troops. And this not the Russians want it".

"You didn't want to help us for the establishment of Ukraine, Prince Sapieha told me, and now this State that could have defended us against the Russian danger will go over to the other side."

f). In connection with the "territorial conditions imposed by the Soviets" (in Minsk), Sapieha stated that "they are indeed better than Lord Curzon's and that the Russians would be determined to recognize to Poland a fairly extensive region east of Brest-Litowsk and by Cholm (Chełm). This region is very sparsely inhabited, and might just serve for a systematic colonization easily accomplished thanks to the excess of an excessively prolific population like the Polish population." Also through the August 26 courier, Alexandru G. Florescu sends Take Ionescu the "retrospective look" regarding the consequences and lessons learned from the events that took place in Poland in the reference month.

The confrontation between the Polish right and the left is permanent "Dmowski and the right-wing parties wanted - after the August battle in Warsaw - for Poland's borders to be ethnically determined and to establish future close friendly relations with Russia, a precursor to a political alliance". Piłsudski and the left-wing parties "saw in Russia a dangerous neighbor of Poland, recalling the sufferings of the past, the tyrannical tendencies of the Muscovites. Hence the desire to build between Poland and Russia a "curtain of intermediate states", intended to defend Poland against expansion Russian. This policy, whose most prominent supporter is the Head of State himself, Mr. Piłsudski, is especially embraced by the left-wing parties. This policy was "the most popular".

"The two policies placed face to face contradict each other. Mr. Dmowski's contains a contradiction in itself. On the one hand it extends the Polish ethnic claims to a line that includes parts of Podolia, of Wolynia, of White Ruthenia, of Lithuania, i.e. Kamienec Podolski, Dubno, Rowno, Pinsk, Minsk, Wilna. And on the other hand, with all these territorial claims, Mr. Dmowski believed that friendship with Russia was still possible".



Roman Dmowski

"On his side were mostly landowners whose domains are in regions with mixed populations. They rejected the idea of creating a Lithuania, a white Ruthenia, a Ukraine." Partisans of this policy demanded that all white, Catholic Ruthenia should belong to Poland, leaving the entire Orthodox region to Russia. From Lithuania, this group demanded the part where the Polish element was more compact, although it did not constitute an absolute majority anywhere, leaving the rest of Lithuania to stick to Russia, being condemned to remain: "a kernel of latent enmity between Russia and Poland, a irredentism at every moment, by splitting both Lithuania and White Ruthenia into two pieces".

The ethnic side of Piłsudski's politics: less pronounced


Commander Piłsudski's ethnic claims were much less, Florescu believed. The concept of the reborn Polish Head of State was not to annex the old Eastern lands of Poland, but to "let them govern themselves, but united with Poland, if not through a federative system, at least through political alliances. The difficulty was also here to establish the limit up to which the borders of Poland went. More modest at the beginning, they gradually expanded, as the chaos in Russia continued, as the Polish

armies also advanced. But in no case these fronts did not touch the Dmowski line. Poland was indeed ready to cede Wilna to a Lithuania united with it by federative or political ties, but not to an independent Lithuania or re-united with Russia." "Poland's borders narrowed the more closely these countries connected with her". "Even from Eastern Galicia, Piłsudski would have been ready to give a piece of land if through this sacrifice he could definitively win Ukraine for his part." The Romanian diplomat Alexandru Florescu considered that: "If all Lithuania, White Ruthenia, Ukraine, not to mention the Baltic States and Finland together, wanted to remain independent, Piłsudski realized that they were individually too weak, even if they were united, they would not they could still live like this, except by leaning on Poland". Some of the leaders of these states believed that Poland was called to help rebuild Russia, through a wise economic penetration, seeking to take the place of Germany. In other words, in Florescu's view Piłsudski was strengthening Poland's position to resist Russian enmity, disregarding the allogeneic element leaning towards Russia

Piłsudski's thesis came very close to Wilsonian principles, not removing Russia's enmity, but strengthening Poland's position to better withstand that enmity.

The Romanian minister in Warsaw also notes that the proposed policy did not sufficiently take into account the allogeneic element with a significant and conscious role: the Jewish element. The Jewish population was very numerous in Lithuania, White Ruthenia and the Ukraine, which had a greater inclination towards Russia than towards Poland. Poland managed, thanks in part to the Polish emigrants returned from America, to establish a class of industrialists and traders who over time partially eliminated and will be able to eliminate the Jews, Florescu believes. Also, through the agrarian reform, the Polish peasant, in turn, will be able to resist more successfully the "predatory tendencies of the Jews". Florescu emphasizes that the Allies' proposals of December 1919 regarding the front line between Poland and Russia, that of the Kingdom of Congress, which left Wilna, Grodno, Minsk, Pinsk, Rowna, Dubno outside Poland's borders, would not have been accepted by either a Pole. At the same time, the allies did not say anything as long as Poland did its own justice. The Poles were wrong because they did not demand by documents the reward of the Allies for the services rendered against Bolshevism

This is the conclusion of the analyzes of the Romanian diplomat, Alexandru G. Florescu, current even today. He also captured the unfolding - in their intimacy - of the relations established between Paderewski, Pilsudski and Dmowski, respectively the envy with which the prime minister and the head of foreign affairs looked at Piłsudski's popularity but also the need to achieve by force of arms what Dmowski had not achieved diplomatically in Paris. "The big mistake that the Poles made then is that they did not stipulate in precise agreements the reward they were due for the service they also rendered to the Allies. (Following the same line, such a reward should have also been demanded Romania at the moment it saved Hungary and Europe from Bolshevism! - N.M.)



Ignacy Paderewski

Mister. Paderewski was then in power. He considered himself to be the man above the parties, but in reality he was more inclined towards the right-wing ideology. "About that time, indeed, he began to look with some distress at the too great popularity of Mr. Piłsudski, the man of the left, and to smile with some complacency at the high dignity with which he was invested." "Mr. Paderewski was thus seeking to accomplish by arms what Mr. Dmowski had failed to accomplish through diplomacy in Paris. Mr. Dmowski had therefore tried to show that White Ruthenia and the Ukraine could not live as national entities, and that Lithuania on which England take control, unjustly claim regions where Poland was in the majority".

And a totally new fact: "And when, on the order of Mr. Ion Brătianu, I was reading to Mr. Paderewski the statement that the Ukrainian mission in Bucharest had given to the former Prime Minister to confirm Ukraine's friendly intentions towards Romania and to recognize the Dniester as the border definitive agreement between our country and Ukraine, Her Majesty was advising me that the Allies should not find out about this declaration and was paying particular attention to all the arguments against an independent Ukraine". "But Mr. Paderewski fell."

Foreign Minister Patek – considered to be a third-rate lawyer

"In the place of Prince Sapieha at Foreign Affairs, Mr. Patek was installed, a third-rate lawyer, more left-leaning, whom nothing showed fit to occupy the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not even his previous appointment as Poland's representative in Prague. Mr. Patek quickly became Mr. Piłsudski's man and put his policy into practice."

In his policy towards Russia, Piłsudski tried to invite Romania as well

"I have shown above what was the policy of the Head of State towards Russia. I will add that no matter how much Poland followed the policy of the Allies, Mr. Piłsudski considered that outside of this policy Poland could pursue a policy of its own towards Russia. To such a policy the Head The state sought to invite Romania as well. He realized that the Allies had no policy in Russia or that they had several, and that thus our countries were called upon or in a position to impose their policy on the Allies."

"What an even greater temptation for Poland was to be able to carry out the policy of the intermediate states from now on in complete agreement between the Head of State and his Ministry, which the advancing Polish armies were calling to an independent life!"

And one more fact revealed by the Romanian diplomat and which historians don't really remember. "The Soviets had made a first peace proposal to the Polish government on December 22, 1919, but the proposal was conceived more in the form of a world manifesto and in such imprecise terms that it had not been taken into account." This in the situation where:

"Ever since then, the Soviets sought to lull the Poles' vigilance. The vagueness with which this call was surrounded is one of the evidences showing that, faced with the shaken situation of General Denikin and

Admiral Kolczak, the Soviets were trying to gain a respite in order to prepare the attack today against Poland".

England stopped helping counter-revolutionary Russian generals only on January 28, 1920, when the peace proposals were specified.

It was a few days after Mr. Patek's trip to Paris and London. It is known that after the defeats of Denikin, Judenici and Kolceak, England stopped helping the counter-revolutionary Russian Generals. The exigencies of his domestic politics and his economic needs imposed upon him a new policy. "Mr. Lloyd George had answered Poland's requests for help with a refusal. And when asked for advice, either to continue the war or to conclude the peace, the English Prime Minister maintained a perfect reserve which many interpreted as an exhortation to to make peace". England did not want to get involved even with an advice, thus declining any responsibility. "England, which had started the talks with Litfinov, therefore observed the expectation. Mr. Bonard Law in the English Parliament did not hesitate to even inform Poland that England wanted not even a single advice to be asked of him on the question of peace with the Soviets"."While Poland therefore sought to solidarize the Allies with the decision they would have taken, the Allies, on the other hand, sought to decline any responsibility regarding any directive to be given."

"In particular, the Inter-Allied Conference in its meeting of February 24 (1921) had decided that "if the States neighboring Soviet Russia whose independence or autonomy were recognized by the Allies, would turn to them to ask for their advice on the attitude they would have- to be taken towards Soviet Russia, the allied governments would reply that they could not take the responsibility of advising them to continue a war which might harm their own interests". Indirectly, at those moments the Bolsheviks were being helped. "Of course, the urge to conclude peace arose more from all of this. However, alongside such an urge, these talks, the official declarations, the lifting of blockades, the refusal to send any more ammunition either on credit or even with payment, all were not than indirect aid given to the Soviets. We were quite far from a strictly neutral attitude. France was forced, in order not to cause a breach in its understanding with England, to follow his lead". Poland accepted the Soviet peace proposals according to Wilsonian principles

"Did the Poles listen to the call to conclude peace? Yes, because the Polish government responded to the peace proposals of the Soviets by

accepting them. But the Poles believed that the Allies, by not interfering in the matter of peace and war, were also denying their right to interfere in that of the terms of peace. Non-intervention in the first question implied non-intervention in the second. Reasoning in this way, the Polish government thought itself at liberty to fix its conditions in complete freedom."

Furthermore, Florescu believes that: "the chief mistake that the Polish government had made is that the use in establishing these unfortunate conditions formulated: "of erasing the traces of the crime of the partitions of Poland and renouncing all territorial rights arising from the acts of violence committed since 1772 against Poland." "The formula was wretched. The fact itself did not imply the restoration of Poland within the limits of 1772. Within these limits the Polish government wanted, in accordance with Wilsonian principles, the peoples to have the right to decide their own destiny. Poland's enemies they exploited this formula, these tendencies presented in an imperialist form. Everything that was socialist and even liberal thinking in the whole world did not hesitate to denounce to public opinion these exaggerated expansionisms".

A sign of chaotic politics: the Allies claim the right to secure Poland's eastern frontiers

"In the interval between the receipt of the peace proposal and the communication of the conditions to the Allies, they, once more forgetting their declarations of non-interference, thought they had the right to remind the Polish Government of Article 87 of the Treaty of Versailles, which gave them and only them the right to fix the eastern frontiers of Poland". "A more chaotic policy could not be conceived" - emphasizes Minister Florescu. And, justifiably, he wonders: "What else today, when even the Allies leave the Poles face to face with the Soviets, does the threatening declaration with Article 87 matter? Will the Allies intervene today to reduce to the limits set by Lord Curzon the more broad that the Soviets want to recognize Poland?" "However, from all these contradictions and hesitations, the Polish government then unjustly concluded that the *fait accompli* would perhaps be the best policy with which even England, a country above all realistic, could come to terms."

The Allies would bow to the accomplished fact only through a conspiracy of silence

As I pointed out at the beginning, General Rozwadowski, returning around February 1920 from Paris, communicated to the head of the Romanian diplomatic mission in Warsaw his impression that the Allies would allow themselves to be beaten and that they would bow before the fait accompli. And when, by order of your Excellency's predecessor, I asked Mr. Patek, if she was aware of the impression made on the Allies by the peace conditions offered by the Poles to the Soviets, conditions communicated to them in advance, she gave me the haughty textual answer: "I don't even want to know about it (them)."

"I had myself sought from my fellow Allies the impression which these conditions had produced on their governments. None, but absolutely none, would give me an answer. Each told me that he did not know it: it was a conspiracy of silence perfect". "What encouragement given to Poland further to put the Allies in front of the fait accompli!". "At this time the Polish government had set to work to carry out its plan. As it had made a deal with White Ruthenia, granting her full autonomy within the Polish Republic, so it was making another deal with Petlura and his government." .

"The question of the eastern fronts of Poland thus seemed settled, without the intervention of the Allies and without a plebiscite. All that was needed was the consent of the Soviets; but here it was believed that a strong offensive, followed by a blow on the green table of negotiations, was of a nature to subdue the resistance of the Bolsheviks". It was clear to the Polish leadership that the Soviets did not seriously consider making peace. It was proved by the discussions that followed on the choice of the place as well as on the armistice, and the offensive that followed put the lid on any doubt".

The weakening of Poland also weakens Romania

"Poland had taken a great step into a momentum unbecoming of her powers. She tried to take advantage of the chaos in Russia to somehow revive the Poland of the past. In her fight against the Soviets, in her attempt to achieve a Ukraine she would have wanted to have partners".

"As much as Romania had worked openly in the matter of its relations with Ukraine, taking care not to offend Poland and clarifying their character,

Poland was working mysteriously. I showed this in special reports, as I pointed out how necessary at that time not to give the impression to the Ukrainians that they could only count on the support of Poland. In those moments, indeed, Poland sought to establish a State and an alliance with that State. By carrying out such a program Poland would have could think herself justified in passing over us, and not appreciating the importance of our friendship at its true value, or she would have tried to force us into this friendship by the fear we would have had of seeing too close a connection established with Ukraine. And since the necessity of Poland's friendship with Hungary was indulged in most Polish newspapers as well as in most thoughts of political men, I thought myself bound to point out the danger which a possible understanding between these tr those States would have had it for us, with whom each had an open issue: Transylvania, Bucovina, Bessarabia".

It is true that Florescu saw the respective danger as overcome, but he considered it necessary to "examine the consequences that the new state of affairs in Poland could have had on Romania's relations with this country, in the sense that a political connection is not desirable and this without any tension.

The miracle happened

It is the title of the first report from which we will present essential fragments, in fact the main ideas that Florescu wanted the Romanian decision-makers to know, being aware of the usefulness of correct knowledge of the events that had taken place on the Vistula and that they had personally experienced to the full. As external testimony, these reports can play an important role for Polish historians as well. Regrettably, until now they have not done it, they have not resorted to these texts. Suffocated, somehow, by pain, the Romanian minister in Warsaw reveals from the beginning: "The Polish army, beaten, fugitive, often without even a glimmer of hope to see themselves fighting again, retreating in disorder and hastily across hundreds of kilometers to the outskirts of the Capital, leaving men and material in the hands of the enemy, this army was nevertheless revived, brought back to new positions, began to defend itself, and even chased the enemy over the same hundreds of kilometers with the same speed, caught him on the pincer allocation, he takes tens of thousands of prisoners, cannons, ammunition and escapes not only a Capital, but an entire country, maybe even general peace".

Sapieha recognizes that a part of the Romanian gold from Kremlin was offered to Poland

On October 13, 1920, Alexandru Florescu informs the prime minister and interim minister of foreign affairs, General Averescu, about Poland's participation in the Little Understanding, following a conversation on this topic with Prince Sapieha, minister of foreign affairs. From the perspective of more than 90 years since the meeting took place, in the context of the signing of the Polish-Soviet peace treaty after the Battle of Warsaw, the formulation expressed by the Polish head of foreign affairs seems extremely important to us: "Regarding the gold that will be paid of Russia to Poland, the Foreign Minister told me that it was a gold that he would not touch with too much pleasure, for the parcel is also a little of our gold, and that he had even given instructions to the Polish delegation, should any difficulty arise in this regard, don't insist on acquiring the gold. I don't know how much sincerity such a statement can contain - the Romanian diplomat showed Bucharest - in any case if the Polish Government had the scruples to touch stolen gold, this matter presents a principled face, and it did not appear to be a possible precaution". It could be understood from Sapieha's statement that since then the Bolsheviks had started alienating the Romanian gold deposited in the Kremlin in 1917. Florescu further specified that it was "interesting the detail given to me by Prince Sapieha on this occasion, that according to the news that (he) has them, the Russians would have no more than 150 million available as gold, which would mean that our treasury was no longer complete as some believed"³.

