

PAMFIL ȘEICARU – 130 YEARS ANNIVERSARY OF HIS BIRTH

85 years ago – Analyzes of the international situation around and after the outbreak of the Second World War (August 4-September 27, 1939)

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Abstract: *This spring, 130 years have passed since the birth of the one who was Pamfil Șeicaru (April 5/18, 1894-October 21, 1980) (civil name was Popescu; later, he took the name of Șeicaru)¹.*

¹ About him – Victor Frunză, *The fate of a death row inmate. Pamfil Șeicaru*, Victor Frunză Publishing House, Bucharest, 2001 /462 pp./; René Al. by Flers, Pamfil Șeicaru as it was. A hero of national integration and a prominent journalist of Romania. Edited edition and with an afterword by Prof. Constantin Juan-Petroi, 2nd Edition [first edition: 2009: Didahia Publishing House, Drobeta Turnu Severin, 2009], MJM Autograf Publishing House, Craiova, 2019 /104 pp./; George Stanca, "Blackmail and the Floor". Pamfil Șeicaru between legend and truth, Adevărul Publishing House, Bucharest, 2012 /320 pp./; Fănel Teodorașcu, Pamfil Șeicaru, Ars Docendi, Bucharest, 2014 /290 pp./; Florian Bichir, Pamfil Șeicaru. A pen of genius, crushed between two dates: August 23, 1944 – August 23, 1976. Foreword by: Ion Cristoiu. Foreword by: Marian Moșneagu, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 2014 /176 pp./ (and with a useful Bibliography: pp. 167-175); Ando Andrei, Pamfil Șeicaru. Author and literary character, David Press Print Publishing House, Timisoara, 2020 /292 pp./.

Also - Gh. Buzatu, Pamfil Șeicaru and the world he passed through, in xxx Tribute to the historian Stelian Neagoe (Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations of the Romanian Academy), Publishing House of the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations (Col. History & Politics) , Bucharest, 2003, pp. 19-33; Stoica Lascu, "Politics of the sea" and "politicianism" in the vision of Pamfil Șeicaru, in Sorin Liviu Damean, Marusia Cîrstea (coord.), Politics, diplomacy and war. Professor Gheorghe Buzatu at 70 years old [Foreword: university professor Dr. Sorin Liviu Damean, pp. 7-8] (University of Craiova. County Library "Alexandru and Aristia Aman"), University Publishing House, Craiova, 2009, pp. 534-557; Constantin Juan-Petroi, Romania and the crises of the 20th century in the vision of Pamfil Șeicaru (Unpublished documents), in Ionuț Șerban, Lucian Dindirică (coord.), State and society in Europe (Universitatea din Craiova – Department of History. County Library "Alexandru and Aristia Aman"), vol. II, Aius PrintEd, Craiova, 2010, pp. 349-372; Valeriu Nicolescu, A famous buzoian - Pamfil Șeicaru, graduate of the "Al. Hașdeu", in "Annals of Buzăului", III, 2011, pp. 73-77; Florian Bichir, Pamfil Șeicaru, in "Historia", XII, no. 6 (126), June 2012, pp. 12-29; Mircea, Colosenco, Total Journalist: Pamfil Șeicaru (April 18, 1894-October 21, 1980), in "Literary Romania", XLIX, no. 27-28, June 23,

Keywords

Prolific and very influential journalist - the well-known journalist Ion Cristoiu considers him "the greatest journalist between the two wars", and professor Gh. Buzatu "a journalist and politician of caliber"²,

– (in a suite of remarkable comrades, among which stood out, among the directors-owners of newspapers, Stelian Popescu /1875-1953/, the director of "Universului", the other great daily newspaper from the Monarchy period; both were also political people, both gave up their souls in Exile), he was:

- founder of publications - including the widespread and combative newspaper "Curentul" (1928-1944) (with editorials that had a great resonance in the era, with a deep understanding of socio-economic and cultural issues and analyzes of an almost unique visionary, in our country, in regarding the evolution of international life, Romania's place within it);
- parliamentarian (with a rich activity – interpellations and interventions³) and opinion leader (with a laborious publicity and memorial presence in Exile⁴ –in Spain and the Federal Republic of Germany - in the period after August 1944, including through letters sent to respondents in the Country⁵);

2017, pp. 22-23; Tudor Nedelcea, Among books and people, vol. V, TipoMoldova, Iași, 2019, pp. 251-258: Pamfil Șeicaru, founder of monasteries and newspapers; Gheorghe Dumitrașcu, People and facts from history (Studies and articles), Intol Press Publishing House, Râmnicu Vâlcea, 2021 [526 pp.]; among the 17 Statesmen, Pamfil Șeicaru is also listed, pp. 180-190.

² Gh. Buzatu, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

³ See - Pamfil Șeicaru, Parliamentary Speeches (1928-1937). Edited by Dr. Andrei Ando. Preface by Acad. Păun Ion Otiman (Romanian Academy. Timișoara Branch. Institute of Banatic Studies "Titu Maiorescu"), Romanian Academy Publishing House, Bucharest, 2021 /688 pp./; Păun Ion Otiman, Pamfil Șeicaru - parliamentary speeches or the best demonstration of the precariousness of current political life, in "Academica", XXXII, no. 2 (376), February 2022, pp. 21-24.

⁴Some of them are republished – Pamfil Șeicaru, Writings. Selection of texts, care, preface and notes Victor Frunză, vol. 1, 2, 3, 4, Victor Frunză Publishing House, Bucharest, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005-2006 / 256 + 300 + 288 + 264 pp./; Idem, Writings from exile, I: Figures from the literary world; II: Political portraits. Edited and prefaced by I. Oprisan, Saeculum I.O. Publishing House, Bucharest, 2002 /560 + 416 pp./; see also, in context - Ovidiu Vuia, Under the sign of the book and the study. With Pamfil Șeicaru in exile, I-II-III, Almarom Publishing House, Râmnicu-Vâlcea, 2002 /1,036 pp.: 304 + 305-668 + 669-1,036 pp./

⁵See - Pamfil Șeicaru, Letters from emigration [51 letters to Radu Valentin]. Portrait sketch by Vasile C. Dumitrescu. Edited by Rodica Șerbănescu and Nicolae Copoiu, EuroPress Group, Bucharest, 1992 /128 pp./; Ditto, Epistolary. Letters from Exile 1968-1978 [268 letters to Dr. Maria /Mimi/ Ciorănescu]. In the Annex: documents from the S.R.I. archive. Edition compiled by Mircea Coloșenco. Text established by Sergiu Coloșenco, Elion Publishing House, Bucharest, 2001 /357 pp. + 2 pp. facsimile/.

- author of numerous volumes of historical and national-cultural nature⁶: History of political parties in Romania (1958), History of the National, Peasant and National-Peasant parties (I-II), 1963), Pax Americana o Pax Sovietica (1947), La Roumanie dans la Grande Guerre (1968), Karl Marx – Notes about Romania (1968), Die Donau – Fluss *der fünf Meere. Ein europäisches Problem im Lichte der rumänisch-sowjetischen Kontroversen*⁷ (1975 Truths to remember (1980); ș.a.

⁶ A list of titles (the author mentions that "The list is not exhaustive"), at - Victor Frunză, op. cit., pp. 435-458: Bibliography of Pamfil Șeicaru's work ["only for writings after August 23, 1944"], pp. 167-175: Bibliography), with the following systematization: Books published during his lifetime (20 titles, almost all in Romanian, during the period 1947-1980); Texts published in the Almanac of Romanian Wanderers (According to "Caietului Veguței") (21 titles, 1959-1962); Articles published in Curierul Românesc and in Chemarea (164 titles in the period 1949-1964); Articles published in the Call (List compiled on the basis of information provided by the Romanian Library in Freiburg, F.R.G.) (49 titles); Articles published in various magazines in exile (According to the "Caietului Veguței". The respective titles are erroneously stated to have been all published in Chemarea) (102 titles in the period 1952-1964): Articles published in the magazine Political Annales, Palma de Mallorca (17 titles in 1952); Articles published in Carpathia magazine, Madrid (33 titles in the period 1954-1962); Various articles without mention of publication and year when they appeared. Probably, original versions of the articles written for El Alcazar and Liberty and Justice (Bibliography compiled on the basis of "Veguței's Notebook") (167 titles); Articles from working Romania (2 titles); Articles from Curentul - Munich. Published during his lifetime (18 titles between 1978-1980); Original articles published posthumously (6 titles in the period 1981-1992); Unprinted manuscripts (For most of them the owner is unknown) (8 titles); Other unprinted manuscripts (according to the "Veguței Notebook") (20 titles); Texts known only in the form of typescripts, most of them unpublished (12 titles); Books published posthumously, in Romania (6 titles, in the period 1990-2000: Nicolae Iorga, Publisher Clio, 1990; Letters from emigration, Europres, Bucharest, 1994; Romania in the Great War, Publisher Eminescu, 1994; Dotla, Fronde, Alba Iulia – Paris, 1996; History of the National, Peasant and National-Peasant Parties, Victor Frunză Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000)

⁷Edition also in Romanian: Danube - river of five seas. A European problem in the light of the Romanian-Soviet controversies. Foreword by Aureliu Goci. Edited and translated by Ioan Dan Poenăreanu. Comments by Ioan Dan Poenăreanu, Ionel Muscalu, Constantin Stoenescu, Pelican Publishing House, Giurgiu, 2006 /130 pp./. Other works published posthumously in the Country (apart from those mentioned by Victor Frunză and the anthologized ones, mentioned in the previous notes) – Indictments. Foreword by Nicolae Florescu. Edited by Mihaela Constantinescu, Jurnalul literar (Col. Capricorn), Bucharest, 1996 /104 pp./ (contains two materials, both published in the press from Exile: Tejgheaua kuvinolor - article-pamphlet addressed to Tudor Arghezi - and Open letter to Mihai Sadoveanu); Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen dynasty. Introductory presentation Vasile Iliescu. Neat edition and notes by Ioan Țepelea, Virgil Bulat, "Aletheia" Library, Oradea, 2002 /164 pp./; The ahistorical politics of Romania. Essays and medallions. With a Portrait of Cezar Petrescu. Edition and foreword by Mircea Coloșenco respectively: The total journalist: Pamfil Șeicaru] Elion Publishing House, Bucharest, 2002 /XVIII + 292 pp./; Murderous balkanization. From

- genuine patriot, fighter in the First World War, had, in Exile, a realistic-comprehensive attitude towards the new realities in the Country;
- Law graduate (1918); founder of the "Adormeria Sfintei Ana" Monastery from Orșova⁸ (where he was reburied in 2005).

Pamfil Șeicaru was also an appreciated lecturer, addressing various social-political and national-cultural topics, and his polemical verve⁹ it was revealed as such by contemporaries. As the man of letters, the philosophy professor Grigore Tăușan (1874-1952; honorary member, elected in 1939, of the Romanian Academy, influential publicist under the pseudonym Petronius) appreciated in January 1935 - at the celebration of seven years of existence of the daily "Curentul" (the most influential newspaper, along with "Universul" and "Adevărul", in the interwar period) -, Pamfil Șeicaru represents "in our daily journalism a temperament shaped by culture, cemented by rich reading and chiseled into a polemical style by the cutting edge heavy that does not hurt or offend because it is melted in the gold of talent. Aristocrat by himself, as a peasant poem is noble as a Racine drama when it captures the meaning of the lyre and renders it with the sincerity of the polished word in the true feeling of the soul.

Here, we celebrate not the polemicist who can sometimes be wrong, but the guild that brought to our daily life the contribution to the Romanian spiritual heritage, the line of a conviction and

nationalism to extremism. Series: Document. Edition and preface by Mircea and Sergiu Coloșenco, Elion Publishing House, Bucharest, 2004 /234 pp./; Nicolae Iorga, Tritonic, Bucharest, 2005 /120 pp./; History of the press. Edited by George Stanca. [Foreword by George Stanca], Paralela 45, Pitesti, 2007 /335 pp./; Political reflections and objections. Publisher: Andrei Ando, Mega, Cluj-Napoca, 2022 /392 pp./; also - Russia "The natural enemy" of Romania (essay), in "Historia", XIV, no. 4 (147), April 2014, pp. 15-24.

⁸See - Justina Popovici, Saint Ana Monastery and its founder Pamfil Șeicaru, MJM Publishing House, Craiova, 2008 /88 pp./; Constantin Mănescu, Pamfil Șeicaru, founder of the "St. Ana" Monastery in Orșova, in "The Mission". Magazine of the Research Center for the Cooperation of the Orthodox Church with the Romanian Army "General Paul Teodorescu", III, no. 1 (3), 2016, pp. 37-41.

⁹ See - Vlad Hogeia, Anthologia pamfletului romanesc, vol. II, Samizdat, f.l., 2005 [414 pp.], pp. 53-86: Pamfil Șeicaru (1894-1980) (there are two anthologized texts: Open letter to Mihail Sadoveanu, respectively a fragment entitled The Picturesque of N. Iorga); Magda Răduță (editor), I hate them, me! An anthology of the pamphlet. From the mountain chroniclers to Pamfil Șeicaru. Foreword by Radu Paraschivescu, Humanitas, Bucharest, 2017, pp. 259-281: A loser: Pamfil Șeicaru; more recently, Stoica Lascu, Pamfil Șeicaru —, *The pamphlet is not a manner of style, but an attitude of the soul*, in „Agora”. Quarterly of culture and interdisciplinary dialog [Constanța], XXI, no. 93-94, May 2024, pp. 23, 25.

the vibration of a literary talent, so useful to a career that lives on the magic of the idea and its transvasation from creation to creation"¹⁰.

The prestigious, hardworking and influential Romanian journalist¹¹ – no less feared pamphleteer and frequent lecturer -, leaves the country a few days before August 23, 1944(at August, 10)¹², being sent on a mission abroad, by Mihai Antonescu, respectively for "publishing a magazine in two languages or two magazines in widely circulated languages (English and French) through which to support the Romanian cause in front of the West"¹³. He was sentenced to death - the only Romanian journalist "honored" with such a punishment, in 1945, being accused of being a war criminal; is pardoned in 1966, by Decree no. 977/December 12, 1966 of the State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania (chaired, at that time, by Chivu Stoica; Nicolae Ceaușescu will combine this position with that of general secretary of the P.C.R. starting from December 9, 1967), in the Explanatory Memorandum of to the Minister of the Interior Cornel Onescu, revealing, among other things, that "Currently, Pamfil Șeicaru, as an emigrant, has an appropriate attitude and carries out an activity abroad, through writing, useful for our country"¹⁴.

¹⁰ Gr. Tăușan, Literary journalist Pamfil Șeicaru, in "Curentul", VIII, no. 2.505, January 24, 1935, p. 11 (article reproduced from "Rampa" newspaper).

¹¹See Viorica Constantin, Pamfil Șeicaru. Great Romanian journalists, in "Spiru Haret University Annales". Journalism", I, no. 1, 2000, pp. 104-120; Mircea Coloșenco, Total Journalist: Pamfil Șeicaru, in "Literary Conversations", CXXXIX, no. 11, November 2005, pp. 75-79.

¹² Florian Bichir, Pamfil Șeicaru. A pen of genius..., p. 22. The last published articles are: Mr. Churchill's exposition, in "Curentul", XVII, no. 5.916, August 5, 1944, p.1; The conference for the organization of peace, in Ibidem XVII, no. 5.919, August 8, 1944, p. 1; Lenin ratifies Stalin, in Ibidem XVII, no. 5.920, August 9, 1944, p. 1; From the Curzon line to the constitutional controversy, in Ibidem, XVII, no. 5.922, August 11, 1944, p. 1; see also – Pamfil Șeicaru, Substantive articles. January-August 1944, Curentul Publishing House, Munich, f.a. [1944] /150 pp./. See, in context - Gh. Buzatu, August 23, 1944, in the vision of Pamfil Șeicaru, in "Tricolorul", IV, no. 636, 23 August 2007, pp. 1, 3.

¹³Pamfil Șeicaru, Writings from exile, vol. I. Figures from the literary world. Edition edited and prefaced by I. Oprisan, Saeculum I.O. Publishing House, Bucharest, 2002, p. 5 (respectively, I. Oprisan, Memorialistica lui Pamfil Șeicaru).

¹⁴apud Gh. Buzatu, Pamfil Șeicaru and the world he passed through..., p. 33. However, on May 8, 1995, admitting the annulment appeal declared by the general prosecutor, Pamfil Șeicaru and the other defendants in the June 1945 trial are rehabilitate! To have not been known, by those in question, regarding Pamfil Șeicaru, the Decree from 1966 - discovered in the archives of C.C. of P.C.R. and made public, in 2003, by Professor Buzatu -?...; in detail - Ditto, Nicolae Ceaușescu. Parallel biographies. Transcripts and Secret Speeches. Original files. The trial and execution, Tipo Moldova (Omnia Collection), Iași, 2011, pp. 415-429: N. Ceaușescu intervenes decisively in the case of Pamfil Șeicaru; also - Tudor

Being abroad, he will lead a precarious material existence, together with his family, in Spain (in Palma de Mallorca, where he will only arrive in February 1945, via Paris; respectively in Madrid), then, from 1975, in the Federal Republic of Germany (in Munich, respectively Dachau - where, on October 21, 1980, he met his common end¹⁵).

Far from the Country, in Exile, he will assert himself as a consistent defender of general-democratic values and will stay away from the political turmoil that characterized the existence of various circles of Romanian exiles. He will carry out a sustained journalistic activity, with memorable memorial pages, creating a critical projection on political morals, on some political morals that undermined the credibility of the parties in the interwar years, on some representatives of the Monarchy, on other figures and personalities who dominated Romanian public life in the first half of the last century. A consistent patriot, he did not overcome his anti-Russian attitude even in exile¹⁶, numerous articles and studies bear witness to this¹⁷ (in

Nedelcea, Among books and people, vol. X, TipoMoldova, Iași, 2024, pp. 195-198: Pamfil Șeicaru pardoned by the Ceaușescu regime

¹⁵In the Historical Bibliography of Romania, IX: 1994-1999. Selective bibliography. Authors: Felicia Hristodol, Gheorghe Hristodol, Stelian Mândruț, Simona Nicoară, Magdalena Tampa, Ottamar Trașcă, Lucia Turc. French translation: Ligia Molnar. With an Addenda by Venera Achim /Coordinator: Gheorghe Hristodol/ (Romanian Academy. Institute of History Cluj-Napoca. "Lucian Blaga" Central University Library Cluj-Napoca), f.e., Cluj-Napoca, 2000, p. 459 - is past, due to the lack of careful correction, the year of death is 1984.

He was born in Tăbărăști commune, Buzău county (April 6/18, 1894) (his paternal grandfather was from Mărginimea Sibiului, probably from Șeica Mare or Șeica Mică) and died far from the country, in Dachau, on October 21, 1980; reburied, on February, 17, 1991, at the "St. Friday"-Grivița, from Bucharest; later, on October 20, 2005, he was re-buried at the "St. Ana" from Orșova (its foundation from the interwar period). Two school units bear his name - the "Pamfil Șeicaru" School Group from Ciorogârla (Ilfov county), respectively the School with classes I-VIII "Pamfil Șeicaru" from Orșova.

¹⁶This attitude of his is found not only in the publishing activity in the Country, but also in that in Exile, being concretized in articles and independent works, and explained by him in numerous situations; we point out, in this sense, what was said in a letter to Nichifor Crainic (dated Madrid, May 28, 1971) - in which he also reveals an ideational naivety regarding aspects of internal life (for example, he saw his superior as the most suitable to be the editor-in-chief of the new series of "Branches"!)) or international: "I fought with the weak powers of a journalist Russia from 1918 to 1944, I supported the war against Soviet Russia and the aftermath of Yalta mi- they ratified the attitude. Who can claim today that Russia can be our loyal friend? (...) Painful, but my fate is to remain in exile until Russia finds itself in tragic turmoil with China and Japan. You will say, you will wait a long time for Pamfile and you will be put in the same grave as Tantz. You will be amazed when I answer you, I will sing the prohod to Russia. This is my great certainty and the day is not far when the skeptics will realize that I am right" - apud

August 1976, he accepts a visit to Romania – „according to some sources”¹⁸, credible¹⁹ –, for a few days, but not allowing himself to be drawn into the chariot of official propaganda that would exploit his feelings anti-Russian²⁰, will return to Germany, preferring to lead the same material existence, at the limit of normality); remaining faithful to this attitude, he expressed himself, in writing, in the sense of supporting the foreign policy of the Romanian authorities from the years '60-'70²¹, from the perspective of revealing the perennial interests of the Romanian State versus the equally perennial interests of Russian/Soviet imperialism. Consistent, also anti-communist, Pamfil Șeicaru had the lucidity and strength to reveal, at the same time, to his exiled compatriots (he did not give up his Romanian passport), those aspects of the life of socialist Romania that illustrated the "gigantic affirmation of the Romanian genius". Thus, showing that "The opposition in exile is purely affective, it does not oppose a severe criticism, as it should, but a constructive one, as conditioned by the realities created during 27 years", he reveals the technical-constructive successes of post-war Romania (the construction of steel plants, hydroelectric plants, bridges, etc.), showing that "Beyond everything that can rightfully separate us from the regime in the country, I feel a sense of pride for the victory of the intelligence, courage and creative will of those who they achieved the gigantic affirmation of the Romanian genius"; and continues, bringing the

Nicolae Scurtu, An unknown epistle of Pamfil Șeicaru to Nichifor Crainic, in "Romania literară", X LIV, no. 9, 2012, p. 15 [continued on: p. 23].

¹⁷See, in context (with comprehensive assessments on the relations with the authorities in the country) - Sorin Gabriel Ioniță, "The publications "Current", "Carpathians" and "Stindardul" in the archives of the Security (1975-1989)". Part I Part II, in "Caietele Inmer" [National Institute for the Memory of the Romanian Exile], VI, no. 14, March 2009, pp. 70-74; no. 15, July 2009, pp. 18-27.

¹⁸See Gh. Buzatu, Romania and the Great Powers (1939-1947), Encyclopedic Publishing House (Coll. Romanians in universal history, vol. 101), Bucharest, 2003, pp. 629-636

¹⁹Nicolae Sporiș, Pamfil Șeicaru. The return to the springs, in "Vitrailii. Lights and shadows". Magazine of Veterans from the Romanian Intelligence Services, II, no. 3, December 2010, pp. 87-92; according to a documented author - who extracted testimonies from the archives of the National Council for the Study of Security Archives /CNSAS/, he was really, incognito, in Bucharest a few days before August 23, 1976; the documentary file in question: Florian Bichir, Pamfil Șeicaru. A pen of genius... /176 pp./.

²⁰Pamfil Șeicaru, Ahistorical Politics of Romania..., p. XVI (respectively, Mircea Coloșenco, Total Journalist: Pamfil Șeicaru).

²¹Florian Bichir, Figures of the Romanian exile in the files of the Security. Pamfil Șeicaru case study, in Constantin Augustus Bărbulescu (coord.), Romanians and Europe (XIV-XXI centuries), Mega Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 2014, pp. 115-132.

clarifications as such: "But precisely this victory of the technical organization in the most daring enterprise constitutes a painful contrast with, alas, so many declines of the Romanian economy under the communist regime. The explanation exists: at the Iron Gates, ideology was fatally absent, because mathematics has no ideology, neither does technique and the engineer, the designer, the technicians in general, do not need to consult Marx, Engels or Lenin, in the work in which they engaged. The treaties they consult have nothing in common with any ideology. In the organization of state trade, in cooperatives, in the various collectives and state enterprises, ideology is the master, and the embodiment of ideology is the bureaucracy of the party. That is why the results are special"²².

The great Romanian journalist and patriot, present almost daily in the pages of the newspaper "Curentul"²³, he made public, almost daily, his opinions also on international events, in the given geopolitical context, revealing in this framework, the national interest of Romania.

On the 130th anniversary of his birth, we are returning to readers today his articles dedicated to the analysis of the evolution of the international situation in the period August-September 1939 - before and after the outbreak of the Second World War (September 1, 1939).

Mr. Chamberlain's statement

Mr. Chamberlain considered it necessary to make a series of statements in the House of Commons, in response to several questions put to him²⁴. What defines Mr. Chamberlain's eloquence is that calmness that runs through each phrase, that special care in the choice of words, lest a rush, a special emphasis highlight a phrase by using a word that would testify to a startle of anxiety.

Even for the English spirit so controlled in the face of the most obvious dangers, Mr. Chamberlain is an exception. To many, the English prime minister appears to them as very slow in making decisions, as an incorrigible optimist, refractory to the harsh and immediate reality of the

²² Pamfil Șeicaru, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

²³According to his own words (dated Madrid, January 10, 1954), he entered the press in 1913, and from "April 1918 until August 10, 1944, I wrote at least one daily article" - Pamfil Șeicaru, *Istoria presei*. Edited by George Stanca [Preface, by George Stanca], Paralel 45, f.l. [Pitesti/] 2007, p. 13.

²⁴

war; but no less. Chamberlain appears as the most stubborn resistance to an inconsiderate rush, a predominance of emotionality over cold judgment.

Basically, Mr. Chamberlain wants to exhaust all the means to save the peace, so that he might not someday be able to reproach himself that there was another means that was not tried.

But one cannot dispute a certain change in Mr. Chamberlain's attitude and, implicitly, in England's policy.

A year ago, in the matter of the Sudetenland, Mr. Chamberlain (to emphasize England's strict objectivity) sent Lord Runcimann to Prague, with the mission of consulting the two nations in dispute; today, the entire British war fleet is concentrated for two months, which is supposed to last the period in which some complications might arise. Naturally, this mobilization of the war fleet is justified by the necessity of the maneuvers of the English navy - as in the region of the Po river the great maneuvers of the Italian army began, and as on August 10 we will record the great concentrations of the French army and, by causal connection, so far... Noting the existence of "numerous centers of unrest", the persistence of these nerve points can only stimulate England's will to solidarize all those threatened, to totalize the disparate forces, to unite what Mr. Chamberlain calls "the front peace", which Germany qualifies as a policy of encirclement.

English tenacity irritates: this persistence in one direction, this acceptance of all means to secure a victory, causes the most legitimate concerns.

England is not a comfortable opponent: because you cannot end their resistance with a lightning offensive. Unfolded over time, this resistance has a crushing massiveness. In this respect, Germany has a recent experience from the period 1914-1918 and the older experience of Napoleon.

What seems incomprehensible to me, however, is how the Fuehrer-Chancellor Adolf Hitler moved away from those lines of direction in foreign policy that he had fixed in "Mein Kampf", when he formulated the criticism of the foreign policy of the German empire that led in conflict with England:

"To secure England's good graces, no sacrifice had to be too great. We had to give up colonies and maritime power and remove all competition from English industry".