Friendship between Poland and Hungary and the Little Entente

In relation to the topic he wanted to elucidate, in the perspective of a visit that Minister Take Ionescu was going to make to Warsaw, it follows that "the great friendship with Hungary distances Poland from the objectives of the Little Understanding" to which was also added the unchanged antipathy against the Czechs.

From the report on the subject of the Little Understanding, written by Alexandru Florescu, it follows that the interlocutor (Sapieha) did not hide

³ AMAE, Fond 71-1920, Dosare Speciale (Special Files), 1920, vol 35 p. 397

from him: "the sympathies of the Poles for the Hungarians, due to the chivalrous qualities of this people, the bravery of the Hungarian soldiers, the social relations of the past, as he did not hide from me nor the lingering resentment of the Poles against the Czechs. In these resentments, it would seem, however much the Poles have the right to complain about the behavior of the Czechs towards those of their countrymen who remained under their domination, that the whole feeling of the territory of Teschen is more alive felt".

From this part of the conversation, the Romanian diplomat was left with the vague impression that: "principle Sapieha would perhaps rely on Romania as the mediator better able to resolve this disputed territorial issue with the Czechoslovaks", gaining the conviction that as long as the state of mind from that time "The Little Understanding will hardly be able to gain the adhesion of Poland" will last. Moreover, Prince Sapieha was not shy to declare to the Romanian minister that: "as soon as the Little Understanding would only show an anti-Hungarian character, Poland would not be able to join her", openly speaking to him about reaching to an "alliance between Romania and Hungary, directed against Bolshevism", to which the impossibility of such an approach was demonstrated.

The Romanian minister in Warsaw, Alexandru G. Florescu, also noted that the interlocutor's keen desire to "base Poland on a close friendship with France and Romania, and added that, if he remains in the government long enough - - something that he seemed to be a bit doubtful - - he will try to give a more concrete form to the approach to France". "I understood that this is about the conclusion of a military convention, about which the Polish press often wrote with particular desire and insistence".

Repeatedly, the Romanian diplomat notes the subtle and permanent constant in Polish politics: "sympathy for the Hungarians, antipathy against the Czechs; the second (orientation) could be cured with time, the first is more difficult". It is easy to understand that in Warsaw's attention there was a much more pressing matter: the alliance against the Soviet Union today, against the Russian chaos of tomorrow.

The Romanian minister felt the need to bring new explanations regarding Polish foreign policy, especially in view of the visit of the Romanian minister of foreign affairs to Warsaw. He did it on October 15, 1920, demonstrating that this policy is like Arvinte's antierium, a continuous patchwork, because "when one seems to be resolved, another appears. When the latter in turn gives the appearance of being resolved, here it

breaks out a new difficulty. It could be said with good reason and with some irreverence that Poland's foreign policy brings with it the formula of Arvinte's predecessor".

Leaning on Poland, Lithuania can keep its independence

The Romanian soil in Warsaw knows how to draw from history the lessons of continuity, perennial. Likewise from the culture of a people. And that's why he states with conviction: "No matter how hard the Allies try to go hand in hand in matters that concern not only the peace of today, but also what of tomorrow, it is obvious that the question of Lithuania separates England from France. England thought that some financial facilities as well as an economic deterioration can quickly change the mentality of a people. The Lithuanian national feeling, which also makes its weakness, exists only in the peasant class, and it still presents itself more under the appearance of a demagogic hatred against the Polish landowner. In the classes of above, the Lithuanian is either a Germanophile or more particularly a Polonophile. What England sought was the acquisition by an economic penetration of a political influence. But England did not quite realize that by trying such a game aimed at weakening Poland she somehow touch France, was preparing an almost certain rapprochement of Lithuania with Germany. This was proved on the occasion of the Bolshevik campaign. Advice and pressures England could not fight the intrigues and help of the Germans". And then it is emphasized that "in the series of declines that England has recently suffered as a result of the Polish victory, the Vilnius issue is one of the most painful", making it clear that "Lithuania's isolation from Russia as well as the entry of the General Zeligowski in Wilna, with all the polite advice given to the Poles by both Great Allies, are received by France with special unofficial satisfaction".

The occupation of Vilnius was possible because "the Head of State - as Supreme Commander - did not take any precautions to thwart him".

Conclusion

Being part of a larger study regarding the activity of Romanian diplomats in Warsaw during the interwar period, this paper aims to present some aspects resulting from the reports sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Bucharest, existing in the Romanian Diplomatic Archives,

written by the first envoy extraordinary and Romanian minister plenipotentiary, Alexandru G. Florescu. The information of this professional diplomat, who came from an old family from Wallachia, with great-grandfathers among the Romanian revolutionaries who worked with the Great Polish Emigration from Paris, was published in full in the monograph recently published in Bucharest, devoted to Marshal Piłsudski. The present study presents a series of novel aspects contained in the diplomatic reports of the first head of the Romanian Legation in Warsaw regarding the situation in Poland from 1920-1921, as well as about Polish foreign policy actions, especially in the eastern area of special interest for the state Romanian. The on-the-spot assessments drawn up by Minister Florescu for the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Sturdza Palace) are of great importance for Romanian, as well as Polish and universal historiography, the Romanian diplomat being an objective, equidistant eyewitness of the events that took place. Former minister plenipotentiary in Greece and diplomat in many capitals, including in Petersburg, director in the headquarters of M.A. S., their author knew how to draw the necessary conclusions, even very useful to Romanian decision-makers in bilateral cooperation, trying to make his judgment as objective and fair as possible. That is why he appeals with aplomb to the knowledge of the situation in Poland to the most truthful sources at the head of the Polish state, to conversations held with Generals Piłsudski and Rozwadowski, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Eustachy Sapieha and others. It should be remembered that before the Miracle on the Vistula in the report sent in July 1920 to Bucharest, the head of the diplomatic mission in Warsaw, Alexandru G. Florescu, report to decision makers in Romania: Although Mr. Piłsudski has recently been the object of passionate attacks, I still believe that his presence at the head of the State will be a sign that Poland will stop on the edge of the precipice. His popularity, indeed very great still among the lower classes, will be able to be a strong bulwark against the dangerous currents. Very low in the upper classes, it represents for the lower ones the memories of a still recent revolutionary past and will perhaps be able to channel the unhealthy beginnings in the name of which the red armies seek to penetrate as deeply as possible into the heart of Poland.

It would be worthy to compare this judgment and others from this study with those sent by other members of the Diplomatic Corps at that time on a diplomatic mission in Warsaw. Polish historiography must lean on these texts.

KING CAROL II - NICOLAE TITULESCU ONE OF THE STILL UNRESOLVED CONTROVERSIES OF THE INTERWAR PERIOD¹

Nicolae MAREȘ
Ambasador

Abstract: *In a period when the rise of the personal power of the most unpredictable monarch of the Kingdom of Romania, despite spectacular economic progress and the flourishing of an effervescent artistic and cultural life, there are political turmoils that lead to surprising and difficult to understand decisions in the context of those times. The present article proposes a documented analysis of the evolution of relations between the monarch and the exceptional politician Nicolae Titulescu, a prominent figure of the interwar political life, who was twice elected president of the General Assembly of the League of Nations. Why this aversion? Readers will learn the author's arguments in a passionate read complemented by numerous documentary and bibliographic references.*

On August 29, 1936, following a government reshuffle of the cabinet headed by Gheorghe Tătărescu, Nicolae Titulescu was released from the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs² or, as the writer-diplomat, Elena Văcărescu, said, kicked out of his post. He was replaced by his government colleague, Victor Antonescu, also with old states in diplomacy. According to Nicolae Iorga's testimony, only a few days after landing, on September 2, 1936, Ion Inculeț, former Minister of the Interior and, from August 29, 1936, vice-president of the Council of Ministers, told him: "how the ministerial change took place with the removal to Titulescu", explaining to him that "he

¹ In the assertions below, I also highlight an interesting point of view expressed by the historian Narcis Dorin Ion, general director of the Peleş Museum, in his monumental work: *Carol II of Romania – A controversial king*

² See Ion M. Oprea, Nicolae Titulescu, Bucharest, Scientific Publishing House, 1966, p. 341-366; *Titulescu și strategia de pace (Titulescu and the Peace Strategy)*, coordinator Gh. Buzatu, Iași, Junimea Publishing House, 1982, chapter XI, entitled *Eșecul păcii globale. Demiterea lui N. Titulescu (A Failure of Global Peace. The Dismissal of N. Titulescu)*, p. 275-326.

had been looking for a long time to get rid of him. But he needed a situation that would not give him a platform"³. The suggestion of the great historian, who had not been an admirer of the Romanian diplomat for several years, was the following: "I tell him that at least one should make a joke of asking him to join the party that demanded a strictly homogeneous government. He regrets that they didn't think..."⁴.

Such credible statements are more and more numerous, also clarifying the glorious ascension of the monarch to the throne of Romania. From 1934, the controversial king felt eclipsed in his totalitarian aspirations and manifestations by Titulescu's diplomatic success. And not only because of this the king was disappointed. The minister's critical attitude towards the royal clique and towards His Majesty's mistress, Elena Lupescu, caused him the greatest annoyance. It is generally known that after returning from Montreux, on July 11, 1936, Nicolae Titulescu submitted his resignation, through a letter (transmitted, in copy, to the king. He explained his gesture by the fact that "for some time now, various internal facts have shown me very clearly that I can no longer remain responsible for the development of our foreign policy on its essential principle, namely, good understanding with all nations without distinction. On the contrary, they have shown me that I cannot even take responsibility for maintaining the results achieved so far".⁵

"I am Romanian - said Titulescu -, born of Romanian parents, raised at the school of Take Ionescu and Vintilă Brătianu, and therefore Romanian nationalism is a dogma for me, both inside the country and outside. That's why I ask that no one from outside the country interfere in our internal affairs and that the guiding principles of our internal policy are purely Romanian". At the same time, Titulescu told Prime Minister Gheorghe Tătărescu, a docile tool of the monarch, that his concern was to "remain faithful to our alliance treaties, but also to establish the best possible relations with all our neighbors, maintaining, of course, our integrity territorial and national interests, that he did not conclude any assistance treaty with the U.S.S.R., respectively he never "assumed a commitment

³ N. Iorga, *Memorii. Sinuciderea partidelor politice (Memories. Suicide of the parties)* (1932-8), vol. VII, p. 353.

⁴ *Ibidem*

⁵ Nicolae Titulescu, *Politica externă a României (Romanian Foreign Policy)* (1937), edited by George G. Potra, Constantin I. Turcu, Ion M. Oprea, Bucharest, Enciclopedică Publishing House, 1994, p. 37-38 and further up to p. 56.

regarding the passage of Soviet armies through Romanian territory, such a matter never even being discussed".

In his memorial work entitled *Politica externă a României (Romanian Foreign Policy)* (1937), to which we refer below), Nicolae Titulescu admits that Tătărescu, Inculeț and, above all, Victor Antonescu insisted on withdrawing their resignation, reaching the signing of the well-known minute of July 14 1936, through which the three expressed their approval of the foreign policy led by the head of foreign affairs. That Gheorghe Tătărescu was working at two ends can be seen from the memorandum he sent to King Carol II, on July 11, 1936, in which from his perspective of Prime Minister, if Titulescu resigns, it is not due to a conflict between the two, but to some factual situations that go beyond passing contingencies. And after the reshuffle of August 29, 1936 - he should also note that "in the difficult situation that Mr. Titulescu created it abroad personally, through attitudes and exaggerations whose responsibility he cannot share with anyone: conflicts with officialdom and Italian public opinion; conflicts with Polish officialdom and public opinion, conflicts with part of French public opinion; tightening of relations even with some of the political leaders of allied and friendly countries - all these facts created an atmosphere of opposition for Mr. Titulescu, in which the action of his lordship can no longer be carried out freely and which sometimes gives him very embarrassing moments. The latest incident with the Italian press is one of the outbreaks of this difficult situation".

At the same time, the head of the Romanian government informed his sovereign that he is "sure that Mr. Titulescu is aware of this atmosphere; it is certain that his lordship is aware that this atmosphere has a detrimental effect on the country and its interests, and that is why he considers it necessary to withdraw, even if only temporarily". Gheorghe Tătărescu also specified that "to this external case, another internal case is added. Mr. Titulescu must be aware that some exaggerations of his lordship - in speech and in attitude - in the matter of relations with the U.S.S.R. they alienated a good part of the sympathies of the Romanian public opinion, refractory to a policy that would go beyond the framework of only external relations with our neighbor from the East. His lordship, not being able to recover neither from the acts committed nor from their consequences, can no longer acquire what he feels he has lost and therefore must consider the solution of withdrawal as the only one that would give him the possibility of restoring his popularity". We can easily see in Tătărescu's gesture that of Pilate from Pontus.

To these "essential causes", the prime minister also added "the collapse of some of the illusions that our hearty collaborator had placed in the systems and practices of international politics, in the elaboration of which he collaborated with passion".⁶



King Carol II and Nicolae Titulescu visiting Great Britain (1936)

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 798.

It was obvious, under the conditions in which the German rise in European politics became more and more pressing, that Nicolae Titulescu could no longer officially represent the policy of adaptation to the realities of the time, which Romania tried in the years 1937-1940, forced to is getting closer economically and militarily to the Third Reich, which has become the master of Europe. The conclusion of the report submitted to the king was that "in this cycle of facts are found the origins of the decision taken by Mr. N. Titulescu to resign from the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs".

Although he expressed his regret for "separation from a man endowed with so many elite qualities", Gheorghe Tătărescu took "this resignation into consideration without concern", even though he was aware that "for international public debates, for the solution of general, European and world problems, Mr. Titulescu's absence will be a difficult gap to fulfill". "However, for Romanian interests - the prime minister emphasized in the report sent to the monarch - the withdrawal of his reign, without causing any danger, will be, on the contrary, an occasion for necessary relaxation in the relations with some of the allied or friendly states, against which the incidents provoked, willy-nilly, because of his rule, they created stressful situations for us".

At the same time, the President of the Council of Ministers considered that "this withdrawal will also give us the opportunity to proceed with a review of the bodies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its propaganda tools, which in today's situation, in many centers, only work within an action personal and constitute dangerous anomalies in the action to defend the general interests of the state and the government". And that scenario was implemented, so that after the elimination of Titulescu from the formula of the new reshuffled government, until the end of 1936 many plenipotentiary ministers were recalled from their posts, being considered to be very close to the former head of Romanian diplomacy, whose policy was not she was still wanted in Bucharest, but offering them other diplomatic missions.

Analyzing the consequences of Titulescu's resignation, Gheorghe Tătărescu also took into account the fact that "the interpretation that will be given, perhaps, by a malicious press and an uninformed public opinion - and according to which Mr. Titulescu's departure means a new orientation in foreign policy of the country - will be quickly refuted by the future acts and attitudes of the government, which will prove that nothing has changed in this policy".

Everything was in vain, because, unfortunately, the prime minister and the king of Romania did not correctly estimate the influence that Titulescu had in the Western diplomatic circles and the completely unfavorable echoes of his removal from the government, the European press putting on the wallpaper exactly this interpretation of a change in Romanian foreign policy. The change will occur, but not in the summer of 1936, but only in the summer of 1940, during the regime of monarchical authority, when pressed by the territorial claims of our revisionist neighbors (the U.S.S.R., Hungary and Bulgaria, copiously helped by Germany and Italy), will shatter the territorial integrity of Greater Romania in the summer of 1940.

Precisely to reassure European diplomatic circles, the head of government informed Carol II that "the replacement by Mr. Victor Antonescu, a traditionalist of our foreign policy, will be, on the other hand, in the first moments of confusion, an additional guarantee and a call to order for all foreign public opinion". The assessment of the President of the Council of Ministers did not turn out to be true. Western and Soviet chancelleries interpreted it exactly the opposite! Noticing this, in order to manage the susceptibilities of the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Tatarescu will make, on September 26, 1936, the following statement to Mihail Semionovici Ostrovski, the Soviet plenipotentiary minister from Bucharest (1934-1938): "The reorganized cabinet will continue Titulescu's policy, which is a traditional policy of the country, less flashy, but more methodical and energetic. Romania's only enemies are Germany and Hungary. (...) Relations with the U.S.S.R. not only will they not change, but the government even has a plan to strengthen and deepen these relations"⁷.

The oddity of history is that Ambassador Ostrovski will be sent to the Soviet Gulag because he "contributed to the removal from office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, N. Titulescu".