However, from this point of view, so bluntly formulated, it is surprising what a deviation German policy had. And it is all the more difficult to understand, since Fuehrer Adolf Hitler is unchanged in the broad lines of

direction he fixed for German politics; if it accepts some temporary adaptations, no less preserves the major line of direction.

With his exceptional intuition, he understood the immense British reserves which, when mobilized, break through their resistance even the most pathetic strains of energy, as was the formidable attitude of Germany from 1914-1918. However, England's attitude can no longer be a topic of controversy; and Mr. Chamberlain, so measured in all things, sought to calm English opinion by saying:

"The chamber knows that we have made the most of the time since March so far and that our defense is now of a formidable character."

For a refractor of rhetorical exaggerations, for an enemy of assertions that are completely inconsistent with reality, the phrase acquires the aspect of an impressive copy of a reality.

How decisive English policy is can also be seen from the acceptance of the continuation of negotiations with Moscow.

There is no doubt that the Soviets - as is natural - seek to capitalize on their situation; hence the system of delays, of introducing new elements into the discussion, of complications surrounding the specification of the term "indirect aggression". The French General Staff especially values the agreement with the Soviets: and not so much in the positive performance of this agreement, but especially that Germany would not have in the neutrality of the Soviets a point of support in a supply of the raw materials that it absolutely needs in case of war.

There is - in Mr. Chamberlain's statements - a phrase that perfectly sums up the difficulty of negotiations with the Soviets:

"We very much want not to give the impression that we are aiming to bring about any violation of the independence of other States".

Beyond the words, lies the deep meaning of the difficulties that stand in the way of perfecting the agreement.

Mr. Chamberlain's exposition makes a serious contribution to the reassurance of the public spirit, beset by all worries.

The English Prime Minister does not seek to mobilize enthusiasm, to stir up passions, to add an additional irritation to the general restlessness; but precisely the character of subdued exposition (without missing that accent of decision which forces the opponent to a serious meditation) facilitates the passage of this autumn without reaching a dramatic denouement.

Moreover, even from the comments made by the German press to Mr. Chamberlain's statements, the legitimacy of our confidence in the viability of peace emerges.

It is a great fortune for this tormented humanity that, in this troubled age, there sits a lucid, a staunch defender of peace in the office of Prime Minister of the British Empire. The calmness of Mr. Chamberlain impresses more than the vehemence of a precipitate of impulsiveness.

With Mr. Chamberlain, at any time, Germany can find a way of discussion. And this very possibility of discussion is a great gain for peace²⁵.

[Great efforts are being made to avoid an armed conflict]

It is not at all wise to let the opponent have a superiority in freedom of movement, in command unity, in speed of execution. However, authoritarian regimes have an undisputed superiority in developing a plan and in its execution compared to democratic regimes, much slower, much more difficult in making decisions. It is quite possible that a decision taken through a debate in a legislative assembly, filtered in controversies, subjected to the decantations of a critical analysis - will be much better constructed, much better cohesive as a presentation and conception, but no less what is most precious was lost: time. And there is a principle: in turbulent times, when the pace of events accelerates, a lost day is a lost battle, and especially the hesitant, all the decision-makers, become the factors of defeat.

However, the democratic regimes, continuing to denounce the regimes of dictatorial authority, still feel obliged to imitate them through some obvious deviations from the democratic spirit and letter. Two facts: the prorogation of the French parliament and the two-month vacation of the English parliament. So the mandate of the current French parliament has been extended for two years, which is exactly how long the crisis is believed to last. The newspaper "Le Populaire" publishes this headline "Coup de force contre le suffrage universel" (Coup de force contre le suffrage universel) and the political director of this newspaper is Léon Blum. Keeping the parliament beyond the deadline means a fear of the ballot box; to close it means that the times are too bad for anyone to have the courage to unleash party passions, to give free rein to irresponsible ambitions or self-interested disguises.

²⁵Pamfil Șeicaru, Mr. Chamberlain's statements, in "Curentul", XII, nr. 4.123, August, 4, 1939, pp. 1-2.

However, the incompatibility of universal suffrage with the troubled times we live in is implicitly acknowledged. The normal rhythm is compatible with the slow deliberation of the laws, it is synonymous with a command that cannot command without prior authorization, the result of a thorough controversy. But in this age of uncertainties, of the precipitation of events, who is so unconscious as to let the country fall prey to party fights, to accept with a sinister serenity the prospect of an electoral campaign, that is, to risk the disintegration of the moral unity of the nation and the collapse of the State? A functioning parliament is much less dangerous than the consultation of universal suffrage, when you do not know whether the enemy will not attack you at any moment

However, Mr. Daladier proved himself to be a courageous politician, of authoritarian initiative and he did not shy away from presenting the prorogation decree to President Lebrun for signature. What gives a much more comprehensive meaning to the act of confessing the incompatibility of universal suffrage with national interests in exceptional times, is the coincidence with the 150th anniversary of the French revolution, which proclaimed the Sovereignty of the People. Implicit is a condemnation of the system, a confession of an authoritarian opportunity, the democratic regime being for normal times. But d. Daladier, as a history teacher, remembered the origins of the dictatorship in the Roman republic, as an institution imposed by exceptional circumstances.

The English attitude is interesting. In the most critical period, when the destinies of peace are decided, when the intense activity of the government has to balance the attitude of England in a dramatic concentration, a two-month vacation of the parliament is considered more suitable to the English interests. There cannot be a more complete proof of the contradiction between the parliamentary system and the fundamental interests of the State in decisive moments. English pragmatism adapted to the circumstances, removing a superiority of the opponents. And once again we repeat: there will be no war. Democracies adapt too quickly to the ritual of totalitarian regimes. War means a break in the balance of forces. However, every day the balance of forces is restored more and more.

We will not have war.

Which means that we have to be exceptionally well prepared²⁶.

²⁶Idem, Great efforts are made to avoid an armed conflict, in *Ibidem*, XII, no. 4.126, August 7, 1939, p. 12; the entire page is subtitled The international situation at a difficult time. Great efforts are made to avoid an armed conflict, the article not having an independent title.

Maginot or Siegfried?

A very interesting controversy is being debated between the French press and the German press: which is stronger: the Maginot line or the Siegfried line? The conception, the works carried out, their deployment in depth, the value of the obstacles designed to nullify the effectiveness of the assault chariots, everything is presented in luxurious detail, so everyone asks, and rightly so: what do these clarifications answer?

Fortifications are by their very nature secret, and the less one knows about a defensive line, defined by fortification works, the more intimidating they will be. No one is afraid of what he knows exactly; the unknown amplifies and torments the human imagination. You walk through a forest during the day with a kind of joyful lyricism, you participate in all the plant exuberance, you experience a feeling of freshness, you have the impression that your thoughts receive drops of dew, and exactly the same forest at night makes you shudder, you have the feeling that the darkness is populated with visions.

Este firească întrebarea: ce interes are atât presa franceză cât și presa germană să despoie fortificațiile de acel vâl amplificator al misterului? Orgoliul unor realizări ciclopice? Eterna întrecere între două națiuni care nu se pot nici când împăca, fie în orice domeniu, cu gândul că cealaltă a întrecut-o?

But no matter how much we multiply the questions, they cannot define the mood, the motive that determines the controversy around the Maginot and Siegfried lines.

The insistence with which the value of the fortifications is emphasized on both sides is not only intended to calm natural concerns, to increase the safety of the German and French nations; there is another goal they want to achieve. The French want to convince the Germans that they are not allowed to hope for a breakthrough - through a surprise attack - as they were able to pour on the plains of Flanders in 1914. All the technical effort, artillery, aviation, tanks will remain powerless in front of the Maginot line.

German military experts are too convinced of the strength of this line of resistance, they realize that France is closed in a steel shell, like a turtle. But no less than the Germans want the French to be filled with the same feeling towards the Siegfried line; hence the insistence with which the German press presents the fortifications lining the Rhine.

It was enough for some rumors to circulate around this line of fortifications for the press reaction to occur against the tendency to

underestimate the importance, the invincible strength that the Siegfried line of fortifications represents.

What is being watched?

To remove any illusion that could be considered as an exhortation, that could encourage aggressive tendencies. In vain you will try to apply the concept of a "Blitzkrieg", a lightning war, because the tension of the German forces will hit powerlessly by the fortifications of the Maginot line. And the French want to convince the Germans that it is not to their advantage to try. When it seemed that some rumors about the inadequacies of the Siegfried line were making their way in the French opinion, the luxurious presentation of the fortifications began. That is, no matter how ingenious the French General Staff, no matter how stormy the energy of the French troops, no matter how perfect the material used, military genius, bravery, cannons, aviation, tanks will crash helplessly against the Siegfried Line. But it is obvious that both sides of the Rhine reject the idea of war. There is too much talk, too much bragging about the armaments, the fortifications, so as not to highlight one concern: to eliminate the war. "Please, don't be fooled! You try in vain and it's a pity for a useless waste of human lives!..." This is, in the final analysis, the meaning of these ridiculous presentations of the Maginot and Siegfried lines of fortifications. And it is natural to take care to inform the opponent so that he does not fall easily into the temptation of the illusion of an easy war.

Does anyone imagine that the war would have broken out in 1914 if Germany had been convinced that France was not a tired country, incapable of a heroic effort and England would not be a spectator like in 1870?

The war broke out from a lack of information, from a false appreciation of the opponent. This time, precisely to prevent the opponent from falling into the nets of an illusion, they hurry to announce the risks, to convince him of the ruinous futility of any offensive approach. It's really moving the care that both of them take to protect their opponents from a wrong appreciation of the fortifications, from an underestimation of the defensive powers. Besides, both the French and the Germans esteem themselves too highly; they knew each other well enough to jump to conclusions about military forces.

For us, all these ridiculous presentations of the fortifications are still a sign of peace. Not only does no one want war, but everyone tries to convince their opponent of the tragic futility of any attack.

More than all the pacifist speeches, more than all the subtleties of international law, everyone's potential for war contributes to peace. Maginot and Siegfried are two sentinels of peace.

The more invincible they will be, the more it will be known that they are invincible, the more lasting the peace will be.

By the way, like the fortifications of other countries²⁷.

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https://adt.arcanum.com/ro/view/The_Current_1939_08/?pg=124&layout=s

The Current, August 1939 (Anul 12, nr. 4120-4150)1939-08-12 / nr. 4131: 1, 2.

Examination of the external situation

We are entering a nerve-wracking phase. From August 10 to October 10-15, every day will contribute to fueling our fears of war.

What remains gained is the horror that all warring peoples have. Obviously, the peoples never had enthusiasm for this bloody war, but there were moments in the various phases of history when war was considered a dramatic necessity. As today, however, the peoples have never been more hostile to the hypothesis of an insane outbreak of war, never have they been more deeply convinced of the sinister error that a general conflagration would mean.

Enthusiasm for war? No one but absolutely no one except the prophets of the world revolution, those who are waiting for the war as the mother of the revolution that could not be victorious, universal in 1918, no one wants the war. In the press of all countries, the feelings of the people are not reflected, but the harsh state needs to prepare the public opinion for a possible catastrophe of the peace assassinated by a cursed imprudence. Basically, the press in all countries is directed, only the methods differ, so we cannot orientate ourselves, at most we can distinguish the trends of the governments of different countries. However, this muted, categorical hostility of the peoples towards the idea of war, decreases a lot from the possible precipitation of the governments. It is enough to cross different countries, to bend your ear, to listen not to what is whispered but to open confessions of an identical state of mind.

²⁷Idem, Great efforts are made to avoid an armed conflict, in *Ibidem*, XII, no. 4.130, 11 August 1939, p. 12.

Apart from this temperature of the peoples, there is another decisive contribution towards the elimination of war. If the League of Nations, of which nothing is known anymore, saw that it could not prevent violent clashes between states, it took refuge in the formula of war localization.

Today no one doubts the war can no longer be localized, in case it breaks out. If Danzig were to become a cause of armed conflict between Poland and Germany, it would simultaneously lead to a declaration of war on the part of England and France, which would cause the automatic participation of Italy. Or, precisely this completely new character of the conflict will determine an accentuation of prudence in the various diplomatic relations. Each holder of responsibility will measure his words, will try not to exceed a limit beyond which the storm is unleashed. As starting from August 10, the armies of all states are almost mobilized under the pretext of maneuvers, no one can benefit from a surprise attack, from a mobilization carried out earlier, which would facilitate the rapid concentration of forces at a certain point to give a fruitful blow, to impose the opponent's movements, to condition his defense. All this contributes to the removal of a tragic outcome.

There is no government in any State that has any illusions about the proportions of the risk, about the true aspect of the war. When Germany was able to conquer almost the whole of central Europe without firing a single shot, it cannot be admitted that for the annexation of Danzig it would provoke a general war. If the annexation of Czechoslovakia and Danzig had been solved simultaneously in March, the game would have been won, given the diplomatic situation of Poland, the almost isolation in which it was. However, after the passage of six months the situation has completely changed, Poland is no longer isolated, in March it agreed with Germany regarding the modification of the political map in Central Europe, and today something more, France and England are determined not to allow no news of the current situation. Victories through intimidation, i.e. the most splendid victories that delight, fascinate peoples - thus freed from the sacrifice of hundreds, millions of lives on the battlefield - are no longer possible.

Today Germany is faced with a terrible dilemma: Danzig with the outbreak of war or finding a middle ground to satisfy German pride and Polish interests. Here are the true terms of the problem, which form the critical point of the international situation. The leader of Germany is in a lucid exaltation, he proved a brilliant strategist of opportunities; it was not a blow that was not calculated down to the smallest detail, not only in terms of execution, but in an equal degree of foresight and in terms of

international consequences. It is in this political structure a strong guarantee meant to brake suddenly at any moment when the situation would take a particularly tragic aspect. Now, we present these elements to the readers in order to obtain the necessary calm, to go through these moments of wavering certainties.

Obviously, logic can be disproved, a thoughtless gesture can unleash destruction, but we will benefit from a position both military and diplomatic when we keep calm, when we are determined to accept even the sinister error of others. We only do a policy of conciliatory attitude, eliminating any element of provocation; but precisely this balance of gestures, this measure in words should be the expression of a determined will to accept and fall...

The more determined we are, the more we present an aspect of calm will, the more we will contribute to the defense of peace. From August 10 to October 15 we enter the phase of uncertainties. Let's have our nerves ready to meet the abysmal news.

We're entering in winter without a storm²⁸.

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https://adt.arcanum.com/ro/view/The_Current_1939_08/?pg=159&layout=s
The Current, august 1939 (Anul 12, nr. 4120-4150)1939-08-14 / nr. 4133: 12.

War postpone, war removed...

No one is allowed not to let his writing be permeated by a sense of responsibility, to abuse the prestige that the print still retains, and instead of an honest orientation, to try the lightness of the statements intended to receive the denial of the events. No one has to promote a trend, but to facilitate a clarification in the disorder and the fullness of contradictions that characterize the contribution of the telegraph agencies.

The reader is waiting to be clarified, to be facilitated in his understanding of international facts, by establishing causal links between - apparently - disparate events. And every day, my purpose boils down to this orientation contribution, always keeping the discipline of a single Romanian point of view. The events that will take place until the middle of October can only be related strictly to the line of Romanian interests, in the

²⁸Idem, Examination of the external situation, în Ibidem, XII, nr. 4.131, August, 12, 1939, pp. 1-2.

light of these interests they should be interpreted, national discipline should coordinate all our attitudes in the face of the coming days.

The first fact that opens the series of chains: the speech of Mr. Foerster, the National Socialist leader of the Germans in Danzig. An energetic speech, well-cohesed as a valorization of the arguments, without bringing a new contribution, only the accent of the decision gives a fresh relief of known theses. Historical rights, the rights of self-determination are invoked to establish the legitimacy of the incorporation of Danzig into the Reich on the basis of a debate before public opinion.

What we found particularly significant in Mr. Foerster's speech is this passage: "The years that followed this detachment proved definitively that the people of Danzig suffered material and cultural damage of all kinds. Even the fact that the port of Danzig was to be Poland's only access to the sea - for which reason Danzig was separated from the Reich - could not prevent this principle from being violated, the vital rights of Danzig were systematically violated. Gdynia has overtaken Danzig and this proves that Danzig has nothing but economic disadvantages to expect from Poland".

Checking on the ground, i.e. visiting Danzig and Gdynia brings you a confirmation of the prosperity of the port of Gdynia and the languor of the port of Danzig. In truth, from a poor fishing port, the Poles made a large and modern commercial port, with intense activity. Rarely in a shorter time has a country managed to create a more beautiful work. But while the Polish port prospers, Danzig receives less and less goods from Poland.

It would be too simplistic a presentation of the Danzig problem if we reduced it exclusively to economic determinants. A good part of the German pride raised to an almost nerve-wracking intensity enters into the composition of the problem that is obsessing Europe today, as well as military considerations, Danzig forming a strategic point not only for the Baltic but also for the East.

The question is: Will Germany make war for Danzig? Let us suppose that Danzig, by proclaiming the rally to the Reich, would provoke the military reaction of Poland which will occupy it.

Can Germany create the illusion of a dissociation of England and France, in the event that Poland appears as an aggressor, as disregarding the principle of self-determination contained in the Treaty of Versailles? Obviously not. All the subtleties of the past, developed around the definition of the aggressor, no longer apply, the positions feel perfectly defined, no matter who attacks, solidarity will occur automatically. No one has any doubts about this aspect of the problem.

Then? Germany will not unleash a world war to regulate a new Statute of the city of Danzig. That it is quite possible to prepare a disturbance among the Ukrainians, to create internal difficulties for Poland, is again out of the question, but the world war will not unleash it for Danzig.

The agitation in Danzig can be a pretext, it can be a huge compulsion to debate a series of issues much more important for Germany, but Danzig cannot be an introduction to a catastrophe. The regulation of Anglo-German relations - (because in the last analysis these relations are what we are talking about in all the neurasthenic tension we are experiencing) - through an unreserved recognition of England's colonial empire in return for Germany being recognized as a zone of economic influence in central Europe and the Balkans, where - according to the German thesis - England has no real interests. The great industrial production power of Germany needs, as a breathing space, outlets that are not under the political pressure of England.

This is what the problem of peace and war basically boils down to. However, England only makes war when all the possibilities of peace have been exhausted. It is significant that Sir John Simon - the English finance minister - defended the Munich agreement at this time "because only thanks to this agreement, today so many millions of people can spend their summer vacation. Where would all these people be now if that agreement had not been signed? And then let's not forget that a war postponed can sometimes also mean a war removed. In Munich d. Hitler solemnly declared that his territorial claims in Europe had ceased.

It's a pity that later facts did not confirm this assurance at all".

So only the uncertainty of the commitments that would be made could be an obstacle in the way of a peaceful understanding.

But to revive the hopes of peace there is still a serious contribution: Italy. Apart from all political and military solidarity, Italian interests cannot be subordinated to other interests. Duke Mussolini can only interpret events from the perspective of Italian interests.

Does anyone seriously believe that Italy will second Germany - if there is an unaccounted for precipitation - in the Danzig business?

There are still so many elements that will contribute to the postponement of war, as Sir John Simon's words "a war postponed may sometimes mean a war removed"²⁹.

²⁹ Idem, *Warpostpone, war removed..*, in Ibidem, XII, nr. 4.133, August, 12, 1939, p. 12.

The role of Duke Mussolini

Our optimism begins to receive some shy confirmations: peace will be saved this time as well. Of course, the utmost secrecy is kept regarding the agreement reached in Salzburg between the foreign ministers of Italy and Germany, but something seems to have come out: Germany will not take any action in Danzig without prior consultation with Italy.

So, in the final analysis, Duke Mussolini has the role of arbiter of the destinies of peace, Italy has the role of decisive factor. The situation is correctly summarized, and implicitly an increase in the legitimacy of our optimism. So Mr. Mussolini today holds the historical role of savior of peace, that is, between so many congested prides, the political leader of Italy should keep a cold lucidity.

Commenting on the recall from London of Mr. Grandi on July 15, 1939, we drew the conclusion of a conference for the organization of Europe, the initiative coming from Italy, that is, a new Munich, but in an Italian interpretation, without the offended pride, without that haste that thwarted the effectiveness of the agreement of the autumn of 1938. Naturally, our statement surprised, it seemed like an isolated note, lost in the tumult of telegrams designed to alarm the world. Unfortunately, the democracies are so turned against Duke Mussolini that they have forgotten, with strange ease, the saving role he played in September 1938. Without such a decisive intervention of the political leader of Italy, we would have been at war for a year and others were the balance of power in September 1938 versus the balance of power in August 1939.

However, after October, while Germany saw its claims fully satisfied, Italy did not even benefit from a moral satisfaction: everyone's gratitude for the saving act of peace.

Resentment stifled even the most basic reflexive gesture of gratitude. A statesman, to whom circumstances designate a historical role in the most difficult moment in the lives of peoples, is not allowed to work with resentments, to let his right judgment be disturbed by the presence of bitterness, disappointments harvested. Duke Mussolini is overwhelmed by the responsibility that the events attribute to him and he is too much of the land of classicism not to have the universal meaning of things. That is why he will hardly decide to accept the fatality of a European war, which would endanger all the spiritual capital that feeds the disciplines of thinking and feeling of modern man.

But if this is the Italian point of view - not only the saving of a synocopated peace every spring and every autumn - a peace ensured by the very order on which it rests, it is no less true that he will have to find out in the ranks democratic countries an understanding, an approval.

The Munich Agreement was concluded under the pressure of panic; it was therefore fatal that it would not have any kind of duration, to continue a temporary period in which the insecurity of all peoples would amplify the economic difficulties of each one. The problem of Danzig, which today forms the nerve point that threatens the viability of peace, is more a matter of honor for Germany, as the "Deutsche Diplomatisch Politische Korespondenz" also testifies.

Let us admit - by reduction to the absurd - that Poland would sacrifice itself and give in without any objection to the German point of view. With Danzig entering the Reich, does anyone imagine that peace in Europe is assured?

What determines the restlessness, we would say the spatial insatiability of Germany, is it only an exaltation of German pride, a demonic inclination towards warlike expansion? But everyone knows the immense difficulties of the German economy; the production power of the German industry is struggling with the narrowing of the sales space as well as with the weight of supplying the factories. The machine is a monster that if you don't let it eat, it eats you and all the huge industrial armature of the German economy creates that climate of warlike neurosis in German politics.

We find almost exactly the same elements - of course, less exasperated - in the structure of the Italian economy. Undoubtedly, there will be no war, Danzig will not cause a general conflagration and Italy is a strong brake.

Surely a compromise will be reached, even only through the direct negotiations that will take place between the Commissioner of Poland in Danzig and the president of the Senate of the Free City, but admitting that the agreement would be strengthened by the accession of the Reich, admitting that Danzig will be removed from the discussion, peace it still remains fragile. Something becomes more and more evident: since 1914, every holder of responsibility does not look lightly at the possibility of a war. There is a fear, everyone is willing to make some sacrifices just to postpone the terrible bloody deadline. Or, precisely this dramatic presence of the sense of responsibility in consciences forms the basic element of a possible understanding

We cannot appreciate enough the value of this sense of responsibility, what role it can play in smoothing out rough edges, in creating that balance of interests meant to give peace a wide breath, comforting for the tormented peoples who inhabit this old continent.

If peace plans really begin to take shape, they demand not only a courageous initiative, not only the bold will of Duke Mussolini, but also a basis for discussion regarding the possibility of normal supply of German and Italian industry.

If today unemployment has disappeared in Germany as in Italy, the fact is due to an artificial supply of industry through the arms race. It is easy to say peace, but this tranquility is conditioned by ensuring economic normalization in Germany and Italy.

It requires a courageous rejection of all the entrenchments of hypocrisy and a total recognition of the causes that perpetuate the neurasthenic specter of war. Ideas of a conference in which England, France, Germany, Italy and Poland would participate in order to liquidate the Danzig problem, would have the advantage of forming an introduction to the complex of economic and political problems that are the substrate of today's situations, threatening peace.

Duke Mussolini's role is to take the initiative of a pacification of spirits by removing the rhetoric of arrogance with the debate of the real elements that make up the tragic equation of peace.

And we are convinced that the detoxification of Europe will begin in the fall of this year.

The sinister absurdity of war will be defeated³⁰.

Defending Peace

A reader asks me with some bewilderment: if I don't believe in war, if I consider war a moral and material impossibility, a true catastrophe of civilization, why do I extol the military virtues with equal strength, and constantly make the apology for the heroic potential of the Nation? I feel obliged to give an answer, I feel obliged to clear up the confusion.

If we are today with broken souls, if the specter of war is looming over all countries, the cause lies in a false conception of peace. For years the peoples were deceived by Geneva's pacifist lemonade. Speeches were

³⁰ Idem, *The role of Duke Mussolini*, in *Ibidem*, XII, nr. 4.136, August, 17, 1939, pp. 1-2.

given, grandiose performances were given with "matches" of eloquence, the outlawing of war was invented, utopias were talked about, virile energies were drugged with the illusion of disarmament and in this orgy of utopias was forgotten by the unendurable laws of human history.

Common sense was considered a reactionary prejudice, the warnings given by the political intelligences as militaristic starts, and no one thought how you can preserve a state, a European order created by a military victory, by denying the forces that created it. Everyone in the political world was convinced that we had fallen out of the bloody phase of history, towards entering the phase of relations of law intended to replace relations of force. War will be an exception, as are individual crimes in social life, everything will be liquidated by legal procedure, the tribunal of peoples being the "League of Nations" (where else is the noble institution of sleepy illusions of the conservation instinct?). You did not oppose an inconvenient neighbor with the profile of a strong army, you did not rest your right on military force, but on the force of eloquence, as the accused hope everything from the brilliance of the lawyers who plead their case. However, all these illusions were considered as axioms in international relations.

But he forgot that it is not enough for the majority to be in good faith, that it is enough for only one country to make a separate opinion, for the whole legal concept of peace to collapse, as the wind shatters the sand dunes. However, at the first manifestations of a separate opinion, at the first visible manifestations of another conception that is completely against the spirit of Geneva, instead of renouncing all the baggage of utopias, they continued to seek to accommodate themselves as if they could coexist in Europe the warrior spirit with the pacifist spirit. And one fine day it was noticed that legal peace, the peace of law receives serious corrections from the force, that everything is shaking, that nothing is certain anymore. The utopians became angry, but anger in the face of force is comical if it has no equivalent power. Then it returned to the reactionary prejudice of common sense and instead of limiting armaments, it began to make up for lost time through a frightening increase in production.