Despite all these assurances given by the head of the Royal Romanian Government, following the replacement of Titulescu as head of Romanian diplomacy, Maxim Litvinov, his counterpart in Moscow, informed him, in September 1936, that he no longer considered the draft treaty, initialed at Montreux on July 21, 1936, in which the principles of mutual assistance between the Kingdom of Romania and the U.S.S.R. were

⁷ *Dokumentî vneşnei politiki S.S.S.R.*, vol. XIX, doc. nr. 279, apud Ioan Talpeş, *Diplomație și apărare. Coordonate ale politicii externe românești (Diplomacy and Defense. Coordinates of the Romanian Foreign Policy)*., 1933-1939, p. 167.

established, based on mutual respect for territorial integrity, because they interpret Titulescu's dismissal as a change in Romanian foreign policy. Nicolae Titulescu's mistake was that he did not bring to the knowledge of the king and the prime minister, neither then nor later, the content of this document that he had initialed with Litvinov, creating great suspicions, which also contributed to his removal from the new government .

Because Titulescu had not notified the Romanian government, officially, about the content of the pact - he reasoned, in a letter to the king, from the end of 1939, that he "conformed to Litvinov's wish, who did not want me to enumerate the act, but to - I will bring it to Your Majesty's attention myself" -, Litvinov telephoned the former head of Romanian diplomacy, in September 1936, to ask him: "Have you submitted the document of July 21 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? No, I replied in good faith. I submitted to your wish and ceased to be a minister before I could communicate it, personally, in Bucharest. Then, Litvinov answered me, don't submit it anymore, because the act of July 21 has no value between us, because we consider that your dismissal, under the known circumstances, is equivalent to a change in foreign policy"⁸.

In May 1937, Litvinov will personally tell Titulescu, at the meeting in Talloires, that he had already communicated to Victor Antonescu, the new foreign minister, that "Romania has changed its foreign policy. So we have to defend ourselves against the documents that Titulescu made us sign. I have only one regret. That of having made the map of Europe out of precious stones, in such a way that Bessarabia entered the Romanian territory. I tried to correct my mistake by adding an old map, in which the territory of Bessarabia is hatched"⁹.

In fact, as Armand Călinescu rightly intuited, after meeting with Titulescu in Paris on April 30, 1937, he wrote: "It seems that the Russian did not have the authorization of his government. In connection with this

⁸ Viorica Moisuc, *Premisele izolării politice a României. 1919-1940 (The Premises of Romania's Political Isolation. 1919-1940)*, București, Editura Humanitas, 1991, p. 329.

⁹ George G. Potra, *Convorbirile Nicolae Titulescu-Maksim Maksimovici Litvinov de la Talloires. 28 mai 1937 (The Talks Between Nicolae Titulescu and Maksim Maksimovici Litvinov from Talloires. May 28, 1937)*, în lucrarea George G. Potra, *Titulescu. Neuitarea geniului. Culegere de studii, articole, conferințe (Nicolae Titulescu. The Oblivion of Genius. Collection of studies, articles, conferences)*, vol. I, p. 316.

agreement, there had been rumors in the country that the passage of Soviet troops was authorized in case of war. He shows me the text, which is annotated by Litvinov. In reality, it was said that the Russian armies will only pass with the authorization of the Romanian government and will be forced to withdraw as soon as the Romanian government asks for it"¹⁰.

An additional argument for rejections from the Soviets was the fact that, at the end of 1936, King Carol II personally decorated Stanisław Poklewski-Koziell (1868-1939), a Russian diplomat of Polish origin, was envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the Tsarist Empire in Bucharest during the First World War. The gesture of the Romanian sovereign - which expressed the gratitude of the Romanians for the role of the Russian diplomat - was interpreted, forced, by the Soviet mass media, obviously at the order of the Kremlin, as a manifestation of anti-Soviet policy on the part of the Romanians, which is completely false and interpreted in a tendentious way. On July 20, 1937, the newspaper "Pravda" published a special article, titled Politics of Adventures, in which it was mentioned that "the Romanian government demonstratively emphasizes its anti-Soviet tendencies. So, for example, at the end of last year, the former plenipotentiary minister of tsarist Russia, with a resonant name, Poklewski-Koziell, was decorated. This fact, in itself, has a humorous character. But the speech given by the King on the occasion of this important event, without a doubt, was aimed at giving this decoration the character of an anti-Soviet political demonstration"¹¹.

A well-versed "zoon politikon", Tătărescu also exposed to the king the possibility that "if Mr. Titulescu wants to make his resignation a platform for agitation and a weapon at the service of a party, it could disturb our internal political field. However, I reckon that his lordship will not commit this mistake, which would jeopardize his return to international activity and make his relations with other political parties impossible".

¹⁰ Armand Călinescu, *Însemnări politice. 1916 - 1939 (Political Notes. 1916 - 1939)*, edited edition and prefaced by Dr. Al. Gh. Savu, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 1990, p. 348

¹¹ "Pravda", no. 198 of July 20, 1937, apud Nicolae Titulescu, *Opera politico-diplomatică (Political-Diplomatic Works)*. January 1, 1937-December 31, 1937, volume edited by George G. Potra, collaborators Delia Răzdolescu, Daniela Boriceanu, Ana Potra, Gheorghe Neacșu, Part II, Bucharest, Titulescu European Foundation, 2007, p. 898, note 1.

Under these conditions, the prime minister left the decision to eliminate Nicolae Titulescu in the hands of Carol II: "However, Your Majesty will decide as it sees fit, taking into account the superior interests of the country, and I submit to its decision beforehand." As is known, the king's decision - instigated, of course, also by Elena Lupescu, whom the great diplomat virulently criticized - was to reshuffle the Tătărescu government. In these conditions, on August 29, 1936, in the new cabinet, Victor Antonescu, former member of the National Liberal Party, deputy (since 1901), former Minister of Justice (1914-1916, 1933-1935) and of Finance (1916-1917, 1935-1936), but also former minister plenipotentiary in Paris in several times: 1917-1918, 1918-1919, 1922-1924¹².

On July 20, 1936, participating in Montreux, at the Straits Conference, during which he gave a speech, Nicolae Titulescu will go to his residence in Cap Martin, located on the Cote d'Azur, in the south of France, from where he sent several telegrams to Sturdza Palace. Here he will learn, on August 29, 1936, about the reorganization of the Tătărescu government, of which he will no longer be a part. In Nice, Titulescu told the newspaper "Le Figaro": "I did not learn about the formation of the new Romanian Cabinet, which is made up of all former ministers, except me, until after it had been formed. The new government no longer needs my services. It is his right. I would have preferred, however, to have been informed of his intentions beforehand, for I am not the man who would have tried to impose his presence. For the moment I refrain from any assessment and I will not specify my future political attitude"¹³.

Being in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for more than a year, Victor Antonescu will continue the efforts to normalize relations with the Soviet Union, meeting with Maxim Litvinov in Geneva on September 19, 1936. King Carol II, who obeyed everyone to the rumors coming from the Romanian diplomatic and political circles, he came to see in Titulescu a great conspirator against his regime. "It is true that the great chancellor cannot swallow that he is no longer in the Government and, through his

¹² Ion Mamina, Ioan Scurtu, *Guverne și guvernanți* (1916-1938), p. 130; *Organizarea instituțională a Ministerului Afacerilor Externe. Acte și documente*, volumul II. 1920-1947, pp. 544-545 [*Governments and Governors* (1916-1938), p. 130; *The Institutional Organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Acts and Documents*, volume II. 1920-1947, pp. 544-545]

¹³ "Le Figaro", from August 30, 1936, apud Nicolae Titulescu, *Documente diplomatice* (*Diplomatic Documents*), p. 814.

many friends, he is making intrigues" - Carol wrote in his diary, on May 3, 1937, recording several news received from Dinu Cesianu, the Romanian minister in Paris and friend from the king's youth: "He warned the Government about these agitations, but it did not take any measures. He has continuous contact with the Country, through emissaries. All the people who go abroad, even H. Catargi, went to see him at St. Moritz; apart from Argetoianu, he has contact with everyone. In order to collect internal and external weapons, he has contact with Stelian Popescu. On May 3 he saw Știrbey, at the Ritz, between May 6-7 he continues contacts with some from Foreign Affairs; Cantemir, Niculescu-Buzești, Hiott, Athanasiu give him copies after telegrams". Our conclusion is that Titulescu was being spied on by Carol II around the clock. It is not known if, concretely, he ordered the transition to measures to suppress him, nor does his personal secretary Sergiu Nenișor mention such a thing in his evocations. Instead, he mentions the names of his friends: Edvard Beneš, Edouard Herriot, Anthony Eden - the current foreign minister of Great Britain -, Paul-Boncour, the former foreign minister of France, Léon Blum, the former president of the Council, and among those who passed in the world of shadows: King Alexander of Yugoslavia, the late Atatürk, Louis Barthou, Austen Chamberlain, Robert de Flers, Politis, the great professor of international law, whose disciple he was and others. Not missing from the gallery of his friends – Litvinov. Of course, on his policy, Carol II also noted a statement by his great rival, Barbu Știrbey: "I do not recognize King Carol and I will never recognize him; however, the thought of what will happen when it's gone worries me."¹⁴

When he noted this premonition of the former intimate adviser of his parents, Carol II in no way suspected that, in only three years, his policy would lead him to lose the Throne. Cleverly, Titulescu had declared to Georges Masidel, knowing that it would reach the sovereign's ears, that "I have never agreed with King Carol to such an extent: he doesn't want me, I don't want him". In fact, what irritated the sovereign was not only the diplomatic success of his former minister of foreign affairs, still received in Paris as an active head of Romanian diplomacy, but also the statements he made that were in disagreement with the new official foreign policy line coordinated directly by him.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 178.

Although he was no longer the head of Romanian diplomacy, Nicolae Titulescu made, in April 1937, a resounding visit to Paris, the echoes of which in the French press are appended by the King to his diary, as an obvious sign that the problem still interested him, but also irritated him, at the same time. "The French government - we can read in the account of the well-known journalist Pertinax - was obliged to act and, above all, to inform itself, using Mr. Titulescu as a source, who knows, like no one else, the internal problems of Romania. This was received with unusual pomp for former ministers. The dinners, the breakfasts, the reception by the President of the Republic, all of these made it clear that Titulescu's arrival in Paris is much more important than the simple visit of a former Minister of Foreign Affairs from a friendly country. Indeed, Titulescu's actions demonstrated, right from the start, that he is willing to give his visit the real political significance of strict topicality.

As if he had not irritated Carol II enough with his diplomatic actions, Titulescu will meet, on May 29, 1937, in Talloires, a small town near the French-Swiss border, with Maxim Litvinov, the commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., with which he addressed the perspectives of Romanian-Soviet relations, general political developments in Central and Eastern Europe, collective security and the future of the League of Nations.

On this occasion, Litvinov frankly confessed to Titulescu the true Soviet intentions regarding Bessarabia: "For several days, Mr. Victor Antonescu asks me for a de jure recognition of Bessarabia. Or, to ask the U.S.S.R. de jure recognition means on the part of Romania to recognize that it does not possess Bessarabia by virtue of the previous documents you signed (...) Romania, I repeat - you say the opposite in vain - has changed its foreign policy. I want the potential that Bessarabia represents to become Russian, not German. That's why I want to inform you that we will try to retake Bessarabia by all the legal and military means that will be possible for us"¹⁵.

On February 5, 1940, a year before passing into eternity, the former Senior of Foreign Affairs sent a long letter to King Carol II, in which he

¹⁵ George G. Potra, *Convorbirile Nicolae Titulescu-Maksim Maksimovici Litvinov de la Talloires. 28 mai 1937 (The Talks Between Nicolae Titulescu and Maksim Maksimovici Litvinov from Talloires. May 28, 1937)*, în *lucrarea George G. Potra, Titulescu. Neuitarea geniului. Culegere de studii, articole, conferințe (Nicolae Titulescu. The Oblivion of Genius. Collection of studies, articles, conferences)*, vol. I, p. 316., Part II, pp. 899-901, 907-914.

expressed the bitterness caused by his removal from the public life of Romania: "I will not hide that the way I had to leave the Ministry of Foreign Affairs depressed me deeply at first. Not the fact of no longer being a minister, but the way I was fired after 20 years of service to my country, for which I have, along with the thanks of the heads of state I have had the honor to serve, the certificates of all the presidents of the Council with whom I exercised power. What is worse—here is a thing I never wanted to say, but which I am forced to do—is that I felt that the feelings of some members of my family—I told some—had changed from the moment I became a simple private individual and was subjected to ostracism from the Romanian authorities abroad. I have always had the absolute certainty that Your Majesty has nothing to do with the way I have been treated. But the high officials of the state thought they were doing the right thing by doing so. Thus, then, during these last three years, I was never the former minister, I was not even a simple private, I was only the man without a future, towards whom regret was expressed that he had been followed in the past. And, nevertheless, the present and the future of many young Romanians is not due to the kindness of Your Majesty, who was kind enough to give his high approval for their appointment, proposed by me, in important positions?".

Aware of the future importance of Romania's relations with the Soviet Union, Nicolae Titulescu sent him, as a patriotic gesture, on March 9, 1940, an extensive Report on Romanian-Soviet relations, a document in which he will explain his actions and meetings after his dismissal from the position of head of externals. He lived only one year. Upon his death, Carol II recorded, in his Journal, on March 18: This morning, the newspapers announce the death of Titulescu. He has also gone, thus ended a long and glorious period of our international politics. An undeniably smart man, a great talent, but too out of the way besides egocentric, an actor and seeing things more through the legal prism of a lawyer and sometimes too little realistic. These notes could be understood, even interpreted as a tribute that the monarch finally pays to a great servant of Romanian interests across the country's borders.

In one voice, Romanian historiography believes that after returning to the country from the self-exile to which he had personally condemned himself, the monarch made the *divide et impera* principle a way of action and life in his relations with the Romanian political forces. He was no longer a balancing factor between the political parties, such as Carol I and

Ferdinand the Unifier. The first attempt, made in June 1930, was to attract Dinu Brătianu and Gheorghe Tătărescu to his side, from the Liberal Party. Then, from among the People's Party, led by Marshal Averescu, Octavian Goga's group broke away. The most difficult was his relationship with the National Peasant Party, personally with Iuliu Maniu, who ab initio spoke against the restoration. And in this political formation, the monarch made a breach by attracting, in 1935, the older leader Vaida-Voevod and then Armand Călinescu, constituting the "centrist" wing of the PNȚ. Initially, the far right Legionary Movement enjoyed political, moral and material support from the king, so that later it came out from under the tutelage of the throne, appreciating that "occult forces darken the royal crown". In order to feel totally "unchained" she removed from the throne not only Queen Maria, but also her brother, Prince Nicholas, on April 9, 1937.

For the annihilation of Maniu, in 1935 the king launched the idea of forming the Mihalache Government, with Vaida-Voevod at the Interior, and appointed Gabriel Marinescu from the chamber. Faithful to the PNT doctrine, Ion Mihalache did not accept the king's proposal. Then the mandate was entrusted to the servile Gheorghe Tătărescu, with the mission of organizing the elections of December 1937. As no party obtained in that election more than 40% of the total votes to constitute a parliamentary majority / PNL (National Liberal Party) - 35.9% , PNȚ (National Peasants Party) - 20.4% and the "All for the Country" Party of the Legionnaires 15.5%. This - gave the monarch a free hand to appoint to the government the political formation most faithful to his personal interests. This is how Octavian Goga, the president of the National Christian Party, an old and determined opponent of Maniu, came to the head of the government in 1938 / in the elections they had won only 9.15% of the votes/. He manages, at the same time, to make another breach in the PNȚ by attracting the "centrists", appointing Armand Călinescu to the position of Minister of the Interior. Deeply outraged by the manner in which Carol II proceeded, who did not consult him, at least formally, in relation to solving the political crisis, he declared that the Goga government had become "a real challenge to the nation". From 1938, the Iron Guard will attack the democratic regime from all sides, arguing for the reorientation of the country's foreign policy towards the Berlin-Rome Axis. Octavian Goga negotiated a secret agreement with Corneliu Zelea Codreanu. In this context, on February 18, 1938, Carol dismissed Goga from the presidency of the Council of Ministers and established a government headed by patriarch Miron Cristea. He


suspended the 1923 Constitution, drafting a new fundamental law that was promulgated on February 27, 1938, the monarchy ensuring a dominant position in the country's political system, establishing the Crown Council as an advisory body with members appointed by the king, and on On December 16, the National Renaissance Front was established, "the only political organization in the state", transformed on June 22, 1940 into the Party of the Nation - "Unique and Totalitarian Party".