Peace is not a juridical creation, but a finalization of a political order by force, and as long as the force called to preserve it lasts, so does the breath of peace. The political order defined by borders is defended not with legal eloquence, not with the skill of a brilliant lawyer at the bar of the League of Nations, but with cannons, tanks, machine guns, planes, torpedoes, submarines, battleships and cruisers. Pleasant, unpleasant, convenient or inconvenient, human or inhuman, the reality is this and you

cannot ignore the laws of the existence of states, without risking to disappear as an independent country. Whoever wants to be free defends his freedom, whoever wants not to be a slave to the invading foreigner defends his borders. Even defeated, a country imposes respect on the victor by the stormy energy with which it opposed it, but woe to the country that surrendered without a fight, woe to the nation that preferred to kneel rather than fight. Peace is a creation of strength, the lasting breath of peace depends on strength, on the decision of those who defend the established order in the form of borders that delimit the sovereignty of States. I don't believe in war, because I don't allow anyone any more illusions regarding the possibility of a strong tension that would ensure victory in the shortest possible time. The stronger we are, the more determined we are, the more we will serve peace.

Those who do not want war, those who realize why peace is a priceless good, should be determined to defend it. But not a parody of decision, not a frightening decision, but a decision so affirmed, so reckless, that even the boldest tendencies feel suddenly restrained by fear. Let only the achievement of that potential of will that we had in 1916 be coveted, let everyone find in it the exaltation that those who created this Great Romania had.

And because of that, the splendid speech delivered by M.S. The King in Constanța is basically a great act of peace, through the very energy with which the will to defend the borders was asserted. Moreover, the echo that the Sovereign's speech had abroad, indicates the value of Romania's peaceful contribution. You are only respected to the extent that you are determined to defend your prestige, to the extent that you are determined to sacrifice your life to defend your honor.

On August 15, 1939, Romania, through the voice of its King, gave the most beautiful contribution to peace.

And I firmly believe in peace, because no one accepts the falsification of peace anymore³¹.

³¹ Idem, *Defense of peace*, în *Ibidem*, XII, nr. 4.139, 20 august 1939, p. 1.

[How the international situation is evolving]

For us it was not a surprise. We foresaw this agreement and we were only surprised by the certainties that were always insistently affirmed, although the negotiations progressed slowly, anemic. An innovation was even introduced, before all the political asperities were ironed out, before an agreement was reached. And in order for the diplomatic protocol to be concluded, military missions were sent to discuss as if the political agreement was a *fait accompli*.

I was surprised by this innovation, all the more so since Mr. Litvinov's change from abroad could give a lot to think about. If it had only been the guarantee of racial adversity - Mr. Litvinov was Jewish - and it would have been enough to ratify all the certainties regarding the move against Germany. However, the sudden change of Mr. Litvinov required a serious examination, an investigation, an extensive documentation in order to conclude something. It is true that as far as England is concerned, she was much more skeptical and it is not known whether a pact with the Soviets would not have determined some situations in the Far East that were against British interests. But no less contributed the telegraph agencies who felt obliged to create an atmosphere of total confidence in concluding an agreement of a negative value for England and France, although the same agreement for Germany, given the internal reserves of raw materials of the Soviets, has a special value.

And all of a sudden, all certainties are shattered, no one expected such a fundamental reversal of situations, Germany obtaining a clear diplomatic victory. It demonstrates the superiority of silence, it proves the value of secrecy in external actions, the publicity serving only to disorientate, the press serving as a splendid diversion to better cover the blow prepared in a completely different direction.

How should we be well oriented, to separate from the tumult of the last events a single fact: the German-Russian economic agreement complete with a non-aggression pact. It is a beginning of clarification, of delimitation of the fronts, which are not ideological, they are not groupings of forces under mystical banners, either Marxist or anti-Marxist, but groups of interests.

Here is a great gain for a political judgment free from the delusions of ideological veils. Everyone adjusts their political direction as the interest of their country dictates. Ideas are adjusted, adversities are forgotten, doctrinal chasms appear as if they did not exist, over them political needs

are breaking the bank. Even worse for those who allow themselves to be caught under the spell of ideologies, they risk finding out that ridiculous positions in politics often equate to disasters.

Anti-fascism, anti-Comintern, ideological solidarities, Spain's three-year passion, everything is looked at, everything is adapted. Let us also retain something from this brutal call to reality, from this unexpected lesson in political realism. We are obliged to examine with all calmness, to be attentive spectators of the events and to relate everything exclusively to the line of demarcation of our interests. The calmer we are, the more we will be subject to the discipline of Romanian thinking (and for anyone who says enough, we will serve the country more fully. We do not expect approving applause from anyone, because the foreigner applauds when it serves his interests him, or at least do not contradict them, so do not imagine that they ratify the right understanding of your own interests. Let us ask only from our instinct of national preservation. Where judgment may err, the robust instinct of the race cannot fail.

Let's not let ourselves be seduced by the waves, let's once be exclusively subordinated to Romanian thought, let's once be exclusively Romanian. To think Romanian means to think according to the interests of your nation and the outline of Romanian interests is obviously the outline of the country's borders.

It is necessary to remember that the borders of the country imply the independence of the nation, masters at home. Why do I feel an imperative need to remember these simple commandments? That each of us should do the examination of conscience and detach the national imperative. The more disciplined, more lucid, more subordinated to reality we will be, the more we will be protected from risks. We are not allowed any adventure, no romantic gesture to validate ideological or lunatic solidarity, but all the energy, all the vigor for the borders of the Motherland. ROMANIAN BLOOD AND TERRITORIES, HERE IS THE FORMULA: HERE IS THE AXIOM OF NATIONAL POLICY.

Until today, the one who writes these lines has not been lied to in any of the anticipations he made about the external situation, allowing me to keep my optimism intact, to find absolutely no reason to panic. On May 4 and 7, 1939, I was predicting today's relations between Germany and the Soviets, I was trying to extract the full meaning of Mr. Litvinov's resignation, so the commercial treaty, the non-aggression pact and other variants of the German-Soviet rapprochement cannot be a surprise for me. once again I repeat: calmness and realistic understanding of the situation.

There is absolutely no reason to panic, as long as we obey the national imperative. It is clear to anyone who thinks exclusively in Romanian³².

The consequences the Russian-German non-aggression pact

In these days of great nervous tension, of shock due to the unexpectedness of events, of contained violence, of delirious exaltation of the forces of destruction, a voice was raised in which the last vibration of humanity seemed to have taken refuge. In the name of the King of Denmark, the King of Sweden, Norway, the Queen of the Netherlands, the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, the President of Finland, King Leopold of Belgium appealed for peace. The King's youth found accents, found out words intended to impose an examination of conscience on each holder of responsibility, before making the gesture intended to unleash the hurricane of anger, each one having a confrontation with that island of human tenderness that still exists in him. Does he have the right to send young lives to the slaughterhouse? Isn't peace possible? Isn't there enough space for a less wild coexistence to be possible? King Leopold of Belgium states that "The world is threatened by an economic collapse, although hostilities have not even opened; a fearful battle is preparing for Europe". In truth, all the states were still struggling under the burden of difficulties left as a sad legacy by the war that ended in 1918 and instead of finding means of correction, they plunged into the madness of this demonic arms race. Of course, unemployment has disappeared, the factories smoke day and night, giving the illusion of prosperity, but at the same time the savings reserve is wasted, the future of the nations is mortgaged, the tension of this necessary armament policy, prepares the economic collapse of tomorrow. The peoples are equally affected by fiscal pressures, almost half of the national income is consumed for the preparation of the war. With a unique moral courage, King Leopold made that appeal of the Kings, reminding that this is not the time for vain opinions, pride, ambitions, because "time does not forgive" and in today's situation, the mercilessness of time, the horrible punishment they want atone equally for all peoples is to "send their children

³² Idem [supratitlu: *Soluționarea problemei Danzigului nu satisface Germania*, cu două subtitluri: *Se cere rezolvarea problemei coloniilor și a tuturor revendicărilor italiene*, respectiv *Cum evoluiază situația internațională*], în *Ibidem*, XII, nr. 4.144, 25 august 1939, p. 12 (*Ultima oră*).

to the slaughter". And in truth "time does not forgive". The latest telegrams inform us that "If Poland is attacked, England will intervene with all its forces", "New concentrations in France", "The archives and luggage of the German embassy in Warsaw have been evacuated". And every telegram increases the worries, adds to the general panic. In all this warlike tumult, a human voice resounds, a supreme call of humanity, the voice of a King who remembers that regiments, divisions, armies, include people, that aviation squadrons, tanks, warships also include people. All these millions of beings leave behind families at the will of chance, millions of them will never return to their homes, and millions more will return with mutilated, crippled bodies. And apart from the conscripts, the cities and villages are doomed to become targets of the air squadrons so that the destruction is as general as possible, and the man finds no refuge anywhere. Monuments of art, all that human genius has achieved, be turned into a heap of smoking ruins. This sinister perspective stirred the soul of King Leopold of Belgium, the humanity condemned to slaughter torments the tender soul of the Kings who gave the mandate to the youngest to try to find the mercy of the people. A young voice in the storm, a tender voice of peace in the midst of the passions stirred up by the ugly hurricane, and the voice is that of a King.

150 years ago, the French revolution broke out to free the peoples from the tyranny of the kings, to ensure the fraternization of the peoples by expelling the tyrants who for personal ambitions, often out of whims, lead wars that impoverish the people. And to be sure that the age of tyrannies was ended, that the people would be free, a gentle king was taken to the scaffold, a king who refused to admit repression in order not to shed human blood. And then came not the fraternization of peoples, but twenty years of continuous wars. Instead of royal armies so few in number did the national armies appear; the kings no longer made wars, the peoples in their integrity made the wars, they mobilized tens because the peoples themselves paid the cost of these warlike confrontations. A numerical competition between armies, a competition in the effectiveness of weapons, a more extensive devotion to death. Where the kings hesitated, sought to avoid wars as much as possible, freedom and democratic fraternity rushed enthusiastically to increase the recruitments, and an eloquent exponent of democracy, a tribune of the people, Jean Jaurés conceived in the "new army" the mass raising of a people in case of war, so that no one should be consumed by the equality of the slaughter.

We live in the era of the domination of the masses, the leaders of the peoples are exponents of the multitudes who continuously plebiscite them by acclamations. But all these sons of the people, all these tribunes, all these exalters of death, of the desire to destroy and distinguish themselves, do not for a moment have the image of the individuals taken in isolation, of the individuals who make up these masses destined for war. They do not see families, hardworking people, those humble heroics of a working existence, gray days but sunny with joys, they have contempt for the individual because they see the uninformed, bestial mass, ready to indulge in the bloody bacchanals of death. The individual has humanity, the mass is an apocalyptic beast; the individual can arouse pity, the mass only the passion of force, the dynamism of destruction. Now, democracy has the cult of the masses, the cult of numbers, of anonymity that cannot stop the momentum of a warlike unleashing, by curbing the mercy of people. And here a voice is raised that echoes the forgotten love of people, a King in the name of Kings invokes mercy for life, tries to stop the slaughter towards which the demonic exaltation of the masses is heading³³.

Peace will be saved

D. Mussolini managed to convince D. Hitler not to start any military action against Poland before trying a peaceful solution to solve the Danzig problem

President Roosevelt's message will not change the course of events. It is an act of vibrant humanity, but it cannot have political consequences. Germany today has a dominant political situation and it is impossible not to exploit the success obtained, after such a secret preparation. In the French conception especially, if the military alliance with the Soviets had not had too substantial a contribution, instead Germany would have been deprived of raw materials, so implicitly it would have caused a serious decrease in its war potential. For France, there could no longer be any doubt about the alliance with the Soviets. It was a political certainty evident through the very fundamental difference in doctrine, through the manifest adversity between communism and Hitlerism. Only in Spain didn't communism and national-

³³Idem, Consequences of signing the Russian-German non-aggression pact, in *Ibidem*, XII, no. 4.145, 26 August 1939, p. 1; with the supertitle: THE REICH DOES NOT GIVE UP DANZIG. AND POLAND, ENGLAND AND FRANCE REMAIN IN POSITIONS.

fascism collide with an unyielding start? Were not Italy and Germany behind General Franco, and weren't the Soviets behind the communists? What could be more logical for France than the impossibility of an agreement between the Comintern and the Anti-Comintern? Due to this certainty, they did not wait for the conclusion of the political agreement and went directly to the application on the ground, sending the commission of military experts, with maps, with an inventory of the available combat material.

We can say that never was a more elaborate farce played than when both Hitler and Stalin had to avoid the prying eyes of that famous "Intelligence Service".

The non-aggression pact concluded between Germany and the Soviets is designed in the traditional spirit of such pacts imagined by the League of Nations, which has always considered them instruments to guarantee peace in sectors threatened by armed conflicts.

No one can attribute to the satanic League of Nations the unconfessed intention of having imagined non-aggression pacts in form, in fact being disguised groups of aggressive intentions. Now, what were the main forces that threatened the peace of Europe? The two ideologies, something more than two political mystics outright enemies, two religions: German-Italian authoritarian nationalism (fascism-racial) and Soviet Marxism. However, at the border of the supreme antagonisms, a non-aggression pact is unexpectedly produced. Read, interpreted, analyzed in the drafting of the texts, in the possible adhesions, in the logical assumptions, this pact bears the stamp of Geneva orthodoxy. You have the impression that the last worshipers of spirituality, of the Geneva method are in Berlin and Moscow. Then why isn't a solemn meeting held at the League of Nations for the approval of the pact and the apologetics for the achievement of an ideology, fecund even apart from the faithful, the parishioners?

If the pact is only a cruel irony to Geneva, which imagined such methods of removing possible conflicts, then it is only a proof of the persistent delusion in which those who served an ideology and a method in international politics have indulged. For the historian of tomorrow, our era will obviously be a theme of perplexities, contradictions, a grid of all possible paradoxes. For us, those of today, the German-Soviet pact only requires a serious examination in order to adapt to the new circumstances.

We have seen what ideological demarcations mean, we have seen that each country is not controlled by the concern, by the fanaticism of a

political mystic, that between the most stubborn political opponents, interests create unexpected affinities, shocking solidarities. Adaptation to the circumstances is the essential condition for the viability of any organism and even more so it is mandatory for States. A careful examination of the map imposed on both Germany and Soviet Russia some rectifications of intransigence, some appeasement of troublesome sectarianisms, for the realistic understanding of the interests of the State.

One of the primordial conditions of a politician is not to ignore the importance of geography. I have often wondered if the downfall of Napoleon Bonaparte was not due to an ignorance of the geography of Russia. And, obviously, geography does not only mean spatial recognition, but also climatic knowledge, ethnic knowledge.

But not only for a military man it is mandatory, but also for a statesman, because the map imposes the line of political action. One day, through the successful farce of two irreducible adversaries, all your geopolitical data is overturned, what is the first duty of the person in charge? To adapt. It is not enough to look at a calendar to know what clothes to wear, open the window or look at the thermometer, because often the temperature has whims that contradict the calendar's indications. However, this matching of clothing is not according to the season but according to the temperature, it is called adaptation, apart from the resistance of those who are insensitive to the cold or who are not afraid of the flu. I for one prefer cold sores. And if I often practically isolate the intransigence of attitudes and do not use to insult my opinions, I will never recommend to the country a very uncomfortable method – even for an isolated individual³⁴.

Diplomats stopped the war instead

The British government's response to Mr. Hitler's message includes new conversations between London and Berlin

All these telegrams announcing the measures taken, as if war were to be declared at any moment, cannot be refreshing to the people's expectations of peace. Yes, the circulation of the subway in London was

³⁴Ditto, Peace will be saved. Mr. Mussolini managed to convince Mr. Hitler not to start any military action against Poland before trying a peaceful solution to solve the Danzig problem, in *Ibidem*, XII, no. 4.147, 28 August 1939, p. 1; supertitle and subtitle on the entire p.1.

interrupted so that it could serve as shelters for archives and refuge for the population in case of bombing; indeed, all the art treasures in Paris were evacuated. And the telegrams in their laconic rendering complete the sea, the gloomy fresco of the fear of the imminence of war.

If there can be doubts about the intentions attributed to Germany to unleash the war, there is not a shadow of doubt about the decision of England, France and Poland to accept the war. There is such a strained will to receive the blow that you would be inclined to believe in a close and tragic denouement.

But from all these telegrams that are full of bad news, I have detached one that reflects a very strange state of mind: the fear of being attributed responsibility for the declaration of war. Each State renounces this sinister role. However, when there is such a great fear, when every country refuses to appear in the memory of mankind as having provoked a war, it is a hopeful sign. When there is still the fear of being responsible for a possible war, implicitly foreign and the fear that the certainty of the final victory is not so total. If there were today a country, or a group of powers that had a certainty in the invincibility of their forces, that is, for this group victory would be as precise as the calculation of a tried and tested engineer, then without a doubt there would no longer be at least beware of the responsibility of unleashing the war. The winner is not afraid of judgment, because he is the judge and it is natural to attribute the responsibility to the loser in the first place. The one who is not sure, who is still calculating, who is still balancing the expectations of victory with the fears of defeat, does not dare to plunge into the tragic unknown of a war. We reproduce a fragment of a telegram from the D.N.B. agency:

"In political and journalistic circles in Rome, the impression is manifested that the decision on the outbreak of war or the maintenance of peace is getting closer hour by hour. The newspapers base this impression on the haste with which democracies continue preparations for war. They suspect that England, in its response to Mr. Hitler, will try to attribute responsibility for a possible war to Germany. Unanimously, the newspapers state that it is expected to produce that characteristic democratic maneuver, to try to change the roles and assign responsibility to Germany. Such a crude attempt - the newspapers continue - cannot deceive anyone, especially since Germany and Italy have repeatedly proven their will for peace: Germany through its well-thought-out initiatives, and Italy through its tireless diplomatic efforts". There cannot be a more conclusive telegram for a general state of mind. But it is not only the great powers' fear of being

responsible for a possible war; we also add everyone's fear of doing it. All the responsible men of Europe at this moment, Chamberlain, Hitler, Mussolini, Daladier and Beck have a complete understanding of what a war could mean for Europe. The victors at the end of the war will be as powerless as the vanquished, and the dominance of the white race in the world will collapse. The colonies were maintained by the prestige of the white race and a war for the colonies, areas of influence, vital space, which would leave Europe desolate, ruined as after the thirty years' war, cannot tempt anyone. No matter how strong, how well armed a State is, it still fears war even if it has a mathematical certainty of final victory. However, no one has such certainty. That is why more than all telegrams, I value as a means of orientation this telegram which denounces the fear of being responsible for a possible war, which implicitly also includes the general fear of war.

I continue to believe in saving peace and I continue to believe in the decisive role of Duke Mussolini. Italy is the active factor and more than ever, the country of classicism, i.e. of the sense of measure, will be the one that will contribute to removing the sinister specter of war. No one has the courage to unleash the war.

It is the only cowardice that can rehabilitate humanity. In a climate of liability fears, initiatives stop, intimidated by the burden of atonements.

Peace is in the making³⁵.

Above the borders

In the flurry of information intended to increase the fear of all peoples, the publication of the exchange of letters between Messrs. Daladier and Hitler brought a touch of humanity.

And one and the other remember that they made the war, that they lived it in all its dramatic unfolding, so two people who breathed that anonymous heroism of the trenches, who knew the absurd existence of man lurking in order to suppress him - and- they presented the titles of mutual understanding.

It is obvious that those who actually made the war cannot desire it, cannot even conceive of it without a shudder of horror. It can be easy for one who has stayed safe from that zone of waiting for death to easily throw

³⁵ Idem, *Diplomații au oprit în loc războiul*. Răspunsul guvernului englez la mesajul d-lui Hitler include noi conversații între Londra și Berlin, în *Ibidem*, XII, nr. 4.149, 30 august 1939, p. 1; supratitlu și subtitlu pe întreaga p. 1.

out the warlike calls and rush right to the tragic denouement. But a former combatant who ended up holding a command post in Stat, a former combatant who can decide on peace or war, will feel the procession of memories curbing any warlike impulsiveness.

In the consciousness of each combatant, the ghosts of dead comrades begin to rise, to parade forgotten images - everything that preserves, unchanged by time, the sensitivity and emotional memory. No one can so easily defeat all these returns that make a procession around the decisions like a chorus in an ancient tragedy, precedes destiny in its implacable sanctions. No one frees himself with a serene soul from the silent grip of memories; no one can easily accept the confrontation with the forgotten images of the war he made.

I also read M. Daladier's letter and M. Hitler's reply—letters intended to form a turning point in the course of events. The gesture of Mr. Daladier, to address Chancellor Hitler directly, has a noble pathos in the nature of the act. It is not addressed to a man who is afraid of the cruel examination of the battlefields, all the tragic silence of the supreme decisions runs through Mr. Daladier's ranks. He feels that he is the exponent of a Nation that made history resound with the footsteps of its victorious armies. But it is precisely this sense of security, of a race in which the memories of Caesar and Vercingetorix are intertwined, precisely this consciousness of strength that gives Mr. Daladier's letter an even greater human value.

Let's not forget that only twenty years separate us from the victory obtained primarily by the French army, no matter how great the devastation of democracy was, none of the great attributes that ensured the victory was lost. Now, having the certainty of the potential of war, Mr. Daladier considers it a duty of human conscience to try to remove the act of devastating madness, to try to save this priceless asset called civilization. The answer given by Chancellor Hitler has the elegance of an adversary's response that refuses to be attributed to aggressive intentions. The praise he gives to French heroism, the insistence with which he emphasizes the evidence of good neighborliness and the acceptance as definitive of the border between the two great nations, give special relief to Chancellor Hitler's reply letter. Especially this phrase we considered appropriate to remember: "Whatever bad things may be said against my method, it will not be denied that I managed, without blood being spilled, to find solutions".

I mix in this confession something more than hopes; and it is not possible for a leader of the destinies of a Nation of eighty million souls to be so blatantly proud of a method - and still have his pride be legitimate -, that

one day he will renounce his method. It is true that before Fuehrer Hitler there was von Stein, then there was Chancellor Bismarck; but the enlargement of Prussia and the realization of the unity of Germany were done through wars. The great, fascinating innovation of Fuehrer Hitler is to have secured a series of astonishing victories "without blood being shed".

Obviously, the German people were forced to some deprivations; but what do these food restrictions mean, these mutilations of individual liberties, when instead the German people were given such a dominant situation, the borders of the Empire were expanded to proportions that would have amazed even Bismarck?

However, it is precisely this method that fascinates the German people. A war?... But then the charm of the miracle no longer exists, because the Fuehrer accepts the dangerous game of chance: he no longer wrests victories from events without subjecting them to that chance check. For a great conqueror of collective sensibility, for a man who knows all the folds of the people's soul, the uncertain paths of war cannot have any seduction: "Whatever may be said against my method, it cannot be denied that I have managed, without blood being spilled, to find solutions".

Naturally, the letter also has some blunt assertions of a twisted logic: "Allow me now, Monsieur Daladier, to ask you: How would you, as a Frenchman, act if, following the outcome of a heroic struggle, one of the provinces of - yours would be separated by a corridor occupied by a foreign power, from a large city, let's say Marseilles, which would prevent it from declaring for France, and if the French settled in that territory were brutally mistreated and murdered "?... So that this passage can then be framed in this gloomy perspective:

"I realize the serious consequences of such a conflict. But I believe that Poland will be the one that will have to suffer the most serious consequences, because in any way a war fought over this issue would end, the Polish state today would have lost in any case".

... To conclude:

"If our peoples continue to throw themselves into a new bloody and destructive war for this reason, this, Mr. Daladier, is not only a cause for sadness for you, but also for me."

When the prospect of war projects such a state of mind, the bridges of a solution "without blood being shed" are still intact...

The peace will be saved³⁶.

³⁶Idem, Above the frontiers, in *Ibidem*, XII, no. 4.150, 31 August 1939, p. 1; supertitle and subtitle on the whole of p. 1; supertitle, on the whole page: THE

**[The break between war and peace continues.
The Anglo-German negotiations did not bring any change apparent in
the international situation]**

The Prime Minister of Great Britain began his statement in the House of Commons on Tuesday with these words: "The threat of immediate catastrophe has been removed, but I cannot yet say that it has been definitively removed." Measured in words, excessively cautious in optimistic provisions, Mr. Chamberlain gave a breather to humanity tormented by waiting. However, it is not enough to draw the conclusion of a total removal of the conflict. Even neutral states like Switzerland, which closed like a snail, closed their borders; the civilian population on the Rhine border was ordered to evacuate; consumption cards began to be distributed in Germany; The Netherlands has mobilized, and in all countries the soldiers are at their units, which have also occupied the positions intended to defend the borders. However, such an atmosphere does not allow excessive optimism, it shakes even the strongest resistances. But no less, something completely new emerges: the unanimous opposition to the idea of war.

Not only the states in the vicinity of the points of conflict, not only the States that could possibly be caught in this collapse, but even distant countries, completely safe from any participation in a possible war, manifest a fierce will for peace, they consider themselves obliged to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the conflict. It is in this participation in the concern of the directly interested countries an affirmation of the spirit of the unity of human life. No country can count that it could reap some benefits from the disasters that lie in wait for the losers as well as the winners.

The imbalance of the world economy from 1919 until today is the cursed legacy of the last war; or, who is that demented, that reckless statesman, who imagines that a new war would not complete the work of the other, that is, would not totally destroy the world economy? By what miracles would not the same cause produce exactly the same effects?

And let's not forget that in 1914 all states participated in the war with healthy finances, with a balanced economy; we could say that they went on the sinister rampage because of a congestion of prosperity. Today, before the war even begins, the consumption cards come into effect, the gold

FUEHRER LATELY DELIVERED TO MR. HENDERSON the answer to the British note, with the subtitle: The international situation has not changed in any way.

reserves, if not devastated, in any case do not have the integrity of 25 years ago. What to make war on? With credits? To mortgage a victory and that extremely problematic? Then?

It is therefore natural for the participation of distant States, completely outside the threatened area, because the economic ruin of Europe would bring the ruin of the entire world economy. However, it is precisely this solidarity that will force us to put a stop to the aggressive beginnings, to an increase in the will for peace.

But apart from the economic aspect, there is also a strictly military one. In the present situation of armaments, the power of arms imposes on any attacking army a double effective and a doubled strength as armament. The effectiveness of the fire mouths increased the strength of the defense so much that the attackers had to have overwhelming forces and be determined to make great sacrifices. German tactics make the most of the principle of surprise and lightning attack (the famous "Blitzkrieg"). Or, precisely this tactical concept promoted the value of motorization, that is, the maximum development of mechanical means of transport.