King Carol II



Philosophy



PLATONIC IDEA OF TRUTH PLEASURE – MOTIVE AND MEANS OF HUMAN WILL AND ACTION IN EUGEN RUSSU'S VISION

Ph.D. Constantin STROE

Abstract: *Mathematician and university professor, Eugen Russu had original and unconventional philosophical concerns about Man, Morality, Creation and Human Action. His main work of philosophical anthropology, published in 1940, is suggestively titled About Man. The present article dwells on his conception of pleasure in its instrument specification by which "Nature determines the same kind of actions, without explicitly making the purpose of the ensembles of facts that constitute Life visible to us". This study examines his conception of pleasure as a motive and means of human will and action. Eugen Russu postulates that it is very important not to limit the meaning of the term "pleasure" only to direct or material pleasures. Pleasure, he asserts, is of several kinds and is the equivalent of the accomplished deed satisfaction, and especially the path traveled until final achievement (the same way as the Platonic idea of truth: it is not the truth as such that is of particular importance, but the path followed for its discovery).*

Eugen Russu (b. 15.12.1910, Tecuci – d. 07.05.1983, Bucharest) was a mathematician, high school teacher (Iași, Târgu Mureș, Bucharest) and university professor (Bucharest). He had original philosophical concerns about man, morality, creation and human action. His philosophical anthropology main work, published in 1940, is suggestively titled *About Man*.

In a previous study¹ dedicated to his work, I insisted on his concept of pleasure as instrument by which "Nature sets the same kind of actions to us without explicitly making the purpose of the sets of facts that constitute

¹ See Constantin Stroe, *About man and his morality (Eugen Russu)*, in vol. "Studies of the history of Romanian philosophy", 18/2022 (in progress at the Publishing House of the Romanian Academy)

Life visible to us"². In the present study I will analyze his concept of pleasure as motive and means of human will and action. In this conceptual context, Eugen Russu notes it is very important not to limit the meaning of the term pleasure only to "direct or material pleasures". The pleasures, he says, are many and of "different kinds". For him, pleasure is the equivalent to satisfaction of the accomplished deed, and, especially, to the path traveled until its final realization (in the same way as the Platonic idea of truth: it is not the truth as such that is of particular importance, but the path followed for its discovery).

"Placement within the real ideal conditions produces an affective state of satisfaction, for which we can maintain the term pleasure..."³, he specified. From such a point of view, he notes the difference between primitive man, driven to satisfy his instincts or to fight for the conditions in which these instincts are satisfied, through the mechanism of pleasure, and the evolved man of today, who feels driven to live up to the conditions of his real ideal⁴, or to fight for their achievement by a mechanism of the same essence. So: instinct versus ideal, the realization mechanism being the same.

There is a difference not only for the same human individual over different ages, but also from one individual to another, as to the sum of the life conditions which do or do not ensure the attainment of pleasure.

Russu says there is another difference "not looking at the directions of life, but at its intensity. According to the individual and to the era in which he is located, the quantity of pleasures necessary for life is different. "We can call vital energy the need and urgency that, at a given moment, an individual feels in order to get this amount. It is the impetus for life in general, to gain pleasure"⁵.

The moment they direct their thoughts to a goal⁶, to an endeavour, which they ardently desire to accomplish, human individuals feel a vital energy within them, mobilizing and preparing them to get to that point. At

² Eugen Russu, Notes about THE MAN, Thought – Georgescu Delafras, Bucharest, 1940, p.41

³ Idem, p.39

⁴ "Since we are talking about real longings, desires that warm the whole being, towards which the individual feels totally, without reservations, trained, we will call the set of longings of this nature, real ideal" (*Ibidem*, p. 35). Russu attributes this qualification of real to it, to distinguish it from the theoretical ideal.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p.47-48

⁶ Russu uses the term *impetus* with the meaning of aspiration and that of tendency with the meaning of desire, inclination, propensity and sometimes even attitude.

the opposite side, when they do not want anything, their vital energy is absent or "sleeping", thus defining what is called a lack of "lust for life".

According to Eugen Russu, we can speak of a certain legitimacy: "The amount of energy spent is translated into the amount of pleasure obtained"⁷ or "the total amount of pleasure experienced must correspond to the vital energy consumed"⁸.

The need for a significant amount of pleasure can also result in the strengthening and special use of the will, as, for example, the acceptance of some present sufferings, in view of greater future pleasures.

At the opposite end, the use of reduced vital energy occurs when the individual is satisfied with "small leaps of pleasure and longer stay on the same stage" and, therefore, "limit to a smaller number of life plans"⁹.

An individual's life, if lived multilaterally "in several domain categories", sees each of them having a pleasure input. "This input will be reduced, so that the sum will fit all"; if that life is less lived, the leaps must be greater. Vital energy is not divided equally. If it is spent more in one area, it must be saved in another, at the expense of other ways of satisfaction. Vital energy also depends on the constitution and physical health of the individual but also, to a very large extent, on his mental health.

The manifestation of pleasure as human activity engine is detailed by Eugen Russu as follows: there are tendencies within the perimeter of an individual's real ideal components that are to be imperatively satisfied. There are also some secondary, weaker ones that can even remain unsatisfied forever. A secondary role tendency can be abandoned, as the individual easily abandoning it does not feel the need to see it as an aspiration. Of course this causes a displeasure which shows that it ought to, or "would have been better" if it were satisfied. This displeasure stops at a certain limit, which indicates that that particular tendency's fulfillment was not, however, imperative. Eugen Russu talks about the fact that some trends in what he calls the real ideal have a periodic trait and others do not. For example, nutrition is periodic, and for its fulfillment it assumes an attraction towards the state of pleasure. A tendency which, however, lacks periodicity also demands its achievement via the same attraction towards the state of pleasure, he points out. "But, Russu emphasizes, the role of life is not limited to a single satisfaction" but "it seeks to extract from a given individual as much facts or "experiences" as possible. This happens

⁷ *Ibidem*, p.48

⁸ *Ibidem*, p.65

⁹ *Ibidem*, p.48

because that state of pleasure related to any particular situation wears out, it cannot last too long"¹⁰.

The consequence is that man is in "eternal turmoil, in eternal evolution towards the complex" aiming at the need for a new pleasure gain, as the previous one has been exhausted. Man cannot stagnate, as it "eternally desires something higher or something else". When he reaches a desired state he feels pleasure, even "a feeling of triumph and satisfaction", this being precisely the pleasure that prompted him on the way traveled so far. "But, says Eugen Russu, gradually, the emotional temperature is lowering. The state he experiences switches from habit to indifference. The soul experiences dissatisfactions again, an organic pleasure thirst, the attachment to a new, different or higher longing. A new training for a new pleasure"¹¹.

According to Eugen Russu, happiness arises precisely from this continuous transformation. The reverse of happiness is sadness, whose content is the unpleasantness caused by the intervention of fortuitous circumstances that make the individual suddenly leave the pleasant situation in which he was. The grief is all the more vivid the more sudden the breakup was, and the newer situation he ends up in is at a lower level compared to the original one. The presence of the first situation in his mind and, therefore, the presence of dissatisfaction, lasts until the sorrow is consumed and a state of indifference arises.

As it can be seen, the essential role is played here by the situation of indifference. Russu specifies that this character of indifference is given to a situation by the idea of finality. But when "the idea of "definitely" turned out to be false", i.e. one loses something "without expecting it", and one realizes that the situation one lost was actually pleasant, regret arises which gives one the impetus for a call for recovery"¹².

In Eugen Russu's opinion, an individual placed in the situation of satisfying his desires, immediately and "automatically", sees the corresponding pleasures as anemic because of their certainty. Such an individual must discover areas in which to conquer his own pleasure, passing through the whole natural range of soul states, because otherwise he remains unfulfilled, "unhappy".

The activism promoted by Russu clearly emerges here. He very carefully notes the fact that "affective states are distributed in such a way as to always trigger action". This makes life a continuous manifestation of

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p.42

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p.43

¹² *Ibidem*, p.45

energy, set in motion precisely by the appropriate dosage of affective states.

Eugen Russu is of the opinion that final pleasure - as the first driving factor of an action - can remain as the only determinant only when the circumstances require a maximization of the work, an effort that exceeds the rhythm of pleasant activity. Such a case may occur when the ultimate pleasure or interest is of paramount importance. Demanding a maximum effort, mobilization of the full range of individual possibilities is also a call to the present organic resources but, in the same time, a warning given to them in order to temper - in the individual or his descendants - the forces that are necessary in the future. The rule is, he concludes, that unlike "pleasurable activities in themselves which seem to exercise and maintain existing forces, purposeful activities cause their strengthening and refinement."¹³

But he qualifies the above by observing that "it is not the activity appreciated as a thing in itself, with its objective meaning, which gives us the key to the transformations it causes", but an activity with a "soul atmosphere of pleasure" (but not a passive one, "in distressing tasting") with a full of momentum discharge tension and rhythm of vital capacities. He qualifies this mechanism of evolution, based on an intense rhythm of living as "a creative rhythm" and states that the most numerous are the cases when living happened in a soulful atmosphere of pleasant tension, in a creative rhythm.

It is fundamental that the soul rhythm in which an activity takes place should be natural and pleasant, not forced and artificial. Eugen Russu exemplifies with work (which often appears as something coercive and forceful) and school (where a forceful coercion hides under the deceptive appearance of complete freedom), situations in which activities "are "forcefully" carried out, with a heavy heart, constrained, with a soul full of insult and discouragement"¹⁴.

In the same range of activities carried out without the "living engine of pleasure" Russu includes "automatic activities", i.e. those that are repeated the same way, with the same concrete content, ad infinitum.

I have shown before (see above) that Eugen Russu speaks of a compensation effect when several and different domains of life are engaged, due to which the limitation to few domains results in the emphasis of life in them, in order to obtain the minimum necessary quantum for pleasure. This offset effect can only occur for independent domains. But when the fields are dependent and, above all, compatible, the act that leads

¹³ *Ibidem*, p.32

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p.52-53

to the realization manifests with a vital energy, a special intensity, unhindered by anything.

For example, if moral perfection is in contradiction with another type of pleasure, the latter, and even others, must be given up so that all the vital energy available to the individual is channeled to the desired direction: moral perfection. In this respect, it is clear that the individual will have all the more strength, the more his life does not find the necessary pleasure elsewhere and all the clearer as, this way, the total force is concentrated but diminished¹⁵.

But if the individual's aspiration is directed towards artistic creation this does not contradict to other tendencies, but, on the contrary, satisfies them on the same path, and the vital energy that would have discharged on several different paths is discharged on only one with the intensity gathered from all the tendencies. In this case the total force is concentrated, without being reduced, as in the previous example.

It is not difficult to see that Eugen Russu recommends that, in order to live a happy life, the individual has to harmonize his tendencies, desires, aspirations, so that they can be easily satisfied in common ways and, in the same time, avoid to opt for different tendencies and aspirations opposing each other. In short, he advises the individual to harmonize the components of his life and avoid disharmony.

But he is wise enough to point out that, although "a general remark can still be made", it is not possible to state "uniform rules in this regard, applicable to everyone, everything depending on the organic and spiritual conformation of each one¹⁶".

While the primitive man had a very limited sphere of pleasures, limited to those directly satisfying the individual - centered on the pleasure of nutrition and sex, the modern man - in addition to these two plans of life - has other individual pleasures: "putting the thinking faculties to work can give pleasure to Science; through sensibility he can taste the Beautiful in Art; through physical forces, in sports¹⁷". Although the latter are not subject to the declining pace of the former, they do not prove to be sufficient either.

Eugen Russu thinks that, in addition to strict individual aspirations-tendencies, at a given moment, one finds additional society useful aspirations in the soul of today's man. In other words, through socialization man aims at turning from a blind instrument of Nature to a stronger instrument of life. The satisfaction procured by achieving such endeavors can no longer be so easily limited because, "while strictly individual

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p.68

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p.71

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p.71

pleasures, sooner or later, wear out, the social utility satisfaction and thirst can always be like meeting new faces. Perhaps we obscurely sense that life in general plays a much more important role than that portion contained in an individual even if that individual is us¹⁸". Which means that in every individual one can simultaneously find purely selfish tendencies and tendencies of satisfaction through altruism. Man's mastery consists in not letting them come into conflict, but coordinating them, in the sense of fully experiencing purely selfish tendencies and correlatively neglecting altruistic ones and vice versa: highlighting the altruistic tendencies and correlatively satisfying selfish ones with indifference.

In the same biunivocal relationship register, Eugen Russu also records the link between intention and deed. The existence of a "well-proportioned dosage" plays an essential role between the imagined intention and the actual possibilities of achievement. That is, there must be "a mutual conditioning: the intention determines setting the forces, poses the problem of a great result and their execution under such conditions educates them along the lines that prove necessary, while the forces of achievement also determine the level, or even the nature, of intent, according to their actual possibilities¹⁹".

Secondly, the individual must also imagine the affective state related to the urge, because this causes the pleasure expectation, it is the engine that drives the impulse to/for the act. Only the obtained image changes along the way, by joining the affective state determined by the path, which can be placed in the meaning but also in the action. In such a circumstance, the deed is carried out to its end only "if the resultant between the expectation of the final pleasure and the eventual pleasure of the deployment of the forces overwhelms the inconveniences encountered²⁰". Thirdly, "the proportioning between achievement forces' intent and maximum effect should be done from the beginning, as fairly as possible", resulting in the requirement that "imagining the goal should be simultaneous with the most accurate representation of the ways of achievement" announcing to the "resources of being that effort is needed. "Imagining the goal means the conviction that it is useful, the path that it is necessary, the effort²¹"

According to his own confession, all the above are three very simple truths, explicitly exposed by him with the aim of proving that in the present man they are not respected in most cases "and, because of this failure to

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p.72

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p.74

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p.74-75

²¹ *Ibidem*, p.75

respect the natural way of thinking, an obsession has the effect of a false soul formation, sick experiences²² and, in the extreme, real and terrible illnesses".

If it is about something imagined and not real, another fact of life is achieved: dreaming ("the dream"), a dream with its own goal and not the image that serves to train in a real way towards it. Here it is no longer a question of "proportioning between intent and the possibilities of action, nor is it of imagining the ways of achievement, but of the imagination that travels easily and with its own power". Everything - actual possibilities, ways to get there - must give the impression of being real. "The dreamer only oscillates between the fantasyland he creates and the concrete reality into which he fatally falls back." And, once back in reality, "the more times he lived the dream, the more he realizes that he deliberately deceived himself, that he lives on a false plan²³". That's why, Russu points out, "the habit of living in dreams forms a structure incapable of fitting into action²⁴" and, as a result, it becomes difficult to live in real life.

In this created ideational context he analyzes two types of dreamers: the first is represented by those who, although they "achieved all the components of the real ideal", destroyed the possibility of its achievement "through damping the momentum by dreaming and not by educating the respective forces", "or when the tendency to dream was provoked by certain causes (...) only the domains of life that were provoked to the dream were falsely lived and exhausted. There are life plans left in him (in the individual) that can be truly lived. He may still have initiatives of his own, untamed in the imagination, which have remained alive and healthy. Such initiatives can be used to discharge the accumulated vital energy; without realizing it, the individual will strongly seek their gratification²⁵". Pleasure will be obtained most of the time, in an intense way, but also in another area, usually in an artistic field: poetry, painting, sculpture, music, etc. The artistic form that appears as a compensation, but also as a sublimation of experience, is "still an imaginative experience, which, however, ends this time with a positive satisfaction: that of creation".

²² Eugen Russu warns that one can arrive at ill-thought-out aspirations ("desires") for two reasons: 1) the improvement of the imagination "which becomes capable of rising far above the immediate reality and creating almost clear situations, thus determining an almost transposition fill"; 2) "because in this imagination of the situation there is a pleasure, in a much easier way than the real one", which he calls "the pleasure of dreaming" (*Ibidem*, p. 75)

²³ *Ibidem*, p.77

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p.76

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p.80

This "transfer" of vital energy was seen by Freud from another point of view: the sexual instinct is "repressed" and has to be "sublimated" in other areas such as literary creation (see in detail pp. 80- 81).

"The second type of dreamer is the one who dreams about all areas of his life. The one who varied the pleasure of the dream in every way, applying it to all his initiatives, thus cutting off the possibility of turning them into a living act, for all the categories of pleasures he could have had²⁶". There are circumstances, Eugen Russu shows, when such an individual can be influenced from outside to imprint and desire another, new field of life, which he had not known before. Be careful, however, that the dreamer does not slip back into imaginary living, too imprinted by habit!

A principle conveyed by Eugen Russu is that it is not someone else who must guard one's psychological processes, but the person in question. He is the one who must realize that the domains in which he could have integrated disappear, one by one, into the abyss of hallucination, from where they can no longer be brought spontaneously, but only through his intervention, in order to be lived for real. Therefore, he must be educated as a man of action and not just allowed to continuously criticize, unconsciously linking all the circumstances that he faces to his ideal states which he dreamed (imagined). He must not be left to mourn in vain under their burden. Because this continued dissatisfaction state leads him again to the dream refuge, which worsens the situation, leading to psychoneurosis²⁷.

Eugen Russu sees "healing" as possible through "explaining the causes, through a self-critical look at the sick way of thinking and living, through the decision to change the style, interweaving thinking with achievement in the future. (...). Let this be a progressive training in thinking the intention only according to its achievement²⁸".

The "healthy life conduct" is obtained through a mechanism that integrates a sequence of steps, each being composed of: aspiration, drive, pleasure, possibilities, deed (action), achievement, happiness (if applicable). There must be close connections between these steps (elements) of the life mechanism. Most often they are intertwined, for example, intent and deed (see above), intent and possibilities, etc.

As for the last pair, Eugen Russu claims that concordance between its elements is necessary, i.e. between "what you wanted" (desire) and "what you could" (possibilities), in order for soul life to be fulfilled without disappointments and sorrows. In this respect, he prescribes the individual

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p.82

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p.82-83

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p.83

the permanent concern to seek educating himself for "the life in which intent is as closely as possible intertwined with the deed".

"Some philosophers or even important currents of morality have predicted this - a possible desire level lowering..., so that its level and the level of reality are the same", but this lowering does not allow for the exit from the indifference state, which is a false state, because "this is only possible through a forced attitude, imposed on the ego by a false reasoning, in which happiness is conditioned only by the correspondence between intention and deed, ignoring the other essential condition: the ascending rhythm²⁹". However, here the fact that "the natural role of life is in motion, not at rest" was eluded. In order to avoid disappointment instead of triumph, Eugen Russu proposes that individuals choose aspirations that are neither too high (overvaluation) nor too low (undervaluation) to the immediately accessible reality. Where life is devoid of a lively evolutionary movement, there is a risk of capping.

In this order of ideas, he formulates "several principles that can help improve each other: intent according to the forces; or forces depending on intent³⁰".

These are: 1) self-knowledge ("own knowledge") which must start from one's own states captured by subjective intelligence (the one "altered by one's own love, by preconceived ideas", and not by "the intelligence that dissects and schematizes external reality to derive causes, effects, laws") and go up to the achievement faculties related to the real ideal; 2) waiting, both with hope of a favorable event, and with fear, with hope of failure, of an unfavorable event for which the individual must be prepared - to be able to wait and bear both the good and the bad. This is because "continuous disillusionment means explicitly and currently waiting for a happiness that never comes. To wait in the same way for a misfortune means to unnecessarily subject oneself to a continuous imaginary threat³¹".

Asking for caution in any kind of activity, Eugen Russu states that "man is not allowed to play it safe. He does not have to predict events and wait for them. He has to fight. And the beauty of fight is the hope for success, without certainly predicting it, the doubt you are gripped by to liven up your nerves, to appeal to the full range of possibilities³²".

The active attitude promoted by Eugen Russu, in his view, involves abandoning repetitive thought, "confident in one's own strength" and the certainty of the intended effect, as a fact accomplished, and embracing,

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p.93

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p.94

³¹ *Ibidem*, p.97

³² *Ibidem*, p.101

orienting towards creative thought, which is frequently associated with inspiration. "Inspiration comes to the one who has certainly not believed in it, so as not to live the fact as accomplished too soon. Our powers of divination remain alive and alert, when our soul lives in the present, when the thought has not transposed you to see how good that already done would be, but a doubt about obtaining the result keeps you in the real and present situation: you aim towards, you just want, you want to find"³³.

Seeing himself as a fighter against the circumstances of life, man must prove his will. "In a test of will the outcome is doubted and our being unconsciously hardens itself with more strength to succeed. When the test is successful, then this leads to the self-qualification as a man of will, which together with the formula "will overturns mountains" establishes a mental atmosphere of anticipated security, of looking at success with "confidence", incapable of causing a maximization of the forces of achievement"³⁴.

Eugen Russu speaks of a myth of the will, which he sees created in a time when man appeared as a master. In fact, he was "only an instrument for the manifestation of some vital evolution laws that he did not create", misinterpreting a "natural tendency to persevere". However, "the impact mechanism is more nuanced than we thought", says Eugen Russu apodictically.

The nuance in question refers to the difference in principle between mechanical determinism, mostly specific to the material world, through causality of the type: under the same conditions, a cause necessarily has the same effect, and the soul domain specific determinism where "the soul is full of unpredictability". The laws of soul manifestation are not known in the same way as the immutable and necessary laws of the material world. This is where Eugen Russu derives his thesis from. According to it, if in the field of inert matter knowledge the human intelligence must "work with a plan", "the action on matter must be planned", in the soul field knowledge the intelligence no longer proceeds this way. Because in this last field, says Russu, "there is a whole past, so many phenomena happened in it and all of them have an importance, all of them have left their mark, all of them are so dependent on each other that intelligence can no longer separate precise qualities, in limited number. The consequence of this is to be predicted on the basis of simple and fixed laws"³⁵.

It is true, however, that even here one can "plan", in the sense that one can conceive "the basic plan of known things that have happened and which we think will happen again under similar circumstances". But here

³³ *Ibidem*, p.100

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p.107

³⁵ *Ibidem*, p.108

the previously established intellectual plan no longer has the same value and meaning, because it must be taken into account that the natural, continuous change of the soul happens. Therefore, a new and important part of the soul content changes the overall circumstances of the phenomenon.

Acting in accordance with a pre-established plan, in Eugen Russu's opinion, "means obeying as a slave the orders you received from someone else", although this contradicts the fact that, as he also says, the human soul has a tendency of independence, free will, which manifests itself even in relation to his past self.

He notes that there are enough people who have managed to remove this requirement of free and actual determination and "therefore to conform to pre-ordained facts, at least in their formal and external part if not in the rhythm of the soul which cannot be determined according to provisions³⁶".

But he is also the one who notices the existence of the strong-willed man in society, who does not accept revisions of attitude, hesitations, reconsideration. The man of will has neither doubt nor certainty of success. He knows he must execute, like a disciplined soldier, higher orders which he has no right to discuss. Hesitations - if any - can only appear in making the decision, otherwise the deed follows the course indicated from the beginning, according to the "plan", methodical and continuous, uninterrupted and equal. Although uncompromising and "scrupulous in duty", the man of will is seen by Russu as a slave of his ambitions. In the case of a strong-willed person, the experienced soul fact is the ferocity to the deed derived not from the actual pleasure of the activity or from the attraction of its direct result from the decision (the result weighed until the decision was made). Once taken, the decision is the only engine of the deed, which is performed monotonously and tenaciously, without the rhythm and undulations of an action dictated by pleasure.

From this point of view, he asserts that the will manifests only where the mechanized and continuous rhythm of action it provokes is sufficient - in this case in living, creative actions. Where a rich, varied, dynamic soul content is needed, the will alone cannot bring it about.

Hence his conclusion that "the most authentic and wonderful human creations do not have will as their engine" because, he believes, in the soul of the creator, the artistic work "grows like an organic being, continuously, naturally, through a necessity of almost free and spontaneous events interiors, like life itself, by no means by a violent harness, whipped by the will, to a movement of a single and determined direction".

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p.110

We must not imagine the will of the creator (creator man, not God) as a force that haunts him and compels him to do things against his will. On the contrary, "the will implies keeping a goal and a unique and certain way to reach it in mind, regardless of its compatibility with the actual circumstances, regardless of whether or not these circumstances converge towards it"³⁷.

Man is free to choose which kind of creation he devotes himself to, without the will intervening in any way. In most cases, he notes, it happens that "in random directions and with no voluntary effort" these creations are small. Therefore, he will naturally assume that things are different if, in order for them to gain value and amplitude, it is necessary that among the determining circumstances there is also the personal taste for a certain type of activity, a taste that maintains the concerns on a continuous upward line.

So, in short, there is no trace of will here, but of "an increased inclination into itself, along with successive achievements and an indulgence in this kind of activity" (The example given by Russu is Science since, he considers, "it has no purpose, its engine is the pleasure of discovery and knowing, its practical utility often comes as a surprise." The same can be said of Philosophy, which we know arose and subsisted as "knowledge for the sake of of knowledge", out of pure intellectual passion).

We find interesting theses in Eugen Russu's vision of creation, such as those that claim that the presence of will is ridiculous in the creator's decision (because he will never trumpet: "I want" to be an artist, "I want" to write a poem, etc.), or that the idea of effort has almost no place in the creative process. Therefore, he writes, "in the mind of the scholar, ideas link to one another, grow and turn themselves into a new and original organic whole, by the nature of things. The effort, no matter how superhuman, would not lead to result"³⁸. Not needing even a minimum of voluntary effort to distinguish what is happening around him, this is how it is explained, says Russu, that "some discoveries were made in a dream or in a semi-awake state near sleep".

The conclusion he drew from the above facts is justified and valid in mente and in re: "The will, seen as a long patience, as a sacrifice of present pleasures for the discounting of a special result, represents an important soul attribute. But her "omnipotence" is a dangerous myth; as well as her transformation into blind obstinacy"³⁹.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p.111

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p.112

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p.113

The main idea of the mathematician with an aptitude for the psychomoral field about the concept of man is that pleasure is what motivates man's action, without being its goal. The direct consequence of this thesis is that pleasure is not the decisive factor in the achievement of happiness. A condition of happiness is, in Eugen Russu's opinion, "the link between intention and the real fact", but even this alone cannot give it. Because, in reality, "happiness means that the rhythm of life has three stages: impetus, pleasure, state of indifference, so that from this last stage it bows again". However, this is exactly the rhythm that Nature intended for her purposes.

Some have speculated on the connection I mentioned above and proposed, as a condition of happiness, the proximity of the longing of achievement, by lowering the level of longing to the immediately accessible reality. But Russu bluntly states: "forcibly lowering your ambition is a trick which cannot give organic satisfaction" because it contradicts "the nature of things". This way one cannot actually achieve real happiness.

We also encounter this lowering of the aspirations level other than determined by a "philosophical" conception (as above), namely "by not being fit and not being trained in the gear of the deed, by what is called the usual, laziness.⁴⁰" To this is added blasé, boredom - expressions hiding a lack of determination to act or masking an existing eagerness, unadjusted. In short, they indicate the real absence of any intent.

As a whole, modern civilized life, Russu shows, is faced with circumstances - such as those above - in which the individual is very easily satisfied, "tasting too much pleasure without having done anything", without being somehow active. The consequences would be that he "remains deed uneducated", i.e. he does not realize that "it is not enough to sanely think about the intention and seek to represent your way in advance with the difficulties and the affective connected with it". Or, he warns, "these are necessary as a preparation. The effect should not be giving up, blaspheming, but one should pursue educating the forces of achievement as well as the conditions in which the maximum yield can be obtained, life being all the healthier the heavier it is lived"⁴¹.

In such an ideational horizon, Eugen Russu speaks of the necessity of deed education, starting precisely from the idea that, unlike heredity, pleasure and affective life - , the power of judgment, will and physical strength - are essential elements for deed achievement that can be educated.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p.114

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p.115

Therefore, he notes, "we will outline some of the conditions of this deed education": work, non-abandonment, half-achievements, pleasurable activities. (see in detail pp.116-126).

The individual's own perfection is the goal of all of the above entwined, by putting them into work ("tendency dug deep in the human being"), but not as "consciously willed perfection, in itself, when its necessity has not been felt in purposeful, precise and important deeds". This is because while distinguishing the real from the abstract (of notions), Eugen Russu says that "Pure perfection is a notion born through abstraction; the fundamental notion is the improvement related to a concrete purpose. Therefore, without condemning the actions made only with a view to improvement, those that also have a concrete target are preferable, in such a way as to make the necessity of this improvement evident"⁴².

"This self-improvement is compatible with the tendency towards altruism, since it can be put at the service of social utility. It is also compatible with selfish tendencies and can, in some cases, be put to their service. Therefore, it must enter unconditionally into the composition of the real ideal.

To summarize, it must be harmoniously organized around the idea of self-improvement, gained at the expense of emphasizing primitive pleasures and put at the service of the tendencies that can give the most highlighted and happy life, the altruistic tendencies"⁴³.

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⁴² *Ibidem*, p.126

⁴³ *Ibidem*, p.73

House, 2015), *Ethical utterances in Romanian philosophy. Studies in the history of Romanian moral reflection*, vol I (2008; reissue 2010, Editura Grinta-Cluj-Napoca), vol. II (Ars Docendi, 2017), vol. III (Ars Docendi, 2019), *Ethical utterances in Romanian culture* (Ars Docendi Publishing House, 2017), *The ethical-moral dimension of the philosophical system of Vasile Băncilă* (Istros Publishing House of the Brăilei "Carol I" Museum, 2021), *Diffused Providentialism. The philosophical system with metaphysical foundations and ethical-cultural purposes of Vasile Băncilă* (same publisher, Brăila, 2022).

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF AN EDUCATIONAL CONCEPT: LINGUISTIC MEDIATION. MRS. VALERIA FEDELI'S SPEECH AT THE TESEO INSTITUTE

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RESEARCH TOPIC AND METHOD

Through this article, we propose to put into circulation a document on the philosophy of education: the speech of Mrs. Valeria Fedeli at the open day organized on May 27, 2021 by the TESEO institute. In a magazine with a mixed profile, history and philosophy, we thus use a research method specific to history in deepening a philosophy theme, more specifically from the philosophy of education. In the society of knowledge, it is natural to expand the list of types of documents that can be placed in the circuit of scientific research.

Our article remains in the sphere of philosophy. Unlike the usually relatively brief presentations of the document put into circulation made by history researchers, we will place it in the context of the doctrine of the philosophy of education and highlight its basic ideas. Our article is a contribution to the research of a problem of the philosophy of education as it presents itself nowadays.

THE CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH

The distinct position of the philosophy of education in the great science called philosophy is already accepted, not only at the level of great thinkers or established specialists, but also in the media dedicated to philosophy readers or those concerned with general culture (<http://britannica>, 2022). The philosophy of education has its distinct place, both as a field of research and as a study discipline in bachelor's or master's programs (Borozan & Betivu, 2021). The philosophy of education is at the same time in close relation with the management of education, with pedagogy, with the psychology of education, with social innovation

projects. True doctrines of the philosophy of education were outlined (<http://unesco>, 2022).

There is a process of updating the philosophy of education, according to the current technological realities (Raley Y and Preyer G., 2010). However, much more difficult and complex is the concordance between established theories in the philosophy of education and the desires for social innovation existing worldwide. We find treated in recent studies issues such as the necessary changes in the philosophy of education, creativity in education, the relationship between complexity and truth in education, the need for a new research agenda in education (Mason, 2008).

THE THEORETICAL CONTEXT OF THE APPEARANCE OF THE ANALYZED DOCUMENT

Italian research in the field of philosophy of education could be noticed for a long time. We also find studies reviewing these contributions for different time periods (Wolf, 1984). Internationally we find studies reviewing these contributions for different periods of time (Wolf, 1984).

The entire evolution of the debates on the philosophy of education and its implications in the effective management of education in Italy can be found in works on the history of schooling (De Giorgi, 2019), in textbooks of comparative education (Barbieri et al, 2018) or in debates on major themes of the philosophy of education (Al Kalak & De Giorgi, 2018; Pruneri, 2014). We also find fundamental ideas of the philosophy of education widely accepted internationally formed at the Italian school (Montessori M, 2016; Montessori M, 2018).

SOME CURRENT TRENDS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION CONSIDERED BY THE MODEL FORMULATED BY VALERIA FEDELI

Among the new problems that must be in the attention of the philosophy of education are the integration in the collectivities formed for education (Golu, 2010), the influences from the family and the external environment on education , with details on aspects of an ethnic nature (Branc, 2006). For this reason we need friendly school units for all those

who want to learn, distributed proportionally on the national territory, even more so in countries with regional gaps.