When Germany has been discussing the Danzig problem for so long, it sets deadlines by which it is decided to liquidate the problem, it implicitly removes the conditions of surprise, cancels the effectiveness of the lightning attack. The aviation, which, through a stormy action, was supposed to prevent the mobilization, to destroy the concentration centers, sees its task removed because all the troops are in positions ready to receive the attack. Would Germany have given up its doctrine of war? But until now he practiced with rare fidelity the tactical principle of surprise and exploited the effectiveness of the lightning attack. Then what happened?

Nu-i oare legitim să acorzi oarecare temeinicie afirmărilor made by Germany that it does not want to unleash the war? Precisely because everyone has mobilized, the troops have taken a fighting position, I think that the war becomes, if not impossible, in any case very risky for the one who goes on the offensive. We believe that the very appearance of a vast battlefield, which Europe has increasingly accentuated, is a guarantee of peace.

Each country that mobilized its army contributed to a decrease in the possibilities of war. And Germany, through the uproar it caused, determined the removal of the surprise. However, a country that wants to attack does not increase its obstacles, does not create overwhelming difficulties. Removing the surprise, Germany showed its will to provoke a discussion of

all European issues. At most a brutal method of forcing consideration of Axis claims.

And here are the points of support of a lucid optimist³⁷.

**[Poland rejected Germany's proposals
Resolving the conflict peacefully seems an impossibility]**

It is almost certain that the Senate of the Free City of Danzig will solemnly declare its accession to the Reich.

Obviously, this declaration, this political act will have consequences. Germany, like Poland, has mobilized, or is in the process of mobilizing, waiting to see the reactions of Poland, which has already taken all measures to ensure the greatest effectiveness of artillery fire, so that Danzig is reduced to a wasteland agglomeration of smoking ruins.

Germany will wait: Poland attacks the city of Danzig, it will respond without a moment's hesitation with a lightning offensive. So in the final analysis it remains to be seen what Poland will do.

From London and from Paris there was no shortage of exhortations for as much conciliatory spirit as possible, that is, decision in substance and a lot of flexibility in form. These exhortations did not take anything away from Poland's freedom of decision. These exhortations are all the more circumspect since England and France are perfectly aware of a specific state of mind in Poland that can be explained by the experience of Czechoslovakia.

There is no doubt that Poland bitterly regrets the attitude it had exactly one year ago, and in exactly the same circumstances.

Instead of assuring Czechoslovakia of neutrality, it participated in the border rectifications, receiving its share of the benefits upon partition.

However, today when Danzig is discussed, Lithuania raises claims on the city of Vilno, thus another threat and implicitly an extension of the surveillance front beyond the line of East Prussia to the border of Latvia. They are almost exactly the same conditions in which last year's Czechoslovakia surgery was performed. The similarity causes a legitimate susceptibility and a desperate intransigence on the part of Poland. In the

³⁷Ibidem, XII, nr. 4.151, September, 1, p. 1; the article is placed under the supertitle, on the whole page, The break between war and peace continues, respectively the subtitle Anglo-German negotiations did not bring any apparent change in the international situation.

end, than a transaction that might not be, given the precedents, than an introduction to the fourth partition of Poland, rather the unleashing of the catastrophe, the war between the two groups of forces. And - unfortunately - the Polish temperament also works. Germany does not ignore all this political psychology of Poland and hence the method it uses.

The annexation of Danzig is proclaimed by the Senate of the Free City.

What will Poland do?

This is the question that can only be answered by negotiations or war. The Polish government has the right to take any attitude regarding the German proposals.

In these moments, national prides are overexcited, the elements in dispute are almost no longer noticeable, declamatory attitudes predominate, but precisely this strain would require a total reduction of passionate impulses to facilitate the exclusive action of the judicial forces, to be able to immobilize the senses of responsibility human.

What will Poland do?

We repeat the question that summarizes the situation. It is almost a certainty that when these lines appear, Danzig will have declared itself German, and Poland will have taken the attitude that it will have considered more suitable to its interests. Military attitude, i.e. war, political attitude, i.e. a conference meant to find a balance of interests and not a provisional balance disturbed in spring and autumn.

He refuses logic, he refuses the instinct to preserve civilization to believe in war. A passionate congestion may cause the accident of right judgment, but it still activates the forces of reason.

The day of September 2 is decisive.

But in all this disorientation, in all this hubbub of excited pride, let's keep calm. Attentive spectators of the events, we have only one discipline: our Romanian interests.

And exclusively of these interests³⁸.

³⁸ Ibidem, XII, nr. 4.152, September, 2, 1939, p. 1; the article is placed under the headline, on the whole page, Poland rejected Germany's proposals, respectively the subtitle Peaceful resolution of the conflict seems an impossibility.

Our duty

So Europe has become a theater of war again.

Only 21 years have passed since the day when the last shot was fired, when the bugler sounded the cease-fire for a long time. It was believed, then, that each of those who had made the war, would keep his memory so strongly, that he would become an active factor in the defense of peace. Those who know what a war means and another one begins have not traveled to the secret worlds of non-being.

Arguments will be invoked from both sides; each of the belligerents will seek to prove the legitimacy of his action. But we are not a forum for judging the events of others, but a forum for judging our own interests.

Until the pact concluded between Germany and Soviet Russia, the necessity of joining one of the two great political religions of revolution and counter-revolution, of Bolshevism and anti-Bolshevism, of nationalism and Marxism, could still be invoked. Today, such a delimitation of politics through the affinity of ideology, of the conception of the State, of man, of history, appears completely naive. "With Christ against Antichrist" remains a slogan of dangerous candor.

We can only be with our Romanian interests. Any action taken apart from the selfish line of these interests can mean a guilty bleeding, a waste of Romanian lives.

There will be no lack of idealistic declarations, each party engaged in the struggle will seek to prove the righteousness of the intentions for which they are fighting, the sacrifice for a noble principle, on whose victory the definitive establishment of peace will depend in the future. Let us only believe in ourselves, let us only have one frontier to defend, let us only know the line of our interests. Whoever would like to try idealistic arpeggios, intended to convince us to an untimely escheat from our vigilant reserve, will not speak under the inspiration of national interests.

The events that began to follow each other will harass us with their unexpectedness. We will daily have the sensation of taking off in an airplane with those sudden, vertical falls, in what are called "air gaps", or the similar startles when we go to the "Montagne russe". Today's certainty can be denied to us tomorrow; hence the need for a very cautious reserve and watchful eyes of spectators.

Let's not lose sight of the fact that we still don't know how far the mutual commitments from the German-Russian pact extend. A Soviet military mission is in Berlin, and who can say with certainty that Soviet

participation will be limited to air force collaboration? Both Berlin and Moscow have proven that they know the art of dissimulation in order to better hide a secret, so the military pact between Germany and Soviet Russia can, it is almost certain, have a series of surprises in store for us.

It is not known, but it is infinitely probable, unless there is an agreement between Germany and Soviet Russia, with the objective of dividing Poland, the fourth partition. Germany would advance to the old borders between Austria and Russia, between Germany and Russia, and the Soviets would do the same.

The threat from Fuehrer Hitler's last statement regarding the fate of Poland, could very well have as a point of reference a secret content of the military pact concluded with Soviet Russia. Moreover, there is no need to try to decipher it, to struggle with all kinds of hypotheses, because the events will quickly reveal to us the entire military content of the pact. But let us content ourselves with taking note of the existence of a military pact between Germany and Soviet Russia and outline our attitudes in relation to this situation. Not a gesture, not a word unheeded; for us there is only one policy of interest national: a good reserve. We do not have to participate in this sinister duel of forces. The reserve, however, also involves a very intense military training and a very severe moral discipline.

The stronger we are, the more our reserve will be respected; the more morally disciplined we are, the more perfect we will be in our lucid reserve. An intense arming, a refreshing of the military training of each soldier, this is what we have to do in the first place.

And parallel to this military training, we are required to learn moral discipline. Let's not get caught in the cobwebs, let's not always be unconscious agents of panic, through all the chasms we make to circulate.

The eagerness to appear well-informed makes many invent all kinds of absurdities that cause disorientation, anxiety, disturbing the normal life of the population. Every lie disseminated should be considered as an action against the interests of the country and repressed by individuals. At the same time, the clear awareness of the fierce times we live in.

It is an age in which comfortable living is forbidden to us. We live as Nietzsche predicted, in the storm of dangers. We will get used to it. And let's fill each day with our dignity, with our decision, with our strong will to regain the lost time.

Let's not forget, let's always repeat as a saving prayer: armament and national discipline.

The times do not forgive the lazy. History records serfs in the cemetery of oblivion. Reserve, attention, discipline, this is what the imperative of this dramatic current situation consists of³⁹.

Strict national discipline

The slowness of the operations on the western front produced a natural bewilderment, this cadence is all the more striking, as the German offensive is unfolding in the East with lightning speed.

You have the impression of a wildly unleashed hurricane, to uproot the trees, to blow the roofs off the houses, as if no resistance would have opposed it.

The German deluge is forcing the Poles to retreat in a hurry, so that by forming a narrow front - as you clench your open fingers to make a fist -, they can put up a resistance with more chances of victory, they can try a battle with all their forces reunited. The intention of the German offensive is to force Poland to ask for peace; hence the whirlwind of the cadence, hence the focus of attention only on the East, where it is not entirely excluded that the political objective (more than the military) will be achieved.

The hypothesis was also examined in London. The "Manchester Guardian" writes, under the signature of its diplomatic editor:

"It is obvious that Germany aims first of all to eliminate Poland, to then turn to the Western powers and other countries in Central Europe."

But this hypothesis did not shake England's decision to carry the war to the end. A war of grinding the German powers, a war without resounding victories, a war of stretching the muscles of the opponent.

From the first days, the character of the war, as conceived by England, was observed: instead of bombardment with explosives, millions of manifestos were circulated, with the objective of the moral dissociation of the German resistance.

³⁹ Idem, our debt, in Ibidem, XII, no. 4.156, September 6, 1939, p. 1; the general supertitle of the page: Romania will keep its peaceful attitude in its foreign policy until now, and the general subtitle: The Government will pursue a good understanding with all its neighbors and is ready to renew the proposal of a non-aggression pact.

The theme of the manifesto: "You do not have the means to wage a long war... Our resources and our reserves and those of our allies, in arms and supplies, are immense."

It is not only a threat; it is England's very conception of war. The economic blockade of Germany - because England considers Germany capable of a huge strain - crushing for any adversary, provided that this strain is not of long duration. In the English conception, Germany does not have ample breathing space to be able to wage a long-lasting war.

Hence that proud assertion: "We are too strong to be broken by blows and can wear you out without escape."

So England did not enter into a short war; it may last four, five, and even seven years - that is, exactly as long as it will be necessary to cause the moral dissociation of the German force and, as a result, the dissociation of the military force.

Will you succeed?

No one can predict the physical resistance of a people to a great moral tension. But apart from the resistance capacity of the Germans, there is also Soviet Russia, — a huge reservoir of supply.

How much assistance will Soviet Russia give?

Can anyone say that after a while Soviet interests will no longer match German interests?

Here is an unknown: we would say that, for Germany, it is really an unknown drama. England will continue the war, and will wait, with that cold obstinacy that forms the decisive element in defining the English character.

A people hostile to confessions by gesture and word, silent and focused, you never know the intensity of the feelings of friendship that they bear to someone; but you can feel the immensity of hatred. When the fog of hatred has taken control of the English will, then you know that he will not tire, he will strain with all his strength, he will pursue the same goal in all ways: the downing of the opponent.

Today's war is a historical conflict between English imperialism and German imperialism. And two rebels collide, two huge forces have engaged in battle, a battle that should not be summarized only at the battle front line, but continues everywhere, to recruit allies, to destroy alliances.

One trembles at the thought of the proportions of this battle with material and spiritual, military and political fronts, seen and unseen. A formidable military potential, in battle with a formidable economic potential, a terrible battle, a battle of extermination.

Who can predict the outcome of this clash of forces?

It would only seem that we will have an innovation of methods.

As England pursues the moral dissociation of German resistance—through this deliberate peace offer addressed to the German people, not the German government—it is to be hoped that the civilian population will be spared bombing, and instead of explosives, will receive manifestos designed to thwart the censors. , to animate the hypothetical discontent of the population against the government.

At least with that to console poor humanity, so that the unarmed, the elderly, women and children are safe from air attacks. We feel a pang of heart when we have come to formulate such timid wishes: to wait for a flimsy protection for humanity to emerge from an act of political tactics...

The war will be lasting. We remember chapters from history: the seven-year, thirty-year, one-hundred-year war. They seemed to us strange inventions, almost the stuff of legend. Who knows if we will not be given the sentence of such an experience?...

The war will be long lasting...

But as we all prepare when a long winter is announced, so let's organize ourselves for our long neutral expectation. With our souls torn by the tragic absurdity of the show, we will keep all the strict discipline that the times impose on us. No one is sure of anyone or anything; hence, the necessity of a straining of all labor powers.

Let's double the work, let's produce as much as possible, and from the yield of the work let's increase the military potential.

Neutrality is guaranteed by the war potential of your army, it is guaranteed by a severe national discipline, it is guaranteed by the seriousness of the understanding of these terrible times. Come on - and in everything let's think exclusively from the perspective of Romanian interests!...⁴⁰

The rebuke of human conscience

Some news about the atrocities committed by the Germans in Poland were published - obviously, in the natural struggle between the telegraph agencies of the countries at war.

⁴⁰ Idem, *Strict national discipline*, în Ibidem, XII, nr. 4.161, September, 11, 1939, p. 1.