At the border between the philosophy of education and social action in the field of education are the doctrines that identify the objectives of each stage of the education process. In the exploration stage specific to the 15-24 years period, needs, interests, abilities and opportunities are identified (Super, 1957). Also on this border we find the new realities of society (Popescu & Mihăilă, 2012) for which new requirements or objectives of education appear. If we were to summarize them in a single word, all this could be expressed by the word *communication*.

One of the probable trajectories of the philosophy of education is its quiet *connection with the philosophy of professional development*, a field that has become autonomous from a functional point of view (Marga, 2018), but which nevertheless remained closely linked to that of education, at least from a philosophical point of view (Jepsen, 1994). The link at the level of philosophical concepts between education and training leads us on the social action level to a new stage in the development of research into the problem of integrating communication with learning (le Boterf, 2000).

On the other hand, in the age of globalization, the philosophy of education includes the theme of the person's identity from the perspective of the school cycle he has completed. Recent studies emphasize that on a professional level, with reference to the individual, competence is an attribute of the person (Chirimbu, 2019).

The philosophy of education acquired in its evolution the ability to connect with the different religions practiced by people. Some themes raised by religious thought can be the basis of the general development of the philosophy of education. For example, the theory of observing the world in a distorted way, through colored lenses (Matsumoto, 2020), according to Buddhist teaching, brings to the forefront for education the objective of forming the ability to see the world in which we live as it is, that of deeper understanding of people and meanings. The connection of education to the increasingly dynamic demands of society and the economy has been presented more and more pressingly in the 20th century from many perspectives. Among these, the problem of the intellectual qualities of the staff (Kazuo, 1995) seems to raise the most difficult problems for education in general, for the philosophy of education in particular.

**A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE DOCUMENT IN CIRCULATION.
SOME ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION
IN THE SPEECH OF MRS. VALERIA FEDELI**

Mainly, Mrs. Valeria Fedeli's speech is focused on the curriculum issue. One of the problems that the philosophy of education addresses is the content of the training of pupils, students and master's students. Mrs. Valeria Fedeli refers to the preparation for the linguistic mediation specialization. All references take into account the realities of today and those of the next period.

In order for the solutions of the philosophy of education to be applicable, they must be connected to reality. In this sense, we observe the balance between the two constraints specific to education in the European Union countries: the national organizational framework and market developments or community norms in the field of education (including the Bologna system also valid outside the European Union). The method of international comparisons is used by Mrs. Valeria Fedeli in an appropriate way. The data from Italy are compared with those of two other neighboring and similar states: Germany and France.

The Superior School of Linguistic Mediation is seen by Valeria Fedeli as an instrument of social action in which the concept of communication retains its central role. Linguistic mediation specialization becomes, according to the presented document, part of a new vision on education, an integrative, socially innovative vision. This new vision of linguistic mediation aims at intercultural relations, the construction of new meanings, the realization of functions of public interest, increasing the pleasure of reading, the radical modification of the current consumption model, the creation of a new world based on mutual knowledge between people. We thus observe the European strand of thought in which philosophy, through any of its fields of specialization, is closely linked to social action. We were pleased to see in Mrs. Valeria Fedeli's philosophical vision of education including the deep European vein, simultaneously existing in each of the national philosophies.

According to him, philosophy, including that of education, contributes to the radical transformation of man, both as a thinking being and as an active being (Bărnutiu, 2002).

It is no secret that a true Christian philosophy was formed on the territory of Italy, surpassing the classical framework of theology, in which culture, thought and education are the dialogue partners of the Divine message on all the meridians of the globe (Francis, 2018). Valeria Fedeli capitalizes on the wisdom of the Holy Father's criticism of surface contact between people and proposes the transition to the cultural dimension of communication, which can also be achieved through linguistic mediation.

FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH

We are convinced that the method of putting documents into circulation will be extended, even beyond the field of philosophy of education. At the same time, we expect the expression of points of view regarding the educational innovation projects formulated on the basis of well-defined doctrines. In important social learning projects, such as the one carried out by the TESEO Institute, it is useful to always have an optimal combination between doctrine and practical action.

Through this article we want to contribute to the formation of a European thinking model on education by putting into circulation the point of view of a great contemporary Italian pedagogue, Mrs. Valeria Fedeli.

Mrs. Valeria Fedeli's speech at the TESEO Institute, May, 27, 2022

Valeria Fedeli*

SSML project: a dialogue between cultures through new forms of interaction and integration

The new role of High Schools for Linguistic Mediators as a strategic space in the dialogue between cultures

In the tradition of academic studies and literature schools, the profile of the linguistic mediator, for the first decades after its normative formalization, was mostly configured within a certain technical definition applied to the function of the translator, to interpreting or rather to a basic linguistic support related to sectoral technical, diplomatic, legal, economic, journalistic and sometimes literary texts.

Italy has always shown a special aptitude for training professionals dedicated to linguistic intermediation, with schools dedicated to interpreting

and translation of great tradition, which from the Second World War onwards have provided professionals in these sectors both for the growing need of the United Nations system, both for the nascent European Union and of course for the Council of Europe. From this tradition, the academic discipline of interpreting and translation has been consolidated, which then found space in many Italian universities, but as sometimes happens in this kind of transformation, the aspects of professional practice that are typical of the profession of the translator and of the 'interpreter, they have not always passed also in the academic field.

However, the legislator considered the previous experience of the old interpreting schools to be important, and recognizing their educational and professionalizing value, he decided to set them up in a separate sector, first with a three-year course, and subsequently starting from 2018 also with the master's level. , in full compliance with the principle of "three plus two" alternation which is typical of the Bologna Process and which characterizes the entire higher education sector. I confess, not without a hint of pride, that the Minister who signed the adaptation of the secondary school courses for linguistic mediators was me, and it was I who wanted the transformation process of the sector, in line with the principles and the objectives of the Bologna process took place, in the terms in which it is developing today, which is why you will understand how happy I am to be here today to celebrate the first year of activity of the Salerno school with my greeting address.

Moreover, the growing phenomenon of globalization, especially since the Second World War, and the consequent development of international relations, connected to an ever more agile fluidity of communications between lands and nations in the digital age, and in the context of a rethought "globalization" of functions, goods and cultures, this restricted understanding of operators trained in linguistic subjects and translation practices is now outdated: many new possibilities open up to those who develop their skills starting from an in-depth linguistic knowledge and modern communication techniques and of teaching.

The linguistic mediator can reconfigure his professional offer on several levels starting from his own linguistic, textual and discursive knowledge, in the dynamic context in which, even with the profound social transformations evident today, his proposal is proposed and inserted.

From a collateral training moment to the academy, and a space in some way still underdeveloped in Italy, in reality the SSML sector can

finally take advantage of the current opportunity to rise to a new role, developing its skills from the contexts of translation and interpreting to those of the "dialogue between cultures", based on the precious skills of interaction and cultural and civil integration, a bridge for renewed international relations.

In fact, what seems to be maturing in the current moment of social complexity and cultural reorganization and transformation is the need to re-weave a web of more mature national and international exchanges, intended at the different levels of experiences, goods and cultural contents to be exchanged. , between a country of historical importance such as Italy and many different spaces in the world, able to interact and exchange with it through a new, different and more mature relationship and contact device. The possibility of connecting and making Italy communicate, for example, with multiple Eastern or Northern European territories, or Mediterranean, Asian or overseas territories outside the pure economic or financial tracks, is a frontier of relations and social and cultural choices today that appear decisive, in the perspective of a new multipolar world, multicentered and less dependent on goods and sources - even communicative and symbolic ones - that are unique, rigid or supercharged as such. Not to mention the potential contribution that linguistic mediation can bring even within a society like the current Italian one, so varied and multilingual, and therefore the support of professionals experienced in linguistic mediation and understanding, become potential actors of that social integration. which every democratic society must strive for to consider itself as such.

THE LINGUISTIC MEDIATOR: AN OPEN DISCIPLINARY PROFILE BETWEEN IDENTITY AND OTHERNESS

The line to follow and to develop as much as possible at this time is therefore an extension and application of the linguistic Mediator's knowledge towards a renewed profile conceived in a social sense, that is, asking his role to function as a strategic and precious hub. of intercultural, interactional and social integration relationships.

This characteristic application is fully inserted in the logic of development of skills relating to linguistic mediation, as indicated by various European and international institutional programs, in the sign of "linguistic mediation", as well as that of "building new meanings", concepts recalled

by EU directives , and of course interpretable as indications of a real "relational construction" embedded in the living social fabric, called to define a possible and important development of the role of linguistic mediator, hopefully evolving towards a role that is also an "intercultural mediator".

The linguistic heritage and the textual instrumentation evolve according to this perspective of knowledge of the socio-cultural profiles of the complex urban context which is a salient feature of Italian society, moving towards knowledge applied to the legal and legal regulations of EU countries and international law.

In this sense, the transition to the work of the intercultural mediator leads to various new paths of cultural and applicative enrichment: an adequate and appropriate knowledge of the cultures of foreign countries, especially those where the chosen languages and metalanguages are widespread, with special attention to their cultural, historical, geo-economic and anthropological dimension. The mediator, following the line now often already traced that is, in recent years, transferring his profile from the strictly linguistic and translation support field to the broader one of social and intercultural mediation in general, is called today to enrich his own competences defining themselves, in this way, at a much higher level of potential social responsibilities, in the exercise of a profession which, if well trained in its study and start-up paths, can follow parallel adventures and increasingly complex and diversified disciplinary paths, thanks to which to enter the job market with much richer possibilities, reaching a large number of very different social and cultural contexts.

TRANSFORMING THE CURRENT STATE OF SSML IN ITALY: NUMBERS AND PROFILES

Indeed, eloquent numbers stand out regarding the current situation of the Higher Schools of Linguistic Mediation in Italy, regarding the desirable perspective of their evolution and transformation, compared to the panorama of international and European studies in the same sector: if Germany proposes a rather developed framework of this training area, with 70,000 and more students enrolled per year on average, and France, albeit to a lesser extent, is about 45,000 attending these institutes, Italy presents

a very different situation, with no more than 4,000 annual enrollments in these schools same training courses.

This is not only a consistence inferiority of numbers, in fact, but probably a much more limited design perspective, with respect to this potentially relevant training and professional area: as mentioned, the mission itself of the high schools of Linguistic Mediation has in fact over the years around a mainly technical profile of the linguistic operator trained by it, limited to a circumscribed professional cabotage, and conceived mostly as an auxiliary support, lacking spaces of broader competence, responsibility, recognition.

If, therefore, it seems appropriate to increase the numbers of SSML writings and graduates / graduates in Italy, it is on the other hand a question of recomposing this intention by grafting it on a renewed conception of the general profile, at the basis of the same conception of the Italian Language Mediation schools. : a new design, capable of drawing this training sector from its current, strongly "technical" simpler profile, to a richer aspect and important function, conceived this time in a more academic and culturally mature sense in the wake of a real work by Alta Training, able to offer skills and abilities in its broader, highly qualified graduates on a critical-cultural and operational level. In this way, enriching the training proposal and directing it towards knowledge connected to intercultural dialogue and a real work of national and international social mediation, relaunching the entire work of these institutes and at the same time giving a much greater strength and wider areas of competence to its students and graduates

According to this perspective, the increase in enrollments must therefore be linked to a decisive increase in the educational quality and didactic organization of the SSML, as well as undoubtedly to their greater presence and diffusion on the national territory, opening new institutes or new branches of the institutes already active.

However, a distinctive factor in this will be to direct the management and organization of the Schools of Linguistic Mediation as much as possible towards a logical and natural conception conceived in the order and objectives of Bodies that collaborate in a "public utility function": philosophy of the SSML should therefore follow a preponderant cultural mission, shifting the axis sometimes dominant today from a commercial perspective, inherent in profit-making companies to that of the public

interest, carried out instead by non-profit organizations, as the Foundations can well interpret.

KNOWLEDGE, CULTURE AND ECOLOGICAL MODEL

A new phase of general productive reconversion of rediscovered ecological awareness must certainly develop, from now on, in many sectors in many areas of work and social relations. A renewed perspective of action, which can also involve in its new movement the work of culture and educational institutions, from universities to academies, from schools of various types to the world of art, audiovisual and entertainment itself. The role of cultural institutions, however, must not be a simple decorative role or of pure supportive solidarity: in fact, in the projection of a renewed ecological model of development and production, the work of knowledge, including humanistic ones, can prove to be fundamental, as it is decisive. In contributing to the displacement of existential and psychological values capable of accompanying a different way of conceiving relationships, territories, the relationship with space and time.

In fact, it is precisely the work of knowledge and culture that is able to recalibrate the quality of territorial and temporal relations in a more sensible and centered way, first of all, helping to break that flow of convulsive consumption that has become dominant in recent decades. A large area of population, convulsive consumption marked by a continuous movement of men, vehicles, goods in the international metropolitan spaces.

A friendly convulsion of both cognitive and energetic waste, that throwaway culture that Pope Francis often refers to, capable of assimilating an entire globalized collective life to its driving dynamics; a widespread experience of constant displacement both material and psychological-bad attention, supported in this by some derives from the use of digital devices, aimed at imposing an uninterrupted communication, but also more and more fragmented, broken, pure contact and surface.

The work of cultural educational institutions, then, could play a decisive game in this problematic context, through a new, large project of cultural dissemination open to society, re-introducing the academic voice within its own territories, revitalizing a relationship that is sometimes asphyxiated, if not absent. Universities in general, but also with their peculiar strength, art academies and schools of linguistic mediation, can in

this way change the social relationship with this convulsive space and time in a virtuous sense: as an attractive force towards a new "centering", the work of knowledge and the experience of culture are able to "stop" the indiscriminate action of consumption and trafficking with a high energy impact and now unsustainable, to relocate - in the rediscovered habits of reading, listening, cultural consumption - widespread social attention, and thus favoring the use of more limited and balanced spaces for action, and less convulsive and more dilated times, aimed at a deeper self-care, as well as a new balance of the spirit.

The task of Universities, Schools or Academies, therefore, can prove to be completely central in the productive and ecological reconversion project, since it is projected into the decisive task of cultivating in the depth of social sensitivity a renewed way of relating to the world, that is, offering the true basis for a qualitative change in consumption, production, exchanges between people and the environment. In this sense of action, disseminating culture - also with extra-academic interaction programs, through training cycles aimed at the urban territory - means re-educating society to the times and peculiar ways of reading and listening, of vision and understanding. ; a slower, deeper dimension, collected with respect to the dynamics of the most convulsive flows, and therefore capable of cultivating a social response, over time, much more adapted to the virtuous ecological spaces and times through a psycho-perceptive relocation in the cognitive order of the book, of theater, meditation or study.

The contribution of the SSML to a similar project of "reconquest", we could say, of their own space and time through the recovery of culture and knowledge, should focus on targeted and characteristic "socio-cultural mediation" activities, based first of everything about education in reading and listening, that is, the recovery of the form and experience linked to the book and the multifaceted strength of the text as such in an unprecedented adventure that specific linguistic and humanistic skills can open up to a comparative dissemination, capable of supporting and disseminating the social knowledge of other cultures, their history, their imagination and values.

A double movement would then be possible in this perspective, of foreign dissemination in Italy, and of the dissemination of Italian history, culture and social values abroad: in a renewed conception and organization of educational and academic knowledge, aimed at opening up internal

didactic paths in multiform moments of cultural inspiration open to the outside of civil society.

I deeply believe in the social role of education and in the power of schools and universities to create better citizens, developing in them that critical attitude which is a fundamental tool for the exercise of democracy. In this convulsive and syncopated time, in which everything goes too fast to be understood and studied, only education, with the times that are necessary for human learning at any age, is the answer to the social uncertainty that today often does to waver our vision of a fair and just society. In this complex framework, in which global multiculturalism adds further complexity, even more so the training sector of linguistic mediation, can play a fundamental role both from the point of view of mutual understanding and from that of peaceful and respectful coexistence.

Talking about peaceful coexistence seems an oxymoron, in this troubled era in which, still struggling with the Covid 19 pandemic, Europe is facing a war in its own home. But I remain deeply convinced, having made the understanding of the other and mediation my reason for living, that many problems would be solved if we were able to truly communicate with each other, fully understanding the nuances of reciprocal positions and thus avoiding conflicts right from their birth, above all avoiding that the initial misunderstandings, over time, magnify the differences, to the point of making them irremediable.

This is the social mission of linguistic mediation, to help people understand each other and above all not to misunderstand each other, and it is perhaps the most important social and cultural message that this training sector has to give to all of us, and it is on this conclusive reflection that I thank you. for your attention.

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**A NEW EXEGESIS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF
VASILE BĂNCILĂ**
A BOOK REVIEW

Ph. D. Ioan N. ROȘCA

Vasile Băncilă (1897-1979) became known in the interwar period mainly through his two books *The Doctrine of Energetic Personalism* of D. Rădulescu-Motru (1927) and *Lucian Blaga, Romanian Energy* (1938) and remained so until the end of his life his, because, in the post-war period, removed from the chair and unpublished with far-reaching philosophical works, he had to waste himself in numerous essays on a variety of subjects, published in different cultural magazines, his writings could only be corroborated by someone who would have followed them expressly, to reveal their philosophical lines. After the philosopher's death, his daughter Ileana Băncilă collected a series of his small writings in a volume of *Portraits and Meanings*, prefaced by Zoe Dumitrescu-Bușulenga (1987), and after 1990 she re-edited his two works and published his volumes *Aphorisms and Para-aphorisms* (1993) and *Philosophy of Ages* (1997). Subsequently, the researcher Dora Mezdrea published his other works: *The Religion of Love and Pestalozzi* (1998), *Vastness of Bă răgan* (2000), *Art and Knowledge* (2002), and from 2003, she took care of the publication of the complete work, designed in 33 volumes, of which, so far, more than half have appeared. Simultaneously with the restitution of his work, Vasile Băncilă tends to assert himself more and more in the history of philosophy as a thinker with a personal and comprehensive philosophical conception. Given the multitude and variety of his writings, a systematization of his philosophical ideas is naturally not easy to achieve.

After the first attempt to synthesize the philosophical work of Vasile Băncilă, made by Valentin Popa in his book *Vasile Băncilă. The Man and the Philosopher* (Brăilei Museum, Istros Publishing House, 2006) and a second undertaking by Ion Dur, *Post-restant. The "Case" of the Thinker Vasile Băncilă* (Ed. Museum of Romanian Literature, 2020), the tireless researcher of Ethical Statements in Romanian philosophy and culture, Constantin Stroe, dedicates to the same thinker two works published in the last two years, namely the ethical-moral dimension of the system philosophy of Vasile Băncilă, with a Preface by Ion Dur (Istros Publishing

House of the "Carol I" Museum, Brăila, 2021) and "Diffuse Providentialism". The philosophical system with metaphysical foundations and ethical-cultural purposes of Vasile Băncilă (Istros Publishing House of Museum "Carol I", Brăila, 2022). I will refer to the second work, since it starts from the most general ideas of the philosopher, called "metaphysical", in relation to which the other ideas, including the ethical-moral ones, are "secondary", in the sense of subordinate or logically derived.

The first two (out of the five) chapters of the successful synthesis by Constantin Stroe cover the themes addressed in the first synthesis (in chronological order) due to Valentin Popa, by the fact that they deal with the metaphysical coordinates of the Banchelian philosophical system (chapter 1) and the metaphysical perspective on culture (ch. 2). The following three chapters complete the mentioned theme, dealing, in order, with elements of cultural-moral anthropology (chap. 3), ethics and pedagogy of the nation (chap. 4) and national cohesion (chap. 5).

Benefiting from the volumes of Works in which Băncilă's philosophical system is also exposed, or, more precisely, the works from which a system can be derived, the exegesis signed by Constantin Stroe does not conclude, but brings some additions to the ideas presented in the synthesis from 2006. first of all, right in the Introduction of his work, in which he analyzes the sketch entitled Philosophical Framework (from 1938), which includes the principles of the projected Banquelian system of philosophy, the author emphasizes the fact that the philosopher originally from Brăila criticized subjectivism and individualism and advocated "individualization plus framing ", namely "the inclusion of man in the general reality" (by reference to society, to the cosmos, to divinity).

Hence, the requirement of the Brailean philosopher that in the branches of his philosophical system - *psychology, logic, ethics, aesthetics, sociology, pedagogy, metaphysics* - to project, in forms specific to each discipline, a general, metaphysical vision of man in his various poses. In this regard, the exegete subscribes to Valentin Popa's remark, according to which metaphysics would no longer have a special place within the projected philosophical system since all other disciplines are permeated by metaphysics. I note, for my part, that Vasile Băncilă included in his philosophical system, in addition to metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics - proper philosophical disciplines, and psychology, logic, sociology and pedagogy - autonomous disciplines, because, in his view, these they also contained, more than others, a philosophical treatment, without which, he considered, they would not have been complete. Or, extending his

consideration, it could be said that philosophy would be one with the set of particular sciences treated philosophically, because any science can also be approached philosophically, metaphysicalized, becoming a component of the philosophy of science. Discrimination between science and philosophy is nevertheless required, because they are forms of knowledge with well-distinct objects and cognitive modalities, philosophy not being reduced to metaphysicalized sciences and, even more so, not to sciences on which one can reflect philosophically.

Constantin Stroe highlights, then, with accuracy, which is the metaphysical foundation of the Banquelian philosophy. Namely, quoting Valentin Popa's assessment, according to which the unity of the world (or "general reality" or the essence of the world) in which man falls is, in Băncilă's view, both transcendent and intramundane, he specifies that, however it may be called, the principle of the world is, in the words of the philosopher, the absolute Spirit or the original Perfection, in other words God or Providence. According to Băncilă, "Spirit was from eternity and in matter and outside it" (p. 30, quoted from *Opere/Works*, vol. X) and created the world from nothing only once, imprinting a finalism or providentialism on it, in meaning "leading thread in Existence". Otherwise, "without finalism (or providentialism), the Universe becomes chaos" (p.27, quoted from *Opere/Works*, vol. X). From here, it follows that, insinuating itself into all forms of existence in the created world, providentialism rules the world, so Băncilă himself calls the system he projects "diffuse providentialism". His conception of the principle of the world and of its manifestation in the created world is, as his recent exegete shows, much more complex, since the principle action is only diffuse. Thus, the source "of original, transcendent, eternal perfection, which creates a diffuse providentialism in the Universe" indeed keeps the world in balance and harmony, but also admits deviations, catastrophes or the existence of evil, because it is "in battle with a demonism (or with a historical demonism), in the created world, partly tolerated, partly abusive (autonomized) and in which man realizes his personality and salvation" (p. 44, quoted from *Opere/Works*, vol. X). If finalism can be proven with arguments provided by the sciences, such as biology, psychology, cybernetics, informatics, electronics, on the other hand, the question of why God created the world and how he created it from nothing remain, even for the philosopher, unfathomable mysteries.

Constantin Stroe reveals the fact that, through its metaphysical or ontological foundation, the philosophy of Vasile Băncilă, as the philosopher himself says, "is not anthropocentric, but theocentric and ontocentric",

giving man "an orientation towards the ontos and the divine", he, Băncilă, not being neither "demiurgic, like Blaga, nor humanist-egoistic, subjectivist, like the moderns" (p. 36, quoted from *Opere/Works*, vol. XIV). His philosophy not only deals with the Absolute, like religion, but aims to lead to religion.

Finalism or providentialism of philosophy implies, epistemologically, apriorism, the possibility of overcoming the immediate data of sensation, because "without apriorism (which means the gnostic form of finalism) knowledge becomes impossible or an empiricism that does not leave the phase of sensation" (p. 27, quoted from *Opere/Works*, vol. X). In this case, the philosopher, Băncilă asserted not without justification, "seeks to overcome logical reason and to give the understanding or intuition of the great forces or metaphysical entities that are the basis of the general reality; the philosopher who does not manage to do this is not a philosopher (he is at most a scientist)" (p. 37-38, quoted from *Opere/Works*, vol. VI).

Constantin Stroe shows that Vasile Băncilă projected the metaphysical foundation of his diffuse providentialism on the explanation he gave to culture (ch. 2). He argues that the philosopher metaphysicalized culture by originating it in the ethnic/nation and considering the ethnic as deeply philosophical, religious and moral. In this regard, Constantin Stroe states that, in Băncilă's view, culture is born simultaneously either with morality, or with religion, or with philosophy or with all three forms together, because they communicate with each other and have a unifying role in relation to other elements of culture. Therefore, there is no culture without philosophy, but also without religion or morality, which presuppose each other. Great philosophy, exemplifies the philosopher, includes a religion and a morality, just as religion, "the very basis of culture," would essentially be "a philosophy infused with complete, harmonized and precise dogmas and practices, of what which only revelation can give" (p. 54, from *Opere/Works*, vol. VI).

Bancila adds that a philosophy harmonized with religion would be his own philosophy, centered on a Transcendent "which manifests itself in the phenomenon especially through religion, morality, arts, sciences, nation, order... and is served by more or less framed personalities community", so that his philosophy "is a personalized communitarianism or a communitarian personalism" (p. 56, quoted from *Opere/Works*, vol. XIV), more precisely a national personalism, which its creator distinguishes from the energetic personalism of C. Rădulescu- Motru and the cultural personalism affirmed by D. Gusti.

The idea of the basis of culture and its communal character, the exegetical work shows, is the same as the idea of its national or ethnic background. As the ethnic background, especially religion and morals, was seriously affected in the culture of his time, Băncilă ended up privileging folklore at the expense of cultured creation and, using Blagian terms, superiorizing the minor culture and claiming that this is the true major culture.

The philosopher from Brăila also meditated on the relationship between culture and civilization, considering that the former needs the support of the latter. He rejected, however, industrial civilization - advanced science and technology - on the grounds that it, through means such as radio, cinema and, notably, television (home cinema), perverted man's morals and isolated him. Consequently, he advocated the restoration not only of the authentic folk culture, but also of the corresponding civilization, one of medium technical level, centered on peasant agriculture, of small agricultural owners and which would be subordinated to the spiritual life and would not make people uniform.

Next, dealing with *elements of cultural-moral anthropology* (chap. 3), Constantin Stroe shows that Vasile Băncilă also vilified the man "specified by our era", called "homo faber" or even "vagrant", who "is a sensual being, desirous of power and with predominantly technical intelligence" (p. 90, quoted from *Opere/Works*, vol. XIV) and predicted the return to a cultural-moral, spiritual man, who "returns to the virtue of framing, of obedience" and for whom "the ideal it must be the communitarian" (p. 92, quoted from *Opere/Works*, vol. XIV), namely a communitarianism served by the spiritual elites.

Further, the author of the monograph moves from the culture-ethics of the individual man to the ethics and pedagogy of the nation (chap. 4), analyzing, in the footsteps of the philosopher, the following: the distinction between national consciousness and ethnic consciousness or ethnos, which is "like a collective ethos lived (incarnated) in the entirety of life" (p. 107, quoted from *Opere/Works*, vol. XII); the mobile of national morality (love of the nation); its purpose ("care for the creative power of the nation", p. 108, quoted from *Opere/Works*, vol. XII); national moral norms (including justice for all social categories); the Romanian qualities and defects (among many others, as C. Rădulescu-Motru had also remarked, easy enthusiasm in opposition to superficiality and inconsistency, or an inferiority complex towards foreigners); the correspondence between universal moral rights and duties and the moral principles of the nation (love of the nation,

concern for the affirmation of the creative spirit, social justice, contempt for national treason, understanding towards other nations, etc.). Summarizing, the morality of the nation provided for the agreement of ethnic or national morality with humanitarian, universal morality, the achievement of this agreement being the task of national pedagogy and national politics. In this context, the author of the monograph emphasizes the Banquellian ideas regarding the distinction between individual education (made through others) and national education (made not through foreigners, but through the nation, more precisely through the elites of the nation, who can change the mentality of a people); the values on which the ethnic soul depends; the involvement in education of all institutions: family, school, church, army, cultural institutions and all others, etc.

The last chapter of the recent synthesis book of Băncilă's philosophical work refers to the problem of patriotism (chapter 5). As characterized by the philosopher, patriotic feeling takes the form of several kinds of feeling; of filiation, of fraternity, of paternity, of religiosity - towards the nation, more precisely towards its time (with its hypostases: past, present, future), its space (geographical, but also culturally impregnated) and its national culture. It is a feeling equated with national feeling and national consciousness. Bancila also admits a supranational feeling, which, according to the interpretation given by the exegete, refers to homo universalis.

Through the monographic research that I have presented, which also corroborates with the work on the ethical-moral dimension of the Băncilian philosophical system, Constantin Stroe has the merit of offering a more comprehensive systematized exposition on the work of Vasile Băncilă, to evaluate his philosophy and to compare it to other Romanian philosophical creations. Not by chance, he ends his book with a complex profile of the philosopher Vasile Băncilă, made up of no less than 15 characteristics, most of them excellent, but also a few against which he delimits himself or expresses certain reservations. Finally, he considers the analyzed thinker "the founder of his own, original philosophical system", by which he places him in the gallery of the other creators of philosophical systems: Conta, C. R.-Motru, Blaga, Florian, Noica.

(RE) FINDING THE EGO THROUGH THE NEUROLINGUISTIC STUDY OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Alexandra RADU

Abstract: *Knowing the deep self helps to correctly position the individual in society and to clearly define his role and needs. However, this knowledge is not easy to obtain, and the author of this article considers that, a useful tool in this respect, would be, in the attempt to re-establish new mental territories, the study of foreign languages from a complex perspective, of the knowledge and assumption of the entire geo-politico-social and historical complex in which the newly studied language and culture was formed. Basically a complex "re-location" of the entire cyber ensemble that is the human individual, in a new space and in a new scenario.*

1. WHAT IS THE SELF OF AN INDIVIDUAL?
2. WAYS TO SEARCH FOR THE EGO
3. REDRAWING ONE'S OWN MENTAL AND AFFECTIVE TERRITORY BY ACQUIRING NEW LANGUAGES AND CULTURES

1. WHAT IS THE SELF OF AN INDIVIDUAL?

The ego constitutes the psychic centering of the individual, self-regulation with the help of self-awareness, which helps him to delimit himself from others in order to live his individuality. *"The self is self-consciousness"¹* This is, in fact, a deep awareness of the inner being, a knowledge of the most hidden details of oneself and a metabolism of all the external elements, with the help of the filter of one's own critical consciousness. The self is the one that separates us from the outer world (helping us to live individually an inner life and to form our own opinions and beliefs) but it is also the one that helps us connect to the outer world,

¹ P. Popescu Neveanu, 1978

this having a role of interface between us and the outer world (ensuring the symbiosis of the individual with the outside, its integration into the social ensemble but also the awareness of its uniqueness and individuality.

The individual ego begins to be aware and develop around the age of three, when the awareness of one's own image and of one's own body appears, but its development and shaping, continues practically, the whole life and has its climax in adolescence. The personal self is nothing but the sum of the experiences lived, interpreted and redesigned in society by the individual: *"constitutes its reflection through the mirror of society and is a result of successive differentiations and integrations: differentiation of things, of the environment, of another; integrations of social models, of rules, of philosophical, ethical, social values"*². None of this, however, would be possible without verbalization, from which we deduce that the development of the individual's self is closely related to the development of language and its capacity to express itself.

Let's see, however, what would be some ways of exploring and developing this inner world that represents us and defines us as individuals.

2. WAYS TO SEARCH FOR THE EGO

Meditation

Charles Tart (1972) defined the "state of consciousness" as the result of the interaction of subsystems such as: memory, cognitive processes, affectivity, etc. The forms of consciousness are: waking up, mental relaxation and meditation.

Meditation as a goal of revealing the Self is the method by which we constantly ask ourselves: "Who am I?" , "Where does this I come from?", that is, it is nothing but a constant interrogation of one's own consciousness and a verbalization as clear and real as possible of the deepest feelings. Perhaps the greatest benefit of meditation is that it leads us to transcend the ego and false identities and identifications, thus supporting us to remove what is not authentic in our consciousness and to preserve only the essence of our identity, to dialogue in the most sincere key with our inner being.

² Alexandrescu, 1988, pg.56

What does meditation actually do? Through a deep calming, meditation manages to silence the daily "noise" and to re-connect us with our deep Being, helping us to listen to it, to understand it and to cultivate it. And although we can address our self perhaps without too many words, verbalization helps us to shape, to delineate, to trace the manifestation territories of our consciousness. That is why we consider that mediating as a technique of self-discovery and self-discovery, is closely related to the development of language skills and the enrichment of the area of the vocabulary and the baggage of words in as many languages as possible. How can you ask yourself who you are and where you come from, as well as where you are going, but especially, how you can answer all these dilemmas, if not through words, through examples from readings (in various languages), by taking over models from different cultures, available to the individual of course, through language.