But the Germans did not remain indifferent, and wanted to give an immediate denial, through the testimony of an American journalist sent to the spot. The German press reacted violently against the fabrications intended to dishonor the German people. But in this prompt reaction, in the tumult of indignation caused by the statements of foreign telegraphic agencies, we see a different psychology emerging, a different conception of war.

No one has the courage to present himself in the armor of cynical brutality; no one bothers to give the force that accent of inhumanity, that wild unleashing meant to create an atmosphere of horror.

Let us not forget that we are in the fourteenth day of the war, and no capital has been bombed, no city reduced to a few smoking ruins. Naturally, every country entered into the war - as well as neutral countries - is mentally prepared for any sinister attempt. The citizens drive around with gas protection masks, they know the shelters where they can take refuge immediately in case of an alarm, they have the agility of their movements because they have done exercises, but so far there has been no need for passive defense instructions.

Without any record, without having established a prior agreement, all the belligerent countries sought to avoid the bombing of the cities. The aviation kept its strictly military objectives, it refrained from raining on defenseless cities quantities of explosives intended to mutilate poor human beings.

It would have been shameful bravery, it would have been an act of criminal cowardice, an unnecessary loss of courage of those pilots who would have faced all the risks, in order to machine-gun the peaceful population from the heights.

And it seems that we are allowed to hope for a finalization of this procedure not imposed by any pact, but a simple, spontaneous compulsion of consciences, a simple confession of another human conception.

It is true that no people is pierced by hatred, no one has set out to fight driven by a wild impulse, ready to commit the most terrible acts, ready to burden their conscience with all the crimes, in order to quench a terrible thirst for revenge.

Troops fight out of duty; the momentum of hostile starts is missing. You get the impression that everyone realizes the immense evil in which they are forced to participate.

There are acts of bravery, there are tens of thousands of unknown heroisms; every army can enumerate its legitimations of a pride—but all these valors cannot testify to a tempestuous elan, an impetuous outpouring of hatred in acts of fearful ferocity. It is not only the concern to preserve a humane demeanor, there is also the fear of public opinion in all countries, which remained neutral. Every war has an end. No matter how strong a country is, it cannot afford the luxury of turning the whole world against it. But this fear of practicing the policy of provocation is not determined only by war, that is, it does not suit anyone to increase their battle fronts, to have nine battle fronts, but much more the countries are afraid of the hatreds that could provoke, for the day when the war would end.

And the bravest people toil and the most warlike secretly comfort the hope of the quiet days of peace.

The mechanical conditions of modern warfare put individual qualities on the back burner, the value of the machine being decisive. The most skilled pilot, a frenzy of dangers, a challenger of distances, will not be able to assert all these attributes of courage in an aerial battle, if his plane only flies at a speed of 400 kilometers per hour and the opponent's at 500 km. However, this embarrassing subordination of man to the machine - his personal value being dependent on the machine - cannot stimulate warlike passions; the man feels like an appendage, he is humiliated...

The will of heroic affirmation, in modern war, finds its field very limited; everything appears as a competition between brands, a clash of patents. Man is more heroic when he watches the attack than when he gives it. In such conditions, peace is a harbor towards which his whole being aspires, and each country thinks especially about the relations it could have, after the war is over, with the other countries.

Let's not forget that today's war will grind a lot of energies, it will exhaust the moral powers as well as the material powers of each participant. When the war is over, no one will be strong enough to scare anyone. Then he will find out, in any country, what remained neutral for the entire duration, the dispositions of opinion that will be determined during the war.

No one has the courage to sow the horror, because no one imagines that victory can ensure his impunity through a formidable reaction of public opinion. The care of the atmosphere that he could create through thoughtless gestures, through acts of revolting atrocities, creates restraint, reduces the destructive starts that could germinate in some instincts.

There is one more aspect: the more the destructive power of man-made machines increases, the more (through a kind of striving for balance) the human sensitivity of the armies participating in the war increases. And nowhere are those roars of warlike enthusiasm recorded, that collective delirium that forms the introduction to the heroic symphony.

You feel an acceptance of a tragic necessity.

For the first time since the beginning, people hate war - not as a consequence of years of hardship, of misery, of crushing all the jolts of excitement.

This war didn't start with just a piece of bread, but it started without even being able to find enthusiasm. Something gray, cold, desolate, defines this war. But this restraint from horrors, this human rectification of machines of a sinister perfection, this housekeeping of the civilian population, indicates a sense of responsibility before a tribunal of human conscience, which exists above artillery duels, flights of bombing planes.

It had a profoundly human meaning, the indignation with which the German press rejected the slanderous accusations regarding the bombing of the famous church in Czestochowa, where the miracle-working icon of the Black Madonna is located.

In the face of technical perfection, the human conscience begins to rise in reproach⁴¹.

Soviet Russia and Poland

Soviet Russia maintained impeccable neutrality throughout the conflict between Germany and Poland. In no way were the Polish armies embarrassed in their operations

the fear of a threat from the east, which would have forced the supreme command to detach units to strengthen the border from Soviet Russia. The attitude of strict neutrality of the U.S.S.R. it made it easier for Poland to oppose the totality of the forces in the war with Germany. What no one expected happened: that the Polish army allowed itself to be continuously maneuvered and, cautiously avoiding a decisive battle, pushed the retreat until it reached the border of Soviet Russia (U.S.S.R.). However, the situation required an examination by the Soviet government.

⁴¹ Idem, *The rebuke of the human conscience*, in *Ibidem*, XII, nr. 4.165, September, 15, 1939, p. 1.

During the German-Soviet negotiations, as well as on the occasion of Mr. von Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow, the line of Germany's claims against Poland was fixed on the map. But, through the continuous retreat of the Polish army, through the destruction of the resistance front, the German army in pursuit of the same Polish army far exceeded the line established in Moscow.

In the German-Soviet non-aggression pact there is a clause that provides for consultations in case the interests of one of the two countries are affected. The government in Moscow tasked its military attaché in Berlin to clarify Germany's intentions, who made it clear that only strictly military considerations compel it to cross the established line, because when in the west it has to deal with the Franco-English front, it cannot leave in behind her a strong and intact Polish army and she is forced to continue pursuing the Polish army, if necessary even to the Russian front.

Obviously, the German point of view related to the military situation was just; that is why Moscow sought to examine the new situation created by the Polish army's inability to resist in order to conclude a stable front, which would allow the rear reorganization of a State life. However, according to the approximate calculations of the Soviet government, 2,000,000 Polish soldiers, accompanied by several million refugees, would cross the Soviet border, invading the fortified area, from which even the native population was removed.

These were the two interests whose conciliation formed the objective of the negotiations carried out by the Soviet military attaché in Berlin with the heads of the German army.

Back in Moscow, the Soviet military attaché brought the German proposals. Based on these proposals, Germany accepts the Soviet thesis to occupy the regions populated by Belarusians and Ukrainians, in order to bring peace and pacification and to be able to facilitate the formation of a protection region for refugees.

But the Soviet government insisted that this action could not be interpreted as a denial of neutrality, instead of being taken for what it is, free access for the Polish army to be disarmed and interned, that is, to create a area for sheltering the defeated Polish army and refugees.

What must be emphasized is that both Germany and Soviet Russia are in favor of maintaining an independent Polish State, a state that will be interspersed between the border of Germany and Soviet Russia. Of course,

the parts claimed by Germany and the parts from Ukraine and Belarus will be broken up from the Poland of yesteryear.

For us, what is of overwhelming importance is the care shown by the Soviet government not to interpret its attitude as a reflexive gesture towards the collapse of the Polish state. As long as there was a legal government, Soviet Russia respected the treaties that existed between it and Poland.

The attitude of Soviet Russia and both the note delivered to the Polish ambassador in Moscow and the note sent by the Soviet government to all the States that have relations with the Union of Soviet Republics, as well as the speech given on Radio-Moscow by Mr. Molotov, the president of the Council of People's Commissars, cannot be overturned. and people's commissar for foreign affairs, affirms the same firm will to prevent upheavals. Soviet Russia did not violate its neutrality, it acted in the logical line of its interests only when "the Polish state and its government effectively ceased to exist."

This action, preceded by all the clarifications intended to remove even the possibility of interpreting a denial of attitude, as a strengthening, as a relief of the Soviet policy, was the note declaring that "it will observe the policy of neutrality towards all countries and Germany and Italy and England and France, as well as towards neutral countries like Finland, Romania, Bulgaria, etc."

There could not be a better confirmation of the policy of neutrality that Romania has established.

The attitude so blatant in its neutral assertions, of Soviet Russia, implies on our part a more frequent direct connection with Moscow. And the change made in the last few days, by sending Mr. Gheorghe Davidescu to Moscow, indicates a natural accentuation of relations with a State that, like Romania, observes the policy of neutrality. A sense of nuanced foresight defines our policy, which legitimizes a particular calmness and finding the normal rhythm.

For the ramblings of all nonsense, I recommend only one word: CONSPIRACY⁴².

⁴² Idem, *Soviet Russia and Polish*, în *Ibidem*, XII, nr. 4.169, September, 19, 1939, p. 1.

European responsibilities

The article in "Popolo d'Italia" and the speech delivered in front of the fascist leaders in Bologna correspond to the same need to give due relief to Italian politics. This policy of anxious vigilance, of non-intervention in the conflict, of continuous efforts to stop the development of the conflict whose catastrophic consequences for European civilization he sees, is the exclusive work of Duke Mussolini.

A profoundly realistic intelligence, refractory to the chimeras that often serve to cover precise interests; a political spirit with a rare power of scrutinizing the future, Duke Mussolini believes that he can still remove that huge clash of forces on the Western front. He thinks logically, this pacification is necessary to save Europe from a terrible desolation.

The intervention was determined by the situation created by the rapid liquidation of Poland and the intervention of Soviet Russia, which occupied two thirds of the territory of the former Polish State.

Let us examine the Italian point of view.

As long as there was (even for a small space), a Polish government, an army continuing to maintain a line of resistance, England and France were bound to defend Poland, continuing the war with Germany. However, it happened (against all expectations), not only the defeat of the Polish army and the evaporation of the government, but also the entry of Soviet Russia, which agreed with Germany to divide Poland, even delimiting its borders. By nothing, Soviet Russia did not show the intention to consider this provisional occupation, when, apart from the mobilization of 100 divisions in Poland, the organization of the territory to become an integral part of Soviet Russia began. Sovietization has already begun in the agricultural regions, which is a definitive indication. However, England and France want to restore Poland to the borders it had before September 1. It could only be idealized, admitting a final defeat of Germany, than to continue the war also against Soviet Russia which occupies two thirds of Poland. Up to this day no act has taken place on the part of the two great guarantor powers, except the Maisky-Halifax meeting, during which the various aspects of the present situation were examined at length, Mr. Maisky promising Lord Halifax to take immediate contact with his government and to answer in short order its question regarding the future attitude of Soviet Russia. But no summons was formulated, the point of view of the territorial integrity of Poland was not decisively raised,

everything remained confused, in a tragic imprecision for the Poles. Or - writes "Popolo d'Italia", under the direct inspiration of Duke Mussolini -, "the guarantees were given to the State in its entirety. They were, in other words, addressed to any threat and any danger, they were made for the intangibility of Poland since Versailles".

But you cannot have two attitudes: to carry the war to the end with one of the occupiers of Poland, and to ignore the presence of the other.

Hence the formulation of Duke Mussolini:

"The governments in Paris and London, out of a wise intention not to widen the conflict, have so far not reacted to the fait accompli of the Soviet Union; but by acting in this way, they compromised their moral justification to tend to the revocation of Germany's fait accompli".

Hence the Duke's statement to use these moments when "the armed masses have not yet met".

Naturally, the Italian point of view could not be shared by England and France, because it would mean devaluing the guarantees given or what they want, given to another State.

That is why Duke Mussolini's call cannot be heard.

Interesting to note is Italy's strict logic, which places the war within the most paradoxical narrowness. It is an endless war; it is an absurd war in that victory can no longer tempt any of the parties, because a decision can only be expected from the grinding over time of the powers in battle. However, the grinding of the forces is done almost in the same proportion, and in the final, the difference is very small.

If the war continues, given the need to save prestige, "a peace based on German victories would mean a dishonorable peace. It would be a peace that would certainly allow new aggression and new war", writes the "Daily Herald".

Italy has fixed a clear position of determined neutrality: "It responds to our national interests, our political agreements and pacts, as well as the desire of all peoples, including the German people, to at least localize the conflict", declared Duke Mussolini. It is in this repetition of the desire to localize the conflict that proof of a sense of European responsibility dominates Duke Mussolini's political sensibility. Italy facilitated the maintenance of large sectors of peace, but however tight the logic of Duke Mussolini's judgment may be, it will not be able to determine a stop to the continuation of the war on the Western front. Due to his neutral position, not being engaged in a decisive measurement of military forces, Duke

Mussolini can have a calm judgment, can scrutinize with lucidity the fatal consequences of this war.

What dominates in judging the situation are not the present relations, but the future relations, the social-political topography of tomorrow's Europe. Rationalism indicates a sudden braking, the courage to examine the dramatic data of a new situation, as it emerges from the ruins of Poland. He who thinks about tomorrow, that tomorrow of tragic fatal convulsions after every war - cannot help but find in Italy's attitude the echo of his own fears.

In a Europe ravaged by passions, Italy keeps the balance of right judgment, that decency that many lack.

Repeating some truths can sometimes also lead to some rediscovery of common sens⁴³.

⁴³ Idem, *European responsibilities*, în *Ibidem*, XII, nr. 4.177, September, 27, 1939, p. 1.