And here's how we discover that language is not only a tool for communicating with others, but also with yourself, becoming a tool to calibrate and shape your own consciousness.

Culture, through values, attitudes, knowledge and behaviors learned in the family and strengthened in the social environment, is the one that "sculpts" the system of the Self, says Vygotski (1985). Cultural development is built on natural, genetic development as the individual uses cultural tools and symbols such as speech and writing. In Vygotsky's terms, these "psychological tools", speech and action, allow people to shape their own actions and those of others, and meditation only gives the individual the chance to use and enrich these tools.

It should be noted that Vygotsky's socio-cultural theory is one of the bases of constructivism, inasmuch as it states that children, far from being mere passive beneficiaries, build their own knowledge, their own scheme, based on the information they receive. Knowledge that does not come from experience is not really knowledge" -Lev Vygotsky. But is the human individual who discovers himself and manages to develop at a higher level, limited to deep self-knowledge? Does he not feel the need for a relation to an absolute entity, does he not become a seeker of the spiritual experiences that lead to the Divinity? And in this sense, does it not become religious meditation, prayer, a way of communication with the self and with God?

The Search for the Self by Reference to the Divinity

As stated by the Romanian philosopher Ioan N. Roșca in his volume "Philosophy of Integrativeness": " the notion of *Being* does not refer to something real, for any real is qualitatively determined, expresses a potency, namely the ambivalent possibility of the forms of existence to be made up of both spirit and matter". The natural tendency to search for the inner Being leads to the Divine nature, as an entity located outside the natural world: " As for the fact that some philosophers have made the Being of things dependent on the divine Being, or even identified them, I believe that if we do not admit that the potential source of intramundane or intracosmic things is ultimate and we wonder where it comes from, what is the cause that generates it, we will conclude that this, being outside the natural world, can only be of a supernatural nature/essence, Divine."³

The exploration of the divine nature of the human individual is done through dialogue with this side of our Being, through a direct and concise address, through a simple way that some of us have been practicing since childhood: prayer. Prayer and religious meditation are as much as they lead us to the discovery of our own aspirations and needs, expressed on an intimate level and projected towards the Universe.

Therefore, whether we meditate on our existence as beings in our own right, by dialogue with ourselves, or by relating to our divine essence and we are in dialogue with the universe, we need language, as nuanced instruments of expression as possible and an absolute understanding of linguistic instruments. So is language the highest human form of manifestation? Is language the most complex human art? Taking into account the infinite ways of expression and the overwhelming number of languages concocted by the human mind, or perhaps occurring through divine inspiration, human language can be considered the most complex form of cultural manifestation.

³ Ioan N. Roșca – "Philosophy of Integrativeness", Editura Fundației *România de Măine*, 2021

3. REDRAWING ONE'S OWN MENTAL AND AFFECTIVE TERRITORY BY ACQUIRING NEW LANGUAGES AND CULTURES

The appropriation of the ability to understand and converse in a foreign language is not only an experience resulting from the assumption of a lexical baggage and grammatical rules, but it is a much more complex process, through which the correct drawing and delimitation of a new neurological territory in the case of that individual is achieved, this process also passes through the redefinition of one's own person through the prism of the whole complex of knowledge that it implies to learn a new language (cultural experiences, culinary, traditional, territorial). In fact, learning a foreign language means a "dedudblation" of the individual, a projection of the Self into a new reality and an assumption of all the new identities that the culture of the people whose language is intended to be learned implies.

The neurological study of foreign languages helps, as I have argued in other materials, not only to simplify learning but also to know the higher self and to deeply acquire the cultural experience that that study implies, to create a new individual, which includes in his own identity, all the ways of cultural manifestation of the people whose language he begins to speak.

Therefore, in the neurological study of a foreign language, they are important: defining objectives as goals (to know what I want; to be able to communicate in given situations; to create communication scenarios), to relate correctly to oneself and to others (the permanent establishment of similarities between the new rules to be assimilated and the principles of the mother tongue or other languages known to the individual), sensory acuity (careful observation of messages transmitted by another person, at a conscious and nonverbal level), etc.

What actually determines the appropriation of all these innovative learning techniques and finally, the assumption of a new culture, of a new linguistic identity? Nothing but the redrawing of a new mental territory, the redefinition of a new individual and the re-discovery of a new self.

We have, of course, examples of the great Romanian authors who chose to express their work at a certain time, in other European languages (French, Italian), that is, they considered that at that moment of their creation they are better represented by that cultural identity. It is not a

betrayal, neither of the country of origin nor of one's own person, it is a way of assuming the second nature of the individual. We must understand that the author of that work is another individual, a new valence of the same author.

And if high spirits such as Emil Cioran or Petre Țuțea managed to rediscover themselves by acquiring other languages and other cultures, why could we, the common people, not do the same exercise, in the deep search of our identity, to practice and expand all the capacities with which we were endowed?

LIVING IN MODERN SOCIETY

Philosophy - History – Language

Arturo CAMPANILE

Abstract: *Through a Philosophical, Historical and Linguistic analysis, we intend to make a vision of modern society by dealing with some issues that are particularly valid in today's social forum. Some sources and figures are cited who have particularly interacted in the topics covered, giving a decisive turn to current knowledge*

LIVING IN MODERN SOCIETY

PHILOSOPHY

It must be recognized that at the moment Modern Society is in full change. After the various revolutions of history we can already feel ourselves in the Digital Revolution which is positioned within the so-called third and fourth industrial revolution. Begun in the avant-garde industrialized countries of the world, towards the end of the fifties of the twentieth century, this digital revolution is the transition from analog mechanical and electronic technology to digital electronic technology. Evidently in various historical phases it has continued up to the present day through various periods. This premise is useful for perceiving that by changing common techniques, with the advent of valid and powerful innovations, corporate modules and therefore social paradigms are also missing. Using a valid metaphor, we can imagine a mighty sailing ship: it must turn the straight side facing the sea in order to subsequently orient it towards land and to do this it must rotate on itself. This requires time, change, movements, which will end only at the end of the maneuver, returning to an apparent state of rest. Society itself is like that. When it matures towards a revolution, it needs time to adapt, during which it changes the order of clichés. We must therefore refer to the philosopher who in our days has been able to grasp this change in society.

Zygmunt BAUMAN, Polish sociologist, philosopher and academic, was born into a Jewish family on November 19, 1925 in Poznań, Poland and died at the age of about 91. in Leeds in the United Kingdom on 9 January 2017. He studied at the University of Warsaw, London School of Economics and Political Science. The change in the paradigms of the aforementioned society brings with it an inevitable chaos and perhaps this thinker, philosopher and sociologist has been able to interpret it in a better way, mitigating the consequent disorientation. His 2000 book "Liquid Modernity" made him the superstar of postmodern thinking. To metaphorize the changes taking place in today's society, he uses the term "liquid" to refer to the physical bonds that bind all the particles of matter. For BAUMAN, being "modern" means being "in progress" with the loosening of these bonds. There is the possibility of briefly summarizing BAUMAN's thought in 6 basic points: 1. Liquid modernity; 2. Indignation; 3. Work ethic and consumer aesthetics; 4. Analysis of the Holocaust; 5. Post-panopticism; 6. Liquid love.

1. Liquid modernity - After the great certainties of the last century and with the advent of the new neoliberalism, the certainties of the State, Society, Welfare that provide for the needs of the individual have disappeared.

2. Indignation - There are complex conflicting pressures without projects that proceed on the basis of populism and in particular of indignation that with mastery is easy to steer even in negative directions.

3. The ethics of work and the aesthetics of consumption - The delay of gratification is an expression of modern society and of that procrastination (investing rather than distributing, saving and not spending; working rather than consuming) in an environment based largely on morality of work. In this inverse perspective in which means and ends exchange places, we get to reward work as an end in itself, extending the delay indefinitely, seeking and maintaining models and rules of common living aimed at standardization. Even the aesthetics of consumption sees work as a mere preparatory tool. Today the world is accelerating more and more: there is no delay and there cannot be, much less waiting. We live in an immense "liquid" field of possibilities, of increasingly intense sensations, often ensnared by the barker on duty: political, economic, idealistic. A strong exasperation of subjectivity where the bonds become more and more liquid in the incredible realizations; with virtual reality and other technologies in

the pipeline where we bow to the liquid and inconsistent tyranny of the ephemeral.

4. Analysis of the Holocaust - In 1989 he published the book "Modernity and the Holocaust" (Modernity and the Holocaust) which was very difficult to produce. From a Jewish family as early as 1939, sheltering in Russia avoids the Shoah and then analyzes the subtle link that unites the persecution of the Jews and modernity. It identifies in this path the ancient clash between finance and land, identifying in this the basic element of destabilization. It is considered a dangerous repeatable fact having been transformed into a consequence of modern civilization in which everything is subordinated to thought - action and whose dynamics are oriented towards economic and efficiency rules. So the Shoah is a fruit of bureaucracy and technology, interpreting anti-Semitism as only a necessary but not sufficient reason, almost seen as a horrible test with hidden possibilities that can be replicated and also applicable in different scenarios.

5. Post-panopticism - The Panopticon (or panoptic) is an ideal prison designed by the English philosopher and jurist Jeremy BENTHAM in 1791. The project allows all subjects to be observed by a single overseer, in a prison institution, without allowing them to understand whether or not they are being controlled at that moment. It is also necessary to think about "To supervise and punish: Birth of the prison" (Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison, 1975) essay by the French historian and philosopher Michel FOUCAULT as well as to the figure of Big Brother from George's book "1984" ORWELL. An analysis of what will happen in post-modernity in a future perspective. In a recent publication "Sixth power. Surveillance in liquid modernity" written with David LYON opens the vision towards the structures of power that expand in this liquid society. The forms of control take on the features of consumption for entertainment. Under the attention of transnational organizations there is a piling up of data and their digital emanations even without people. The highest risks beyond privacy itself concern control and therefore freedom of action and choice. It is beyond the panopticon, even losing the walls. There is also no need for an overseer since the "victims" are themselves collaborating, providing and contributing to their own control. Hidden under the seductive aspect is the repressive aspect of unperceived control of the unwary victims. Beyond the prison or the refugee camp there is no longer a place like home, school, bank, prison or factory, where we can concentrate to control ourselves to a

greater extent. So unfortunately there will no longer be a place for anyone to take refuge in order not to be spied on. We are increasingly controlled, tested, evaluated, judged always in daily life.

6. Liquid love - The sentimental relationship, like loneliness, generates fear and insecurity, together with the precariousness of an increasingly liquid future. In this hypothesis of the future, one is afraid of being entangled in stable relationships fearing close ties with burdens that one does not want to assume.

These analyzes in particular will remain solid tools and (non-liquid) milestones in the analysis of current postmodernity, they are lessons subsequent to its academic phase focused on the sociology of work that have contributed to the elaboration of this thought.

LIVING IN MODERN SOCIETY HISTORY

Giovanbattista VICO (Naples, June 23, 1668 - Naples, January 23, 1744) Italian philosopher, historian and jurist of the Enlightenment Age still today appears to be recurring and exact his theory of "historical courses and recourses". Life that repeats itself without man grasping its message to avoid even unpleasant recurrences over the centuries. The problem of today's society can be read in particular in three historical events: The fall of the Western Roman Empire, the French Revolution, the affirmation of totalitarian states in Europe.

The fall of the Western Roman Empire - It is considered by historians with the fall of the Roman emperor in office. On 4 September 476 A.D. Odoacer King of the Heruli occupied Ravenna and abdicated the emperor Romulus Augustus, decreeing the end of the Western Roman Empire.

The causes that led to the dissolution of the Roman military giant are certainly multifactorial together with the leitmotif of a hegemonic class that is oblivious to the people it harasses.

Epidemics, famines, wars, economic crisis, inconsistent political organization (patronage, with numerous latent critical points within it), discontent of war veterans, difficult economic and social situation, development of large estates to the detriment of small and medium-sized owners with abandonment lands, trade and crafts in crisis due to the advent of large patrician competitors who had more money at their disposal, the

spread of new other philosophical and religious beliefs. All this weakened the apparent solid power, through a general dissatisfaction of the people, hungry and devoid of real political leaders who were not fighting each other, with constant betrayal, overthrow and loss of credibility. A hegemonic class that is heedless of the people it harasses.

The French Revolution - Upon Louis XIV's death (1715) France was in a period of political and economic crisis. The political crisis shows the weakening of the figure of the monarch due to the quest for power by the nobility. In 1780 the economic crisis reappeared and in order to cope with it, King Louis XVI and Jacques NEVER, in charge of finance, unsuccessfully tried to limit the tax privileges of the Clergy and Nobility. The Minister of Finance reveals the frightening situation of the French economy, denounces the financial situation of the state with those responsible for waste and is immediately opposed by the Clergy and Nobility

This led to the convening of the States General, an assembly of the three classes present in France (Nobility, Clergy and Third Estate). To the latter, the Third Estate, belonged 95% of the French people tired of the abuses of the other two classes. Substantially, therefore, the main causes can be identified in the inadequacy of power, discontent of war veterans, difficult economic and social situation, the economic and cultural crisis, epidemics, wars, famines, the uncertainty of the future, which brought the Third State to the rebellion. We then also have cultural factors that have also been helpful in the American Revolution, albeit profoundly different. Here in France the Enlightenment has been thundering for decades, developed here, based on three principles: Rationalism, Egalitarianism and Contractualism. Once again a hegemonic class that is heedless of the people it harasses.

The affirmation of totalitarian states in Europe - At the beginning of the twentieth century, between the two Great Wars, there was general discontent on the part of the people. Totalitarianism both on the right (in Italy Benito MUSSOLINI, in Spain Francisco FRANCO, in Germany Adolf HITLER) and on the left (in Russia Iosif STALIN) always rest on the same causes already listed above: poverty, economic crisis, epidemics, inadequate political apparatus, the discontent of war veterans, the difficult economic and social situation, the uncertainty of the future, hunger and famine, popular backwardness and discontent, class inequalities. Always a hegemonic class that is heedless of the people it harasses.

Perhaps it would be appropriate to prevent this from happening again.

LIVING IN MODERN SOCIETY LANGUAGE

Mainly the language has undergone a new and strong connotation thanks to the powerful work done by Avram Noam CHOMSKY. CHOMSKY born on 7 December 1928 in the town of East Oak Lane (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.) is a philosopher, linguist, cognitive scientist, academic, communication theorist, political activist and American essayist still alive today at the ripe old age of 94. In his life he has always wanted to speak to a group of people attentive to his research and his consequent message. Sometimes he intentionally used words or phrases with effect, such as the Organ of Language that differentiates Man from other animals. This is an effective definition because in reality it did not speak of a specific organ in itself but indicated a "system" of organs including the larynx, the tongue, parts of the brain and more, therefore of a System. Systems Theory was theorized by the Austrian biologist Ludwig Von BERTALANFFY and considers the whole world not as a chaotic complex of elements, marked by the law of linear causality, but rather an organism with principles and laws involving the totality of its constituent components, creating precisely "systems".

Growing up in a Jewish environment where he learned the language from an early age, he listens intently to family debates about Zionist politics as his family was involved in leftist Zionism. In this direction he oriented his studies in the world of thought, also uniting his concerns.

His studies took place at the University of Pennsylvania, under the considerable influence of Zellig HARRIS. Already an advocate of new and left-wing ideas, he finished his PhD in 1951. He later spent four years at Harvard and in 1955 he moved to the University of Pennsylvania teaching at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to begin an intense and long career.

He is rightly considered one of the main founders of the Transformational Generative Grammar (TGG). Here is what is meant by Transformational-Generative Grammar. It is a system of linguistic analysis that is hidden behind this long and complicated name and which competes with traditional linguistics since all the topics are related to philosophy, logic and psycholinguistics. In 1957 he published a book "Syntactic Structures" which is considered a revolution in the discipline of linguistics. In it,


CHOMSKY perceives and suggests two structures in every human expression:

A Superficial Structure, the way to superficially combine words;


A Deep Structure, based above all on universal rules and mechanisms. In this framework it is stated and maintained that the means of acquiring a language in all human beings are natural and are activated automatically as soon as a child begins to learn the fundamentals of a language. A series of innate grammatical structures is therefore common to all humanity.

Great critic of US capitalism and foreign policy. Already in 1967, a precursor of '68, opposing America's involvement in the Vietnam War, he began his foray into political activism, creating his book of essays entitled "The responsibility of intellectuals ", a work that earned great recognition.

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ISSN 2784 - 2002
ISSN-L 2784 - 2002



ROMANIA DE MAINE FOUNDATION PUBLISHING HOUSE